P. v. Chambers

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Filed 1/10/07 P. v. Chambers CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DARLENE LYNNE CHAMBERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
C052245
(Super. Ct. No.
CM022702)
Defendant Darlene Lynne Chambers entered a negotiated plea
of no contest to willfully evading a pursuing peace officer, and
she admitted having a prior serious felony conviction and having
served three prior, separate prison terms. The trial court
sentenced her to an aggregate term of nine years in prison (the
upper term of three years, doubled to six years pursuant to the
“three strikes law,” plus three years for the prior prison term
enhancements).

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On appeal, defendant contends her upper term sentence
violates Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d
403] (hereafter Blakely). We disagree and shall affirm the
judgment.
FACTS
Just after noon on March 11, 2005, a deputy sheriff saw
defendant in a car parked in the driveway of a home in Paradise,
California. The deputy knew defendant “was ‘a wanted absconding
parolee.’” Defendant tucked her head down after the deputy
approached and called out her name. When the deputy told her to
get out of the vehicle, defendant said: “‘That’s not going to
happen.’” She put the vehicle in gear and drove onto the public
roadway. With a patrol car in pursuit, defendant fled at speeds
reaching 80 to 90 miles per hour. She caused a minor traffic
collision by failing to yield to traffic, and she passed
numerous vehicles at blind curves or by crossing double yellow
lines. Defendant then turned onto southbound Highway 99, but
got off at an exit. After driving through a red light, she
drove back onto southbound Highway 99 and exceeded 118 miles
per hour as she passed many vehicles, forcing many to move to
the shoulder of the roadway. Defendant did not stop even after
driving over a spike strip north of Gridley. Instead, she drove
through the town at a high rate of speed, “failing to yield at
all stop lights and failing to obey the designated traffic laws
in the city.” With her left tires going flat, defendant reduced
her speed to between 70 and 80 miles per hour as she continued
south on Highway 99. Defendant drove over another spike strip,

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but continued to drive as her left side tires disintegrated to
the rims. She finally stopped when she lost control of her
vehicle four miles north of Yuba City.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296,
invalidates the statutory method used by California trial judges
to impose an upper term, thereby invalidating her sentence. The
People retort that defendant forfeited her claim because she did
not raise a Blakely objection in the trial court. Assuming,
without deciding, that defendant did not forfeit her claim by
failing to object at sentencing, her argument fails.
Defendant concedes we are bound by the California Supreme
Court’s holding that our state’s sentencing scheme--including
the procedure for selecting an upper term--does not violate
Blakely. (People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1261-1264
(hereafter Black); Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Thus, she raises the issue solely
“to preserve it for federal court review.”
Not only does the holding in Black defeat defendant’s claim
of error, the contention fails for another reason. Applying the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United
States Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S.
466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435]) (hereafter Apprendi) that other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact increasing the penalty for
a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be tried to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 490 [147 L.Ed.2d at
p. 455].) For this purpose, the statutory maximum is the maximum

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sentence a court could impose based solely on facts reflected by
a jury’s verdict or admitted by the defendant. Therefore, when
a sentencing court’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence
depends upon additional fact findings, there is a right to a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the additional facts.
(Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [159 L.Ed.2d at pp. 413-
414].)
One of the reasons the trial court gave for imposing the
upper term is defendant’s prior criminal convictions. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) As we have noted, the rules
of Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to a prior conviction used
to increase the penalty for a crime. Since one valid factor in
aggravation is sufficient to expose defendant to the upper term
(People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433), her sentence
did not violate the rules of Apprendi and Blakely.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SCOTLAND , P.J.
I concur:
DAVIS , J.
I concur in the result:
NICHOLSON , J.

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