P. v. Khalji

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Filed 12/16/05 P. v. Khalji CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SHOAIB KHALJI,
Defendant and Appellant.
C047212
(Super. Ct. No. TF31491A)
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant Shoaib
Khalji pled no contest to first degree residential burglary.
(Pen. Code, § 459.)1 After the denial of defendant’s motion to
withdraw his plea, the trial court placed him on probation for
five years and ordered him to serve 300 days in county jail.
The court also ordered defendant to pay direct victim
restitution in the amount of $12,100 (the estimated value of the
items reported stolen) plus an undetermined amount for a jewelry
box and its contents.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause and
defendant appeals, contending: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea; (2) the
trial court erred in not stopping the hearing on the motion to
withdraw his plea and sua sponte conducting a Marsden2 hearing;
and (3) the direct victim restitution was improper because he
was not specifically advised he would be ordered to pay it under
the terms of the plea agreement. We shall affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 18, 2004, the day this matter was set for a
jury trial, defendant appeared with retained counsel and entered
a plea of no contest to residential burglary. The trial court
recited the terms of the plea agreement to defendant as follows:
“THE COURT: [¶] . . . [¶] “Mr. Khalji, this charge carries
a maximum of six years in prison. The agreement is that I will
not give you more than the low term, which is two years.
“Now, I’ve had an opportunity to discuss the facts of the
case with your attorney and the district attorney, and I have
indicated that based on what I had heard this is more than
likely a probation case, not a prison case. However, if it
turns out there are things that I don’t know about, I still have
the option of giving you the two years or low term in state
prison.
“Is that your understanding of what we’re doing today?”
2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

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“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Other than what I have just said, has anyone
made any threats or promises to get you to enter this plea?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“THE COURT: Have you had enough time to discuss your case
with your attorney, including your constitutional rights, the
elements of this charge, possible defenses that you have, and
the consequences of your plea?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Have you had enough time with her?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Are there any questions that I can answer for
you before we proceed?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“THE COURT: Now, as I indicated, the maximum is six years.
The promise is that you will receive no more than two years, and
you may receive probation. If you are placed on probation, that
will be formal probation for a period of five years, and you can
be ordered to serve up to a year in the county jail.
“Do you understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
After further advisements, including defendant’s right to a
jury trial, presentation of evidence, testify, and confront and
cross-examine witnesses (and defendant expressly waiving those
rights), the trial court asked defendant how he pled to
residential burglary. Defendant replied, “No contest.” The
court then specifically asked, “You understand, sir, that a no

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contest plea is the same as a guilty plea?” Defendant
responded, “Yes.”
The prosecutor placed the following factual statement on
the record at the entry of plea: “On October 14, 2002, in the
City of Tracy, . . . between the hours of 11:15 a.m. and
1:30 p.m., the victim, Jawid . . . Razawi[’s] home was broken
into. The subject entered the home by removing the screen and
going through[,] then[,] an open window. Once inside the house,
a number of electronics and jewelry [were] taken. The Tracy
Police Department did an investigation. Several latent prints
were recovered at the point of entry in an area that . . . we
believe that only the person who broke into the house could have
placed these fingerprints. Those fingerprints were tested both
by the Tracy Police Department and by the Department of Justice
and found to belong to the defendant.”
The probation officer’s presentence report recommending
state prison was filed on March 16, 2004. Thereafter, defendant
moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that he pled no contest
“to avoid undue stress and hardship placed upon his immediate
and extended family.”
During defendant’s presentation of evidence at the hearing,
defendant, age 22, testified that he had been in this country
since 1992 and has no problem with English. He pled to a
misdemeanor two or three years earlier and was placed on
informal probation. He had appeared in court over 20 times on
the instant case.

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In the few months preceding his no contest plea,
defendant’s mother’s health was failing. His mother had
collapsed during the change in plea hearing. His father had
been ill and out of the country in Afghanistan. Defendant’s
counsel had contacted the probation officer and ascertained that
the officer had no objection to defendant leaving the country to
assist the United States government in Afghanistan. Defendant,
however, had since found out that they would not accept his help
because of his felony. Defendant had not seen his aunts or
uncles for the past two years and could not attend his
grandfather’s funeral because there was a restraining order
against him.
Defendant testified that when he entered his plea of no
contest, it was his understanding he would avoid a prison
sentence and his attorney told him the matter could be expunged
after two and a half years. Defendant further testified that he
had since been getting pressure from his family to withdraw his
plea and prove his innocence. It was his understanding that no
contest meant he had a chance to prove his innocence within the
two and a half years. It was also his understanding that he
would receive no kind of time at all. And although defendant
remembered the court asking him if anyone had made any other
promises and that he responded, “No,” he testified there was a
promise that he would do no time and that within two and a half
years, the matter would be expunged. He got this understanding
from his attorney. His attorney had originally told him he
would receive no prison time but, when he later found out that

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prison and jail were two different things, his attorney said he
would do no time at all.
Defendant remembered some, but not all, of the pre-plea
colloquy between him and the court. He did recall the court
asking him if he understood that the promise was he would
receive no more than two years and may receive probation and
that if he received probation, he could be ordered to serve up
to a year in county jail, and defendant did recall that he
responded, “Yes.” Defendant stated, however, that it was not
his understanding at that time. Instead, his “understanding”
was that he was in a very bad situation, his mother was dying
outside, his father was in Afghanistan, his brothers and sisters
worked at home, it was raining outside, and he had only 24 hours
to “bring everyone in.” He did not, however, explain this
stress to the judge.
With respect to the court’s advisement that a no contest
plea is the same as a guilty plea, defendant did not
specifically recall that advisement and explained that that was
not his understanding. He explained that he was probably not
listening to the judge at the time because he was concerned
about his mother. He was not thinking properly; he just wanted
to conclude the proceedings. Afterward, he asked his attorney
if the pleas were the same thing and his attorney told him, “No,
I would never have anybody plead guilty.” Defendant’s
understanding of “no contest” was “not guilty.”
There was also considerable testimony from several
individuals regarding the merits of the underlying charge.

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After hearing from counsel, the trial court denied the motion to
withdraw the plea. The court explained that, while there were
intense family issues and cultural nuances involved in the case,
the court did not find that defendant was suffering from any
stress that would override his judgment.
With respect to defendant’s claims of misunderstanding, the
trial court found: “He has testified that he believed there was
no jail. The transcript is very clear that the Court informed
him he could get up to two years in prison or up to a year in
the county jail if he was granted probation. He testified he
believed this would be dismissed after two and a half years.
There is no indication in the plea transcript even though the
Court did inquire whether any other promises or threats had been
made to him. He indicates he would later have an opportunity to
prove his innocence. I don’t know where that has come from,
that is no where [sic] in the record. And that he thought no
contest meant not guilty, yet the Court specifically stated I
would allow the defendant to withdraw his previously entered
plea of not guilty and the Court advised him that no contest was
the same as guilty.
“Mr. Khalji is a very articulate, obviously intelligent
young man. I don’t see anything that would make me believe that
he is not capable of understanding.”

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DISCUSSION
I
Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw His Plea
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw the plea. He argues the motion should have
been granted on the ground that he was confused or mistaken
about the consequences of his plea.
Section 1018 provides, in pertinent part, “On application
of the defendant at any time before judgment . . . the court
may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to
be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.”
“‘[M]istake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the
exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a
guilty plea. But good cause must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Quesada (1991)
230 Cal.App.3d 525, 538.) “[T]he granting of such a motion made
by a defendant who entered his plea with counsel is
discretionary with the court and we will not disturb the trial
court’s ruling in the absence of a clear demonstration of abuse
of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Defendant argues the trial court “applied an erroneous
legal standard” because it focused on the advisements given to
defendant by the court, rather than the alleged conversations
defendant had with his counsel. We find no error in the trial
court’s analysis.
In a contested motion to withdraw a plea, the trial court
is the trier of fact responsible for judging the credibility of

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the witnesses or affiants. The court must resolve conflicting
factual questions and draw the resulting inferences. (People v.
Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636.) Where two conflicting
inferences may be drawn from the evidence, a reviewing court
must accept the one supporting the trial court’s order. (People
v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660, 667.)
Here, the trial court did not believe defendant’s testimony
that he was confused or did not understand the terms of the plea
agreement at the time he entered his plea. It matters not
whether the trial court disbelieved defendant regarding the
substance of the alleged conversations defendant had with his
counsel or whether the trial court believed defendant understood
the terms and consequences of his plea despite any conversations
he may have had with counsel. The trial court was not required
to accept defendant’s claim that he was confused, particularly
in light of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Defendant specifically acknowledged that he understood the
plea agreement was a maximum low term of two years in state
prison or five years probation and up to 300 days in the county
jail. Defendant specifically stated that no other promises were
made to get him to enter his plea. Defendant specifically
stated that he understood and gave up his rights to a public
trial by judge or jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
to present evidence on his own behalf, to subpoena witnesses and
testify on his own behalf. Defendant specifically acknowledged
that he understood that by entering his plea, he was “in essence
convicting [himself] by [his] own statement.” After defendant

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stated he understood and gave up those rights, the court stated
it was “allow[ing] the defendant to withdraw his previously
entered plea of not guilty” and defendant pled no contest.
Defendant then stated he understood that “a no contest plea is
the same as a guilty plea.”
Moreover, the court’s finding that defendant lacked
credibility with respect to his claim that he misunderstood the
terms and consequences of his plea is also supported by his
written acknowledgment of his legal rights, which he signed over
a year before entering his no contest plea. The written
acknowledgment, entitled, “LEGAL RIGHTS OF A DEFENDANT CHARGED
WITH A FELONY,” expressly states: “(c) Nolo Contendre (No
Contest) a nolo contendre plea has the same effect as a guilty
plea and will be accepted by the court as a guilty plea.” The
form also states: “A felony conviction could result in a
sentence to state prison.” In bold type, the form cautioned,
“DO NOT SIGN THIS STATEMENT UNLESS YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND IT.”
Defendant signed directly under that warning, indicating: “I
represent to the court that I have read and fully understand the
foregoing statement.”
The trial court found defendant to be “a very articulate,
obviously intelligent young man” who admittedly had no problem
with English. The court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting defendant’s claim that he was misinformed about the
terms and consequences of his plea and denying the motion to
withdraw the plea.

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II
Failure to Conduct a Marsden Hearing
Defendant argues the trial court was required to initiate a
hearing outside the presence of the prosecutor, as provided
under People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, for requests to
relieve appointed counsel, when he testified during the hearing
on the motion to withdraw his plea that his attorney “misadvised
him regarding his plea bargain and made inappropriate promises
regarding the outcome of his case.” We disagree.
Defendant was represented by retained, not appointed,
counsel. The rights and procedures granted under Marsden do not
apply to retained counsel. Unlike instances involving appointed
counsel, a defendant who retains counsel may discharge his
attorney for any reason, as long as it will not result in
“significant prejudice” to the defendant and is “timely.”
(People v. Lara (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 139, 152-153; People v.
Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983-984.)
Moreover, even if Marsden did apply to retained counsel, a
trial court has “no obligation to initiate the Marsden inquiry
sua sponte. A trial court’s duty to conduct the inquiry arises
‘only when the defendant asserts directly or by implication that
his counsel’s performance has been so inadequate as to deny him
his constitutional right to effective counsel.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776, 787, italics
omitted, quoting People v. Molina (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 544,
549.) A request for substitution of counsel under Marsden must
be clear and unequivocal. (People v. Rivers (1993) 20

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Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051, fn. 7.) “Although no formal motion is
necessary, there must be ‘at least some clear indication by
defendant that he wants a substitute attorney.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157, quoting People v.
Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8.) Here, defendant never
indicated he wanted a different attorney. Nor was there a
direct assertion or a clear implication of performance so
inadequate so as to be unconstitutionally ineffective, since the
trial court did not believe, nor was it required to believe,
that defendant had been misled by his counsel. Thus, the court
had no duty to conduct a further inquiry.
III
Direct Victim Restitution
Finally, defendant contends the $12,100 victim restitution
order impermissibly exceeded the punishment specified in the
plea agreement. Defendant appears to make two analytically
distinct but related arguments: (1) he was not advised of the
direct consequences of his plea; and (2) the plea agreement was
violated. (See People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1020.)
Accordingly, he argues the victim restitution must be stricken
or, alternatively, he must be afforded the opportunity to
withdraw his plea. We conclude the victim restitution was
properly ordered.
Consequences of the Plea
The maximum possible penalty or range of punishment is a
direct consequence of the plea of which the defendant must be
advised. (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592,

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605; People v. Lytle (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1,4.) Defendant
argues the $12,100 victim restitution order was improper because
he was not advised prior to his no contest plea that he would be
required to pay victim restitution. His contention, however, is
belied by the record.
Although the trial court did not advise defendant direct
victim restitution would be a consequence of his conviction
immediately prior to accepting his no contest plea, defendant
was informed of that consequence long before he entered the
plea. On January 13, 2003, as we have noted, defendant signed
the form entitled, “LEGAL RIGHTS OF A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH A
FELONY.” That form expressly stated, “If you are granted
probation, unless the court finds compelling or extraordinary
circumstances to the contrary, you will be ordered to make
restitution (pay damages) to the victim or restitution fund or
do community service in lieu of payment.” In bold type, the
form cautioned, “DO NOT SIGN THIS STATEMENT UNLESS YOU FULLY
UNDERSTAND IT.” Defendant signed directly under that warning,
indicating: “I represent to the court that I have read and
fully understand the foregoing statement.”
This written advisement was sufficient to advise defendant
that direct victim restitution would be a consequence of his
conviction in this case. Defendant was, in fact, granted
probation. Since the court did not find any compelling or
extraordinary reasons not to order the restitution, the court
ordered the victim restitution as defendant was advised. The
fact that defendant was not given the opportunity to do

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community service in lieu of payment did not void the
advisement.
Terms of the Plea Agreement
Generally, the trial court cannot significantly deviate
from the terms of a plea agreement in imposing sentence without
giving the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
(People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1024-1025.) But “the
circumstance that a statutorily mandated consequence of a guilty
plea is not embodied specifically within the terms of a plea
agreement does not signify that imposition of such a consequence
constitutes a violation of the agreement.” (People v. McClellan
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 381; cf. In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342,
357.)
When a victim has suffered an economic loss as a result of
a defendant’s criminal conduct, the trial court must order full
direct victim restitution unless it finds compelling and
extraordinary circumstances for not doing so. (§ 1202.4, subd.
(f).) “The victim’s right to restitution is a constitutional
right.” (People v. Valdez (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1203;
Cal. Const. art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) It may not properly be
made the subject of negotiations. (People v. Valdez, supra, at
p. 1203.)
The trial court properly ordered defendant to pay
restitution to the victim even though defendant’s plea bargain
was silent on the point. (People v. Valdez, supra, 24
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1202-1203.) Thus, the order to pay $12,100
in direct victim restitution does not constitute a violation of

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the parties’ plea agreement. (Ibid.; see also People v.
Campbell (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 825, 829-830.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SIMS , J.
We concur:
BLEASE , Acting P.J.
HULL , J.

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