P. v. Williams

Filed 6/2/20 P. v. Williams CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SAUMAL WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
B299053
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA007720)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Salvatore Sirna, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia Grimm, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Acting Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Nancy Lii Ladner, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________

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Saumal Williams pleaded no contest to one count of second
degree murder and one count of attempted murder. He
challenges an order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1170.95. We affirm. Code references are to
the Penal Code.
I
In 1991, Williams and two others were in a car and pulled
up next to another car. Williams and one of the others fired shots
at two people in the second car, killing one victim and wounding
the other.
A felony complaint for arrest warrant charged Williams
and two codefendants with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a))
and one count of attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). The complaint alleged Williams
personally used a firearm in both offenses (§§ 1203.06, subd.
(a)(1), 12022.5). The complaint also alleged Williams
intentionally inflicted great bodily injury and death as a result of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 12022.55), caused
the death of the murder victim (§ 1203, subd. (e)(10)), and
personally inflicted great bodily injury on the attempted murder
victim (§ 12022.7). The complaint further alleged Williams
committed both offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (2)) and had three prior felony
convictions and served a prior prison term.
Williams pleaded no contest to one count of second degree
murder and one count of attempted willful, deliberate,
premeditated murder. Counsel and Williams stipulated the trial
court could read a police report to determine whether there was a
factual basis for the plea. The trial court accepted Williams’s

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plea and waivers on the record, and found there was a factual
basis for the plea. The court sentenced Williams to concurrent
terms of 15 years to life for the murder count and life for the
attempted murder count, and dismissed the remaining
allegations.
In 2019, Williams filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1170.95. Before the People filed a response, the trial
court found Williams was not entitled to relief as a matter of law
and summarily denied the petition for five reasons. First, “the
court file reflect[ed] that [Williams] was the actual killer.” The
People did not pursue a felony-murder or natural and probable
consequences theory, so section 1170.95 did not apply to
Williams’s murder conviction. Second, section 1170.95 did not
apply to attempted murder, and thus did not apply to Williams’s
attempted murder conviction. The trial court’s third, fourth, and
fifth reasons discussed the ways Senate Bill 1437 and section
1170.95 violated different provisions of the California
Constitution.
Williams appealed.
II
We give context to section 1170.95, under which Williams
filed his petition for resentencing. The Legislature enacted
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) to “amend
the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
SB 1437 amended section 188 to state a principal to murder must

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act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).) It amended section 189 to state a defendant
charged under the felony-murder theory must be the actual
killer, a direct aider and abettor, or a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
SB 1437 also added section 1170.95, which provides: “A
person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court
that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts” under certain circumstances. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
Three conditions must apply: (1) the People filed a complaint,
information, or indictment against the petitioner allowing the
People to proceed under a felony-murder or natural and probable
consequences theory; (2) a jury convicted the petitioner of first or
second degree murder at trial, or the petitioner accepted a plea
offer instead of a trial at which the jury could have convicted the
petitioner of first or second degree murder; and (3) the petitioner
could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of
the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Ibid.)
Under section 1170.95, “The [trial] court shall review the
petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of this
section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall
appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. . . . If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief,
the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1170.95, subd.
(c).)

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III
Williams first argues he made a prima facie showing
section 1170.95 applied to him. He argues the trial court erred
by summarily denying the petition without appointing counsel
and allowing the parties to brief the issue. These arguments fail
because the record showed Williams was the actual killer and the
People did not pursue a felony-murder or natural and probable
consequences theory. The trial court properly found Williams
ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.95 and was not
required to appoint counsel or allow briefing.
A
Williams did not make a prima facie showing section
1170.95 applied to him.
The plain language of section 1170.95 is clear. Only those
“convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory” may file petitions with the
sentencing court to vacate their murder convictions. (§ 1170.95,
subd. (a).)
We follow the line of cases holding the trial court may
summarily deny a section 1170.95 petition for resentencing
without appointing counsel for the petitioner if the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Verdugo
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 329–330, review granted Mar. 18,
2020, S260493 (Verdugo) [after a threshold review of the record of
conviction, the trial court may dismiss any section 1170.95
petition where the petitioners were not convicted of murder based
on a charging document permitting the prosecution to proceed
under a felony-murder or natural and probable consequences
doctrine]; People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1137,
review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 (Lewis) [record of

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conviction was sufficient to determine petitioner did not make a
prima facie showing under section 1170.95]; People v. Cornelius
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 58, review granted Mar. 18, 2020,
S260410 [trial court may deny section 1170.95 petition without
appointing counsel where jury implicitly found petitioner was the
actual killer].)
Williams’s plea did not convict him under a felony-murder
or natural and probable consequences theory. The felony
complaint alleged Williams was the actual killer, not an aider or
abettor. It alleged Williams personally used a firearm in both the
murder and attempted murder. It did not mention other
potential felonies. The complaint also alleged Williams
intentionally inflicted great bodily injury and death by
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. Further, Williams
pleaded no contest to second degree murder, admitting he
“willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought” murdered
the victim. These facts bar Williams from seeking relief under
section 1170.95. (See Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 330 [a
petitioner who admitted being the actual killer as part of a plea is
ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as a matter of law].) The
record itself contradicts Williams’s argument that nothing in the
record shows he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Williams notes the trial court “did not specify what it relied
upon in the court file to make[] its determination that Williams
was the actual killer.” He then argues it was improper for the
trial court to rely on the probation report to deny his
resentencing petition because the report contains hearsay
statements and cannot be “part of the ‘record of conviction.’” This
argument is speculative because, as Williams states, the trial
court’s order denying his petition did not specify the documents

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on which it relied. Further, the felony complaint and record
transcript of Williams’s plea were sufficient to deny Williams’s
petition without the probation report.
Williams also contends the firearm enhancements in the
felony complaint do not exclude him from section 1170.95 relief
because they “do not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Williams fired the fatal shot.” He argues the trial court must
hold an evidentiary hearing where the People must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt he is ineligible for resentencing. These
arguments miss the mark. The felony complaint charged him
with murder. He pleaded no contest to murder, admitting he
“willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought” killed the
victim. Williams thus did not make a prima facie showing
section 1170.95 applied to him, and was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)
In a letter submitted after briefing, Williams requests we
consider People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 (Offley). This
case does not apply to Williams. In Offley, the trial court
summarily denied two codefendants’ section 1170.95 resentencing
petitions on the ground both defendants received sentence
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). (Id. at p.
597.) The Court of Appeal reversed the denial and held an
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) was
insufficient on its own to justify summarily denying a
resentencing petition because it did not establish as a matter of
law a defendant acted with malice aforethought. (Ibid.) In
contrast, the trial court did not deny Williams’s resentencing
petition on this ground. Williams did not receive a sentencing
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The felony
complaint alleged Williams was the actual killer and Williams

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admitted he “willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought”
murdered the victim. The trial court was within its rights to
deny the petition summarily, without briefing.
B
The trial court properly dismissed Williams’s petition
without appointing counsel.
Williams contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
deny his petition without appointing counsel because this process
is a “special proceeding” governed by statute, and section 1170.95
requires the trial court to appoint counsel if the petitioner so
requests. This argument fails. A trial court need not appoint
counsel if petitioners have not made a prima facie showing they
are entitled to relief under section 1170.95. (Verdugo, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at pp. 332–333.) The duty to appoint counsel does
not arise unless and until the trial court makes the threshold
determination the petitioner falls within the statute’s provisions.
(Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140.) Because the trial court
properly found Williams did not make a prima facie showing he
was entitled to relief under section 1170.95, it properly denied
the petition without appointing counsel.
Williams incorrectly argues the trial court violated his
federal constitutional rights by not appointing counsel. A
sentence reduction under section 1170.95 is purely a state
statutory right. Erroneous denial of that right does not implicate
the federal Constitution. (See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th
19, 29.)
IV
Williams next argues the trial court erred by denying his
section 1170.95 petition as to his attempted murder conviction.
He contends section 1170.95 should apply to attempted murder

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because remedial benefits should extend to lesser included
offenses, relief under SB 1437 is similar to relief under
Proposition 47, which courts have interpreted to apply to crimes
not listed in the statute, and excluding attempted murder from
SB 1437 relief raises equal protection concerns. Two cases from
our district have held SB 1437 does not apply to attempted
murder convictions. We follow suit.
We note a split in authority currently pending before our
Supreme Court. The two cases concluding SB 1437 does not
apply to any attempted murder convictions are People v. Lopez
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1103–1104, review granted
November 13, 2019, S258175 (Lopez) and People v. Munoz (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 738, 743, review granted November 26, 2019,
S258234 (Munoz). Two other cases hold SB 1437 applies to
premeditated attempted murder convictions if the convictions
resulted from a natural and probable consequences theory, but
section 1170.95 relief is limited to certain murder convictions and
excludes those convicted of attempted murder: People v. Medrano
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1015–1016, review granted March
11, 2020, S259948 (Medrano), and People v. Larios (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 956, 968, 970, review granted February 26, 2020,
S259983 (Larios). We note that while courts disagree about
whether the Legislature intended to include attempted murder in
SB 1437, no court has held section 1170.95 provides relief for
petitioners convicted of attempted murder.
We agree with the careful analysis in Lopez and Munoz.
These reasoned cases reject Williams’s arguments. We need not
add to their conclusions that, based on plain language and
legislative history, SB 1437 does not apply to attempted murder
convictions.

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Even if we applied Medrano and Larios, SB 1437 still
would not apply to Williams, because he was not convicted of
attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences
theory. The felony complaint charged Williams with attempted
willful, deliberate, premeditated murder. Williams pleaded no
contest to attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder.
There was no natural and probable consequences theory.
Williams was ineligible for relief. The trial court properly
denied Williams’s petition as to his attempted murder conviction.
V
Because section 1170.95 does not apply to Williams’s
convictions, we do not reach the part of the trial court’s order
regarding its constitutionality.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
BIGELOW, P. J.
STRATTON, J.

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