P. v. Condiff

Filed 5/14/20 P. v. Condiff CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NORMAN LOUIS CONDIFF,
Defendant and Appellant.
B296181
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA051505)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Teri Schwartz, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark S. Givens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda Lopez and Stephanie C. Santoro,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________

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In 2005, Norman Louis Condiff was convicted of first
degree murder, attempted murder, and other crimes committed
to dissuade a witness from testifying against him in court.
In 2019, Condiff filed a petition pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437,
which amended the felony murder rule and eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) A petitioner may seek to
have his murder conviction vacated and be resentenced on any
remaining counts under Penal Code section 1170.95,1 if he had
been convicted of murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court
summarily denied Condiff’s petition.
On appeal, Condiff asserts the trial court erred in denying
his petition without first appointing counsel or giving the parties
the opportunity to file briefing on the petition as required by
section 1170.95. We are persuaded by three recently published
opinions—People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 (Lewis),
People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54 (Cornelius), and
People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 (Verdugo)—that
Condiff’s arguments lack merit. Each of these cases affirmed
summary denial of a section 1170.95 petition without the
appointment of counsel where, as here, the record clearly
indicated the petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. We also determine the Sixth Amendment and due process
concerns do not require the appointment of counsel at this early
stage of the petition. We affirm the order denying relief.
1 All further statutory citations refer to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Condiff, Tyrone Baker, and Robert Fielder were members
of Blood-affiliated street gangs. Condiff had been arrested for
selling marijuana to Jessica R. and faced a 25-years-to-life
sentence due to his prior strikes. He believed she had “snitched”
on him and sought to either dissuade her from testifying against
him in court or kill her to prevent her from doing so.
On November 12, 2002, Condiff and Baker knocked on the
door of Jessica’s apartment, asked if Jessica was home, and
identified themselves as Jessica’s friends in order to conceal their
true motive to kill Jessica. When her uncle said she was not
home, they announced their intent to return and left.
Condiff needed to get to Jessica that night, because his
preliminary hearing was the next day. He decided to modify his
ruse to lure Jessica out into the open by staying behind in the car
while Fielder, Jessica’s friend, went with Baker to her apartment.
He formed a backup plan to kill one or more of Jessica’s relatives
if Jessica was not there. To effectuate his plan, Condiff
instructed Baker to make sure Fielder had a gun. Baker
retrieved guns from the backseat, pulled Fielder out of the car,
and gave him a gun. Baker and Fielder came upon Jessica’s
uncle sitting in the apartment patio area. When the uncle again
said Jessica was not home, the two pulled out concealed guns,
and Baker shot the uncle. The grandmother came outside, and
the two dragged her to the carport area where Fielder shot her.
2 The facts of the underlying crime are taken from our
unpublished opinion, People v. Condiff (Aug. 28, 2007, B186654)
[nonpub. opn.].

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Condiff was convicted by a jury of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); willful, deliberate and premeditated
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2); conspiracy to
commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 3); dissuading a
witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 4); and
conspiracy to dissuade a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd.
(c)(2); count 5). As to count 1, the jury found true the special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while
lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and in furtherance of
criminal street gang activities (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). As to all
counts, the jury found the crimes were committed for the benefit
of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that during
their commission a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). The trial
court found Condiff had suffered two strikes under the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
Condiff was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) for count 1, which was tripled under the Three
Strikes law, plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement. As to
count 2, the trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life as a
third strike, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.
As to counts 3 through 5, the trial court imposed the same
sentence as count 2, but ordered the sentence on count 4 to run
concurrently with count 1 and stayed the sentences on counts 3
and 5 under section 654.
On appeal, Condiff conceded his first degree murder
conviction could be sustained based on the evidence of
premeditation and deliberation. However, he argued there was
insufficient evidence to support the lying-in-wait and gang
special circumstance findings. He also argued the trial court

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committed reversible error by failing sua sponte to instruct on
implied malice second degree murder, a lesser included offense.
Finally, he argued the trial court committed sentencing errors
and erred in imposing a parole revocation fine along with other
fines and fees. We modified the sentence by striking two of the
LWOP penalties and the parole revocation fine, but otherwise
affirmed the judgment.
Six days after it became effective on January 1, 2019,
Condiff filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. In
his petition, Condiff asserted he was entitled to relief because he
was convicted of first degree murder pursuant to the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
neither of which could serve as a basis for a murder conviction
under the new law.
The trial court summarily denied his petition without
prejudice on January 18, 2019, finding Condiff failed to show
entitlement to relief as a matter of law because his murder
conviction was not based on the felony murder rule or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. Instead, “[t]he record
reflects the jury found petitioner aided and abetted the murder of
the victim in count 1 of the information, with the intent to kill.”
Among other things, the jury found Condiff had the intent to kill
when it found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance. The
jury separately found overt acts demonstrating an intent to kill
when it found Condiff guilty of conspiracy to commit murder.
The trial court additionally relied on our unpublished opinion in
which we noted that Condiff conceded his first degree murder
conviction could be sustained based on evidence of premeditation
and deliberation. We further found substantial evidence to

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support the gang and lying-in-wait special circumstances, both
requiring an intent to kill.
Condiff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437
The Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 in 2018 to
“amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, . . . to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) Senate Bill No. 1437
amended section 188 to require that a principal “shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” Section 189
was also amended to limit liability for felony murder if (1) the
“person was the actual killer”; (2) the person was an aider or
abettor in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the
“person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§§ 188, subd.
(a)(3), 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2,
3.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1170.95, which sets
forth the procedure by which a “person convicted of felony murder
or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
To file the petition, all three of the following conditions must be
met: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed

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against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a
trial . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or
second degree murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1)–(3).) The petition shall include a declaration
stating that “he or she is eligible for relief under this section”
based on the three requirements of subdivision (a). (§ 1170.95,
subd. (b)(1)(A).)
If the petition contains all of the required information,
section 1170.95, subdivision (c), discussed more fully below,
describes the procedure by which the court may determine
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief and
issue an order to show cause. Once an order to show cause is
issued, a hearing is held to determine whether to vacate the
murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).)
II. Section 1170.95 Provides For Summary Denial
Condiff asserts the trial court erred when it summarily
denied his petition without appointing counsel or allowing the
parties to brief the matter, as required under section 1170.95.
We disagree.
“When we interpret statutes, giving effect to legislative
purpose is the touchstone of our mission.” (People v. Valencia
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 409.) We must take “the language . . . as it
was passed into law, and [we] must, if possible without doing
violence to the language and spirit of the law, interpret it so as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.” (People v. Garcia
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14.)

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Section 1170.95, subdivision (c), states: “The court shall
review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions
of this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court
shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The prosecutor
shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the
petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30
days after the prosecutor response is served. These deadlines
shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner makes a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.”
Condiff reads section 1170.95, subdivision (c), to set forth
only one prima facie determination, which occurs after
appointment of counsel and briefing by the parties. Condiff
concedes there is a “pro forma preliminary step” to ascertain the
petition is facially sufficient under subdivision (b). “However,
this is merely a cursory review to see that all of the required
information is present in the petition, not a determination of
whether a prima facie case has been made or an evaluation of the
merits of the petition.”
The People contend section 1170.95, subdivision (c),
expressly requires two prima facie determinations, taking into
account the references to it in the first and last sentences.
The People argue Condiff’s interpretation would render the first
sentence of subdivision (c) superfluous. Thus, the People contend
an initial prima facie review decides whether the petitioner falls
within the provisions of section 1170.95, which includes a
determination of whether the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. This occurs before appointment of counsel and

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briefing. A second prima facie determination occurs after
appointment of counsel and briefing.
Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at page 320, Lewis, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at page 1128, and Cornelius, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at page 54 read section 1170.95, subdivision (c) as
the People do. We are persuaded by these cases and adopt their
reasoning.
In Verdugo, the appellant, like Condiff, claimed the trial
court’s role in conducting the initial review of the petition is
simply to determine whether the petition is facially sufficient.
The Verdugo court noted section 1170.95, subdivision (c),
expressly contains two prima facie determinations, a prebriefing
one and a postbriefing one. It concluded the initial prebriefing
prima facie review involves something more than determining
whether the petition is facially sufficient, however. (Verdugo,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 329.) Rather, “[t]he court’s role at
this stage is simply to decide whether the petitioner is ineligible
for relief as a matter of law, making all factual inferences in favor
of the petitioner.” (Ibid.)
In making this determination, the trial court is not limited
to the four corners of the petition. The Verdugo court observed,
“Although subdivision (c) does not define the process by which the
court is to make this threshold determination, subdivisions (a)
and (b) of section 1170.95 provide a clear indication of the
Legislature’s intent. . . . [S]ubdivision (b)(2) directs the court in
considering the facial sufficiency of the petition to access readily
ascertainable information. The same material that may be
evaluated under subdivision (b)(2)—that is, documents in the
court file or otherwise part of the record of conviction that are
readily ascertainable—should similarly be available to the court

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in connection with the first prima facie determination required by
subdivision (c).” (Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 329.)
As the trial court did in this case, the trial court in Verdugo
found the petitioner was not entitled to relief as a matter of law,
and summarily denied the petition because “ ‘the appellate
opinion affirming the petitioner’s conviction and sentence reflects
that the petitioner was convicted as a direct aider and abettor,
with malice aforethought, and not on a theory of felony murder of
any degree or a theory of natural and probable consequences.’ ”
(Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 325.) The Verdugo court
held it was proper for the trial court to consider the unpublished
opinion affirming the petitioner’s convictions to find him
ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. (Verdugo, at p. 333.)
Lewis and Cornelius likewise affirmed a trial court’s summary
denial of a section 1170.95 petition without the appointment of
counsel and briefing. (Cornelius, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 58;
Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138.)
We are persuaded by Verdugo, Lewis, and Cornelius to
affirm the trial court’s summary denial of Condiff’s section
1170.95 petition. The record clearly shows Condiff is ineligible
for relief as a matter of law because Condiff was not convicted of
felony murder or murder under a theory of natural and probable
consequences. Instead, the jury found he acted with intent to kill
in a direct aider and abettor capacity. The jury found true the
lying-in-wait and gang special-circumstance allegations, both of
which require intent to kill. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15), (22).)
Further, Condiff conceded in the previous appeal that his murder
conviction could be sustained based on the evidence of
premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Jurado (2006)
38 Cal.4th 72, 123 [premeditated and deliberated murder

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necessarily included finding defendant had specific intent to
kill].) He does not now repudiate that concession.
We are not convinced by Condiff’s assertion that other
parts of the record which are not currently before this court, such
as the jury instructions or closing arguments, may indicate the
prosecution argued felony murder or murder under a theory of
natural and probable consequences to the jury. Even if the jury
was so instructed, those instructions do not override its true
findings as to the enhancement allegations that require intent to
kill. Based on this record, Condiff was ineligible for relief under
section 1170.95 as a matter of law and the trial court did not err
by summarily denying his petition.
III. Condiff Was Not Entitled to Appointment of Counsel
at the Initial Prima Facie Determination
We also rely on the correct analysis in Verdugo, Lewis, and
Cornelius to reject Condiff’s argument he was entitled to the
appointment of counsel under section 1170.95 at the initial prima
facie determination. All three courts held subdivision (c) of
section 1170.95 does not require appointment of counsel prior to
the trial court’s initial prima facie review. (Verdugo, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140;
Cornelius, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 58.) The Lewis court
explained, “ ‘It would be a gross misuse of judicial resources to
require the issuance of an order to show cause or even
appointment of counsel based solely on the allegations of the
petition, which frequently are erroneous, when even a cursory
review of the court file would show as a matter of law that the
petitioner is not eligible for relief. For example, if the petition
contains sufficient summary allegations that would entitle the
petitioner to relief, but a review of the court file shows the

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petitioner was convicted of murder without instruction or
argument based on the felony murder rule or [the natural and
probable consequences doctrine], . . . it would be entirely
appropriate to summarily deny the petition based on petitioner’s
failure to establish even a prima facie basis of eligibility for
resentencing.’ ” (Lewis, supra, at p. 1138, quoting Couzens et al.,
Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 23:51(H)(1),
pp. 23–150 to 23–151.)
Neither are we persuaded by Condiff’s argument that the
Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel at this
stage of the proceedings. In Dillon v. U.S. (2010) 560 U.S. 817
(Dillon), the high court held the Sixth Amendment was not
implicated when an incarcerated defendant moved for a sentence
modification pursuant to amendments to the federal statutory
sentencing guidelines. The court concluded that a statutory
motion requesting a reduction in sentence based on intervening
amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines did “not
authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding. Instead, it
provides for the ‘modif[ication of] a term of imprisonment’ by
giving courts the power to ‘reduce’ an otherwise final sentence in
circumstances specified by the [Sentencing] Commission.” (Id. at
p. 825.) A district court, in ruling on such a motion, “does not
impose a new sentence in the usual sense.” (Id. at p. 827.) The
court explained, “We are aware of no constitutional requirement
of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of
imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [Sentencing]
Guidelines amendments. Rather, § 3582(c)(2) represents a
congressional act of lenity intended to give prisoners the benefit
of later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the
Guidelines. [¶] Viewed that way, proceedings under § 3582(c)(2)

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do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential
facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at pp. 828–
829.)
Adopting Dillon’s reasoning, the court in People v. Anthony
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102 (Anthony), determined petitioners
under Senate Bill No. 1437 were not entitled to a jury trial,
explaining, “the retroactive relief they are afforded by Senate Bill
1437 is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis. Rather, the
Legislature’s changes constituted an act of lenity that does not
implicate defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.” (Anthony, at pp
1156–1157.) California courts have similarly relied on Dillon to
find Sixth Amendment protections are not implicated when
petitioners seek sentence modifications under Proposition 36 and
Proposition 47.3 (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1063–
1064 [retroactive application of the benefits from Prop. 36 are a
legislative act of lenity that does not implicate Sixth Amendment
rights]; People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
3 “Proposition 36 . . . effected a change in the sentencing law
[of California] so that a defendant convicted of a nonviolent drug
possession offense is generally sentenced to probation, instead of
state prison or county jail, with the condition of completion of a
drug treatment program.” (In re DeLong (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
562, 566.)
Proposition 47 reclassified certain drug and theft-related
offenses that were felonies or “wobblers” as misdemeanors, and
provided a resentencing process for individuals who would have
been entitled to lesser punishment if their offenses had been
committed after its enactment. (People v. Rouse (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 292, 294 (Rouse).)

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1279, 1304 [same]; People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1322, 1336 [same]; People v. Rivas–Colon (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
444, 451–452 [no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to establish
eligibility for resentencing under Prop. 47].)
Though Dillon, Anthony, and the cases cited above do not
specifically address the right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment
analysis found in these cases nevertheless informs our decision.
We are persuaded that if section 1170.95 petitioners do not enjoy
a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Anthony, then
they also have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel either.
This conclusion comports with the rule that a defendant’s
“right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right,
and no further[,]” including postconviction collateral attacks.
(Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 555.) Federal courts
have consistently ruled that an incarcerated defendant has no
constitutional right to counsel with respect to statutory
postconviction motions seeking a reduction in sentence. (See,
e.g., U.S. v. Webb (11th Cir. 2009) 565 F.3d 789, 794–795 [motion
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 seeking reduction in sentence based
on post-sentencing amendments to federal sentencing guidelines];
U.S. v. Reddick (2d Cir. 1995) 53 F.3d 462, 465 [same]; U.S. v.
Taylor (4th Cir. 2005) 414 F.3d 528, 530 [motion to reduce a final
sentence pursuant to Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 35(b)]; U.S. v.
Palomo (5th Cir. 1996) 80 F.3d 138, 142–143 [same].)
Condiff argues the initial prima facie determination under
section 1170.95, subdivision (c), is a “critical stage in the criminal
process” such that he has a constitutional right to counsel,
relying on our opinion in Rouse, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.
Rouse addressed whether a petitioner is entitled to counsel at
resentencing after a determination of eligibility has already been

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made. It distinguishes itself from cases, like this one, where
eligibility has not yet been determined.
In Rouse, the trial court found the petitioner was entitled to
resentencing under Proposition 47. After making that
determination, the court vacated the petitioner’s original
sentence in its entirety and resentenced him, including on the
non-Proposition 47 counts. The Rouse court determined this was
a “critical stage” of a criminal prosecution to which the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches because the petitioner’s
entire sentencing package would be restructured and the trial
court would exercise its sentencing discretion, despite the
requirement no additional punishment may be imposed. (Rouse,
supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) Thus, it was akin to a plenary
sentencing hearing at which the petitioner’s substantial rights
were in jeopardy without the assistance of counsel. (Id. at
p. 298.)
The court explained, “A defendant is entitled under state
and federal law to the assistance of counsel when a sentence is
vacated on appeal and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
‘ “ ‘[W]hen a criminal sentence is vacated because one of the
convictions has been reversed, it becomes void in its entirety;
the sentence—including any enhancements—has ‘been wholly
nullified and the slate wiped clean.’ ” [Citation.] Consequently,
when a sentence is vacated and remanded for re-sentencing, the
district court has the discretion to “reconstruct the sentence.”
[Citation.] . . . Therefore, [the defendant’s] presence and his
counsel’s presence [are] a necessity, not a “luxury.” [Citation.]’ ”
(Rouse, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.)
In reaching this conclusion, Rouse was careful to
distinguish its procedural posture from other Proposition 47

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cases which found the Sixth Amendment right to a jury did not
attach. Rouse cautioned, “Whether the right to counsel attaches
at an earlier stage of the petition, including the eligibility phase,
was not before us and we therefore express no opinion on that
issue.” (Rouse, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) We conclude
the initial prima facie determination under section 1170.95,
subdivision (c), is not a critical stage of a criminal prosecution.
Instead, Dillon and its progeny support a conclusion that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not implicated at this initial
stage.
We also reject Condiff’s assertion that due process requires
the appointment of counsel at the initial prima facie
determination. Condiff cites several cases to argue procedural
due process requires an incarcerated defendant be afforded the
right to counsel in certain circumstances where the Sixth
Amendment does not apply. Each of those cases is
distinguishable by its procedural posture. (Rouse, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th 292 [distinguished above], Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of California (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 155 [direct appeal];
People v. Scott (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 550, 553 [direct appeal].)
Condiff provides no meaningful analysis as to how those
authorities apply to his claim. He has thus failed to meet his
burden on appeal to demonstrate error. (People v. Smith (2015)
61 Cal.4th 18, 39.) Moreover, as discussed above, section
1170.95, subdivision (c), does not provide for the appointment of
counsel at the initial prima facie determination and Condiff did
not attain a liberty interest in receiving the assistance of counsel
at this early stage. Condiff’s substantive due process rights were
thus not violated. (See Hewitt v. Helms (1983) 459 U.S. 460, 466.)

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DISPOSITION
The order summarily denying the section 1170.95 petition
is affirmed.
BIGELOW, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, J.
WILEY, J.

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