Geiser v. Kuhns

Filed 2/28/20 Geiser v. Kuhns CA2/5
Opinion on remand from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
GREGORY GEISER,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Respondent,
v.
PETER KUHNS et al.,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.
B279738
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BS161018,
BS161019, BS161020)
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Affirmed.
Dinsmore & Sandelmann, Frank Sandelmann and Brett A.
Stroud, for Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent.
Law Office of Matthew Strugar, Matthew Strugar; Law
Office of Colleen Flynn, Colleen Flynn, for Defendants,
Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Gregory Geiser filed petitions for civil harassment
restraining orders against defendants Peter Kuhns and spouses
Mercedes and Pablo Caamal, after defendants demonstrated at
plaintiff’s place of business and in front of his residence in an
attempt to prevent the Caamals’ eviction from their home. In
response, defendants moved to strike the civil harassment
petitions as strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-
SLAPP motions). After plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his civil
harassment petitions, the trial court awarded defendants
attorney fees as the prevailing parties on the petitions. The trial
court denied defendants’ attorney fees on their anti-SLAPP
motions, ruling they would not have prevailed on the motions.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s determination that
defendants were the prevailing parties on the civil harassment
petitions and, alternatively, the calculation of the attorney fees
award. Defendants appeal the trial court’s determination that
they would not have prevailed on their anti-SLAPP motions.
On August 30, 2018, we affirmed the trial court’s orders.
On November 14, 2018, the California Supreme Court granted
defendants’ petition for review. On September 11, 2019, the
Supreme Court transferred the matter back to us with directions
to reconsider the matter in light of its decision in FilmOn.com
Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn.com) which
interpreted the “catchall provision” of the anti-SLAPP statute
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(4)1). Having considered
FilmOn.com’s application to this matter, we affirm.
1 All statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure,
unless otherwise stated.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the founder, President, and Chief Executive
Officer of Wedgewood LLP, which is in the business of
purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling distressed properties. On
September 23, 2015, through a non-judicial foreclosure sale, a
Wedgewood subsidiary purchased from Wells Fargo a triplex Ms.
Caamal owned (the property) for $284,000. Wedgewood then
obtained an eviction judgment for one of the units.
According to Ms. Caamal, on December 17, 2015, she and
her husband, along with a group of concerned citizens, went to
Wedgewood’s office building and requested a meeting with
plaintiff to attempt to prevent their eviction and to negotiate a
repurchase of her home. The concerned citizens included Kuhns
and persons involved with the Alliance of Californians for
Community Empowerment (ACCE), an entity whose various
missions include saving homes from foreclosure and fighting
against displacement of long-term residents. Kuhns is the Los
Angeles Director for ACCE. The group set up a tent in
Wedgewood’s lobby and disrupted its business.
Plaintiff was not present. Wedgewood’s Chief Operating
Officer Darin Puhl and its General Counsel Alan Dettelbach went
to the lobby. Dettelbach attempted to move the tent and was
shoved by one of the demonstrators. The police were called. No
one was arrested or cited.
Puhl spoke with the Caamals and learned they were
interested in repurchasing the property. He offered to meet with
them in private if the demonstrators left the building. The
Caamals agreed. In the meeting, the Caamals told Puhl they
could afford to repurchase the property. Puhl agreed to hold off
enforcement of Wedgewood’s eviction judgment on the property’s

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first unit (an unlawful detainer trial was set for January 2016 for
the other two units) for several weeks so the Caamals could meet
with a lender to assess whether they could qualify for a loan.
Although Puhl “gave [the Caamals] an idea of the value [of the
property] according to similar properties in the area,” they did
not discuss a purchase price.
The Caamals subsequently submitted to Wedgewood a
prequalification letter apparently with a purchase price of
$300,000. In early January 2016, Puhl again met with the
Caamals. Puhl informed them that Wedgewood believed the
property was worth $400,000 according to real estate websites
and $300,000 was unacceptable. Wedgewood offered to sell them
the property for $375,000.
The Caamals asked for additional time to obtain a home
loan, agreeing to vacate the entire property within 60 days—by
March 20, 2016—if they could not obtain financing. On March
18, 2016, the Caamals sent Wedgewood a prequalification letter
with a $300,000 purchase price. Wedgewood deemed the
prequalification letter unacceptable because it was not for the
purchase price of $375,000 and it expressly stated that it did “not
constitute loan approval.”
The Caamals did not vacate the property by the date
agreed upon, and, on March 23, 2016, they, Kuhns, and persons
involved with ACCE returned to Wedgewood’s office building
seeking to meet with plaintiff. Mr. Caamal allegedly stated,
“‘[Y]ou’re not getting me out of this property alive.’” The Caamals
and their supporters left the premises either because the police
were called and removed them or because Puhl agreed to review
the Caamals’ “prequalification” documents.

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Because the Caamals had not arranged to purchase the
property by the date agreed upon, Wedgewood had the San
Bernardino Sheriff’s Department evict them on March 30, 2016.
Later that night, defendants and persons involved with ACCE
went to plaintiff’s residence. According to defendants, the
Caamals and their supporters staged a residential picket on the
sidewalk outside of plaintiff’s home. They held signs, sang songs,
chanted, and gave short speeches. The demonstration lasted for
about an hour—from about 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Officers from
the Manhattan Beach Police Department were present, but did
not order the demonstrators to disburse or intervene to stop the
demonstration. No one was arrested or cited.
According to Gilbert Saucedo, a National Lawyers Guild
legal observer, ACCE organized the demonstration to protest the
unfair and deceptive practices Wedgewood and its agents used to
purchase the property and to evict the Caamals. He estimated
there were 25 to 30 demonstrators and described the
demonstration as “peaceful.”
Plaintiff viewed the demonstration at his home differently.
Two days after the demonstration, he filed petitions for civil
harassment restraining orders against defendants. In his
petitions, plaintiff stated that around 9:00 p.m., a “mob” of about
30 persons arrived at his residence and chanted, “Greg Geiser,
come outside! Greg Geiser, you can’t hide!” Plaintiff called the
police. His wife sneaked out the back door and hid at a
neighbor’s house.
Plaintiff further recounted the incident in his declaration in
support of restraining orders as follows: “Sometime before
midnight, as a result of discussions with the police and
Wedgewood’s lawyer, the mob disbanded. My wife and I were left

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shaken by the escalating campaign of harassment that has
followed me from work to my home. In view of the mob actions
combined with the direct verbal threats, we are in fear for our
safety. We have arranged for private security to stand guard
outside both our place of business and our house.
“I further understand from conversations Wedgewood’s
general counsel had with the police the night the mob assaulted
my home that police require a court order to keep the mob away
from my house by any meaningful distance. This is why we are
seeking this Court’s assistance in issuing an order for these
respondents to stay away from my wife and me, my business, and
my home, by at least 100 yards.”
The trial court issued temporary restraining orders. The
orders required defendants to stay at least 50 yards from
plaintiff, his wife, and Wedgewood for the following three weeks.
Defendants responded to the civil harassment petitions by
filing anti-SLAPP motions. They claimed plaintiff was
attempting to stifle their free speech and expressive activity.
In addition to the civil harassment petitions, plaintiff
sought to prevent further demonstrations in front of his home
through the Manhattan Beach City Council. The day after the
demonstration, plaintiff spoke with a city council member. Based
on that conversation, the council member proposed an ordinance
to the Manhattan Beach City Council that would prohibit
targeted residential picketing.
On July 5, 2016, plaintiff spoke at the Manhattan Beach
City Council meeting at which the proposed ordinance was

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addressed.2 During a break in the meeting, Manhattan Beach
Police Department Chief Eve Irvine approached plaintiff and
assured him that what had happened at his home on March 30
would never be allowed to happen again. She explained the
police department had received additional training about how to
enforce the city’s existing laws in those types of situations. If the
demonstrators returned to his home, the police department would
do everything in its power to make sure that his home, family,
and neighbors were protected. Following that meeting, plaintiff
had several phone conversations with other members of the
Manhattan Beach Police Department and members of the
Manhattan Beach City Council during which he was assured that
if a similar demonstration happened, he could expect a “full
response” from the police department.
On August 4, 2016, plaintiff dismissed without prejudice
the three civil harassment petitions.3 He dismissed the petitions
because, based on his July 5, 2016, conversation with Chief
Irvine, he “felt reassured” the police department would respond
appropriately if the demonstrators returned. Also, it had become
clear to plaintiff from ongoing settlement negotiations with the
Caamals that they were not going to repurchase the property and
2 On August 17, 2017, the City Council tabled a motion to
approve the ordinance.
3 Plaintiff and Wedgewood had also filed a civil action
against defendants and ACCE relating to essentially the same
conduct giving rise to the civil harassment petitions (case number
BC615987). We grant plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of
plaintiff’s dismissal of that action on July 14, 2016, and otherwise
deny his request for judicial notice.

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he believed it would be easier to list and sell the property without
pending litigation.
When plaintiff dismissed the civil harassment petitions, the
trial court had not ruled on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions.
Defendants moved for an award of $84,150 in attorney fees (a
$56,100 lodestar with a 1.5 multiplier) and $370 in court costs as
the prevailing parties under the mandatory attorney fees
provision of the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1)) and,
alternatively, as the prevailing parties under the discretionary
attorney fees provision of the civil harassment statute (§ 527.6,
subd. (s)) (attorney fees motion).4 The trial court ruled that
defendants would not have prevailed on the anti-SLAPP motions,
but found they were the prevailing parties on the civil
harassment petitions. The trial court thus awarded defendants
$40,000 in attorney fees and court costs. In declining to award
the full amount sought by defendants, the trial court found that
the hourly rates defendants’ attorneys requested were high in
light of their experience and the nature and difficulty of the
litigation. The trial court also found that large parts of the
requested attorney fees related to unsuccessful settlement
negotiations and the anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court
concluded would not have succeeded.
4 Defendants did not separately request attorney fees for
work performed on the anti-SLAPP motion and for work
performed on the civil harassment petition. Instead, they sought
an award of attorney fees for all work performed in the litigation.

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DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Appeal
Plaintiff appeals the award of attorney fees and costs,
claiming the trial court erred by: (1) excluding evidence that was
crucial to determine that plaintiff was the prevailing party on the
civil harassment petitions; (2) ultimately concluding that
defendants were prevailing parties; and (3) miscalculating the
amount of fees.
A. “Exclusion” of Evidence
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it excluded as
hearsay his declaration testimony that Chief Irvine assured him
the police department would protect him and his family in the
event of further demonstrations at his home. The ruling was
error, plaintiff argues, because the testimony was offered to show
that plaintiff acted in reliance on that assurance when he
dismissed his civil harassment petitions, and not for the truth of
the matter asserted—i.e., that the police would protect him.
Plaintiff contends the error was prejudicial because it was crucial
to the trial court’s prevailing party determination. The trial
court did not err.
We review a trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections
for an abuse of discretion. (Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 688, 694.) “Discretion is abused only when in its
exercise, the trial court ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered.’” (Shaw v. County of
Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281 (Shaw).) An
appellant bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion
when challenging a trial court’s discretionary rulings. (Ibid.)

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In the declaration he submitted in opposition to defendants’
attorney fees motion, plaintiff stated that Chief Irvine, other
members of the Manhattan Beach Police Department, and
members of the Manhattan Beach City Council assured him the
police department would protect him if the demonstrators
returned to his home. Defendants objected to those parts of
plaintiff’s declaration as hearsay.
The trial court ruled, “[Plaintiff] claims he obtained the
relief he sought outside of court after he received an assurance
from Manhattan Beach Police Chief Eve Irvine that ‘what happed
at [his] home on the night of March 30 would never be allowed to
happen again.’ This statement and similar alleged statements by
Chief Irvine and other city officials, however, are inadmissible
hearsay.” In a footnote appended to the ruling, the trial court
stated, “[Plaintiff] argues that the statements are admissible to
show what his state of mind was when he dismissed the petitions.
The court agrees. (See Evid. Code, § 1250.) But petitioner’s state
of mind is of marginal relevance to the issue of who was the
prevailing party in this litigation and the other issues the court
must decide to adjudicate [defendants’] motions.”
Later, in a section addressing defendants’ evidentiary
objections, the trial court sustained hearsay objections to the
statements made by other members of the Manhattan Beach
Police Department and by Manhattan Beach City Council
members. With respect to the statements attributed to Chief
Irvine, the trial court sustained the hearsay objection, explaining
that “Chief Irvine’s statements are hearsay to the extent they are
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.”
Plaintiff’s appeal concerns only the trial court’s ruling on
Chief Irvine’s alleged statements. His argument that the trial

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court erred by excluding the statements as hearsay fails because
the trial court did not exclude the statements for all purposes.
The trial court’s ruling is clear. It excluded the police chief’s
statements to the extent they were offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, but admitted them to explain why plaintiff
dismissed his civil harassment petitions—the very reason
plaintiff argues on appeal they were admissible. Accordingly, we
find no error with respect to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.
B. Prevailing Party
Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it determined that he was not the prevailing party under section
527.6. He argues that he prevailed because he “obtained the
object of the litigation, namely assurances from representatives
of the City of Manhattan Beach that future harassment would be
prevented.” We disagree.
We review a trial court’s prevailing party ruling under
section 527.6 for an abuse of discretion. (Adler v. Vaicius (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777; Elster v. Friedman (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 1439, 1443 (Elster).) As stated above, a trial court
abuses its discretion “only when in its exercise, the trial court
‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered.’” (Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
“‘A plaintiff will be considered a prevailing party when the
lawsuit ‘“was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the
primary relief sought’” or succeeded in ‘“activating defendants to
modify their behavior.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Elster, supra,
211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1443–1444 [section 527.6 action].)
Ordinarily, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the
defendant is the prevailing party. (See Coltrain v. Shewalter

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(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 100, 107 [alleged SLAPP suit dismissed
without prejudice].) However, “a court may base its attorney fees
decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each
party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment,
settlement, or otherwise.” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th
599, 622 [contract action].)
The trial court ruled that defendants were the prevailing
parties, finding that “they obtained what they wanted out of the
litigation—[plaintiff] dismissed his actions and did not get
restraining orders or any other relief.” It rejected plaintiff’s claim
that he was the prevailing party because he achieved what he
sought outside of court through Police Chief Irvine’s assurances
that what happened at his home would not be allowed to happen
again. The trial court found that plaintiff “did not obtain this
alleged promise by Chief Irvine as a result of these lawsuits.” It
reasoned that plaintiff could have sought Chief Irvine’s
commitment without filing the civil harassment petitions.
Moreover, the trial court recognized the substantial difference
between what plaintiff did achieve outside of the lawsuit, i.e., “a
commitment by Chief Irvine to enforce existing law—whatever
that is worth,” and the “gravity” of what plaintiff sought through
the lawsuit, i.e., “remedies that would have limited [defendants’]
liberty, namely their freedom of movement and communication,”
as well as “a court finding that they engaged in socially
unacceptable behavior.”
We agree with the trial court. The objective of plaintiff’s
civil harassment petitions was to obtain orders restraining
defendants from, among other things, harassing or contacting
him or his wife, and requiring defendants to stay 100 yards
award from him, his wife, his home, and his workplace—i.e.,

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Wedgewood. Plaintiff failed to achieve that objective, and
obtaining Chief Irvine’s assurances fell short of such objective.
Moreover, to the extent obtaining Chief Irvine’s
commitment to enforce the law can be characterized as having
obtained plaintiff’s objectives in bringing suit, there is no
evidence that plaintiff’s civil harassment petitions motivated
Chief Irvine to give her assurances or even that Chief Irvine
knew of the petitions. In this regard, we reject plaintiff’s
contention the trial court impermissibly “required” a nexus
between plaintiff’s filing the petitions and Chief Irvine’s actions.
The trial court never stated such a nexus was necessary for
plaintiff to be a prevailing party. Rather, the trial court’s
consideration of the lack of any causation between the lawsuit
and Chief Irvine’s assurance to plaintiff was a valid (if not
dispositive) factor in the exercise of its discretion. We likewise
reject plaintiff’s suggestion that the absence of evidence that his
civil harassment petitions were not a motivating factor for the
police department means we should infer the petitions were a
motivating factor. That suggestion fails to acknowledge that
plaintiff bears the burden of showing the trial court’s prevailing
party determination exceeded the bounds of reason. (Shaw,
supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s determination that defendants were prevailing
parties.
C. Attorney Fees Calculation
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in calculating
defendants’ attorney fees award on the civil harassment
petitions. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error.

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“A trial court’s exercise of discretion concerning an award
of attorney fees will not be reversed unless there is a manifest
abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘“The ‘experienced trial judge is
the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his
court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it
will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that
it is clearly wrong[’]—meaning that it abused its discretion.
[Citations.]”’ [Citation.] Accordingly, there is no question our
review must be highly deferential to the views of the trial court.
[Citation.]” (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233,
1239 (Nichols).)
In their attorney fees motion, defendants requested $84,150
in attorney fees and $370 in court costs.5 The trial court awarded
a reduced amount—$40,000—finding defendants’ attorneys’
hourly rates were too high and a large amount of time was spent
on unsuccessful settlement negotiations and the anti-SLAPP
motion, which would not have succeeded.
Plaintiff contends the trial court disregarded its findings in
reducing the requested attorney fees and court costs by $44,520
because time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion alone accounted
for $43,230 of the initial request. Thus, plaintiff concludes, the
trial court essentially reduced the attorney fees award by the
amount spent on the anti-SLAPP motion with no reductions for
5 In their reply in support of their motion, defendants
increased their request for attorney fees to $100,525, the
adjustment reflecting attorney time responding to plaintiff’s
opposition. The trial court based its attorney fees award on the
$84,150 figure in defendants’ attorney fees motion and not on the
$100,525 figure in their reply. Defendants do not claim on appeal
that the trial court erred.

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the attorneys’ unreasonably high hourly rates or fruitless
settlement negotiations.
Plaintiff does not explain how he arrived at the $43,230
figure. His opening brief cites his opposition to defendants’
attorney fees motion, which in turn does not explain how plaintiff
arrived at the unmodified lodestar of $28,820 ($28,820 x 1.5 =
$43,230) for work on the anti-SLAPP motion referenced in the
opposition. “Counsel is obligated to refer us to the portions of the
record supporting his or her contentions on appeal. [Citations.]
. . . [W]e will not scour the record on our own in search of
supporting evidence. [Citation.] Where, as here, respondents
have failed to cite that evidence, they cannot complain when we
find their arguments unpersuasive. [Citation.]” (Sharabianlou v.
Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149.) Plaintiff has failed to
show the trial court abused its discretion in awarding defendants’
attorney fees and court costs. (Nichols, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1239.)
II. Defendants’ Cross-Appeal
Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying
attorney fees related to their anti-SLAPP motions on the ground
that defendants would not have prevailed on such motions.
Specifically, they argue the trial court erred in finding that the
anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to plaintiff’s civil harassment
petitions because defendants failed to establish the first step in
bringing a successful motion—i.e., that defendants engaged in
protected activity. Because defendants’ challenged activity
concerned a purely private issue and did not concern or further

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the public discourse on a public issue or an issue of public
interest, the trial court did not err.6
“A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public
participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of
constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. [Citation.] The
Legislature enacted . . . section 425.16—known as the anti-
SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of
lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of
constitutional rights.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1055–1056; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)7.) The anti-SLAPP statute is to
be construed broadly, but not so broadly as to apply to purely
private transactions. (Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
1508, 1524 (Garretson).) We review an order denying an anti-
SLAPP motion de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299,
325–326.)
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.
First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the
6 Accordingly, we do not reach defendants’ second contention
that plaintiff would not have prevailed on his civil harassment
petitions.
7 Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.”

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defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a
probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,
384.)
At the first step, “[t]he moving defendant’s burden is to
demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains
were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,
Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) Section 425.16, subdivision (e) sets
forth four categories of conduct the anti-SLAPP statute protects.8
Defendants argue their demonstrations were conducted “in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest”
within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and
(e)(4) because they were directed at plaintiff and his company
and were “related to the company’s residential real estate
8 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) provides, “As used in this
section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

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business practices that displace residents and gentrify working-
class neighborhoods.” Further, the demonstrations concerned the
root causes of the great recession—large scale fix-and-flip real
estate practices.
“‘“The definition of ‘public interest’ within the meaning of
the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not
only governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts
a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a
manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” [Citation.]’
(Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified
Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1233 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d
57]; see Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 468, 479 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205].) ‘[T]he precise
boundaries of a public issue have not been defined. Nevertheless,
in each case where it was determined that a public issue existed,
“the subject statements either concerned a person or entity in the
public eye [citations], conduct that could directly affect a large
number of people beyond the direct participants [citations] or a
topic of widespread, public interest [citation].” [Citation.]’
(Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736–737 [87
Cal.Rptr.3d 347].)” (USA Waste of California, Inc. v. City of
Irwindale (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 53, 65 (USA Waste of
California, Inc.).)
In FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th 133, the Supreme Court
granted review in part “to decide if and how the context of a
statement—including the identity of the speaker, the audience,
and the purpose of the speech—informs a court’s determination of
whether the statement was made ‘in furtherance of’ free speech
‘in connection with’ a public issue” and thus merits protection
under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision. (Id. at

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pp. 142–143.) Speech that is “too remotely connected to the
public conversation” about “the issues of public interest they
implicate” do not “merit protection under the catchall provision.”
(Id. at p. 140.)
“The inquiry under the catchall provision . . . calls for a
two-part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal
logic. First, we ask what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public
interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer
by looking to the content of the speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the
speech and the public conversation about some matter of public
interest. It is at the latter stage that context proves useful.”
(FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.)
Applying the first part of the catchall provision analysis, we
conclude that defendants’ demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office
building and plaintiff’s residence focused on coercing Wedgewood
into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price,
which was a private matter concerning a former homeowner and
the corporation that purchased her former home and not a public
issue or an issue of public interest. (Garretson, supra, 156
Cal.App.4th at p. 1524; USA Waste of California, Inc., supra, 184
Cal.App.4th at p. 65.) The private nature of the demonstrations
is made clear in defendants’ own declarations submitted in
support of the anti-SLAPP motions.
In Ms. Caamal’s declaration, she described the motivation
for the demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building. As to the
first demonstration, she stated that she and her husband “and a
group of concerned citizens seeking to assist us, went to
Wedgewood’s office building in Redondo Beach and requested a
meeting with [plaintiff] to attempt to prevent the impending

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20
eviction and negotiate a re-purchase of m[y] home.” (Italics
added.) As to the second demonstration, she stated that “as
Wedgewood was attempting to lock me and my husband from our
home and continuing to ignor[e] letters from both myself and my
attorney, my husband and I, as well as another group of citizens
supporting our effort to repurchase our home, returned to
Wedgewood’s office and again requested a meeting with
[plaintiff].” (Italics added.) She said nothing about Wedgewood’s
residential real estate business practices displacing residents and
gentrifying working-class neighborhoods or about large scale fix-
and-flip real estate practices being a root cause of the great
recession.
Consistent with his wife’s stated purpose for the first
demonstration, Mr. Caamal stated in his declaration, “I
“accompanied my wife to Wedgewood’s office building . . . to
obtain an answer as to why Wedgewood was refusing to
negotiation [sic] with my wife in her attempt to repurchase our
home.” (Italics added.) Kuhns likewise stated in his declaration,
“I and others involved with ACCE accompanied Mr. and Ms.
Caamal to Wedgewood’s office building . . . to obtain an answer as
to why Wedgewood was refusing to negotiation [sic] with the
Camaals [sic] in their attempt to repurchase their home.” (Italics
added.) Neither Mr. Caamal nor Kuhns said anything in his
respective declaration about the purpose of the demonstrations
relating to issues of displacement of residents due to residential
real estate business practices, gentrification, or large scale fix-
and-flip real estate practices leading to the great recession.
Even a third-party participant, Saucedo, the National
Lawyers Guild legal observer, described in his declaration the
purpose for the demonstration at plaintiff’s residence as a private

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21
matter limited to the Caamals’ dispute with Wedgwood. He
stated that ACCE organized the demonstration at plaintiff’s
residence “to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by
Wedgewood . . . and its agents in acquiring the real property of
Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and evicting them from their home.”
(Italics added.) That motivation was purely personal to the
Caamals and did not address any societal issues of residential
displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the great
recession.
As to the content of the speech, during the first
demonstration at Wedgewood, the Caamals requested a meeting
at which they could discuss repurchasing their property from
Wedgewood and the demonstrators left the building once Puhl
agreed to such a meeting. During the second demonstration, the
demonstrators sought another meeting and Mr. Caamal stated
that Wedgewood would not get him out of the property alive. The
only evidence of the specific content of the speeches during the
demonstration at plaintiff’s residence was that the demonstrators
demanded plaintiff personally come out of his home.
Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635 (Thomas)
is instructive. Defendants argue that Thomas supports their
claim they engaged in protected activity because the Thomas
court found that protest activities against a landlord by a tenant
and a group of activists were covered by the anti-SLAPP statute
in that particular case. But the facts of Thomas demonstrate
precisely why defendants’ activities here were not protected.
In Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 654, defendant
Quintero was a tenant in a building owned by plaintiff Thomas.
They became “embroiled in a number of landlord-tenant disputes,
which culminated in an eviction proceeding.” (Ibid.) Quintero

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22
was then put in touch with a group called Campaign for Renters
Rights (CRR) through which he met many other former tenants
of Thomas. (Ibid.) Quintero thus learned that Thomas was “a
‘notorious landlord’ whose pattern of unjust evictions throughout
Oakland was ‘the first big public case of the campaign in Oakland
for a Just Cause of Eviction Ordinance.’” (Ibid.) Indeed, CRR
previously “had helped to organize 21 former tenant families who
were allegedly owed more than $35,000 in unpaid security
deposits by Thomas” and “claim[ed] to have contacted more than
100 former tenants of Thomas’s.” (Id. at pp. 654–655.) According
to CRR materials, “Thomas had filed evictions against 142
families over a five-year period,” and “he was successfully sued by
the City of San Rafael for $19,000 when he failed to initiate
repairs of rental units he owned there.” (Id. at p. 655.) After
Quintero and a group appeared at Thomas’s church to protest,
Thomas petitioned for a civil restraining order, claiming that
Quintero and his group “harassed church members, blocked
entrances, and trespassed on church property, with the stated
purpose of causing extreme embarrassment and severe emotional
distress” to him. (Id. at p. 654.)
The court in Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 661,
held that Quintero’s activities were protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute, finding that, “while his private interests were certainly
in issue, there were much broader community interests at stake
in the protests.” Specifically, the court reasoned that the protests
involved issues of public interest because Thomas was “accused of
wrongfully evicting and improperly retaining the security
deposits of more than 100 tenants” and was “accused of a pattern
of refusing to make needed repairs to his rental properties,
allegedly resulting in legal action being taken against him by

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23
several municipalities.” (Ibid.) The court found that such
“allegations against Thomas implicate both a concern for the
stability of the rental market in the affected community, as well
as intimate the threat of potential urban blight associated with
the failure to make necessary repairs to buildings in the
neighborhood.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the court noted that the
“protest activities were not an end to themselves, but were
coupled with a genuine effort to engage the members of Thomas’s
congregation in discussing and finding a solution to the disputes,”
namely, “there was a direct call for public involvement in an
ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion with respect to
Thomas’s past and continued property management practices.”
(Ibid.)
Here, by contrast, we do not find in the record any basis to
conclude plaintiff was a public figure or had gained widespread
notoriety throughout the community for his real estate activities.
Nor do we find any basis to believe the Caamals’ private dispute
with plaintiff was one of many similar disputes shared in
common with members of the community.9 The record is also
9 In their cross-appeal reply brief, defendants state plaintiff’s
company “has been accused of unlawful conduct throughout the
state” and claim “the record includes accusations” that the
company harassed and evicted “many” immigrant working class
families, directed its employees to aggressively target foreclosed
homes and refrain from repairing them, and participated in
various unlawful and fraudulent schemes. To support that claim,
however, defendants cite only to two civil complaints filed by two
separate homeowners involving two individual properties located
in San Francisco. Those complaints are appended as exhibits to a
request for judicial notice, which it appears the trial court never
granted. Even if properly before this court, these two additional,

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24
devoid of any governmental complaints, actions, or disputes with
plaintiff or his company, which might be indicative of a broader
public issue with respect to plaintiff’s house-flipping conduct.
Further, as discussed above in defendants’ declarations, the
purpose of the demonstrations was to assist the Caamals in
getting the property back, not to engage other members of the
community or to call for public involvement in finding a solution
to purported issues concerning real estate practices. These
important differences from the circumstances in Thomas, supra,
126 Cal.App.4th 635, underscore exactly why the demonstrations
regarding the property were not protected activity concerning a
public issue or issue of public interest.
Finally, defendants contend that the “wide-spread” media
attention their demonstrations received shows that the
demonstrations were matters of public interest. While the fact of
media coverage may be indicative of a public matter, “[m]edia
coverage cannot by itself . . . create an issue of public interest
within the statutory meaning.” (Zhao v. Wong (1996) 48
Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121, disapproved on other grounds in Briggs
v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106;
see also Rivero, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 926 [“If the mere
publication of information in a union newsletter distributed to its
numerous members were sufficient to make that information a
matter of public interest, the public-issue limitation would be
substantially eroded, thus seriously undercutting the obvious
isolated instances do not transform the Caamals’ private dispute
into a public one. (See Rivero v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 913, 925 (Rivero) [supervisor’s conduct toward eight
custodians in the union did not rise to the level of a public issue
involving unlawful workplace activity].)

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25
goal of the Legislature that the public-issue requirement have a
limiting effect”].) Moreover, the record on the media attention
that defendants did enjoy is not entirely clear. In describing
media attention, defendants primarily cited to various websites,
without attaching the articles themselves or archiving an article
so that the trial court could determine what an article stated at a
relevant time.10 In any event, for the reasons discussed above,
defendants’ demonstrations concerned the Caamals’ private
dispute with plaintiff and his company. The fact that they
attracted some media attention did not convert a purely private
matter into one of public interest.
As for the second part of the catchall provision analysis,
even if we accepted defendants’ contention that the
demonstrations concerned the issues of displacement of residents
due to residential real estate business practices, gentrification,
and large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices leading to the
great recession, those demonstrations did not qualify for
statutory protection because they did not further the public
discourse on those issues. “‘[I]t is not enough that the statement
refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement
must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’
(Wilbanks [v. Wolk (2004)] 121 Cal.App.4th [883,] 898 [17
10 The dissent refers to a press release by Wedgewood
accusing ACCE of being interested in headlines in support of the
notion that this was a matter of public interest. But that press
release was made in August 2016, four and a half months after
the demonstration at plaintiff’s home and the filing of the
requests for civil harassment restraining orders and does not
establish that the demonstrations, at the time, were conducted in
connection with a public issue.

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26
Cal.Rptr.3d 497]; see also Dyer v. Childress (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 1273, 1280 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 544] [‘[t]he fact that “a
broad and amorphous public interest” can be connected to a
specific dispute’ is not enough].)” (FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 150.) In determining whether speech or conduct contributes
to the public debate and thus qualifies for statutory protection,
“we examine whether a defendant—through public or private
speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse
that makes an issue one of public interest. [Citations.]” (Ibid.;
id. at p. 151.) As we conclude above, defendants’ demonstrations
at Wedgewood’s office building and plaintiff’s residence were
directed at Wedgewood and plaintiff and were for the purpose of
coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal
at a reduced price. Accordingly, the demonstrations did not
further the public discourse on the issues of displacement of
residents due to residential real estate business practices,
gentrification, or large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices
leading to the great recession.
To be fair, and as the dissent observes, defendants’ conduct
does bear certain hallmarks of classic SLAPP conduct. For
instance, defendants characterize their conduct as participating
in a “demonstration” or “residential picket.” They held signs,
sang songs, chanted, and gave short speeches. Further, the
National Lawyers Guild is “a bar association whose members
frequently engage in legal observing for organizations and
individuals exercising their First Amendment rights to freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly.” But merely characterizing
conduct as a demonstration or picket does not grant that conduct
First Amendment protections. (See, e.g., FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 152 [“[d]efendants cannot merely offer a ‘synecdoche

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27
theory’ of public interest, defining their narrow dispute by its
slight reference to the broader public issue”].)
The anti-SLAPP statute “defines conduct in furtherance of
the rights of petition and free speech on a public issue not only by
its content, but also by its location, its audience, and its timing.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th. at p. 143.) Here, the record indicates
that the demonstrations at Wedgewood’s Office occurred at a
commercial building, during office hours, and were directed at
plaintiff. As to the demonstration at plaintiff’s residence, it took
place at 9:00 p.m. and there is no indication in the record that
there was an audience other than plaintiff and his family, and no
evidence of media presence to inform persons not at the
demonstration. Based on this record, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that defendants’ activities were not in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

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28
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KIM, J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.

-- 28 of 41 --

Geiser v. Kuhns et al.
B279738
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Before we get to the merits, a brief recitation of the
procedural history of this case is in order. This court initially
decided this appeal in 2018. The panel majority held the trial
court correctly awarded attorney fees to defendants Mercedes
Caamal, Pablo Caamal, and Peter Kuhns for prevailing in civil
harassment petition litigation, but excluded from the fees
calculation work done on anti-SLAPP motions that defendants
filed to strike the civil harassment petitions. I dissented from the
anti-SLAPP holding, explaining the majority incorrectly
concluded no anti-SLAPP protected activity was at issue. Our
Supreme Court thereafter granted a petition for review of this
court’s opinion and held the matter pending the outcome of its
decision in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
133 (FilmOn), an anti-SLAPP case. Once that decision issued,
our Supreme Court issued an order transferring the case back to
us for reconsideration in light of FilmOn. We vacated our prior
opinion and asked counsel to reargue the case.
The largely recycled opinion the majority now files is no
more persuasive (as to the cross-appeal’s anti-SLAPP issue1) than
the first. The majority’s treatment of the FilmOn opinion
misunderstands the bounds and contours of the anti-SLAPP
1 I continue to concur in the majority’s resolution of the civil
harassment attorney fees issue.

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2
statute’s “catchall provision” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 139-
140) and produces an outcome inconsistent with the speech-
protective purpose behind the anti-SLAPP statute. When
FilmOn is properly applied, as I will endeavor to show, it is even
more apparent now than it was before that the majority’s anti-
SLAPP rationale is wrong.
I
A sentence that comes early in FilmOn suffices almost by
itself to point the way to the correct result here. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Cuéllar explained: “In the
paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded developer limits free
expression by imposing litigation costs on citizens who protest,
write letters, and distribute flyers in opposition to a local project.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 143.) Now consider the facts here.
Well-funded developer? Check. Citizen protest of a local (evict-
and-flip housing) project? Check. Limits on free expression by
imposing litigation costs? Check. Our facts illustrate precisely
why, as I previously said, this case has many of the hallmarks of
vintage SLAPP conduct. But let us examine the FilmOn decision
in greater detail to understand the full analytical route a court
should travel to determine anti-SLAPP protected activity is
implicated here.
FilmOn.com, a business that distributes online
entertainment programming, sued DoubleVerify, a business that
generates reports for prospective advertiser clients about the
content and viewers of various websites. (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at 140-141.) FilmOn.com contended DoubleVerify
improperly disparaged FilmOn.com websites in the reports
DoubleVerify sent confidentially to its advertiser clients because

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3
the reports characterized some of FilmOn.com’s websites as
depicting adult content or copyright infringing material. (Id. at
141-142.) In response to FilmOn.com’s lawsuit, DoubleVerify
filed an anti-SLAPP motion contending its website reports
“‘concerned issues of interest to the public’ because ‘the public
ha[s] a demonstrable interest in knowing what content is
available on the Internet, especially with respect to adult content
and the illegal distribution of copyrighted material.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at 142.)
The trial court granted DoubleVerify’s anti-SLAPP motion
and the Court of Appeal affirmed. But our Supreme Court
“granted review to decide if and how the context of a statement—
including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the
purpose of the speech—[should] inform[ ] a court’s determination”
of whether the statement qualifies as protected activity under
subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute. (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at 142-143.) Under that “catchall” subdivision, “conduct
in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest” qualifies as anti-
SLAPP protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(e)(4).)
In fleshing out the meaning of subdivision (e)(4), our
Supreme Court looked for contextual clues in the other categories
of activity protected by the statute and concluded conduct in
furtherance of the rights of petition and free speech on a public
issue is defined not only by the content of the speech or
petitioning activity but by “its location, its audience, and its
timing.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 143.) Specifically, the
Court held catchall provision analysis should consider whether

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4
speech or petitioning activity was private or public, to whom it
was directed, and for what purpose it was undertaken. (Id. at
148.) The FilmOn opinion describes a two-step process to allow
for such contextual consideration.
First, courts should identify what public issue or issue of
public interest is implicated in the case at hand. (FilmOn, supra,
7 Cal.5th at 149.) In performing this task, our Supreme Court
cited with approval Court of Appeal decisions that have “distilled
the characteristics” of what counts as an issue of public interest.
(Ibid. [citing Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913
(Rivero) and Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122
(Weinberg)].) Rivero cites three non-exhaustive categories of
public interested matters: a person or entity in the public eye
(e.g., the Church of Scientology), conduct that could directly affect
a large number of people beyond the direct participants (e.g.,
allegedly defamatory statements made regarding a homeowners
association of more than 3,000 individuals), or a topic of
widespread, public interest (e.g., the general topic of child
molestation in youth sports). (Rivero, supra, at 924.) Weinberg
clarifies a matter of public interest does not equate with mere
curiosity and should be something of concern to a substantial
number of people. (Weinberg, supra, at 1132-1133.)
Second, courts should assess “what functional relationship
exists between the speech [or petitioning activity] and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest.” (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at 149-150.) Context is useful in undertaking
this inquiry, our Supreme Court explained, because it helps avoid
the quagmire that otherwise results when “courts strive to
discern what the challenged speech is really ‘about’—a narrow,

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5
largely private dispute, for example, or the asserted issue of
public interest.” (Id. at 149; see also ibid. [“[I]f the social media
era has taught us anything, it is that speech is rarely ‘about’ any
single issue”].) As already described, the contextual inquiry
considers all relevant circumstances, including the identity of the
speaker or petitioner, the audience sought, the timing and
location of the speech or petitioning, and the apparent purpose of
the conduct assertedly protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id.
at 142-144, 154.) When there is “‘some degree of closeness’”
between the challenged statements and the topic of asserted
public interest, such that the statements themselves can be said
to have contributed to the public debate “in some manner,” the
statements are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall
provision. (Id. at 150.)
Performing this two-step analysis on the facts presented in
FilmOn, our Supreme Court held the website reports sent to
advertisers did not qualify as anti-SLAPP protected activity.
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 154.) The Court acknowledged the
actions of a prominent CEO (DoubleVerify argued FilmOn.com’s
CEO was in the public spotlight) or the issue of children’s
exposure to sexually explicit media content would qualify as
issues of public interest.2 (Id. at 152.) But the Court held
2 In identifying the topics of public interest at issue, the
Court seemed to defer at least in part to DoubleVerify’s own
identification of those issues. The FilmOn Court noted
“DoubleVerify has identified the public issues or issues of public
interest to which its reports . . . relate” and the Court assumed at
least one of the issues DoubleVerify identified (the prominence of
FilmOn.com’s CEO) merited analysis. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at 152.)

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6
DoubleVerify’s reports did not further the public conversation on
either issue—emphasizing that the website reports were not
distributed to the public at all, only sent confidentially to
DoubleVerify’s clients who used them solely for their own
business purposes. (Id. at 153.) The Court cautioned that this
single contextual factor (private distribution) was not alone
dispositive (ibid.), but the Court reasoned the factual “scenario
before [it] involve[d] two well-funded for-profit entities engaged
in a private dispute over one’s characterization—in a confidential
report—of the other’s business practices,” which was not an
instance in which a court should liberally extend anti-SLAPP
protection to encourage continued participation in matters of
public significance. (Id. at 154.)
II
When the FilmOn framework is applied here, the opposite
result obtains: the public protest outside plaintiff Gregory
Geiser’s home contributed to public debate in some manner and
qualifies as protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
1
Much like DoubleVerify in FilmOn, defendants identify the
issue of interest to the public that is implicated in this case:
displacement of long-term community residents by unfair
foreclosure and fix-and-flip housing practices.3 Fairly read, the
3 As in FilmOn, we should give some weight to defendants’
own identification of the issue of interest to the public that is
implicated here. There is little concern speakers will devise and
rely on post-hoc rationalizations because the analysis of context—

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7
record bears out the assertion that the content of the speech in
question concerned Geiser and his company’s housing practices
that displace long-time community residents.
The protest outside Geiser’s home was attended by Kuhns,
the Los Angeles Director of Alliance of Californians for
Community Empowerment (ACCE); the Caamals; other ACCE
members; and Gabriel Saucedo, a representative of the National
Lawyer’s Guild. ACCE, according to Kuhns, is an entity
dedicated to “sav[ing] homes from foreclosures and the fight
against displacement of long[-]term residents in our
communities.” With that mission, ACCE’s participation in the
protest is enough by itself to infer the content of the public
protest outside Geiser’s home concerned unfair (at least as
perceived by ACCE) housing practices that displace long-time
community residents. But there is more.
Saucedo explained in a declaration that the purpose of the
ACCE-attended demonstration outside Geiser’s home was “to
protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood, LLC
[Geiser’s company] . . . and its agents in acquiring the real
property of [the Caamals], and evicting them from their home.”
The reference to “practices” suggests conduct that includes—but
extends beyond—the Caamals’ own situation. And that is borne
out by the relatively large group, 25 to 30 people, participating in
the protest at 9:00 p.m. on a Wednesday evening. That group
well exceeds the number of people who had some personal stake
in, or connection to, the foreclosure on the Caamals’ home, which
the degree of closeness between the identified interest and the
pertinent circumstances—that occurs at step two of the FilmOn
inquiry will normally smoke out a fabricated issue of public
interest identified at step one.

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8
means the only apparent shared tie among everyone present was
the desire to engage in public speech consistent with ACCE’s
mission and the issue of public interest identified here:
combatting unfair housing and foreclosure practices that displace
long-term community residents.4
There is no real dispute that this issue is indeed one of
genuine public interest. (See Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 [an issue of public interest is any
issue in which the public is interested].) Indeed, if there were any
doubt about that, the fact that Wedgewood issued a press release
of its own (one that argued ACCE was more interested in
“making headlines” than in helping the Caamals return to their
home) confirms Wedgewood’s resident-displacing practices was
an issue in which the public was interested.
The majority arrives at a different conclusion at step one of
the FilmOn inquiry by making two missteps. First, the majority
4 The Caamals’ declarations also generally describe, after
recounting their eviction from the home where they lived for 10
years, what occurred during the protest outside Geiser’s home.
They say the protesters “held signs, sang songs, chanted, and
gave short speeches, all from the sidewalk.” The majority faults
the declarations for not being more specific, i.e., for not detailing
whether the signs, songs, speeches, and chants made reference to
Wedgewood’s residential real estate business practices displacing
residents. I suppose that is logical so far as it goes: the absence
of direct protestor quotes in the declarations means the majority
is free to believe the ACCE members and others present outside
Geiser’s home might have been holding signs and chanting about
the Protestant Reformation or some topic other than
displacement of long-term residents like the Caamals. But that
is a strained and artificial way to read the record.

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9
spends an inordinate amount of time parsing the descriptions in
the Caamals’ declarations of the earlier two sit-ins inside the
lobby of Wedgewood’s office building rather than the public
protest outside Geiser’s home. The lobby sit-ins, however, are
largely irrelevant. It was the protest on the sidewalk outside
Geiser’s home from which the civil harassment suits arose, and
that protest accordingly should be the focus of our analysis.
Second, to the extent the majority does engage with the facts
concerning the protest outside Geiser’s home, it does so mainly by
attacking Saucedo’s declaration with italics. Here is the
majority’s sentence: “He [Saucedo] stated that ACCE organized
the demonstration at [Geiser’s] residence ‘to protest unfair and
deceptive practices used by Wedgewood . . . and its agents in
acquiring the real property of Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and
evicting them from their home.’ (Italics added.)” Application of
italics, however, is not legal analysis. Emphasizing the latter
half of Saucedo’s sentence does not somehow wipe away his
assertion that unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood
were in play. And the majority ignores entirely the housing
displacement mission of ACCE as described by Kuhns and the
participation of ACCE members among the 25 to 30 people
present for the sidewalk protest.
2
As just explained, the issue of public interest implicated in
this case, properly understood, is displacement of long-term
community residents by unfair foreclosure and fix-and-flip
housing practices. We now must assess, at step two of the
FilmOn inquiry, all of the contextual information we have about
the sidewalk protest outside Geiser’s home to determine whether

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10
there is “‘some degree of closeness’” between the protest and the
identified issue of public interest, such that the protest can be
said to have contributed to the public debate “in some manner.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 150.)
The identity of defendants, the audience they sought, and
the timing and location of the speech all show a degree of
closeness between the protest and the ongoing public
conversation about housing displacement. Let us take the
considerations in that order.
Kuhns and other ACCE members participated in the
sidewalk protest outside Geiser’s home, and ACCE’s identity and
involvement is strong evidence of a connection to an issue of
public interest. (Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635,
653-655, 661 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to a civil harassment
petition filed by a landlord against a tenant who, with the help of
a community renters’ organization, organized protests against
the landlord; the renters’ organization’s involvement
demonstrated that the tenant’s private interests were certainly in
issue but “there were much broader community interests at stake
in the protests”] (Thomas).)
The audience sought here, in meaningful contrast to
FilmOn, was not limited to a confidential communication to a
private business. Rather the audience for the speech at issue was
the general public, i.e., those within earshot of the protest and
those that might hear about it later, including via press reports.
This public aspect of the protest was not mere happenstance; it
was integral to its design. Defendants’ hope was that by placing
the public spotlight on Wedgewood’s practices, Wedgewood and
Geiser would relent (motivated either by their own shame or the
consequences of public disapprobation) and agree to allow the

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11
Caamals to buy back the home they had occupied for 10 years
rather than flipping it and selling it for more.
As to location and timing, these too evince a contribution to
the public debate: public sidewalks are traditional sites for
discussion and debate as “one of the few places where a speaker
can be confident that he is not simply preaching to the choir”
(McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464, 476), and the protest
occurred the very same day of the Caamals’ eviction—when
public interest in their plight as a concrete example of the
consequences of housing displacement was likely to be at its
apex. The various contextual considerations therefore show
defendants’ sidewalk protest contributed “in some manner” to the
public debate.
How does the majority again conclude otherwise? This is
the reason we are given: “As we conclude above, defendants’
demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building and [Geiser’s]
residence were directed at Wedgewood and [Geiser] and were for
the purpose of coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property
to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price.” That is wrong on multiple
levels.
At the most obvious level, the sidewalk protest—which
involved ACCE members who volunteered to help the Caamals—
cannot be fairly said to have been directed solely at Wedgewood
and Geiser with no connection to broader issues of interest to the
community; Thomas illustrates the point nicely.5 But on a deeper
level, the majority’s analysis fails even on its own terms. Let’s
5 The majority finds Thomas “instructive,” but learns the
wrong lesson. Even a cursory reading of that opinion reveals it is
a case that undermines the majority’s anti-SLAPP holding, not
one that supports it.

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assume, however improbably, that the protesters’ sole aim was to
get the Caamals their house back and that ACCE would have
accordingly disbanded had they been successful. The question
still remains, by what means did the protestors seek to succeed?
The answer: by appeal to public sentiment. In other words, even
if helping the Caamals were the only objective, the way in which
defendants and the other protesters hoped to achieve it was by
connecting the Caamals’ individual plight to public interest in,
and disapproval of, long-time community resident displacement
and unfair foreclosure practices.6 That is just the sort of
connection the FilmOn contextual inquiry demands at step two.
Stepping back from the doctrinal framework, the question
of anti-SLAPP protected activity vel non is really rather
straightforward on these facts. Stated simply, the public protest
contributed to the public debate.
III
The upshot of the majority’s anti-SLAPP holding is that in
a small corner of Southern California, the venerable American
tradition of peaceful public protest—often the only resort of those
with modest means—is left diminished by a well-funded
litigation scheme seeking to suppress it. That is what the anti-
SLAPP statute was intended to guard against, and it is
unfortunate the majority idiosyncratically reads the record to
6 The majority reasons “merely characterizing conduct as a
demonstration or picket does not grant that conduct First
Amendment protections.” This is not a case of mere
characterization. What is undisputedly at issue here is a protest
on a public sidewalk. If the majority believes that sort of conduct
does not merit First Amendment protection, the majority should
try to explain why.

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deny anti-SLAPP protection in a case where, as even the majority
concedes, “defendants’ conduct does bear certain hallmarks of
classic [anti-]SLAPP[-protected] conduct.”
I would reverse the trial court’s anti-SLAPP attorney fees
ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with the
views I have expressed.
BAKER, Acting P. J.

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