Pittsburg Unified School District (PERB A049E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
UNITED 	PUBLIC
	EMPLOYEES,
	LOCAL
	390,
SEIU, 	AFL-CIO,
Employee
	Organization,
APPELLANT,
.
and
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYEES
	UNION,
	LOCAL
	1,
Employee
	Organization,
and
CALIFORNIA
	SCHOOL
	EMPLOYEES
	ASSOCIATION,PITTSBURG
	CHAPTER
44,
Employee
	Organization,
and
PITTSBURG 	UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Employer.
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) 	Case 	Nos. 	SF-D-18
SF-D-20
PERB
	Order
	No. 	Ad-49
Administrative
	Appeal
October
	20, 	1978
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_____________________
.)
Appearances: 	Stewart
	Weinberg,
	Attorney
	(Van 	Bourg,
	Allen,
Weinberg 	& Roger)
	for
	United 	Public
	Employees, 	Local
	390, 	SEIU,
AFL-CIO; 	Henry L.
	Clarke, 	General
	Manager
	for 	Public
	Employees
Union, 	Local
	l;
	Sal
	P.
	Cardinale,
	Deputy
	Superintendent
	for
Pittsburg
	Unified 	School
	District;
	and Ann 	Stombs, 	Deputy
	FieldDirector 	for 	California
	School 	Employees
	Association,
	Pittsburg
Chapter 	44.
Before 	Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Cossack 	Twohey 	and 	Gonzales, 	Members.
DECISION
United 	Public
	Employees, 	Local 	390, 	SEIU, 	AFL-CIO
	(hereafter
SEID) 	appeals 	the 	decision 	of 	the
	San 	Francisco 	regional 	director
granting 	Public 	Employees 	Union, 	Local 	1
	(hereafter 	Local 	1) 	10
days 	to 	perfect 	its
	showing 	of 	employee 	support 	for 	a
	decertifi-
cation 	petition 	filed
	by Local 	1.

FACTS
California
	School
	Employees
	Association,
	Pittsburg
	Chapter
	44
(hereafter
	CSEA),
	the 	exclusive
	representative
	of
	a
	unit
	of
	classi-
fied
	employees, 	had
	negotiated
	a
	contract
	with
	Pittsburg
	Unified
School
	District
	(hereafter
	District)
	which
	expired
	on
	June
	30, 	1978.
Both
	SEIU and
	Local
	1
	filed
	dece.rtification
	petitions.
	The
San
	Francisco
	regional
	director
	determined
	that
	Local
	l's
	showing
of
	support
	was
	deficient.
	He
	notified
	Local
	1
	of
	the
	deficiency
and
	granted
	it
	10
	calendar
	days
	in
	which
	to
	perfect
	its
	showing
	of
support.
	Local
	1
	submitted
	sufficient
	additional 	signatures 	within
the
	allotted
	10
	days.
	The
	regional
	director
	scheduled
	a
	decertifi-
cation 	election
	to
	be
	held
	on
	June
	1,
	1978.
1
SEIU
	appealed, 	contending
	that
	the
	regional
	director
	had
	erred
in 	granting
	Local
	1 	an
	extension
	of
	time
	within
	which
	to
	perfect
its
	showing
	of 	support.
	CSEA
	also
	contends
	that
	Local
	l's
	petition
is
	invalid.
We
	agree
	that
	the
	regional 	director
	improperly
	granted
	Local
	1
additional
	time
	within
	which
	to 	perfect
	its
	proof 	of 	support
	and
that
	Local
	l's
	petition
	is
	invalid.
	We
	further 	find
	that
	SEIU's
petition 	is
	also 	invalid
	because
	the 	signatures
	submitted
	in
	support
of 	the
	petition
	are
	undated. 	Accordingly,
	we
	dismiss 	both
	petitions.
DISCUSSION
The
	Board's
	rules
	and
	regulations2 	contain
	no
	provision 	afford-
ing 	an
	extension 	of
	time
	to
	one 	employee
	organization 	seeking 	to
decertify
	another.
	The
	rules
	governing 	Educational
	Employment
1SEIU
	filed
	an 	appeal 	requesting
	a
	stay 	of 	the
	decertificationelection 	until 	after
	the
	Board
	itself
	rules
	on
	the
	instant
	appeal
regarding
	Local
	l's
	right 	to 	appear
	on
	the 	election 	ballot.
	The
Board
	itself
	ordered
	a
	stay 	of 	the 	election 	in 	Pittsburg 	UnifiedSchool
	District
	(5/26/78)
	PERB
	Order
	No. 	Ad-34.
2The
	Board's 	rules 	are 	codified 	at
	Cal.
	Admin. 	Code,
	tit.
	8,
sec.
	31100
	et
	seq.
-2-

Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	EERA)
3
representation
	matters 	are
	contained
in 	chapter
	3. 	There
	are
	two
	sections
	in
	chapter
	3
which
	provide
employee
	organizations
	an
	opportunity
	to 	perfect
	a
	deficient
	showing
of 	support.
	Both
	sections 	are
	contained
	in
	article
	2
	of 	chapter
	3,
entitled
	11
	"Request
	for
	Recognition
	and
	Intervention.
4
Neither
article
	5
	of 	chapter
	3,
	entitled, "Decertification
	Petition,"
	nor
article
	1,
	entitled
	"General
	Provisions,"
	make
	any
	reference 	to
extensions 	of
	time
	for 	perfecting
	a
	deficient
	showing
	of
	support.
Thus,
	while 	the 	Board's
	rules
	allow
	employee
	organizations
	initially
seeking 	to 	represent.employees
	to
	perfect
	a
	deficient
	showing
	of
support,
	they
	do
	not
	afford
	a
	similar
	opportunity
to	
an 	employee
organization
	seeking
	to 	replace
	an
	incumbent. 	This
	distinction
is
	neither
	inadvertant
	nor
	arbitrary.
In 	the
	first
	instance,
	no
	purpose
	would 	be
	served
	by
	denying
a
	petitioning
	organization
	an
	opportunity 	to
	perfect
	its
	showing
3The
	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	EERA)
is
	codified
	at
	Government 	Code
	section
	3540
	et
	seq. 	All
	statutory
references 	hereafter
	are 	to 	the
	Government 	Code
	unless 	otherwise
specified.
4
There
	are
	two
	sections 	of
	article
	2,
	33055 	and 	33075, 	which
the 	regional 	director
	to 	allow
	an 	employee
	organization
	up
	to
	10
calendar
	days
	to 	perfect
	its
	proof 	of 	support.
	The
	text 	of 	these
two
	sections
	is 	identical.
	They
	state,
	in 	pertinent 	part,
(a) 	Within
	20
	calendar
	days
	of 	the 	date 	of 	receipt
of 	the 	request, 	unless 	otherwise
	directed
	by
	theRegional
	Director, 	the
	employer
	shall
	file
	with 	the
regional 	office
	an
	alphabetical
	list,
	including 	job
titles
	or
	classifications,
	of
	employees 	employed
	inthe 	claimed
	unit
	on
	the 	date 	the 	request 	for
recognition
	was
	filed
	with 	the
	employer.
(b)
	If, 	after 	initial
	determination, 	the
	showing
is 	insufficient 	the 	Regional 	Director
	may
	allowup
	to
	10
	calendar
	days 	to 	perfect 	the
	showing
	ofsupport
•...
-3-

of
	support.
	If
	the
	initial
	petition
	were
	dismissed, 	the
would
	merely
	refile
	with
	an
	augmented 	showing.
	All
	that
would 	have 	been
	accomplished
	is
	a
	needless
	exchange
	of
	paper.
organi-
zation
The
	second
	circumstance,
	however,
	requires
	a
	balance
	between
the
	right
	of
	employees
	to
	be
	represented
	by
	an
	organization 	of
their
	choosing
	and
	the
	maintenance
	of
	stability
	in
	employer-
employee
	relations.
The
	EERA
	itself
	seeks
	to 	balance 	these
	competing
	interests.
Sections 	3544.l(c)
5
and
	3544.7(b)(1)
6
provide
	that
	an
	employee
organization
	may
	not
	file
	a
	request 	for 	recognition
	during 	the
	term
of
	an
	existing
	agreement 	between
	an 	employer 	and 	an
	exclusive 	repre-
sentative,	
except 	during
	a
	prescribed 	period 	of
	time
	of
	more
	than
5
Section 	3544.l(c) 	provides:
The
	public
	school
	employer
	shall
	grant
	a
reauest
	for 	recognition
	filed
	pursuant 	toSection
	3544
	unless:
••eeca•••i»-e••••eoeooctce
(c)
	There
	is 	currently
	in
	effect
	a
	lawful
written
	agreement
	negotiated
	by
	the 	publicschool
	employer
	and
	another
	employee
organization
	covering
	any 	employees
	included
in 	the
	unit
	described 	in 	the 	request 	for
recognition, 	unless 	the
	reauest
	for
recognition
	is 	filed 	less
	than.120 	days, 	but
more
	than
	90
	days, 	prior 	to 	the 	expiration
date 	of 	the
	agreement
••••
6
Section 	3544.7(b)
(1) 	provides:
(b)
	No
	election 	shall
	be
	held
	and
	the
petition 	shall
	be 	dismissed •••
(1)
•••
	unless
the 	request 	for 	recognition 	is 	filed 	less
than
	120
	days, 	but
	more
	than
	90
	days, 	priorto 	the 	expiration 	date 	of 	the 	agreement
••••

90
	but 	less
	than
	120
	days
	prior
	to 	the
	expiration
	date 	of 	the
agreement.
	Section
	3544.5(d)
7
permits
	employees 	and 	employee
organizations
	to 	seek 	to 	expel
	an 	incumbent
	organization 	or
replace
	an 	incumbent
	with
	anothe~
	organization.
	Both
	a
	request
for 	recognition
	and
	a
	decertification 	petition raise
	a
	question
of
	representation
•.
	Section
	3544.
7
(a)
8
grants 	the
	Board
	broad
authority
	to 	resolve_questions
	of 	representation.
	Inherent
	in
this
	broad
	authority
	is
	the
	necessity
	of
	establishing
	when
	and
how 	a
	question 	of 	representation
may
	be
	raised.
Stable
	employer-employee
	relations
	are
	undermined
	if
	employees
or
	competin,g
	organizations
	are 	free
	at
	any
	time
	to 	seek	
to	
displace
7
Section
	3544.S{d)
	authorizes
	the
	filing
	of
	a
decertification 	petition, 	stating:
A
petition
	may 	be
	filed
	with 	the 	board,
	in
accordance 	with
	its
	rules
	and
	regulations,reauesting
	it
	to
	investigate
	and
	decide 	the
auestion 	of
	whether
	employees 	have
	selected
or
	wish
	to
	select
	an
	exclusive
representative
	or 	to 	determine 	the
appropriateness
. . . . . of
	a
	unit,
	by:
. 	. . . 	. 	. . 	. . . 	. . 	. 	. 	. . .(d)
	An
	employee
	organization
	alleaina 	that
the
	employees
	in
	an
	appropriate 	unit-nolon9er ·aesire
	a
	particular
	employee
organization
	as
	their
	exclusive
representative,
	provided
	that
	such
	petitionis
	supported 	by 	current
	dues
	deduction
authorizations
	or 	other 	evidence 	such 	as
notarized
	membership
	lists,
	cards,
	or
petitions
	from 	30
	percent 	of 	the
	employees
in 	the 	negotiating 	unit 	indicating 	support
for 	another 	organization 	or 	lack 	of 	support
for 	the 	incumbent
	exclusive 	representative.
8
section 	3544.7(a) 	provides, 	in 	pertinent 	part:
(a) 	Upon
	receipt 	of
	a
	petition 	filed 	pursuant
to 	Section 	3544.3 	or 	3544.5, 	the 	board 	shallconduct 	such 	inquiries
	and 	investigations 	or
hold 	such hearings 	as
	it 	shall
	deem necessary
in 	order 	to 	decide 	the 	questions 	raised 	by 	the
petition •... 
-5-

an
	incumbent
	exclusive
	representative.
	·This
	is 	particularly
	true
during 	the
	last
	days
	of
	an
	old
	agreement
	and
	during 	the 	time
	when
an
	incumbent
	organization
	is
	striving
	to
	negotiate
	a 	new
	agreement.
Negotiations 	for
	a 	new
agreement 	seldom,
	if
	ever,
	afford
	full
satisfaction
	to
	all
	members
	of
	the
	negotiating
	unit.
Rival
	employee
	organizations
	must 	be
	given
	an
	opportunity
	to
challenge
	an
	exclusive 	represent.ative.
	If,
	however,
	the 	challeng-
ing 	organization
	does
	not
	have
	the
	requisite
	support
	among
	unit
members
	at
	the
	time
	it
	makes
	the 	challenge, 	the
	incumbent	
organi-
zation	
should
	be
	afforded 	the 	opportunity 	to
	negotiate
	a 	new
agreement
	free
	from
	the 	continuing
	threat,
	and
	concomitant
uncertainty,
	of 	challenge
	by 	a
	rival
	organization.
	Since 	Local
	l's
petition
was
	not
	accompanied 	by
	a
	sufficient
	showing
	of
	support
at
	the
	time
	it
	was
	filed,
	it
	is
	dismissed.
SEIU's
	petition 	is
	also
	deficient
	and must 	be
	dismissed.
	As
set 	forth
	above,
	the 	Board's
	rules
	governing
	EERA
	representation
matters 	are
	set
_forth
	in
	chapter 	3.
	Article
	1
	of 	that
	chapter
is 	entitled
	"General
	Provisions."
	The
	rules
	contained
	in
	article
	1
are 	applicable
	to
	all
	subsequent
	rules 	in
	the 	chapter. 	Section
33030
	of
	article
	1,
	entitled
	"Proof
	of
	Majority 	Support
	or
	at
Least
	30
	Percent 	Support,"
	states,
	in 	pertinent 	part,
(c)
	Each 	form
	of 	proof, 	excluding
	a
notarized
	membership
	list,
	shall 	indicatethe 	date
	on which 	each
	signature
	was
	obtained.
~	
si~1;-ature which
	is
	undated
...
shal}
	be
1.nva
	1.d
	for 	the 	ur 	ose 	of 	calculat1.nproo
	o
	support....
	Emphasis 	adde
	.)
None
	of 	the 	signatures 	submitted
	by 	SEID
	in
	support 	of
	its
petition 	is
	dated.
	It
	is
	impossible 	to 	ascertain
	from
	the 	proof
of 	support
	itself
	when 	any
	of 	the 	signatory
	employees
	signed 	the
declarations 	in 	support 	of
	SEID. 	The
	purpose 	of 	requiring 	dated
designations 	is 	basically 	to
	make
	certain 	that 	the 	signatory
employees
	currently wish 	to 	be 	represented 	by 	the 	organization
designated 	and 	to 	preclude 	stale 	claims 	of 	representation.
-6-

No
	party 	to 	the
	instant
	case 	questioned
	SEIU's
	showing
	of
support.
	However,
	verification
	of
	the
	sufficiency 	of
	an
	employee
organization's
	showing
	of
	support
	is
	solely
	within 	the 	Board's
jurisdiction.
	Section
	3544.S(d)
	of
	the
	EERA,
	as
	amended,
	requires
that
	the
	showing
	of
	support
	shall
	be
	submitted
	to
	the
	Board,
	and
that
	the
	Board
	shall
	not
	disclose
	it
	to
	anyone
	else.
	Thus,
	only
the
	Board 	and
	its
	agents
	are
	able 	to
	determine
	the
	validity
	of
an
	employee
	organization's
	showipg
	of
	support. 	Accordingly,
	we
dismiss
	SEIU's
	petition.
9
ORDER
The
	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
	ORDERS
	that:
The
	decertification 	petition 	filed
	by
	Public
	Employees 	Union,
Local 	1,
	is
	dismissed.
The
	decertification 	petition 	filed
	by
	United
	Public
	Employees,
Local
	390, 	SEIU, 	AFL-CIO,
	is
	dismissed.
.....----,
'By;./'	
Jerilou
	Cossack
	Twohey, 	Member
Raymond
	J.
	Gonzales,
	Member,
	dissenting:
The
	majority 	finds
	that
	because 	the
	si$r:>:c:1;ur~s 	on
	the 	petitions
9
our
	dissenting
	colleague 	argues
	that
	because 	the
	regional
director notified
	SEIU, 	and
	all
	other
	parties, 	that
	SEIU
had
	a
sufficient
	showing
	of
	support 	for
	its
	petition,
	the
	Board
	is
	estoppedfrom
	finding 	the
	petition 	invalid.
	Our
	colleague
	has
	misconstrued
the 	doctrine 	of 	estoppel. 	Equitable 	estoppel 	requires 	the 	pre-
sence 	of
	all
	the 	following 	elements:
	(1) 	a
	representation 	or
concealment
	of material 	facts,
	(2) 	made
	with
	knowledge
	of 	the 	fact,
(3)
	to
	a
	party 	ignorant 	of
	the
	truth,
	(4)
	with 	the 	actual 	or
virtual
	intention 	that
	the 	ignorant 	party 	rely 	thereon,
	(5) 	and
inducement 	of 	the 	ignorant 	party 	to
	act
	on
	the 	represented
	facts.City 	of
Long 	Beach
	v. 	Mansell 	(1970) 	3
Cal.3d
	462, 	488-89 	[91
Cal.Rptr.
	23, 	476
	P.2d 	423];
	Domarad
v. 	Fisher	
& 	Burke,
	Inc.
	(1969)
270
	Cal.App.2d 	543, 	555 	[76
	Cal.Rptr. 	529];
	California Milling
Corpo
	v. 	White 	(1964) 	229
	Cal.App.2d 	469, 	479 	[40
	Cal.Rptr. 	301].See
	also 	Cal. 	Evid. 	Code
	section
	623. 	The
	regional 	director 	inthe 	instant 	case 	did not 	have 	access 	to 	facts
	unknown
	to
	SEIU.
Both 	knew,
	or 	should have known,
	that 	the 	signatures 	submittedwere 	undated. 	Both were, 	or 	should have 	been, 	aware
	that 	Board
rule
	33030(c) 	requires 	signatures 	to 	be 	dated. 	The
	regional 	director'smistake 	in 	accepting 	undated 	signatures 	could not 	rectify 	SEIU's
mistake 	in 	submitting 	them 	in 	the 	first 	placeo 	Moreover, 	the
dissent 	ignores 	the 	Board's 	responsibility 	to 	correct 	the 	error
of 	its 	agents 	and 	to 	protect the 	right 	of 	the 	incumbent 	employee
organization 	to 	be 	free 	from 	improper 	decertiffcation 	pe-tTt1.ons •...,

submitted
	by
	SEIU
	in
	support
	of
	its
	decertification
	petition
	areundated,
	SEIU's
	decertification 	petition 	is
	invalid.
	I
	disagree.
Section
	33030(c)
	of
	the 	Board's
	rules,
	quoted
	in
	part
	by
	the
majority,
	provides:
(c)
	Each form
	of
	proof,
	excluding
	a
	notarized
membership
	list,
	shall-
	indicate
	the 	date
	on
whicheach
	signature
was
	obtained.	
A	
signature
which
is
	undated
	or
	which
	indicates
	that
	it
	was
	obtained
earlier
	than
	one
	calendar 	year
	prior
	to 	the
	filing
of
	the
	request 	or 	intervention
	with 	the
	employer
shall
	be
	invalid 	for
	the
	purpose
	of
	calculating
proof
	of
	support. 	In 	the 	case
	of
	a
	notarized
membership
	list,
	the
	list
	shall
	be
	dated 	not
	e~rlier
than
	one
	calendar year
	prior
	to 	the 	date
	of
	filing
and
	shall
	[be]
	certified
	as
	accurate.
	(Emphasis
	added).
The
	majority
	argues
	that
	because
	section
	33030
	falls
	under 	the
heading
	of
	"General
	Provisions"
	it
	is
	applicable
	to
	all
	situations
wherein 	proof
	of
	support
	is
	required.
	General
	provisions 	are
applicable
	only
	insofar
	as
	the
	language
	contained within
	such
provisions 	permit
	them
	to
	be.
	The
	majority 	conveniently 	ignores
the
	plain
	language
	of
	subdivision
	(c) 	which
	refers 	specifically
and
	solely
	to 	requests 	for 	recognition
	and
	intervention
	petitions.
That
	subdivision
	does
	not 	consider
	decertification 	petitions.
Thus,
	while 	the
	Board may
	have
	intended 	the 	dating 	requirement 	to
also
	apply 	to
	decertification 	petitions,
	it
would 	be
	unfair
	to
suddenly
	impose
	that
	requirement
	on 	SEIU
	given 	the
	clear 	language
of 	rule
	33030(c) 	and
	the 	absence
	of
	any 	comparable
	section 	in 	the
Board's 	rules
	regarding
	decertification 	petitions.
	Such 	a
requirement 	should 	only be 	imposed by 	an 	unambiguous
	rule 	with
prospective 	application.
	To
	do
	otherwise,
	I
	believe, 	denies
	SEIU
a
	fundamental 	element
	of
	due
	process,
	that 	of notice.
•
Alternatively,
	assuming
	for 	the 	sake
	of
	argument 	a
	reading
of 	rule
	33030(c) 	could be
	interpreted 	to 	apply 	to
	decertification
petitions
	as 	well 	(and
	this
	would be 	a
	strained 	reading 	of 	that
provision 	in
	view of 	the 	above), 	I 	would 	argue
	that 	the 	Board
is 	estopped 	from 	finding 	the 	SEIU
	petition 	invalid. 	In 	a
	letter
dated
	May 	5, 	1978, 	an 	agent 	of 	the 	Board
	notified
	SEIU
	that 	its
-8-

decertification 	petition
	was.acceptable.
1
In
	making
	this
representation,
	the 	Board's 	agent
	was
	fully
	apprised
	of 	the 	facts
surrounding 	the 	case.
	She was 	aware
	that
	the
	employee
	organization
had
	submitted 	the
	decertification 	petition
	to 	her
	for
	approval;
that
	she
	was
	required
	to
	notify
	the
	union
	of
	the
	acceptability
	or
unacceptability 	of
	the
	petition;
	and
	that
	SEIU would
	rely
	upon
	her
representation
	as	
to	
the
	petition's
	validity.
It
	has 	been
well
	over 	four
	months
	since
	this
	case
	came
	to 	the
attention
	of
	the
	Board.
	I
	have
	no 	~oubt
	~hat
	SEIU,
	relying
	on
	the
Board
	agent's 	representation
	that
	its
	petition
	for
	decertification
was
	adequate,
	can
	demonstrate
	an
	expenditure
	of
	time,
	money, 	and
energy
	in 	anticipation 	of
	its
	participation
	in
	a
	decertification
election.
	Nor 	do 	I
	doubt
	that
	such
	reliance
	is 	justified.
2
As
noted
	above,
	neither 	section
	33030(c)
	nor
	any
	other 	provision 	of
the
	rules 	specifically 	requires
	dated
	signatures
	on
	decertification
petitions.
	In
	view
	of 	this
	ambiguity,
	it
	would 	be
	ludicrous 	to
assert
	that
	SEIU knew
	or
	should
	have
	known
	that
	its
	petition
required
	dated 	s~gnatures.
1
In 	the
	letter,
	addressed 	to
	all
	the
	parties 	in 	this
	case,the
	Board
	agent
	stated:
Review
	of
	the
	showing
	submitted
	by
	both 	theUnited
	Public
	Employees, 	Local 	390, 	SEIU,
AFL-CIO 	and 	by
	the 	Public
	Employee 	Union,
Local
	No. 	l
	in 	support
	of
	those
	petitions
has
	resulted 	in 	the 	administrative 	determination
that
	they 	are
	sufficient
	to
	meet
	the 	requirements
of 	section
	33030(b)
	of 	the
	PERB
	rules
	and
regulations.
2
Although 	a
	similar 	representation 	of
	adequacy 	was 	made
	toLocal
	No. 	1
	in 	the 	Board
	agent's
	letter
	dated
	May
	5, 	1978, 	I
would
	find
	its
	reliance 	to
	be
	unjustified.
	As
	the 	majority
opinion 	points 	out, 	the 	Board's 	rules
	and
	regulations 	are 	devoid
of
	any 	provision 	affording
	an
	extension 	of
	time 	to 	one 	employee
organization 	seeking 	to 	decertify 	another. 	Further,
	on
	the 	verysame 	day 	Local 	No.
	l's
	showing
	of 	support was 	determined 	to 	be
adequate, 	SEIU's 	appeal was
	filed 	placing 	the 	validity 	of 	LocalNo.
	l's
	petition 	in 	issue.
	Thus
	it
	would 	have 	been 	imprudent
for 	Local 	No. 	1 	to 	rely 	solely
	on 	the 	Board
	agent's 	representationas 	to 	the 	validity 	of 	its 	petition.
-9-

The
11
doctrine
	of 	equitable
	estoppel
	may
	be
	applied
	against
the
	government 	where
justice
	and
	right
	require
11
it.
3
Numerous
cases
	have
	applied
	it
	under 	circumstances
	similar
	to 	those
	here
where
	an
	agent
	of
	the
	public
	entity
has
	made
	representations
	to
an
	individual
	causing
	him
	to
	act
	or not
	act
	to
	his
	detriment.
4
Basic
	notions
	of
	justice
	and
	fair
	play
	require
	that
	we
	not
	allow
SEIU	
to	
suffer
	for
	its
	relying
	on a
	representation
	made
	to
	it
	by
one
	of 	this
	Board's 	agents.
Lastly,
	I
	believe
	the
	Board
	could
have
	protected
	its
	processes
short 	of 	declaring
	SEIU's
	petition
	invalid
	as
	it
	does
	today.
	It
could
	have
	ascertained
whether
	or 	not
	the
	signatures 	submitted
by
SEIU
were
	current.
	The 	Board
	could
	have
	required
	SEIU
	to
	either
submit
	a
	declaration
	to 	the
	effect 	that
	the signatures
	on
	its
showing
	of
	support
	were
	current 	or 	to
	submit
	affidavits 	of
	the
signatories
	themselves
	to 	the
	effect 	that
	they
	had
	signed
	SEIU's
petition
within 	the 	current 	year.
On
	the
basis
	of
	the 	foregoing,
	I
	cannot
	find
	SEIU's
	petition
to 	be
	invalid.
	Rather, 	the
	majority
	has
	erred 	in
	denying
	SEIU
	its
fundamental
	right
	of
	due
	process.
~a)71116nd
	J.
	,.,Meniber	
~ails',
3c·
:i.ty o f 	Long 	Beach
v. 	Mansell 	(1973) 	3
	Cal.3d
	462,
	493.
4
see
	Rand
	v. 	Andreatta
	(1964) 	60
	Cal.2d
	846, 	where
	the
	Courth71~
	that
	estoppe~
	may 	b~	
used
	in
	a
	proper 	case 	to 	excuse
	the
	late
f 1l~ng 	~f 	the 	clai~s 	against 	public
	entities
	or 	the
	filing 	of
	such
c 	aims
	in
	a
	defective
	form. 	(Emphasis 	added) . 	See
	also
	Farrell
	v.
County
	of 	Pl~cer
	(1944)
	23
	Cal.2d
	624, 	and
	Cruisev.
	City 	and 	County
of 	San 	Francisco
	(1951) 	101 	Cal.App.2d 	558. 	-
-10-

---
STATE
Of
CALIFORNIA EDMUND
G. !ROWN JR., Govern
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 	BOARD
Son Francisco Regional Office
177 Post St., 9ih Floor
Son Francisco, California 	94108
(415) 557-1350
April
	25,
	1978
Mr.
	David
V.
	Platt
Public
Employees Union,
	Local
1
P.O.	
Box 222
Martinez,
	California	
94533
RE:
	SF-D-20
Dear
Mr.
	Platt:
The
	decertification petition filed
by
Local
1
	for	
a	
unit of
	classified
employees
	(Unit
A) 	was
	received by
	the
Pittsburg
Unified
School
District
on
or
about
March 28,
	1978.
Review
of
	the
	showing
submitted
	in
support of
your
request 	for
	recognition
has
	resulted
in.
the following
	initial
determination:
·
1.	
Unit
size
per
employer as
	of
March 28, 	1978
==
184
2. 	Su£port
required
	to
	qualify
	=
	55
3. 	Valid support submitted
	= 	52
4.	
Valid support
	still
	required
	= 	3
You
	are
hereby
	granted
10
	calendar
days
	in
which
	to
	perfect
	your showing
	of
support. 	Please note
	that
any such augmentation
must be	
received
	by
	this
office
within
10
calendar
	da~s
	of receipt
	of
	this
	letter.
Should
you
have any
questions concerning
this
matter, 	please contact
Jerilyn
Gelt.
Sincerely,
James
	W.
	Tamm
Regional Director
\Jerilyn
Gelt
Regional Representative
JG:JT:pa