Bakersfield City School District (PERB 1262E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES )

ASSOCIATION, )
Charging Party, ) Case No. LA-CE-3691
Vv. )’ PERB Decision No. 1262
BAKERSFIELD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) April 28, 1998
Respondent.
)
Appearances: Alan S. Hersh, Staff Attorney, for California

School Employees Association; Breon, O'Donnell, Miller, Brown &
Dannis by David G. Miller and Ivette Perfa, Attorneys, for
Bakersfield City School District.
Before Caffrey, Chairman; Johnson and Dyer, Members.
DECISION

JOHNSON, Member: This case is before the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the
Bakersfield City School District (District) to an administrative
law judge's (ALJ) proposed decision (attached). In the proposed
decision, the ALJ found that the District violated section

3543.5(a), (b) and (c) of the Educational Employment Relations

Act (EERA)* when it: (1) refused to provide the California

“EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the
Government Code. Section 3543.5 states, in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for a public school
employer to do any of the following:

(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of rights

School 	Employees 	Association 	(CSEA) 	with 	information necessary
and 	relevant 	to 	its 	representational 	duty; 	and 	(2) 	unilaterally
changed 	the mechanics 	of 	the 	release 	of 	unit members' 	home
addresses 	and phone 	numbers.
The 	Board has 	reviewed 	the 	entire 	record, 	including
the 	proposed 	decision and hearing 	transcript, 	the 	District's
exceptions 	and 	CSEA's 	response. 	The 	Board 	finds 	the ALJ's
findings 	of 	fact 	and 	conclusions 	of 	law 	to 	be 	free 	of 	prejudicial
error 	and 	adopts 	them as 	the 	decision 	of 	the 	Board 	itself
consistent 	with 	the 	following 	discussion.
DISCUSSION
The 	majority 	of 	the 	District's 	exceptions 	restate 	arguments
thoroughly 	considered 	and properly 	decided by 	the 	ALJ. 	The 	Board
sees 	no 	need 	to 	further 	discuss 	these 	arguments 	on appeal.
The District 	argues 	for 	the 	first 	time 	on appeal 	that 	PERB
lacks 	jurisdiction 	over 	the unilateral 	change 	allegation, 	and
asserts 	that 	the 	allegation 	should be 	dismissed 	and 	deferred 	to
the parties' 	contractual 	grievance procedure under 	the 	test
established 	in Lake 	Elsinore Unified School 	District 	(1987) 	PERB
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter. 	For purposes 	of
this 	subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes 	an
applicant 	for 	employment 	or 	reemployment.
(b) 	Deny 	to 	employee 	organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse 	or 	fail 	to meet 	and negotiate 	in
good 	faith 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
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Decision No. 	646 	(Lake Elsinore) 	and EERA section 3541.5(a)(2),2
Under PERB precedent, 	including Lake Elsinore, 	deferral 	is
appropriate when: 	(1) 	the parties' 	contractual grievance
procedure 	covers 	the matter at 	issue 	and 	culminates 	in binding
arbitration; 	and 	(2) 	the conduct 	complained of 	in the unfair
practice 	charge 	is prohibited by the parties' 	agreement. 	The
Board 	finds 	that 	no provision 	of 	the 	collective bargaining
agreement 	between 	the parties 	arguably prohibits 	the 	conduct
alleged 	in the 	charge and complaint. 	Accordingly, 	the Board
finds 	deferral 	inappropriate 	in this 	case.
Remedy 	for Unilateral 	Change Allegation
We 	affirm the ALJ's 	finding 	of 	a violation on 	the unilateral
change allegation; 	however, 	we are modifying the remedy he
ordered. 	In fashioning a 	remedy for unlawful 	conduct, 	the Board
has 	broad authority 	to 	take 	action which effectuates 	the policies
of 	the EERA. 	In this 	case, 	the ALJ ordered an interim remedy
requiring 	the District 	to 	facilitate 	CSEA's 	communications 	with
unit members 	while 	the parties 	engage 	in negotiations 	over the
mechanism by which the District will 	provide unit members' 	home
addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	to CSEA.
2EERA section 3541.5(a)(2) 	states, 	in pertinent part:..
. 	. 	. 	the board shall not 	. 	. 	. 	[i]ssue a
complaint 	against 	conduct 	also prohibited by
the provisions 	of 	the 	agreement between 	the
parties 	until 	the grievance machinery of 	the
agreement, 	if 	it 	exists and covers 	the matter
at 	issue, 	has been exhausted, 	either by
settlement 	or binding 	arbitration.
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While 	the 	objective 	of 	this 	interim remedy may be
commendable, 	in practical terms, 	it 	interjects 	the Board deeply
into 	the 	internal 	administrative practices 	of 	the District. 	The
Board declines 	to 	take 	that 	remedial 	action in this 	case, 	instead
leaving 	the mechanics 	of 	providing 	the 	information 	in question 	to
the negotiations of the parties. 	Accordingly, 	the remedy is
modified 	as 	described below.
ORDER
Based upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact 	and 	conclusions 	of
law, 	and upon the entire record in this matter, 	the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(Board) 	finds 	that 	the 	Bakersfield
City School 	District 	(District) 	violated the 	Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA), 	Government Code section
3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	The District violated these provisions
of 	EERA on or about April 	2, 	199 6, 	by refusing to provide 	the
California School 	Employees Association 	(CSEA) 	with the home
addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	of 	unit members 	and by unilaterally
changing 	the mechanics 	of 	providing 	such 	information 	to 	CSEA.
This 	conduct 	violated the District's 	duty 	to bargain 	in good
faith with CSEA, 	in violation of EERA section 3543.5(c). 	This
conduct 	also denied CSEA its 	right 	to 	represent unit members 	in
violation of EERA section 3543.5(b). 	This 	conduct also
interfered with 	the 	right 	of 	unit members 	to be 	represented by
CSEA, 	in violation of EERA section 3543.5(a).
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Pursuant 	to EERA section 3541.5(c), 	it 	is hereby ORDERED
that 	the 	District, 	its 	governing board and 	its 	representatives
shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing without 	legal 	justification to provide
CSEA with 	relevant 	and necessary 	information, 	upon a proper
request 	by 	CSEA.
2. 	Making a unilateral 	change 	in the mechanics 	of
providing 	information 	to 	CSEA.
3. 	By the same 	conduct, 	denying CSEA its 	right 	to
represent 	bargaining unit members 	in 	their employment 	relations
with 	the District.
4. 	By the same 	conduct, 	interfering with the 	right 	of
unit members 	to be 	represented by CSEA.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED 	TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF EERA:
1. 	Meet and negotiate with CSEA, 	if 	requested, 	within
10 	days 	following service 	of 	this Decision, 	concerning the
mechanics 	of providing unit members' 	home addresses and phone
numbers 	to 	CSEA, 	including any 	formal 	mechanism for employees 	to
exercise 	their 	rights 	under 	the 	California 	Public Records Act,
Government 	Code 	section 	6254.3.
2. 	Within thirty-five 	(35) 	days 	following the date
this Decision is no longer subject 	to reconsideration, 	post at
all 	work 	locations 	where 	notices 	to 	classified 	employees
customarily are posted, 	copies 	of 	the Notice attached hereto as
an Appendix. 	The 	Notice must 	be 	signed by an authorized agent 	of
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the District, 	indicating that 	the District will 	comply with the
terms 	of 	this 	Order. 	Such posting 	shall 	be maintained 	for a
period of 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive workdays. 	Reasonable 	steps
shall 	be 	taken to 	insure 	that 	this Notice 	is not 	reduced 	in size,
altered, 	defaced or 	covered by any 	other material.
3. 	Upon issuance of 	a 	final 	decision, 	make written
notification of 	the actions 	taken to 	comply with this 	Order to
the 	Sacramento Regional Director 	(Director) 	of 	the Board in
accordance with 	the Director's 	instructions.
Chairman 	Caffrey and Member Dyer 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
6
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APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY 	ORDER OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
An Agency of 	the 	State 	of 	California
After a hearing 	in Unfair Practice Case No. 	LA-CE-3691,
California 	School 	Employees 	Association v. 	Bakersfield City
School District, 	in which all parties had the 	right 	to
participate, 	it 	has 	been 	found 	that 	the Bakersfield City School
District 	(District) 	violated 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations
Act 	(EERA), 	Government Code section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	The
District violated the EERA on or about April 	2, 	1996, 	by refusing
to provide 	the 	California 	School 	Employees Association 	(CSEA)
with 	the 	home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	of unit members 	and by
unilaterally 	changing 	the 	mechanics 	of 	providing 	such 	information
to CSEA.
As 	a result 	of 	this 	conduct, 	we have been ordered to post
this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing without 	legal 	justification to provide
CSEA with relevant 	and necessary information, 	upon a proper
request 	by 	CSEA.
2. 	Making a unilateral 	change 	in the mechanics 	of
providing 	information 	to 	CSEA.
3. 	By the same 	conduct, 	denying CSEA its 	right 	to
represent 	bargaining unit 	members 	in 	their employment 	relations
with 	the District.
4. 	By the same 	conduct, 	interfering with the 	right 	of
unit members 	to be 	represented by 	CSEA.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	EERA:
1. 	Meet and negotiate with CSEA, 	if 	requested, 	within
10 	days 	following service 	of 	this Decision, 	concerning the
mechanics 	of providing unit members' 	home addresses 	and phone
numbers 	to CSEA, 	including any 	formal mechanism for employees 	to
exercise 	their 	rights under the 	California 	Public Records Act,
Government 	Code 	section 	6254.3;
Dated: 	BAKERSFIELD 	CITY 	SCHOOL
DISTRICT
By: Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED 	FOR AT LEAST
THIRTY 	(3 0) 	CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE REDUCED 	IN SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED, 	OR COVERED WITH
ANY 	OTHER MATERIAL.

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
BAKERSFIELD 	CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	LA-CE-3691
PROPOSED DECISION
(8/15/97)
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Appearances: 	Alan S. 	Hersh, 	Staff Attorney, 	for California
School Employees Association; 	Breon, 	O'Donnell, 	Miller, 	Brown &
Dannis, 	by David G. 	Miller and Ivette Pena, 	Attorneys, 	for
Bakersfield 	City 	School 	District.
Before Thomas J. 	Allen, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
In this 	case, 	a union alleges 	that 	a school 	district
unlawfully withheld 	from the 	union 	the 	home 	addresses 	and home
phone numbers 	of 	employees. 	The 	school 	district maintains 	its
conduct was 	lawful.
On June 21, 	1996, 	the California School Employees
Association 	(CSEA) 	filed an unfair practice 	charge 	against 	the
Bakersfield City School District 	(District). 	On July 29, 	1996,
the 	Office 	of 	the 	General 	Counsel 	of 	the 	Public 	Employment
Relations Board 	(PERB) 	issued a complaint, 	alleging that 	on or
about April 	2, 	1996, 	the District 	had refused to 	supply CSEA with
employee 	home 	addresses 	and home phone 	numbers 	without 	employee
authorization.1 The 	complaint 	alleged 	the 	District's 	refusal
1The complaint 	also 	alleged 	the 	District 	refused 	to 	supply
certain other employee 	information, 	including social 	security
numbers, 	but 	in its 	reply brief CSEA withdrew those portions 	of

represented 	(1) 	an unlawful 	refusal 	to provide 	information that
was 	relevant 	and necessary to 	CSEA's 	discharge 	of 	its 	duty to
represent 	employees 	and 	(2) 	an unlawful 	unilateral 	change 	in
policy.
On August 	19, 	1996, 	the District 	filed an answer to the
complaint. 	On October 23, 	1996, 	PERB held an informal 	settlement
conference with the parties, 	but 	the matter was 	not 	resolved. 	On
February 19, 	20 and 21, 	1997, 	PERB conducted a formal hearing.
After the 	filing of post-hearing briefs, 	the matter was 	submitted
for decision on July 3, 	1997.2
FINDINGS 	OF 	FACT
The 	District 	is 	a public 	school 	employer under the
Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA) .3 CSEA is an
employee 	organization under 	EERA and 	is 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	three units 	of 	the 	District's 	classified
employees.
The 	District 	and 	CSEA are parties 	to 	a negotiated agreement
(Agreement) 	for the term July 1, 	1995, 	through June 30, 	1998.
its 	charge. 	The District 	has not 	objected to this withdrawal.
Pursuant 	to PERB Regulation 32625, 	I 	determine 	the withdrawal
shall be with prejudice. 	In this proposed decision, 	I 	shall
therefore make 	findings 	of 	fact 	and conclusions 	of 	law only as
relevant 	to 	the 	issues 	involving addresses 	and phone numbers.
(PERB regulations are codified at Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	31001 and following.)
2By a 	letter dated July 9, 	1997, 	the District 	requested time
to brief 	a 	"new issue" 	in CSEA's reply brief, 	but 	the District
later withdrew this request, 	by a letter dated July 17, 	1997.
3EERA is codified at Government Code section 3 54 0 and
following. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references
are 	to the Government 	Code.
22

The Agreement 	does 	not 	address 	CSEA's 	rights 	to 	request 	and
receive 	information, 	the District's 	rights 	to withhold
information, 	or the 	rights of 	employees 	to have 	information
withheld. 	The Agreement 	(in Article 	3.2) 	does give 	CSEA the
right 	to post notices 	on designated bulletin boards, 	subject 	to
immediate 	removal 	by District 	management 	of 	information 	that 	is
"false or defamatory." 	The Agreement 	(in Article 	3.3) 	also gives
CSEA the 	right 	to use 	the 	District 	mail 	service 	and mail 	boxes
for communications 	to unit members, 	with the condition that 	the
District 	superintendent 	must 	be 	provided with material 	intended
for 	"general 	CSEA distribution." 	The Agreement 	(in Article 	3.5)
also provides 	for payment 	to 	CSEA of 	agency 	fees 	by unit 	members
who 	are not 	CSEA members.
In 1992, 	the 	California State Legislature amended section
6254.3 	of 	the 	California 	Public 	Records Act 	(Public 	Records Act
or PRA).4 This 	section previously applied to the 	home 	addresses
and phone numbers of 	state employees 	only. 	As 	amended, 	the
section 	states 	in relevant part 	as 	follows 	(with the 	new language
underlined):
(a) 	The home 	addresses 	and home 	telephone
numbers 	of 	state employees 	and employees 	of 	a
school 	district 	or 	county office 	of 	education
shall 	not 	be deemed to be public 	records 	and
shall 	not 	be open to public 	inspection,
except 	that 	disclosure 	of 	that 	information
may be made 	as 	follows:
(3) 	To an employee organization pursuant 	to
regulations 	and decisions 	of 	the 	Public
4The 	Public 	Records Act 	is 	codified at 	section 	6250 	and
following.
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Employment Relations Board, 	except 	that 	the
home 	addresses 	and home 	telephone 	numbers 	of
employees 	performing 	law 	enforcement-related
functions 	shall 	not 	be 	disclosed.
(b) 	Upon written request of any employee, 	a
state agency, 	school district, 	or county
office 	of 	education 	shall 	not 	disclose 	the
employee's 	home 	address 	or home 	telephone
number pursuant 	to paragraph 	(3) 	of
subdivision 	(a) 	and an agency shall 	remove
the 	employee's 	home 	address 	and home
telephone 	number 	from 	any mailing 	list
maintained by the 	agency, 	except 	if 	the 	list
is 	used exclusively by the 	agency 	to 	contact
the employee.
None 	of 	the District's witnesses 	testified as 	to when they became
aware 	of 	this 	amendment. 	CSEA's Labor Relations Representative
(Representative) 	testified she had known about 	it 	since 	the
amendment was made.
On an annual basis 	since 	1993, 	the 	CSEA Representative
requested from the District, 	and the District provided, 	a 	list 	of
unit members' 	home addresses and phone numbers. 	The 	last 	such
complete 	list was provided to CSEA in April 	1995. 	That 	list
appears 	to give 	the 	home 	addresses 	(or post 	office boxes) 	and
phone numbers of 	all 	the unit members; 	none of 	the addresses or
phone numbers 	is 	listed as 	confidential.
On approximately a quarterly basis 	since 	1994, 	the 	local
CSEA treasurer 	requested 	from the 	District, 	and 	the 	District
provided, 	a 	list 	of unit 	members 	that 	included their home
addresses.5 The 	last 	such complete 	list 	in evidence was 	dated
5The 	treasurer 	testified 	she would have 	liked 	such 	a 	list
every month but 	"we made 	a deal" 	that 	the District 	"would give 	it
to me 	every three months 	or 	something 	like 	that."
44

October 18, 	1995, 	and appears to include all the unit members'
home addresses 	(or post office boxes), 	with none 	listed as
confidential.6 The 	treasurer 	testified 	these 	lists 	were 	provided
within a week or so of her requests.
On February 22, 	1994, 	the District 	sent out 	a 	survey to 	its
principals 	and department 	heads, 	on the 	subject 	of 	a possible
District 	directory. 	The principals 	and department 	heads 	were
asked to 	talk to their staffs 	and to report, 	among other things,
the 	numbers 	of 	employees 	who would authorize publication of 	their
home addresses 	and phone numbers, 	their home addresses only, 	or
their phone 	numbers 	only. 	Based on the 	responses 	to 	the 	survey,
the 	District 	concluded, 	"Most 	employees 	surveyed would not
authorize publication of 	their home 	address 	and/or phone 	number."
The 	District 	therefore decided not 	to publish a directory. 	The
CSEA Representative was 	unaware 	of 	this 	survey, 	which had no
apparent 	effect 	on 	the District's 	practice 	of providing 	CSEA with
employees' 	addresses and phone numbers.
The 	District's 	director 	of 	personnel 	services 	testified 	that
at 	an unspecified time 	the 	District 	did a 	survey of 	part-time
employees 	to 	determine 	their preferences 	with regard 	to 	a
possible 	option to 	select 	a defined benefit plan 	in 	lieu of
social 	security. 	A written 	survey asked questions 	of 	individual
6The 	only apparent 	anomaly was 	the 	street 	address 	of
employee 	Cynthia Sanchez, 	which was 	listed simply as 	"G" 	on the
list dated October 18, 	1995. 	No explanation for this 	listing has
been given. 	Cynthia 	Sanchez's 	full 	address was 	listed on earlier
and 	later lists given to CSEA; 	it 	appears 	she moved sometime
between a list dated May 15, 	1995, 	and a list dated August 	6,
1996. 	I 	attribute no particular significance to the anomaly.
UT	
5

employees, 	who returned the 	survey to the District. 	There was no
evidence 	as 	to the 	results or effects of 	this 	survey.
On January 19, 	1996, 	CSEA Representative Jonnie 	Parker
(Parker) 	sent a letter to Michael Lingo 	(Lingo), 	the District's
director of personnel 	services. 	The 	letter began as 	follows:
As 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	a 	(the)
bargaining unit(s) 	in Bakersfield City School
District, 	CSEA is entitled to certain
information. 	In order 	for CSEA to 	fulfill
its 	obligation as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	and enforce 	the 	terms 	of 	our
collective bargaining contract, 	we request
the 	following 	information on 	all 	bargaining
unit(s) employees.
The 	letter then requested a 	list 	of 	all 	unit members 	with certain
information about 	them, 	including their home 	addresses 	and phone
numbers. 	The 	letter continued as 	follows:
However, 	we would prefer to establish an
electronic 	transfer of 	this 	information.
Such 	a 	transfer would greatly assist 	CSEA.
The 	electronic 	transfer 	can be 	provided 	in
one of 	several 	formats.
The 	letter then 	listed three 	alternative 	formats, 	along with
several 	properties 	for the 	data 	requested.
At 	the 	time 	she 	sent 	this 	letter, 	Parker had last 	received a
list 	of 	home 	addresses 	and phone numbers 	for unit 	members 	some
nine months earlier, 	in April 	1995. 	During 1995, 	she had
discovered discrepancies 	between 	the 	gross 	numbers 	of 	the April
1995 	list 	and the numbers of potential 	unit members.
During January, 	February and March of 	1996, 	Parker had
several 	conversations with Lingo's 	secretary, 	mostly concerning
the 	format 	in which the District 	could provide 	information 	to
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CSEA.7 In a conversation on March 13, 	1996, 	the secretary told
Parker 	that 	CSEA would not 	receive 	home 	addresses 	and phone
numbers. 	The next 	day, 	Parker 	showed the 	secretary copies of
pages 	from the April 	1995 	list, 	which included addresses 	and
phone numbers. 	Parker assumed that 	if 	there was 	still 	a problem
Lingo would contact 	her, 	which he did not 	do. 	When Parker next
talked to the 	secretary, 	Parker was 	told a data 	systems 	employee
was working on providing the 	information; 	she was 	not 	told any
information 	would be 	excluded.
On April 	1, 	1996, 	Lingo's 	secretary sent Parker a facsimile
transmission. 	The 	cover 	sheet 	indicated Parker was 	being 	sent 	a
"survey to 	classified employees 	re 	release 	of 	info" 	for 	Parker's
"information and response." 	The 	second page was 	a document 	in
two parts. 	The 	top part 	was 	an undated memo 	from Lingo addressed
to 	"New Classified Employees" 	regarding 	"Release 	of 	Confidential
Information." 	The memo 	stated as 	follows:
Due to a change 	in the 	law, 	home addresses
and 	telephone 	numbers 	are 	now considered,
"confidential 	information."
This 	information 	is 	sometimes 	requested by
Classified 	[sic] 	School 	Employees
Association, 	Chapter #48, 	(CSEA) 	for
miscellaneous 	reports.
Please 	complete 	the bottom of 	this page,
indicating whether or not 	you would like 	this
information 	released.
7In one of these conversations, 	on January 25, 	1996, 	the
secretary told 	Parker 	that 	CSEA would not 	receive 	social 	security
numbers, 	which had been part 	of 	CSEA's 	request. 	Parker told the
secretary this 	issue 	had been 	settled 	the 	previous 	summer.
Apparently the 	issue 	did not 	come 	up 	again 	in their
conversations.
77

The bottom part 	of 	the page was 	a 	form headed 	"Bakersfield City-
School 	District 	Personnel 	Services." 	The 	form had 	four blank
lines labeled 	"Employee 	(Printed Name)," 	"Employee Signature, 	"
"School/Department" 	and 	"Date 	Signed." 	The 	form then had two
boxes, 	labeled as 	follows 	and in the 	following order:
NO, 	permission is not granted to release my
home 	address 	& telephone number.
YES, 	I grant permission to release my home
address 	& telephone number. 	[Emphasis 	in
original.]
This 	facsimile 	transmission was 	the 	first 	notice 	Parker 	received
that 	such a 	document 	would be 	used.
On the next day, 	April 	2, 	1996, 	Parker called Lingo and told
him that 	she 	did not 	understand why the 	"survey" 	was 	being 	sent
out, 	that 	she 	had never heard from Lingo there was 	a problem,
that 	she 	believed the 	District 	had been 	stalling, 	and that 	in her
opinion 	it 	was 	an unfair practice 	for the 	District 	to 	refuse 	to
provide 	the 	requested 	information 	and 	to 	send out 	the 	memo 	and
form. 	Lingo 	told Parker he 	had referred 	Parker's 	January 	19
request 	to 	the 	District's 	counsel 	and had been 	advised 	that 	an
amendment 	to 	the 	Public Records Act 	gave 	employees 	the 	ability to
refuse 	CSEA their home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers. 	He 	further
told 	Parker 	that 	the 	District 	was 	not 	going 	to provide 	CSEA with
anything until 	the 	District 	had 	"actively surveyed" 	the 	unit
members. 	Parker reiterated CSEA's position that 	the 	District
should provide 	the 	information 	and 	should not 	send out 	the 	memo
and 	form.
88

On April 	9, 	1996, 	the District 	sent out 	to all unit members
a 	revised version of 	the 	memo 	and 	form. 	The 	revised version was
addressed to 	"All 	Classified Employees," 	not 	just 	"New Classified
Employees." 	It bore the date April 	9, 	1996, 	and it referred to
CSEA by its 	correct 	name. 	What 	had been the 	last 	sentence 	of 	the
memo portion was 	revised to 	specify that 	employees 	should
indicate 	whether 	or 	not 	they wanted 	information 	released 	"to
California School Employees Association, 	Chapter #48." 	In
addition, 	the 	following sentence was 	added:
Please 	return 	completed 	form 	to 	Personnel 	by
Monday, 	April 15, 	1996. 	[Emphasis in
original.]
The 	form portion was 	essentially unchanged except 	that 	it 	no
longer asked 	for 	the 	"Date 	Signed." 	CSEA Representative 	Parker
did not 	receive 	a 	copy of 	the 	revised memo 	and 	form 	from the
District 	at 	that 	time.
At 	one 	school 	site, 	the 	school 	secretary gave 	the 	head
custodian 	(who was 	also the 	local 	CSEA president) 	copies 	of 	the
memo and 	form for all 	the 	custodians 	at 	the 	site; 	she 	told him to
distribute 	them and have 	them returned 	to 	her. 	When he 	returned
his 	own 	form she 	checked his 	name 	off 	a 	list. 	At 	another school
site, 	copies 	of 	the memo and form were 	just placed 	in unit
members' 	mail boxes, 	and names were not checked off.
In the 	District's Operations Department, 	the 	site 	supervisor
handed out 	copies 	of 	the memo 	and 	form to unit members 	after
giving them their work assignments 	for the 	day; 	he 	told them to
turn 	in the 	forms 	before proceeding with their work. 	When unit
9

members 	asked questions, 	the 	supervisor 	referred them to 	the
local 	CSEA chief 	job steward, 	who worked in the department, 	but
the 	steward 	said he 	could not 	comment 	because 	he was 	there 	as 	an
employee 	and not 	as 	a CSEA representative. 	The 	supervisor
checked off 	employees' 	names 	as 	they turned in the 	forms.
On April 	26, 	1996, 	Lingo sent 	Parker a letter stating in
part as 	follows:
Pursuant 	to your 	request 	for personal
information 	on 	Bakersfield 	City 	School
District 	employees 	as 	stated 	in your 	letter
of January 19, 	1996, 	please be advised that
the District 	is 	hesitant 	to 	supply such
personal 	information without 	the 	express
permission of each unit member. 	I 	am
informed that 	a 	recent 	amendment 	to 	the
Public 	Records Act 	underlines 	the need 	for
the 	District 	to proceed with an abundance 	of
caution, 	despite what might 	have occurred in
the past, 	or any internal pressure an
employee 	organization may wish 	to 	exert.
I 	am also 	informed that 	in the 	intervening
period 	several 	telephone 	conversations 	have
occurred between our offices 	in 	an effort 	to
clarify your 	specific 	need 	for 	such personal
data. 	Pursuant 	to the advice of 	Counsel,
your written 	request 	and 	our 	telephone
conversation of April 2, 	1996, 	please be
advised that 	the District, 	at 	its own
expense, 	is 	in the process of printing and
distributing to each unit member, 	the
attached 	form. 	Once 	received by the
District, 	an affirmative response should
enable 	the 	District 	to 	supply to CSEA,
Chapter #48, 	the home 	address and telephone
number on record, 	of 	consenting 	individual
unit members.
The 	District 	regrets 	any 	inconvenience 	and
delay that 	may ensue 	pursuant 	to 	the
District's 	legal 	position on the 	CSEA,
Chapter #48, 	request 	for personal 	information
on BCSD employees.
10

Attached to 	this 	letter was 	the 	revised version of 	the memo 	and
form.
At 	the 	hearing, 	Lingo 	acknowledged that 	the 	District
maintains 	the home 	addresses 	and phone numbers 	of 	unit 	members,
and that 	the District had such information on January 19, 	1996,
when 	CSEA requested 	it. 	There was 	no 	evidence 	that 	at 	any time
prior to April 	9, 	1996, 	there were any unit members who had made
written 	requests 	that 	their home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	not
be 	disclosed to CSEA. 	It 	was 	stipulated on the 	record that 	PRA
section 	6254.3 	does 	not 	refer to 	the 	ability of 	an employer 	to
"survey" 	employees 	on this 	issue. 	Apart 	from Parker's 	testimony
about what 	Lingo told her 	(which is 	hearsay) 	and Lingo's April 	26
letter 	(also hearsay), 	there is no actual evidence 	in the record
as 	to why the District 	refused to provide 	the 	requested
information until 	it 	had 	surveyed the 	employees.
Lingo 	asked his 	secretary to keep 	track of 	who 	returned 	the
surveys. 	On May 6, 	1996, 	she 	informed him that of the District's
1,720 	classified 	employees 	only 	967 	had 	returned 	completed
surveys, 	while 	753 	had not. 	She 	asked him if 	she 	should send a
list 	to 	each 	school 	site 	and department 	indicating who 	had not
returned the 	survey, 	with a note 	asking the principals 	and
department 	heads 	to 	collect 	and return the 	remaining 	surveys.
Lingo responded, 	"Yes."
On May 10, 	1996, 	Parker sent Lingo a letter in response to
his April 	26 	letter. 	Parker's 	letter stated in part 	that 	the
District 	was 	"refusing to provide 	information 	in a 	timely
11

manner," 	despite 	a 	"long standing practice" 	of providing such
information, 	and was 	"obstructing the 	CSEA's 	right 	to relevant
and necessary 	information" 	by 	"soliciting permission 	to 	release
said 	information via 	a 	newly created 	form." 	The 	letter 	requested
that 	the 	District 	provide 	the 	information no 	later than May 	17,
1996, 	or 	face an unfair practice charge. 	Parker also called
Lingo 	the 	same 	day with the 	same message.
On May 13, 	1996, 	Parker and the 	local 	CSEA president met
with Lingo and the District 	superintendent. 	In 	response 	to
CSEA's expressed concerns, 	the 	superintendent 	stated, 	"What's
done 	is 	done; 	where 	do we go 	from here?" 	Lingo 	stated a 	second
survey would be 	sent 	out 	because 	the 	District 	had not 	received an
adequate 	response 	to the 	first 	one. 	CSEA objected, 	but without
success.
At 	the 	hearing, 	Lingo testified that 	it was 	his 	decision to
send out 	a 	second 	"survey" 	and that 	he 	did not 	ask 	CSEA if 	he
could do 	so. 	He gave his 	reasons 	for the decision as 	follows:
I 	was 	concerned that 	753 	surveys 	had not 	been
returned and I wanted, 	I 	thought 	it was
necessary that 	we 	have 	some 	kind of 	response
from 	those 	individuals 	before 	proceeding
further.
He 	did not 	explain why he 	thought 	the 	additional 	responses 	were
necessary.
On May 21, 	1996, 	Lingo sent a memo to all principals and
department 	heads 	regarding 	"Survey to All 	Classified Employees
(Release of Confidential 	Information)." 	The memo stated in
relevant part 	as 	follows:
12

Enclosed 	is 	a 	list 	of 	classified employees 	at
your 	site who have not 	responded to 	this
survey.
Each 	employee 	listed 	should 	receive 	this
survey, 	which gives 	them the option to
release 	-- 	(or not release) 	-- 	their home
address 	and telephone 	number 	to 	California
School Employees Association, 	Chapter #48.
Enclosed with each memo was 	a 	list 	of 	non-responding employees
and 	copies 	of 	a new memo 	and 	form. 	The new memo was 	dated
May 21, 	1996, 	and was 	addressed to 	"All 	Classified Employees Not
Responding to April 	9, 	1996, 	Memo." 	The new memo was otherwise
like the April 	9 memo, 	except 	that 	it 	asked for forms 	to be
returned by 	"Friday, 	May 31, 	1996," 	and it 	concluded with the
following additional 	language:
Unless 	this 	document 	is 	received on or before
the due date with a mark in the 	"NO" 	box,
your home 	address 	and 	telephone 	number will
be provided to CSEA, 	Chapter #48.
The 	form portion of 	the 	document was 	essentially the 	same 	as
before. 	CSEA Representative 	Parker did not 	receive 	a 	copy of 	the
new memo 	and 	form 	from the 	District 	at 	that 	time, 	although she
did receive a copy on June 	12, 	1996.
At 	one 	school 	site, 	the principal 	told the 	school 	secretary
she 	(the principal) 	was 	going to take 	the new memo and form
around to 	employees 	and ask 	them to 	sign 	it 	and turn 	it 	in. 	The
principal 	instructed 	the 	secretary to 	check off 	the 	names 	of
employees 	who 	returned the 	forms 	and 	to 	follow up 	on employees
who did not 	do 	so. 	The 	secretary did as 	she was 	instructed.
On or about August 	6, 	1996, 	the District gave CSEA
Representative 	Parker 	a 	79-page 	computer-printed 	list 	of 	unit
13

members. 	For some unit members, 	the 	list gave home addresses and
phone numbers, 	but 	for others 	it 	listed the home addresses 	and
phone numbers 	as 	"confidential". 	Parker was 	told the
"confidential" 	listings 	represented 	the 	employees 	who 	had marked
the 	"No" 	box on the April 	9 	form or the May 21 	form.
On February 6, 	1997, 	Parker and Lingo's 	secretary reviewed
and counted 	the 	forms 	that 	employees 	had marked. 	They 	found 	that
on the April 	9 	form some 	541 	employees had marked the 	"Yes" 	box
and 507 	had marked the 	"No" 	box. 	They found that 	on the May 21
form some 	155 	employees 	had marked the 	"Yes" 	box and 	146 	had
marked the 	"No" 	box.
At 	the 	hearing, 	several 	CSEA witnesses 	testified about
CSEA's use of unit members' 	home addresses and phone numbers.
One use 	of 	the 	home 	addresses was 	to 	send unit 	members who were
not 	CSEA members 	their annual 	Hudson notices.8 Home 	addresses
and phone 	numbers 	were 	also used 	to 	survey or poll 	unit 	members
on bargaining issues, 	to notify them of ratification votes, 	to
monitor the 	status 	of unit members on extended leave, 	and to
communicate 	with unit 	members 	facing 	layoff.
8The 	name 	"Hudson notice" 	refers 	to 	the 	United States
Supreme Court's decision in Chicago Teachers Union, 	Local No. 	1
v. 	Hudson 	(1986) 	475 U.S. 	292, 	106 S.Ct. 	1066 	[121 LRRM 2793] .
In that 	decision, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	held that 	a public 	employee
who pays 	an agency 	fee has 	a 	constitutional 	right 	to 	receive 	from
the union an adequate 	explanation of 	the basis 	for the 	fee. 	In
PERB Regulation 32 992, 	PERB requires 	that each agency fee payer
receive 	annually a written notice 	that 	includes 	the 	amount 	of 	the
fee, 	expressed as 	a percentage 	of dues based on identified
chargeable expenditures, 	and the basis 	for calculating the 	fee,
with all 	calculations made 	on the basis 	of 	an 	independent 	audit
made 	available 	to the 	fee payer.
14

CSEA's witnesses 	also 	testified about 	difficulties 	in
communicating with unit 	members 	without 	their home 	addresses 	and
phone 	numbers. 	Unit 	members 	sometimes 	called CSEA and left
messages 	with only their names 	and work 	sites. 	CSEA was 	not
allowed 	to 	call 	unit 	members 	on 	their work 	time 	and 	could not
always 	contact 	them on their lunch time. 	During the 	summer, 	the
District 	mail 	system was 	not 	available 	as 	a means 	of
communicating with many unit 	members, 	because 	the District 	did
not 	deliver mail 	to most 	school 	sites, 	and most unit members were
off work 	for one or two months. 	CSEA witnesses gave 	examples 	of
bargaining 	and 	representation 	issues 	that 	arose 	during 	the 	summer
months, 	when CSEA could not 	rely on 	the 	District 	mail 	system as 	a
means 	of 	communicating with unit members.
CSEA's 	witnesses 	testified that 	even when 	the 	District 	mail
system was 	available 	it 	was 	not 	always 	reliable 	or confidential.
Mail 	CSEA sent 	to employees was 	sometimes 	sent back, 	because 	the
employees had transferred without 	notice 	to 	CSEA. 	The 	local 	CSEA
president 	sometimes 	found 	that 	mail 	sent 	to 	CSEA through 	the
District 	mail 	system had already been opened when he 	received 	it.
At 	one school 	site, 	classified aides 	shared mail boxes with
certificated teachers, 	and mail 	intended for the aides was
sometimes 	found in teachers' 	work rooms or rest 	rooms. 	At 	the
same 	school 	site, 	mail 	for all 	the 	classified cafeteria workers
went 	into one 	box and was picked up by the 	cafeteria manager. 	At
another school 	site, 	mail 	for all 	the 	custodians went 	into one
box and 	then was 	placed on a 	counter 	in 	the 	"custodian 	room."
15

Employees 	complained 	to 	CSEA that 	they did not 	receive 	mail 	CSEA
had sent, 	or 	that 	CSEA did not 	respond to mail 	they had sent,
which CSEA had not 	in fact 	received.
Mail 	for 	"general 	CSEA distribution" 	could not 	be
confidential, 	because Article 3.3 	of the parties' 	Agreement
required that 	such material 	be 	provided 	to 	the 	District
superintendent. 	Postings 	on bulletin boards 	could not 	be
confidential 	either, 	because 	the bulletin boards were 	in open
view.9
ISSUES
1. 	Did the 	District 	unlawfully refuse 	to provide 	CSEA with
the 	home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	of 	unit members?
2. 	Did the 	District's 	conduct 	represent 	an unlawful
unilateral 	change 	in policy?10
CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
Alleged Refusal 	to 	Provide 	Information
It 	has 	long been held by the National 	Labor Relations 	Board
(NLRB) 	and by PERB 	that 	the duty to bargain 	in good 	faith
requires 	an 	employer 	to provide 	information 	requested by a union
9Also, 	as noted above, 	under Article 3.2 of the parties'
Agreement 	"false 	and defamatory" 	information on bulletin boards
was 	subject 	to 	immediate 	removal 	by District 	management. 	This
clearly 	implies 	that 	the bulletin boards 	were 	subject 	to
management 	scrutiny.
10CSEA's 	briefs 	argue 	that 	the 	District's 	conduct 	also
represented unlawful 	polling and coercion of 	employees. 	This
argument 	is not 	reflected in the 	PERB 	complaint, 	or 	in a motion
to amend the 	PERB 	complaint, 	and was 	not 	fully litigated at 	the
hearing. 	I 	shall 	therefore make no conclusions 	of 	law as 	to 	the
issues 	raised by this 	argument.
16

that 	is 	necessary and relevant 	to 	the 	union's 	duty as 	exclusive
representative 	to represent unit members. 	(NLRB v. 	Acme
Industrial Company 	(1967) 	385 U.S. 	432 	[64 LRRM 2069]; 	Procter &
Gamble Manufacturing Company v. 	NLRB 	(8th Cir. 	1979) 	603 	F.2d
1310 	[102 	LRRM 2128]; 	Stockton Unified School District 	(1980)
PERB Decision No. 	143 	(Stockton).) 	Certain information is
presumed to be 	relevant, 	but 	if 	the 	employer questions 	the
relevance 	the union must 	give 	the 	employer an explanation.
(Modesto 	City Schools 	and High School 	District 	(1985) 	PERB
Decision No. 	479.) 	Once relevant 	information is requested, 	the
employer must 	provide 	it 	or adequately set 	forth the 	reasons 	why
it 	is unable 	to comply. 	(The Kroger Company 	(1976) 	226 NLRB 	512
[93 	LRRM 1315]; 	Stockton.) 	The employer may be excused if
compliance would be burdensome, 	but 	the 	burden of proving this
defense is on the employer. 	(NLRB v. 	Borden, 	Inc. 	(1st Cir.
1979) 	600 F.2d 313 	[101 LRRM 2727]; 	Stockton.)
The NLRB has held unit members' 	home addresses 	and phone
numbers are presumptively relevant. 	(See, 	e.g., 	Harco
Laboratories, 	Inc. 	(1984) 	271 NLRB 220 	[117 LRRM 1232]
(addresses); 	Dvantron/Bondo Corp. 	(1991) 	305 NLRB No. 	75 	[138
LRRM 1446] 	(addresses and phone numbers); 	Show Industries 	Inc.
(1991) 	305 NLRB No. 	72 	[138 LRRM 1416] 	(addresses and phone
numbers).) 	In Prudential 	Insurance Co. 	v. 	NLRB 	(2d Cir. 	1969)
412 F.2d 77, 	84 	[71 LRRM 2254] 	(Prudential), 	the Court of Appeals
stated the 	following about 	a union's 	request 	for the 	addresses 	of
unit members:
17

The 	kind 	of 	information 	requested by 	the
Union 	in 	this 	case 	has 	an even more
fundamental 	relevance 	than 	that 	considered
presumptively relevant. 	The 	latter 	is 	needed
by 	the 	union 	in order 	to bargain
intelligently on 	specific 	issues 	of 	concern
to the 	employees. 	But 	data without which a
union 	cannot 	even 	communicate 	with employees
whom it 	represents 	is, 	by its very nature,
fundamental 	to the 	entire 	expanse 	of 	a
union's 	relationship with the employees. 	In
this 	instance 	it 	is urgent 	so that 	the
exclusive 	bargaining 	representative 	of 	the
employees 	may perform 	its 	broad range 	of
statutory duties 	in 	a 	truly representative
fashion 	and 	in harmony with the 	employees'
desires 	and interests. 	Because this
information 	is 	therefore 	so basically related
to 	the proper performance 	of 	the union's
statutory duties, 	we believe 	any special
showing 	of 	specific 	relevance 	would be
superfluous.
In dynamic 	employment 	situations, 	where 	representation 	issues may
arise 	quickly and require 	a quick response, 	this 	statement 	would
seem to 	apply with equal 	force 	to a 	request 	for unit members'
phone numbers.
With regard to 	requests 	for addresses 	(as 	well 	as 	with
regard to other requests 	for information), 	PERB has generally
followed NLRB precedent. 	(See, 	e.g., 	Mt. 	San Antonio Community
College District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	224, 	citing
Prudential.) 	There 	appears 	to be no reason why PERB 	should not
follow NLRB precedent 	with 	regard to 	requests 	for phone 	numbers
as well. 	Indeed, 	in its reply brief the District 	"does not
dispute 	that 	employee 	home 	addresses 	and home 	telephone 	numbers
may, 	depending upon the circumstances, 	be relevant 	information to
which 	an 	employee 	organization 	ordinarily 	is 	entitled 	[emphasis
18

added]." 	I conclude unit members' 	phone numbers as well as
addresses 	are 	presumptively relevant 	information.
The 	PERB 	complaint 	alleges 	in part 	that 	on or about April 	2,
1996, 	the 	District 	refused to provide 	relevant 	and necessary
information, 	including addresses and phone numbers, 	which CSEA
had requested on or about 	January 19, 	1996. 	There 	is 	no evidence
the 	District 	did not 	have 	the 	requested 	information 	on April 	2,
1996; 	on the 	contrary, 	District 	Personnel Director Lingo
testified the District had the 	information on January 19, 	1996,
when 	it was 	first 	requested.
I 	have 	concluded 	the 	requested 	information 	(addresses 	and
phone numbers) 	was presumptively relevant. 	The District 	has 	not
rebutted 	this presumption. 	There was 	no 	testimony the District
even questioned the 	relevance of 	the 	information, 	so as 	to oblige
CSEA to give 	the 	District 	an explanation.
The 	District 	argues 	(in 	its 	reply brief) 	that 	CSEA's 	request
was 	"not 	urgent" 	because 	CSEA 	"had recently and 	repeatedly
received 	such 	information 	from 	the 	District." 	There was 	no
testimony, 	however, 	that 	the District 	questioned the 	timing and
urgency of 	CSEA's 	request. 	On the 	contrary, 	the 	timing of 	CSEA's
January 1996 	request 	appears 	to have been consistent 	with the
timing of 	previous 	requests 	that 	were 	honored by the 	District.
Furthermore, 	CSEA Representative 	Parker 	testified 	that 	during
1995 	she 	had discovered discrepancies 	between 	the 	gross 	numbers
of 	the April 	1995 	list 	of 	address 	and phone numbers 	and the
numbers of potential unit members. 	In a mobile 	society, 	it 	could
19

be 	expected a 	number of 	unit 	members 	would have 	changed addresses
or phone 	numbers 	between the April 	1995 	list 	(or even the 	October
1995 	list 	given to 	the 	local 	CSEA treasurer) 	and the 	January 	1996
request. 	I 	therefore do not 	find that 	the District's 	argument
that 	the 	request was 	"not urgent" 	rebuts 	the presumption of
relevance 	and 	necessity.
The 	District 	does not 	argue 	it 	would have 	been unduly
burdensome 	for 	it 	to provide 	the 	requested information. 	There 	is
no evidence 	that 	the District 	told CSEA it was burdensome, 	or
that 	it was burdensome 	in fact. 	On the contrary, 	it 	appears 	that
in 	the past 	the 	District 	had been able 	to provide 	the 	information
readily and promptly 	(within a week or 	so, 	in the 	case 	of 	the
information requested by the 	local 	CSEA treasurer).
What 	the 	District 	did 	tell 	CSEA 	(mostly clearly 	in Lingo's
April 	26 	letter) 	was 	that 	the District was 	"hesitant" 	to provide
the 	requested 	information because 	of 	"a 	recent 	amendment 	to 	the
Public Records Act," 	apparently a reference 	to the 	1992 	amendment
to 	section 	6254.3. 	As a 	justification 	for the District's 	alleged
refusal 	to provide 	the 	requested 	information on or 	about 	April 	2,
1996, 	however, 	this 	explanation is unsupported by the 	facts 	and
the 	law. 	There was no evidence that on or about April 	2, 	1996,
there 	were 	any unit 	members 	who had made 	written 	requests 	that
their addresses 	and phone numbers 	not 	to be 	disclosed, 	and PRA
section 	6254.3(b) 	only required that 	the 	District 	not 	disclose
20

such 	information 	" [u]pon written request 	of 	any employee."11
As 	PERB 	stated 	in 	California Union 	of 	Safety Employees 	(1992)
PERB Decision No. 	948-S, 	"The only home addresses properly
withheld . 	. 	. were those of individuals who, 	in writing, 	had
invoked the privacy provision of 	section 	6254.3(b) 	[emphasis
added]," 	not 	those of 	individuals who might 	invoke the provision
in the future.
On April 	2, 	1996, 	Lingo told Parker the District would not
provide 	any 	information until 	the 	District 	had 	"actively
surveyed" 	the unit members. 	PRA section 6254.3, 	by its terms,
does not 	require or authorize 	such a 	survey; 	it was 	stipulated on
the 	record that 	the 	section does not 	refer to 	the 	ability of 	an
employer 	to 	survey employees 	on 	this 	issue. 	Lingo 	did not
testify he 	even believed 	the 	section 	required 	or 	authorized 	the
survey.
The District 	appears 	to argue 	(in its 	reply brief) 	it 	did
not 	actually 	"refuse" 	to provide 	information on or about April 	2,
1996, 	as 	the complaint alleges, 	but merely delayed providing the
information, 	with 	"no prejudice" 	to CSEA. 	Such an argument does
not 	fit 	the 	facts 	of 	this 	case. 	The 	facts 	are 	the District
refused 	to provide 	CSEA with 	the 	requested 	information 	during
what 	was 	actually and predictably the 	last 	week 	there were
(apparently) 	no employee 	requests 	limiting disclosure 	of 	the
11Section 6254.3(a)(3) 	also required that 	the District 	not
disclose 	the 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	of 	employees 	"performing
law enforcement-related 	functions," 	but 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	of
such employees 	in the 	CSEA units, 	and the 	requirement 	is not 	at
issue 	in this 	case.
21

information. 	The 	District 	explicitly refused to provide 	the
information until 	it 	had 	"actively 	surveyed" 	the unit 	members.
It 	was 	certainly predictable 	that 	at 	least 	some 	of 	the 	employees
surveyed, 	especially when given a 	specific 	form and a 	specific
deadline, 	would request 	that 	their addresses 	and phone 	numbers
not be disclosed. 	The prejudice 	to CSEA was obvious: 	the
District's April 	2 	refusal, 	coupled with its April 	9 	and May 21
surveys, 	meant 	the District was 	not going to provide 	CSEA with
all 	the 	information CSEA had requested, 	even though the 	District
apparently could otherwise 	have 	provided 	all 	that 	information 	at
any time prior to April 	9, 	1996.
I 	therefore 	conclude 	CSEA 	requested presumptively 	relevant
information, 	the District 	did not 	rebut 	the presumption of
relevance, 	the District 	refused 	to provide 	the 	information on or
about April 	2, 	1996, 	and the District 	has established no defense
for its April 	2 	refusal. 	Under PERB precedent, 	the District's
refusal 	violated 	its 	duty to bargain 	in good 	faith with CSEA, 	in
violation of EERA section 3543.5(c). 	This conduct 	also denied
CSEA its 	right 	to represent unit members, 	in violation of 	EERA
section 3543.5(b). 	This 	conduct 	also 	interfered with the 	right
of unit members 	to be 	represented by CSEA, 	in violation of 	EERA
section 3543.5(a).
Alleged Unilateral 	Change
An employer's 	unilateral 	change 	of 	terms 	and conditions 	of
employment within the 	scope of 	representation is, 	absent 	a valid
defense, 	a per se refusal 	to negotiate, 	in violation of EERA
22

section 3543.5(c) . 	(Pajaro Valley Unified School 	District 	(1978)
PERB Decision No. 	51.)
To prevail 	on a complaint 	of unilateral 	change, 	a 	charging
party must 	establish by a preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	(1) 	the
employer breached or altered the parties' 	written agreement 	or an
established past practice; 	(2) 	such action was 	taken without
giving 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	notice 	or 	an 	opportunity 	to
bargain over the change; 	(3) 	the change was not merely an
isolated breach but 	amounted to a change 	of policy 	(that 	is, 	it
had 	a 	generalized 	effect 	or 	continuing 	impact 	on 	the 	bargaining
unit); 	and 	(4) 	the change 	in policy concerned a matter within the
scope 	of 	representation. 	(Pajaro Valley Unified School 	District,
supra, 	PERB Decision No. 	51; 	Davis Unified School District 	(1980)
-
PERB Decision No. 	116; 	Grant Joint Union High School District
(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	196.)
PERB 	has 	held 	the provision of 	relevant 	and necessary
information 	to an exclusive 	representative 	is within the 	scope 	of
representation. 	(Jefferson School 	District 	(1980) 	PERB Decision
No. 	133; 	Healdsburg Union High School District 	(1984) 	PERB
Decision No. 	375 	(Healdsburg); 	Davis Joint Unified School
District 	(1984) 	PERB Decision No. 	474.) 	In Healdsburg, 	PERB
found 	"the most 	appropriate 	way to 	avoid conflict 	over 	access 	to
necessary 	information 	is 	to 	regulate 	the 	[exclusive
representative's] 	access 	to 	that 	information 	through the
collective 	bargaining process."
23

With regard to 	the provision of 	the 	home 	addresses 	of
employees, 	PERB has 	issued specific regulations under the Ralph
C. 	Dills Act 	(Dills Act) 	and the Higher Education Employer-
Employee Relations Act 	(HEERA) .12 The Dills Act 	regulation is
PERB Regulation 40165 	and 	states 	in relevant part 	as 	follows:
(a) 	Except as prohibited by law, 	the state
employer 	shall 	release 	to 	an 	exclusive
representative 	a mailing 	list 	of 	home
addresses 	of 	state 	employees 	it 	represents
pursuant 	to 	a written 	request 	by the
exclusive 	representative. 	The mechanics of
such release, 	including but 	not 	limited to
(1) 	timing, 	frequency, 	and manner of
disclosure, 	(2) 	maintenance of names or the
mailing list, 	and 	(3) 	cost of production
shall 	be 	subject 	to 	the 	collective bargaining
process. 	[Emphasis added.]
(c) 	As provided by Government 	Code 	Section
6254.3, 	and upon written request of a 	state
employee, 	the 	state employer shall remove 	the
state 	employee's 	home 	address 	from the
mailing 	lists 	referenced 	in 	subsection 	(a)
and 	(b) 	prior to the release of 	such lists.
The HEERA regulation is 	PERB Regulation 51027 	and is parallel 	to
the Dills Act 	regulation.
The 	Dills Act 	and HEERA regulations were 	issued 	in 	1986,
when 	PRA section 	6254.3 	applied to 	the 	home 	addresses 	and phone
numbers 	of 	state 	employees 	only. 	Now that 	the 	1992 	amendment 	to
the 	Public 	Records Act has 	made 	section 	6254.3 	applicable 	to 	the
addresses 	and phone numbers 	of public 	school 	employees 	as well,
there 	appears 	to be 	no reason why the principles 	embodied 	in
these 	regulations 	should not 	also 	apply under EERA, 	which 	in all
12The 	Dills Act 	is 	codified at 	section 	3512 	and 	following.
HEERA is 	codified at 	section 3560 	and 	following.
24

relevant 	respects 	is parallel 	to the Dills Act 	and HEERA. 	Given
my conclusion that phone numbers 	as well 	as 	addresses 	are
presumptively relevant 	information, 	there 	appears 	to be no 	reason
those principles 	should not 	also apply to phone numbers. 	I
therefore 	conclude 	that 	under EERA the 	"mechanics" 	of 	the 	release
of unit members' 	home 	addresses 	and phone numbers 	are within the
scope 	of 	representation 	and 	"subject 	to 	the 	collective 	bargaining
process."
The 	District nonetheless 	argues 	(in 	its opening brief) 	"the
duty to provide 	information 	is 	a 	stand-alone 	duty which may arise
because 	of 	contract 	language" 	but 	the 	"existence 	or non-existence
of 	a past 	practice 	regarding providing 	information 	is 	irrelevant
because 	the nature, 	timing and substance of 	CSEA's 	requests 	for
information vary." 	It 	is 	true 	CSEA may request 	a variety of
information in a variety of 	contexts, 	and as 	to 	some 	such
requests 	there may be no established past practice, 	but 	it 	does
not 	follow there 	can never be 	an established past 	practice
regarding any such requests. 	The 	District's 	argument 	appears 	to
acknowledge 	that 	"contract 	language" 	may be 	relevant 	to 	the duty
to provide 	information; 	in the 	law of unilateral 	change,
established past 	practice 	may be 	just 	as 	relevant 	as 	contract
language. 	(Pajaro Valley Unified School District, 	supra, 	PERB
Decision No. 	51; 	Davis Unified School District, 	supra, 	PERB
Decision No. 	116; 	Grant Joint Union High School District, 	supra,
PERB Decision No. 	196.)
25

In the present 	case, 	I 	find there was an established past
practice with regard to 	the mechanics 	of providing unit 	members'
home 	addresses 	and phone numbers. 	The practice was 	that 	the
District 	provided 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	to 	the 	CSEA
Representative on an annual basis, 	upon request, 	and that 	the
District 	provided 	addresses 	to 	the 	local 	CSEA treasurer 	on
approximately a quarterly basis, 	upon request. 	Furthermore, 	the
practice 	was 	that 	the 	District 	provided 	the 	requested 	information
promptly and without 	first 	conducting 	a 	survey of 	unit 	members 	on
the 	subject.
I 	further find that 	on April 	2, 	1996, 	the District 	altered
this 	past 	practice 	by refusing 	to provide 	the 	requested
information until 	it 	had 	"actively surveyed" 	the unit 	members.
This 	was 	a change 	in the mechanics 	of providing the 	information,
both 	in that 	it 	affected the 	timing of 	disclosure 	and also 	in
that 	it 	created an entirely new step 	in the 	disclosure process.
This 	change 	affected all 	three 	CSEA bargaining units, 	and it was
presented to CSEA as 	a flat 	refusal, 	not 	as 	a matter for
negotiation. 	I 	therefore 	conclude 	the District's April 	2 	conduct
constituted a unilateral 	change 	of 	policy.
The District 	argues 	(in its opening brief) 	"the District has
regularly surveyed 	its 	employees 	about 	certain matters." 	The
evidence 	does 	show that 	in 	1994 	the District 	surveyed unit
members 	about 	a possible District 	directory, 	and also 	that 	at 	an
unspecified 	time 	the 	District 	surveyed part-time 	unit 	members
about a possible defined benefit option. 	I 	do not 	find, 	however,
26

that 	these 	two 	surveys 	demonstrate 	an established past 	practice
relevant 	to the present 	case. 	First of all, 	two surveys within
an unspecified period of 	years 	seem 	insufficient 	to 	demonstrate 	a
"regular" 	practice, 	let alone an established one. 	Second, 	the
evidence 	shows 	the 	CSEA representative was unaware 	of 	the 	1994
directory survey, 	and there 	is 	no evidence 	CSEA was 	aware 	of 	the
defined benefit 	survey, 	so 	it 	cannot be 	said the 	surveys
demonstrate 	a past 	practice 	reflecting 	a 	tacit 	understanding
between the parties. 	Furthermore, 	the two surveys were
dissimilar even to each other, 	with the 	1994 	directory survey
being addressed to principals 	and department 	heads, 	who 	simply
reported back 	the 	numbers 	of 	employees 	who 	responded 	in various
ways, 	while 	the 	defined benefit 	survey was 	addressed to
individual 	employees, 	who returned individual 	responses.
Moreover, 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	either 	survey had any effect 	on
any right 	of 	CSEA, 	including 	its 	right 	to 	receive 	information.
The 	District 	further argues 	that 	"the District's 	right 	to
communicate with 	its 	employees 	is 	an area 	reserved to 	its
discretion and the 	District 	is 	not 	legally obligated 	to 	negotiate
with CSEA about 	it." 	This 	argument 	might 	be persuasive 	if 	all
the 	District 	had done was 	inform employees 	of 	their rights 	under
PRA section 6254.3. 	The District did more than that, 	however.
First 	of 	all, 	the District 	unilaterally changed its 	established
past 	practice 	of 	promptly providing 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers
to 	CSEA, 	by refusing to provide 	any such 	information until 	it 	had
"actively surveyed" 	unit members. 	Second, 	the District
27

unilaterally 	established 	a 	new 	and 	specific 	mechanism 	for
employees 	to 	exercise 	their 	rights 	under PRA section 	6254.3,
which became part 	of 	the 	overall 	mechanics 	of 	the 	release 	of
information to 	CSEA. 	The District 	unilaterally determined, 	among
other 	things, 	that 	employees would be 	given a particular 	form to
be 	returned to 	a particular office 	(personnel) 	by a particular
deadline 	(initially, 	April 15, 	1996). 	As to the form itself, 	the
District unilaterally determined, 	among other things, 	how the
employees' 	options would be 	defined and in what 	order they would
be 	listed. 	Later, 	the District 	unilaterally determined there
would be 	a 	second 	survey of 	nonresponding 	employees 	with another
particular deadline 	(May 31, 	1996). 	All of these determinations
went beyond mere 	communication of 	information to employees, 	and
altered the 	overall 	mechanics 	of 	the 	release 	of 	information 	to
CSEA.
The District 	argues 	that 	employees' 	rights under section
6254.3 	are 	themselves 	outside 	the 	scope 	of 	representation. 	I
agree 	this 	appears 	to be 	a 	correct 	reading both of 	the 	Public
Records Act 	and of 	the 	PERB 	regulations 	under the Dills Act 	and
HEERA 	(PERB Regulations 40165 	and 51027), 	which I 	have 	found
applicable 	in principle under EERA as well. 	The 	District 	further
argues 	"the 	process 	by which public 	school 	employees 	are 	informed
of and exercise their rights 	. 	. 	. 	are similarly outside the
scope 	of 	collective bargaining 	[emphasis 	added]." 	To the 	extent
this 	argument 	would 	indicate 	that 	an 	employer may unilaterally
design and dictate 	a 	formal 	mechanism 	for employees 	to 	exercise
28

their rights, 	I 	disagree. 	The rights created by PRA section
6254.3 	are employee rights, 	not management 	rights. 	There 	is no
reason why 	an 	employer 	should unilaterally determine 	any 	formal
mechanism for the 	exercise 	of 	those 	rights, 	especially when that
process will 	affect 	the mechanics 	of 	a union's 	access 	to 	relevant
and necessary information. 	As 	PERB 	stated in Healdsburg, 	"the
most 	appropriate way to 	avoid 	conflict 	over access 	to 	necessary
information 	is 	to 	regulate 	the 	[exclusive 	representative's]
access 	to 	that 	information 	through the 	collective 	bargaining
process."
I 	therefore conclude 	that on or about April 	2, 	1996, 	the
District 	unilaterally 	changed 	the 	mechanics 	of 	providing unit
members' 	home addresses 	and phone numbers 	to CSEA, 	which was 	a
matter within the 	scope 	of 	representation, 	and that 	the District
has 	not 	established any valid defense. 	This 	conduct 	violated the
District's 	duty to bargain 	in good 	faith with CSEA, 	in violation
of EERA section 3543.5(c). 	This 	conduct 	also denied CSEA its
right 	to 	represent 	unit members, 	in violation of 	EERA section
3543.5(b). 	This conduct 	also interfered with the 	right 	of unit
members 	to be 	represented by CSEA, 	in violation of 	EERA section
3543.5(a).
REMEDY
EERA section 	3541.5 	gives 	PERB:
. 	. 	. 	the power to issue a decision and order
directing an offending party to 	cease 	and
desist 	from the unfair practice 	and to 	take
such affirmative 	action, 	including but 	not
limited 	to 	the 	reinstatement 	of 	employees
29

with or without back pay, 	as will 	effectuate
the policies of this chapter 	[EERA].
In the present 	case, 	the 	District 	has been found to have violated
its 	duty to bargain 	in good 	faith 	(1) 	by refusing to provide 	CSEA
with 	relevant 	and necessary 	information 	and 	(2) 	by unilaterally
changing a policy within the 	scope of 	representation. 	It 	is
therefore 	appropriate 	that 	the 	District 	be 	directed 	to 	cease 	and
desist 	from making such refusals 	and 	such unilateral 	changes. 	It
is 	also appropriate 	that 	the District be directed, 	if 	CSEA so
requests, 	to meet 	and negotiate about 	the mechanics 	of providing
unit members' 	home addresses and phone numbers, 	including any
formal 	mechanism 	for unit 	members 	to 	exercise 	their 	rights 	under
PRA section 	6254.3. 	It 	is 	further appropriate 	that 	the District
be directed, 	if CSEA so requests, 	to reinstate 	its past practice
of 	providing home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers promptly and
without 	first 	conducting a 	survey of 	unit 	members 	on the 	subject.
If 	this were 	an ordinary case of 	refusal 	to provide
information, 	it would also be appropriate 	to direct 	the District
to provide 	CSEA now with all 	the 	information 	it 	unlawfully
refused to provide on or about April 	2, 	1996, 	that 	is, 	all 	the
unit members' 	home addresses 	and phone numbers 	available 	at 	that
time, 	including those 	later listed as 	"confidential" 	due 	to the
April 	9 and May 21 	surveys. 	In the present case, 	however,
because of 	PRA section 6254.3, 	such a 	remedy appears 	legally
inappropriate.
Since April 	9, 	1996, 	hundreds of employees have apparently
exercised their 	right 	under 	PRA section 	6254.3 	to make written
30

requests 	that 	their addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	not 	be 	disclosed.
PRA section 	6254.3 	appears 	to 	require 	the 	District 	to honor 	those
requests 	now, 	and also appears 	to deny PERB 	the 	authority to
order, 	by regulation or by decision, 	that 	they not be honored
now. 	For the purposes of 	section 6254.3, 	it appears to be
irrelevant 	that 	the 	written 	requests 	came 	into 	existence 	only
after what 	has 	been 	found 	to be 	an unlawful 	refusal 	to provide
the 	information, 	and only because of what 	has been 	found to be 	an
unlawful 	unilateral 	change.13
PRA section 	6254.3 	thus makes 	it 	very difficult 	to provide
an appropriate remedy in this case.14 I 	have 	found, 	in effect,
that 	CSEA had a 	right 	to 	receive 	the 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers
of all unit members on or about April 	2, 	1996, 	and that 	the
District 	unlawfully withheld the 	information at 	that 	time, 	but
section 	6254.3 	apparently prevents 	PERB 	from ordering 	the
District 	to provide 	all 	of 	that 	information to 	CSEA now. 	As 	a
result, 	CSEA is deprived of 	information which appears 	to be
relevant 	and necessary 	for 	CSEA to be 	able 	to 	communicate
13Under PRA section 6254.3, 	the 	relevant 	inquiry appears 	to
be whether an employee 	has made 	a 	"written request" 	that 	the
employer 	not 	disclose 	the 	employee's 	address 	and phone 	number 	to
an employee 	organization. 	Although the April 	9 	and May 21 	forms
do not 	track the 	language 	of 	section 6254.3, 	I 	do not 	find them
so ambiguous 	that 	the District 	or PERB may disregard them, 	unless
they are 	revoked by the 	employees 	or 	superseded by a new
mechanism.
14For this 	reason, 	during the 	hearing 	I 	particularly invited
both parties 	on 	the 	record to address 	the 	remedy issue 	in 	their
post-hearing briefs.
31

promptly, 	reliably and confidentially with 	all 	the 	unit 	members
it represents.
Some 	of 	the 	difficulty may be 	alleviated 	if 	the 	District 	and
CSEA negotiate 	to 	agreement 	on 	a 	different 	mechanism 	for
employees 	to 	exercise 	their 	rights under PRA section 	6254.3. 	The
mechanism unilaterally designed by the 	District 	is 	at 	least
arguably slanted 	(whether 	intentionally or not) 	in 	favor of
nondisclosure.15 A negotiated 	agreement 	may yield 	a more 	neutral
mechanism and ultimately more 	disclosure 	of 	addresses 	and phone
numbers. 	If nothing else, 	a new mechanism may allow employees 	to
be 	more 	fully 	informed about 	the 	rights 	and opportunities 	they
may 	sacrifice 	by exercising 	their 	rights 	under 	section 	6254.3.16
As 	indicated above, 	the 	District 	shall 	be 	ordered to negotiate 	on
this subject, 	if CSEA so requests.
Negotiation takes time, 	however, 	and meanwhile the
District's unlawful 	conduct 	will 	have 	the 	continuing effect 	of
limiting CSEA's 	ability to communicate with unit members. 	It 	is
inappropriate 	for this 	effect 	to go entirely unremedied. 	It 	is
more 	appropriate 	to 	fashion 	an 	interim 	remedy 	requiring 	the
District 	to 	facilitate 	CSEA's 	communication with 	those 	unit
15For example, 	the District's 	form described the 	issue 	as one
of 	granting permission to 	release 	information, 	and 	it 	listed the
"No" 	option 	first, 	arguably implying that nondisclosure was 	the
norm.
16The 	District's 	description of 	CSEA's use 	of 	home 	addresses
and phone 	numbers 	"for miscellaneous 	reports," 	while not
necessarily 	inaccurate or pejorative, 	certainly does 	not 	convey
the 	importance 	of 	CSEA's 	use 	of 	the 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers
to 	send out Hudson notices, 	which are 	of 	constitutional
significance, 	and for 	important 	representational purposes.
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members 	whose 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	were 	listed as
"confidential" 	due to the April 	8 	and May 21 	surveys. 	As 	to
those unit members, 	I 	find the 	following procedures to be an
appropriate 	interim 	remedy:
1. 	When CSEA wishes 	to 	send a mailing to 	such a unit
member, 	CSEA may place 	the mailing 	in a 	sealed CSEA envelope 	and
give 	it 	to the District, 	along with sufficient 	information to
identify the unit member. 	Within one business day, 	the District
shall 	place 	the 	sealed CSEA envelope 	in a District 	envelope 	and
mail 	it 	to the unit member's home address, 	with a cover letter
stating, 	"In Unfair Practice Case No. 	LA-CE-3691, 	the Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board ordered 	the 	District 	to mail 	to you 	at
your home 	address 	the 	enclosed mailing 	from the 	California 	School
Employees Association." 	The District 	may bill 	CSEA for 	the 	cost
of 	necessary postage.
2. 	When CSEA wishes 	to 	contact 	such a unit 	member by
phone, 	CSEA may give 	the District 	a message 	for the unit member,
stating when 	and at 	what 	phone 	number 	the 	unit 	member may call
CSEA. 	Within one business day, 	the District 	shall 	attempt 	to
call 	the 	unit 	member's 	home phone 	number and leave 	the message,
and shall 	report 	to 	CSEA the 	time 	of 	the 	attempted call 	and
whether 	the message was 	left. 	The 	District 	may bill 	CSEA for the
cost of necessary toll 	calls.
These procedures 	shall 	be 	in effect 	as 	an 	interim remedy
from 	such time 	as 	CSEA requests 	negotiations 	on 	the 	mechanism 	for
unit members 	to exercise 	their rights 	under 	PRA section 	6254.3,
33

to 	the 	time 	such negotiations 	are 	completed, 	either by agreement
or by exhaustion of 	statutory 	impasse procedures, 	unless 	the
parties 	agree 	on 	different 	procedures 	or on 	a 	different 	interim
period.
This 	interim remedy will 	be 	seen 	as 	imperfect 	from either
party's point of view. 	From the District's point of view, 	the
interim 	remedy will 	appear 	to 	impose 	an 	extraordinary duty to
facilitate 	CSEA's 	communication with unit 	members 	- - a 	duty 	that
EERA would not 	otherwise 	impose 	on the 	District. 	That
extraordinary duty 	is 	appropriate 	as 	a part 	of 	an 	interim remedy
in this 	case, 	however, 	because the District's unlawful 	conduct on
or about April 	2, 	1996, 	has 	(intentionally or not) 	limited CSEA's
ability to 	communicate with unit members 	-- 	an ability that 	is
important 	to 	CSEA's 	duty under EERA to 	represent 	those 	unit
members. 	By requiring the District 	to 	facilitate 	such
communication, 	the 	interim remedy will 	help 	to effectuate 	the
policies 	of 	EERA.
From CSEA's point of view, 	on the other hand, 	the 	interim
remedy will 	appear 	to 	fall 	short 	of 	fully restoring 	CSEA's
previous 	opportunity for prompt, 	reliable 	and confidential
communication with unit members. 	PRA section 6254.3, 	however,
appears 	to prevent 	the 	full 	restoration of 	that 	opportunity 	in
this 	case. 	In the 	long term, 	section 6254.3 	is a reality to
which 	CSEA will 	have 	to 	adjust. 	The 	interim remedy may at 	least
help 	to ease 	that 	adjustment, 	and to alleviate 	the 	immediate
34

effects 	of 	the District's unlawful 	conduct, 	while 	the parties
negotiate 	for 	the 	long 	term.
It 	is 	also 	appropriate 	that 	the 	District 	be 	directed to post
a notice 	incorporating the 	terms 	of 	the 	order 	in 	this 	case.
Posting of 	such a notice, 	signed by an authorized agent 	of 	the
District, 	will provide employees with notice that 	the District
has 	acted in an unlawful manner, 	is being required to cease 	and
desist 	from 	this 	activity and to 	take 	affirmative 	remedial
actions, 	and will 	comply with the order. 	It effectuates 	the
purposes 	of 	EERA that 	employees 	be 	informed both of 	the
resolution of 	this 	controversy and of 	the 	District's 	readiness 	to
comply with 	the 	ordered 	remedy. 	(Placerville Union 	School
District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	69.)
PROPOSED 	ORDER
Based upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact 	and conclusions 	of
law, 	and upon the entire record in this matter, 	it 	is 	found that
the 	Bakersfield City School 	District 	(District) 	violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act 	(Act or EERA), 	Government
Code section 3543.5 	(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	The District violated
these provisions of EERA on or about April 	2, 	1996, 	by refusing
to provide 	the 	California 	School 	Employees Association 	(CSEA)
with the 	home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	of 	unit members 	and by
unilaterally 	changing 	the 	mechanics 	of 	providing 	such 	information
to 	CSEA. 	This 	conduct violated the 	District's 	duty to bargain 	in
good faith with CSEA, 	in violation of EERA section 3543.5(c).
This 	conduct 	also denied CSEA its 	right 	to 	represent 	unit
35

members, 	in violation of EERA section 3543.5(b). 	This conduct
also 	interfered with the 	right 	of 	unit 	members 	to be 	represented
by CSEA, 	in violation of EERA section 3543.5 (a) .
Pursuant 	to EERA section 3541.5 	(c) , 	it is hereby ORDERED
that 	the 	District, 	its governing board and its 	representatives
shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing without 	legal 	justification 	to provide
CSEA with 	relevant 	and necessary 	information, 	upon 	a proper
request 	by CSEA.
2. 	Making a unilateral 	change 	in the mechanics 	of
providing 	information 	to 	CSEA.
3. 	By the 	same 	conduct, 	denying CSEA its 	right 	to
represent unit members.
4. 	By the 	same conduct, 	interfering with the right of
unit 	members 	to be 	represented by CSEA.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE 	POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	If 	requested by CSEA within 	10 	days 	of 	this
proposed decision becoming 	final, 	to meet 	and negotiate 	in good
faith with 	CSEA concerning the mechanics 	of 	providing unit
members' 	home 	addresses 	and phone numbers 	to CSEA, 	including any
formal 	mechanism 	for 	employees 	to 	exercise 	their 	rights 	under
the California Public Records Act 	(PRA), 	Government 	Code
section 6254.3;
36

2. 	If 	requested by CSEA, 	to reinstate 	the prior
practice 	of providing unit members' 	home 	addresses 	and phone
numbers 	to 	CSEA promptly and without 	first 	conducting a 	survey of
unit 	members 	on the 	subject;
3. 	From such time 	as 	CSEA requests 	negotiations 	on
the 	mechanism 	for unit 	members 	to 	exercise 	their 	rights 	under
PRA section 	6254.3, 	to the 	time 	such negotiations 	are 	completed,
either by agreement 	or by 	exhaustion 	of 	statutory 	impasse
procedures, 	to 	comply with the 	following procedures with regard
to 	those 	unit 	members whose 	home 	addresses 	and phone 	numbers 	were
listed as 	"confidential" 	due to the surveys of April 	9, 	1996, 	and
May 21, 	1996, 	unless 	CSEA and the District 	agree on different
procedures 	or on 	a 	different 	interim period:
a. 	When CSEA wishes 	to 	send a mailing to 	such a
unit member, 	CSEA may place 	the mailing 	in a 	sealed CSEA envelope
and give 	it 	to the District, 	along with sufficient 	information to
identify the unit member. 	Within one business day, 	the District
shall 	place 	the 	sealed CSEA envelope 	in 	a 	District 	envelope 	and
mail 	it 	to the unit member's home address, 	with a cover letter
stating, 	"In Unfair Practice Case No. 	LA-CE-3691, 	the Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board ordered 	the 	District 	to mail 	to you 	at
your home 	address 	the 	enclosed mailing 	from 	the 	California 	School
Employees Association." 	The District 	may bill 	CSEA for 	the 	cost
of 	necessary postage.
b. 	When CSEA wishes 	to 	contact 	such a unit
member by phone, 	CSEA may give 	the 	District 	a message 	for the
37

unit member, 	stating when and at what phone number the unit
member may call 	CSEA. 	Within one business 	day, 	the District
shall 	attempt 	to 	call 	the unit 	member's 	home phone 	number and
leave 	the message, 	and shall 	report 	to CSEA the 	time of 	the
attempted call 	and whether the message was 	left. 	The District
may bill 	CSEA for the 	cost 	of 	necessary toll 	calls.
4. 	Within ten 	(10) 	workdays of 	the 	service of a 	final
decision 	in this matter, 	post 	at 	all 	work locations where notices
to 	classified employees 	customarily are posted, 	copies 	of 	the
Notice 	attached hereto as 	an Appendix. 	The Notice must 	be 	signed
by an authorized agent 	of 	the 	District, 	indicating that 	the
District 	will 	comply with the 	terms 	of 	this 	Order. 	Such posting
shall 	be 	maintained 	for a period of 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive
workdays. 	Reasonable 	steps 	shall 	be 	taken to ensure 	that 	the
Notice 	is not 	reduced in size, 	altered, 	defaced or covered with
any other material.
5. 	Upon issuance of 	a 	final decision, 	make written
notification of 	the 	actions 	taken 	to 	comply with the 	Order 	to 	the
Sacramento Regional 	Director of 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations
Board, 	in accord with the 	regional 	director's 	instructions.
Pursuant 	to California Code of Regulations, 	title 	8,
section 323 05, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order 	shall become
final 	unless 	a party files 	a 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	with the
Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in Sacramento within
20 	days of 	service of 	this Decision. 	In accordance with PERB
regulations, 	the 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	should 	identify by page
38

citation or exhibit 	number the portions 	of 	the 	record, 	if 	any,
relied upon for such exceptions. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32300.) 	A document is considered 	"filed" 	when
actually received before 	the 	close of business 	(5 	p.m.) 	on the
last day set 	for filing 	". 	. 	. o r when sent by telegraph or
certified or Express 	United States 	mail, 	postmarked not 	later
than the last day set for filing 	. 	. 	. 	." 	(See Cal. 	Code of
Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32135; Code of Civ. 	Pro. 	sec. 	1013 shall
apply.) 	Any 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and supporting brief must 	be
served 	concurrently with 	its 	filing 	upon 	each party 	to 	this
proceeding. 	Proof 	of 	service 	shall 	accompany each 	copy 	served on
a party or filed with the Board itself. 	(See 	Cal. 	Code of Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	secs. 	32300, 	32305 and 32140.)
THOMAS J. ALLEN
Administrative Law Judge
39