Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (PERB 1184E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND ITS HACIENDA
LA PUENTE CHAPTER #115,

Charging Party, Case No. LA-CE-3576

Vv. PERB Decision No. 1184

HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,

February 21, 1997

Respondent.

Mae ee eee Nee eee ee ee Se et et er et he

Appearances: California School Employees Association by Alan S.
Hersh, Staff Attorney, for California School Employees
Association and its Hacienda La Puente Chapter #115; Wagner &
Wagner by John J. Wagner, Attorney, for Hacienda La Puente
Unified School District.
Before Caffrey, Chairman; Garcia, Johnson and Dyer, Members.
DECISION

DYER, Member: This case comes before the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) on appeal’ by the Hacienda La
Puente Unified School District (District) to a Board
administrative law judge's (ALJ) proposed decision (attached).
In her decision, the ALJ concluded that the District violated
section 3543.5(a), (b) and (c) of the Educational Employment

Relations Act (EERA)* when it refused to provide the California

“EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq.
EERA section 3543.5 provides, in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for a public school
employer to do any of the following:

(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
_on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise

School 	Employees Association and 	its 	Hacienda La 	Puente 	Chapter
#115 	(Association) 	with 	information which was 	necessary and
relevant 	to 	the Association's 	discharge 	of 	its 	duty to 	represent
unit employees.
The 	Board has 	reviewed the 	entire 	record in this 	case,
including the proposed decision, 	the hearing transcript, 	the
District's 	exceptions, 	and the Association's 	response 	thereto.
The Board 	finds 	the ALJ's 	findings 	of 	fact 	to be 	free 	from
prejudicial 	error and adopts 	them as 	the 	decision of 	the 	Board
itself. 	The 	Board 	finds 	the ALJ's 	conclusions 	of 	law regarding
the Association's 	right 	to 	information relevant 	to 	the 	grievance
process 	to be 	free 	from prejudicial 	error and adopts 	them as 	the
decision 	of 	the 	Board 	itself 	consistent 	with the 	following
discussion.
DISTRICT'S 	EXCEPTIONS
The 	District 	filed 	two 	exceptions 	to 	the proposed decision.
First, 	the District 	contends 	that 	the ALJ incorrectly 	found that
the District 	does 	not 	have 	the 	right 	to 	the benefits 	of 	the
collective bargaining agreement 	(CBA) 	between the parties.
Second, 	the District 	argues 	that 	the ALJ 	incorrectly 	found that
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise of 	rights
guaranteed by this 	chapter. 	For purposes 	of
this subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes an
applicant 	for 	employment 	or 	reemployment.
(b) 	Deny to employee 	organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse 	or fail 	to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with an 	exclusive 	representative.
22

the District's 	refusal 	to process 	a 	facially defective 	grievance
was 	a 	failure 	of 	its bargaining 	obligation.
ASSOCIATION'S 	RESPONSE
The 	Association 	contends 	that 	the ALJ properly 	rejected 	the
District's 	waiver argument 	and properly 	found 	that 	the District
violated 	the 	EERA when 	it 	failed 	to provide 	information necessary
and relevant 	to 	the Association's 	duty to 	represent 	its members
in the grievance process.
DISCUSSION
As 	noted above, 	the District's 	exceptions purport 	to
challenge two findings of 	the ALJ. 	The ALJ, 	however, 	did not
make either of 	the challenged findings. 	Nonetheless, 	the Board
will 	address 	the apparent 	intent 	of 	the District's 	exceptions.
In 	its 	first 	exception, 	the District apparently contends
that, 	because 	the CBA does not 	require 	the District 	to provide
the Association with 	information 	regarding 	grievance 	processing,
the Association has waived its 	right 	to such information. 	It 	is
well 	established, 	however, 	that 	the Board will 	not 	infer a waiver
of 	the 	right 	to bargain 	from silence. 	(San Mateo County
Community College District 	(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	486, 	proposed
decision at p. 	11; 	see also, 	Chula Vista City School District
(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	834 at pp. 	50-52 	(finding right to
necessary 	and 	relevant 	information 	implicit 	in duty 	to bargain).)
Therefore, 	the CBA's 	silence 	regarding the Association's 	right 	to
information is not a waiver of 	that 	right.
33

The District's 	second exception appears 	to argue 	that
because of 	the 	"adversarial" 	nature of 	collective bargaining, 	the
District 	has 	no 	obligation 	to provide 	the Association with 	its
reasons 	for rejecting a unit member's 	grievance. 	As 	the ALJ
found, 	all 	of 	the 	information requested 	in this 	case 	related 	to
grievance processing. 	The Board has 	long held 	that 	an 	exclusive
representative 	is 	entitled 	to 	information 	relating 	to grievance
processing. 	(Chul
---------------·a Vista City School District, 	supra
--·, 	PERB
Decision No. 	834 at p. 	51.) 	The District provides no
justification 	for abandoning 	this precedent, 	and the Board sees
no reason to do so.
ORDER
Upon the 	findings 	of 	fact 	and conclusions 	of 	law and the
entire record in this 	case, 	it 	is 	found that 	the Hacienda La
Puente Unified School 	District 	(District) 	violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA), 	Government Code
section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	The District violated EERA when
it 	refused 	to provide 	the 	California 	School 	Employees Association
and its 	Hacienda La Puente Chapter #115 	(Association) 	with
information necessary and 	relevant 	to 	its 	duty 	to 	represent
bargaining unit members.
Pursuant 	to section 3541.5, 	it 	is hereby ORDERED that 	the
District 	and 	its 	representatives 	shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Failing and 	refusing 	to bargain 	in good 	faith by
failing 	to provide 	information which 	is 	relevant 	and necessary 	to
44

the Association 	for 	the proper performance 	of 	its 	representation
of 	bargaining unit members 	in 	their employment 	relationship with
the District, 	including grievance processing.
2. 	Denying 	the Association rights 	guaranteed 	to 	it by
the EERA, 	including the 	right 	to represent unit members 	in
grievance 	and 	other 	employment matters.
3. 	Interfering with the 	rights 	of 	classified unit
employees 	to be 	represented by 	their 	exclusive 	representative 	by
denying 	that 	representative 	information 	that 	is 	necessary and
relevant 	to 	its 	representational 	functions, 	including grievance
processing.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE 	POLICIES 	OF THE 	EERA:
1. 	Upon request, 	provide 	the Association with a copy
of 	the 	Julie Milan 	letter/incident 	report 	requested by 	the
Association on November 22 	and December 5, 	1994, 	and January 10,
1995. 	Additionally, 	within thirty 	(30) 	calendar days after the
document 	is 	furnished to the Association, 	upon request 	of 	the
Association or Sam Ortiz 	(Ortiz), 	allow Ortiz to file a
supplemental 	rebuttal 	to 	the written 	reprimand 	issued 	to him on
November 7, 	1994.
2. 	Further, 	upon request, 	provide the Association
with 	timely 	information 	that 	explains 	or 	clarifies 	the District's
reasons 	for not 	accepting 	or processing a unit member's 	grievance
that 	the 	District 	initially perceives 	as 	procedurally defective.
3. 	Within thirty-five 	(35) 	days 	following the date
that 	this Decision is no longer subject 	to reconsideration, 	post
5

at 	all 	work locations where notices 	to 	classified employees 	are
customarily placed, 	copies 	of 	the Notice attached as 	an Appendix
hereto. 	The Notice must 	be 	signed by an authorized
representative 	of 	the District, 	indicating that 	the District will
comply with 	the 	terms 	of 	the Order. 	Such posting shall 	be
maintained 	for a period of 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive workdays.
Reasonable 	steps 	shall be 	taken to 	ensure 	that 	the Notice 	is 	not
reduced in size, 	altered, 	defaced, 	or covered with any other
material.
4. 	Written notification of 	the actions 	taken to
comply with 	this 	Order shall 	be made 	to 	the 	San 	Francisco
Regional 	Director of 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	in
accordance with her 	instructions.
Chairman 	Caffrey and Members 	Garcia 	and 	Johnson 	joined 	in 	this
Decision.
6
6

APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY ORDER OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
An agency of 	the 	State 	of 	California
@,1
After a hearing in Unfair Practice 	Case No. 	LA-CE-3576,
California 	School 	Employees Association and 	its 	Hacienda 	La
Puente Chapter #115 	v. 	Hacienda La 	Puente Unified School
District, 	in which all parties had the right to participate, 	it
has 	been 	found 	that 	the 	Hacienda 	La 	Puente Unified 	School
District 	(District) 	violated the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations
Act 	(EERA), 	Government Code section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	The
District 	violated EERA when 	it 	refused 	to provide 	the 	California
School 	Employees Association and 	its 	Hacienda La 	Puente 	Chapter
#115 	(Association) 	with 	information necessary and relevant 	to 	its
duty to 	represent 	bargaining unit members.
As 	a result 	of 	this 	conduct, 	we have been ordered to post
this 	notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST 	FROM:
1. 	Failing and 	refusing 	to bargain 	in good 	faith by
failing 	to provide 	information which 	is 	relevant 	and necessary 	to
the Association 	for 	the proper performance 	of 	its 	representation
of 	bargaining unit members 	in 	their 	employment 	relationship with
the District, 	including grievance processing.
2. 	Denying the Association rights 	guaranteed to 	it by
the EERA, 	including the 	right 	to represent unit members 	in
grievance 	and other employment matters.
3. 	Interfering with 	the 	rights 	of 	classified unit
employees 	to 	be 	represented by 	their 	exclusive 	representative 	by
denying 	that 	representative 	information 	that 	is 	necessary and
relevant 	to 	its 	representational 	functions, 	including grievance
processing.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE 	POLICIES 	OF THE 	EERA:
1. 	Upon request, 	provide 	the Association with a copy
of 	the Julie Milan 	letter/incident 	report 	requested by 	the
Association on November 22 	and December 5, 	1994, 	and January 10,
1995. 	Additionally, 	within thirty 	(30) 	calendar days after the
document 	is 	furnished to the Association, 	upon request 	of 	the
Association or Sam Ortiz 	(Ortiz), 	allow Ortiz to file a
supplemental 	rebuttal 	to 	the written 	reprimand 	issued 	to him on
November 7, 	1994.

2. 	Further, 	upon request, 	provide the Association
with 	timely 	information 	that 	explains 	or 	clarifies 	the District's
reasons 	for not 	accepting 	or processing a unit member's 	grievance
that 	the 	District 	initially perceives 	as 	procedurally defective.
Dated: 	HACIENDA LA 	PUENTE UNIFIED 	SCHOOL
DISTRICT
By: Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED 	FOR AT LEAST
THIRTY 	(30) 	CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS 	FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE REDUCED 	IN SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY
MATERIAL.
22

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CALIFORNIA 	SCHOOL 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND 	ITS 	HACIENDA
LA PUENTE 	CHAPTER #115,
Charging 	Party,
v.
HACIENDA LA 	PUENTE 	UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	LA-CE-3576
PROPOSED 	DECISION
(9/30/96)
Appearances: 	Chuck Shepard, 	Senior Labor Relations
Representative, 	for California 	School 	Employees Association
and its Hacienda La Puente 	Chapter #115; 	Wagner 	& Wagner by
John J. 	Wagner, 	Attorney, 	for Hacienda La Puente Unified School
District.
Before W. 	Jean Thomas, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
The 	California 	School 	Employees Association 	and 	its 	Hacienda
La 	Puente 	Chapter #115 	(CSEA) 	filed an unfair practice 	charge
with 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or Board)
against 	the 	Hacienda 	La 	Puente 	Unified School 	District 	(District)
on June 	5, 	1995, 	alleging that 	the District 	engaged in conduct
that 	violated 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations Act 	(EERA or
Act).1
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_______________ )
1EERA is codified at Government Code section 3 54 0 	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	are 	to 	the
Government 	Code.

After 	an 	investigation 	of 	the 	charge, 	the 	Office 	of 	the
General 	Counsel 	of 	PERB 	issued 	a 	complaint 	on 	July 	3, 	1995.2 The
complaint 	alleged 	that 	the 	District 	failed 	and 	refused 	to 	provide
information 	that 	CSEA requested 	(1) 	on December 4, 	1994, 	in
connection 	with 	a 	special 	evaluation 	of 	unit 	member 	Sam 	Ortiz
(Ortiz), 	and 	(2) 	on January 18, 	1995, 	when CSEA requested
specific 	reasons 	for 	the 	District's 	refusal 	to 	process 	a
grievance 	filed by Ortiz 	on 	January 	10, 	1995. 	This 	conduct
allegedly violated 	section 	3543.5(c) 	in 	that 	it 	amounted 	to 	a
refusal 	and 	failure 	to bargain 	in 	good 	faith 	with 	CSEA, 	and
interfered 	with 	the 	representational 	rights 	of 	unit 	employees 	and
CSEA's 	right 	to 	represent 	unit 	members 	in 	violation 	of 	section
3543.5 (a) 	and 	(b) .3
2On 	the 	same 	day, 	the 	PERB 	board 	agent 	denied 	the 	District's
request 	for 	deferral 	to 	arbitration 	on 	the 	grounds 	that 	the
collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	(CBA) 	between 	the 	parties 	did not
cover 	the 	matter 	at 	issue 	in 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge.
3In pertinent 	part, 	section 	3543.5 	states 	that 	it 	shall
be 	unlawful 	for 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	to 	do 	any 	of 	the
following:
(a) 	Impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on 	employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter. 	For purposes 	of
this 	subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes 	an
applicant 	for 	employment 	or 	reemployment.
(b) 	Deny 	to 	employee 	organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them 	by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse 	or 	fail 	to meet 	and negotiate 	in
good 	faith 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
N	2

The 	District 	answered the 	complaint 	on July 11, 	1995,
wherein 	it 	denied all material 	allegations 	of unfair conduct.
This 	dispute was 	not 	resolved at 	an 	informal 	conference
conducted by PERB on July 31, 	1995.
A 	formal 	hearing was 	conducted by 	the 	undersigned on
November 22 	and December 	7, 	1995. 	After both parties 	filed post-
hearing briefs, 	the 	case was 	submitted 	for proposed decision on
April 9, 	1996.
FINDINGS 	OF 	FACT
The 	District 	is 	a public 	school 	employer and CSEA is 	an
employee 	organization as 	those 	terms 	are 	defined 	in EERA. 	CSEA
is 	also 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	a 	comprehensive unit 	of
the 	District's 	classified 	employees.
The 	District 	and CSEA were parties 	to 	a 	CBA with an
effective 	term from September 1, 	1993 	through August 	31, 	1996,
which covered the 	time period at 	issue. 	This 	CBA contains 	a
four-step grievance procedure 	that 	culminates 	in 	final 	and
binding 	arbitration.
The 	terms 	of 	the grievance procedure 	are 	set 	forth 	in
Article V of 	the 	CBA. 	The 	stated purpose 	of 	the 	grievance
procedure is 	". 	. 	. t o provide, 	at the lowest administrative
level, 	a means by which a grievance may be 	resolved in an
equitable, 	efficient manner 	in an atmosphere 	of 	courtesy and
cooperation." 	Section 5.6.1 	of 	this 	article 	defines 	a
"grievance" as:
W	
3

[A] 	claim by the Association, 	a member or
members 	of 	the bargaining unit 	that 	there 	has
been a violation, 	misinterpretation, 	or
misapplication of 	an 	expressed provision of
this 	agreement.
The 	steps 	for grievance 	resolution 	are 	contained 	in
section 5.7. 	The process 	for initiating a grievance 	at 	Step 	1
reads:
Any grievant 	who 	knew or 	reasonably 	should
have 	known of 	the 	circumstances which 	formed
the 	basis 	for the 	grievance 	shall 	present 	the
grievance 	in writing 	to 	the 	immediate
administrator within fifteen 	(15) 	days.
Failure 	to 	do 	so will 	render the grievance
null 	and void. 	The written 	information 	shall
include:
5.7.1.1 	Description 	of 	the 	specific 	grounds
of the grievance, 	including name, 	dates, 	and
places 	necessary 	for 	complete 	understanding
of 	the grievance.
5.7.1.2 	A 	listing 	of 	the 	provisions 	of 	this
agreement 	which are 	alleged 	to 	have been
violated, 	misapplied, 	or misinterpreted.
5.7.1.3 	A 	listing 	of 	the 	specific 	action
requested of 	the 	district 	which will 	remedy
the grievance.
The 	immediate 	administrator 	or his 	designee
shall 	meet 	with the 	grievant within 	five 	(5)
days. 	The 	disposition of 	the grievance 	shall
be 	indicated in writing within 	five 	(5) 	days
of 	the meeting with copies 	to 	the 	grievant
and the 	association.[4]
4The 	time 	limits 	specified 	in the 	grievance procedure 	are
governed by the 	terms 	of 	section 	5.2. 	Sections 	5.2 	and 5.7.1 	of
this 	article were modified during the parties' 	reopener
negotiations 	in the 	fall 	of 	1995 	to 	standardize 	and 	shorten 	the
time 	lines 	for 	initiating a grievance. 	As 	a result 	of 	these
changes, 	all references to 	"days" 	are working days. 	These
changes, 	however, 	are not relevant to this case.
A	
4

The 	parties 	use 	a 	standard 	form 	for grievance 	processing.
The November 7, 	1994 	Letter to Ortiz
Ortiz 	has 	been employed by the 	District 	for 	six years 	and
works 	as 	a grounds worker 	II. 	He 	is 	supervised by Rudy Chavarria
(Chavarria), 	the operations supervisor.
On November 7, 	1994, 	Chavarria summoned Ortiz 	to a meeting
at 	which 	time 	he presented Ortiz 	with 	a 	letter 	concerning his
work performance. 	The 	letter 	stated that 	Ortiz 	engaged 	in
unacceptable behavior on the morning of May 18, 	1994, 	when he
confronted District 	employee Julie Milan 	(Milan) 	at 	La 	Puente
High 	School 	(following a meeting earlier 	that 	same 	morning with
Chavarria about being at his home during working hours), 	accused
her of 	calling 	Chavarria's 	office 	about 	him, 	and allegedly
threatened to 	"come back" 	and 	"take 	care of business" 	if 	he
proved that 	she made 	the 	call. 	Milan 	is 	a security patrol
officer at 	La 	Puente 	High School. 	The 	letter concluded with the
following 	statement:
Pursuant 	to board policy GA-K, 	Personnel
Files, 	a copy of this 	letter will be placed
in your personnel 	file. 	If you wish to
respond to 	this 	letter, 	please do so within
the next 	10 	working days 	either to my office
or to Barbara Koehler, 	assistant
superintendent personnel.[5]
Thereafter, 	Ortiz, 	Marcelo Pantoja 	(Pantoja), 	the local CSEA
5On June 	13, 	1994, 	Chavarria met with Ortiz 	and warned him
to 	stay away 	from Milan and to not 	repeat 	his 	actions 	of May 	18.
The next day, 	Chavarria and George Cota 	(Cota) , 	director of
maintenance 	and operations, 	met with Ortiz 	regarding this 	same
matter. 	Ortiz 	testified 	that 	thereafter he 	complied with his
supervisors' directive.
5

chapter vice president and job steward, 	and Genie Lee 	(Lee), 	the
CSEA labor relations 	representative, 	met 	informally with Gary
Matsumoto 	(Matsumoto), 	acting assistant superintendent, 	business
services, 	on November 22, 	1994, 	to discuss removal of the
November 	7 	letter 	from Ortiz's personnel 	file. 	In answer to
Lee's 	question about what 	the 	letter was, 	Matsumoto referred to
it 	as 	a 	"notice of unsatisfactory service". 	CSEA also requested
a 	copy of 	the 	letter 	that 	Milan had 	submitted 	to 	the 	District
concerning 	Ortiz 	because 	CSEA and Ortiz 	believed 	that 	Milan's
letter was 	the 	impetus 	for what 	they then referred to 	as 	the
"notice 	of 	unsatisfactory 	service".6
Matsumoto 	agreed 	to 	discuss 	both matters with Barbara
Koehler 	(Koehler), 	assistant superintendent of personnel, 	and
respond to 	CSEA and Ortiz 	as 	soon as 	he 	could.7
The 	record 	is 	unclear 	about 	whether Matsumoto 	discussed 	the
matter with Koehler. 	In any event, 	Lee, 	Ortiz and Pantoja,
6In May 	1994, 	Cota 	showed Pantoja 	a 	typewritten document
which Cota 	said Milan had written. 	Pantoja, 	who witnessed the
May 18 	incident 	between Milan and Ortiz, 	could not 	recall 	whether
the document bore a signature, 	but he did recall 	that 	it
contained 	several 	derogatory 	statements 	about 	Ortiz's 	character
and conduct.
Lee 	testified that 	during this meeting, 	Matsumoto 	remarked
that 	during 	the 	current 	school 	year he 	had 	received a 	telephone
call 	from Milan who asked what 	was 	going to be 	done 	about 	Ortiz
in relation to the 	letter she had submitted to the District.
7Lee 	testified 	that 	Matsumoto 	also 	agreed to waive 	the 	CBA
timelines 	for 	initiating 	a 	grievance 	should 	CSEA and Ortiz
decided to pursue 	a grievance 	concerning the November 	7 	document.
Matsumoto denies 	any recall 	of 	discussion about 	a possible
grievance 	being 	filed or 	such an agreement. 	A resolution 	of 	this
conflicting 	testimony 	is 	not 	necessary 	in order 	to 	decide 	the
ultimate 	legal 	issues of 	this case.
66

subsequently met with Koehler on December 5, 	1994, 	regarding the
Ortiz matter. 	Lee 	renewed the 	request 	that 	the November 	7
"unsat" 	letter be 	removed 	from Ortiz's personnel 	file 	and that
CSEA and Ortiz 	be given a 	copy of 	the Milan 	letter. 	Koehler
denied knowing anything about 	a Milan 	letter. 	However, 	she 	did
promise 	to give 	a prompt 	response 	to 	the 	other request.
Koehler notified Ortiz verbally on December 15, 	1994, 	that
the 	disciplinary letter 	of 	November 	7 	would not 	be 	removed 	from
his 	file. 	However, 	she made no 	further mention to Ortiz 	or CSEA,
verbally or 	in writing, 	about 	the Milan letter.
Koehler 	testified 	that 	Milan prepared 	an 	"incident 	report"
about her verbal 	exchange with Ortiz on May 18, 	however, 	that
report, 	according to her, 	did not 	form the basis 	for the
November 	7 	letter.
Koehler further testified that 	the November 	7, 	1994,
document 	issued to Ortiz 	was 	a 	letter of 	reprimand and not 	a
"notice 	of unsatisfactory service". 	The reprimand was 	issued
because 	of 	Ortiz's 	insubordination 	in 	ignoring 	the 	La 	Puente 	High
School 	assistant principal's directive to him on May 18, 	1994,
that 	he 	not 	speak 	to Milan during working hours. 	Since 	the
reprimand 	involved derogatory 	comments 	about 	Ortiz 	and was 	to be
placed in his personnel 	file, 	in accord with board policy GA-K,8
8District policy GA-K 	(personnel 	files) 	states, 	in part, 	as
follows:
Information of 	a derogatory nature 	shall 	not
be 	entered or 	filed unless 	and until 	the
employee 	is 	given notice 	and an opportunity
to 	review and comment 	thereon. 	An employee
77

Ortiz 	was 	entitled 	to 	a 	copy beforehand and an 	opportunity to
file 	a written rebuttal. 	Ortiz 	did 	file 	a written response which
was 	attached to 	the 	reprimand. 	Both documents 	remain 	in his
personnel 	file.
In contrast 	to a written reprimand, 	Koehler described a
"notice 	of unsatisfactory service" 	as 	a 	type of 	special
evaluation 	that 	is 	issued pursuant 	to 	the 	evaluations 	provisions
of the CBA. 	Article XX, 	section 20.5, 	requires that a notice of
unsatisfactory 	service be 	made 	on 	a prescribed 	form.9 No 	such
form 	is 	required 	for 	a written 	reprimand.
Lee 	testified that 	she 	knew there was 	a 	form 	for 	special
evaluations, 	but 	she had never seen such a document until 	it was
introduced as 	an exhibit 	during 	the 	hearing.
shall 	have 	the 	right 	to 	enter and have
attached 	to 	any 	such derogatory 	statement,
his 	own comments 	thereon. 	Such review shall
take place during normal business hours, 	and
the 	employee 	shall 	be 	released 	from duty 	for
this 	purpose without 	salary reduction.
9The 	specific 	document 	used 	is 	a 	triplicate 	form entitled
"Notice 	of Unsatisfactory Service 	for 	Classified Employees,"
dated January 	1994.
Article XX, 	section 20.5 	(Special Evaluations), 	reads:
A supervisor may 	issue 	to 	an 	employee 	a
Notice 	of 	Outstanding Service 	or a Notice 	of
Unsatisfactory Service 	at 	any time. 	Such
notices 	shall 	be made 	on prescribed forms 	and
shall 	set 	forth specific 	reasons 	for
recognition 	of 	outstanding 	or unsatisfactory
service by the 	employee. 	The 	immediate
supervisor 	or 	the 	next 	higher 	supervisor
shall 	present 	the 	special 	evaluation 	to 	the
employee 	and discuss 	it with him/her. 	A copy
of 	such notice 	shall 	be placed 	in the
employee's personnel 	file.
8

The January 10, 	1995, 	Ortiz Grievance
Ortiz 	filed a Step 1 grievance on January 10, 	1995, 	alleging
that 	the District 	had violated Article 	III 	(Management 	Rights),
section 3.1, 	and Article XX 	(Performance Evaluations), 	section
20.5, 	of the CBA by issuing the November 7, 	1994, 	"notice of
unsatisfactory 	service" 	without 	affording due process 	and
refusing 	to 	provide 	the 	Milan 	letter 	requested by 	CSEA to 	assist
it 	in challenging the 	"unsat" 	notice. 	The 	remedy sought was
(1) 	removal 	of 	the notice 	of unsatisfactory service 	from Ortiz's
personnel 	file, 	and 	(2) 	provide CSEA with a copy of 	the Milan
letter regarding Ortiz. 	Lee 	assisted Ortiz 	with the preparation
of 	the grievance which was 	submitted on the parties' 	standard
grievance 	form.
Chavarria responded on January 12, 	1995. 	His 	letter to
Ortiz 	stated:
I 	am in receipt 	of 	a document 	which you gave
me on January 11, 	1995. 	This document 	is not
being processed as 	a grievance 	in that 	it
does 	not 	follow procedures 	outlined 	in
Article V in the 	agreement 	between the 	Board
of 	Education and the 	California 	School
Employees Association.
A copy of 	Chavarria's 	letter was 	sent 	to Lee.
Lee 	received her copy of 	the 	letter on January 17, 	1995.
She 	immediately called Chavarria 	to 	find out 	what 	specific
section(s) 	of Article V had not been followed. 	He 	stated that 	he
would have 	to 	check and call 	her back. 	The next 	day, 	Lee 	again
called Chavarria 	and he 	told her 	that 	she 	would have 	to 	speak
with Koehler.
9

Lee called Koehler the 	same day, 	made the 	same query, 	but
Koehler would not 	tell 	her what 	was 	wrong with the 	grievance.
Instead 	she 	suggested that 	Lee 	go 	through 	it 	"line by line" 	until
she 	figured out 	the problem. 	Lee 	informed Koehler that 	she 	had
already done 	a 	review before 	she 	called, 	and was 	calling her 	for
clarification. 	Koehler, 	however, 	offered no further explanation.
Lee 	then 	told 	Koehler 	that 	she 	could only assume 	that
perhaps 	Koehler 	considered 	the 	grievance 	untimely 	filed. 	Lee
informed Koehler that 	if 	this was 	the 	case, 	Matsumoto had agreed
to waive 	timelines 	for a 	grievance 	to be 	filed during the
November 22, 	1994, 	meeting. 	Koehler responded that Matsumoto did
not 	have 	the 	authority to waive 	timelines 	on grievance 	filing,
but 	offered no 	further 	information 	in this 	regard. 	Koehler also
would 	not 	confirm or 	deny whether Untimeliness 	was 	the 	problem
with the 	Ortiz 	grievance.
Thereafter, 	Ortiz 	and CSEA attempted to elevate 	the
grievance 	to 	Step 	2 	of 	the procedure by submitting 	it 	to
Chavarria on January 19, 	1995. 	Chavarria's January 24, 	1995,
response 	was basically the 	same 	as 	his 	response 	to Ortiz 	at
Step 1.
On February 24, 	1995, 	Lee requested by letter that
Superintendent 	John Kramar 	(Kramar) 	move 	the Ortiz 	grievance 	to
Step 	3. 	Step 	3 	provides 	for mediation by the 	state Mediation/
Conciliation Services. 	Kramar responded to Lee on March 1, 	1995.
His 	letter acknowledged receipt 	of 	Lee's 	February 24 	letter and
directed 	her 	attention 	to 	attached 	copies 	of 	Chavarria's
10

January 12 	and January 24 	written responses 	to Ortiz. 	No
additional 	comments 	or explanations 	were made 	to 	indicate 	a
specific 	reason 	for 	rejecting 	CSEA's 	request 	for mediation.
At 	the 	hearing 	Koehler 	testified that 	the 	Ortiz 	grievance
was 	not 	processed because 	it 	was 	deemed untimely filed. 	Koehler
admitted that, 	prior to the hearing, 	she never 	informed CSEA nor
Ortiz 	why the grievance was 	rejected. 	She 	explained that 	her
conduct 	in this 	respect 	was 	consistent 	with the 	District's
longstanding practice 	of 	not 	informing person(s) 	filing a
grievance 	about 	how to use 	and 	follow the 	CBA. 	The 	District
assumes 	that 	the 	grievant 	and/or CSEA knows 	the procedures 	to be
followed 	in grievance processing; 	and therefore 	they cannot
expect 	the 	District 	to 	inform 	them or 	explain why an 	attempted
grievance 	is 	not processed 	if 	it 	has 	not 	been filed 	in accord
with the 	requirements 	of 	the 	CBA grievance procedure.
Koehler 	further 	testified 	that 	the 	District 	also 	has 	had a
longstanding policy of 	only authorizing 	extension 	of 	timelines
for grievance 	processing 	through her office. 	Although other
administrators 	have 	the 	authority to 	respond to 	and 	adjust
grievances, 	none of them, 	including Matsumoto, 	have the authority
to grant 	extensions 	of 	time 	for grievances 	filed pursuant 	to 	the
CBA. 	Since 	CSEA did not 	request 	an extension of 	time 	from her
office 	to 	file 	the Ortiz 	grievance, 	according to Koehler's
calculations, 	the January 10, 	1995, 	grievance was untimely.
It was 	not 	filed within 	15 	working days 	from the 	date 	the
November 7, 	1994, 	written reprimand was 	issued.
11

ISSUES
Whether the District violated section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	or 	(c)
by 	failing 	and 	refusing 	to 	provide 	information 	requested by 	CSEA
in 	connection with 	its 	representation 	of 	a bargaining unit
member?
DISCUSSION AND 	CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
A. 	Legal 	Standard 	for 	the 	Duty to 	Furnish Requested 	Information
It 	is well 	settled that 	an employer's 	duty to bargain 	in
good 	faith with 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	its 	employees
includes 	the 	obligation 	to provide 	necessary and 	relevant
information needed by the 	union 	for 	the 	proper performance 	of 	its
representational 	obligations. 	(Stockton Unified School 	District
(1980) 	PERB decision No. 	143 	(Stockton); 	Chula Vista City School
District 	(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	834 	(Chula Vista); 	NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. 	Co. 	(1956) 	351 U.S. 	149 	[38 LRRM 2042].)
The 	employer's 	duty to 	furnish information, 	like 	its duty to
bargain, 	"extends beyond the period of 	contract 	negotiations 	and
applies 	to 	labor-management 	relations 	during the 	term of 	an
agreement." 	(NLRB v. 	Acme 	Industrial 	Company 	(1967) 	385 U.S. 	432
[64 	LRRM 2069] 	(Acme 	Industrial).) 	This 	includes 	information
needed to police 	and 	administer an 	existing 	CBA, 	including
grievance processing. 	(Chula Vista; 	Modesto City Schools 	and High
School District 	(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	479 	(Modesto); 	Acme
Industrial.)
In determining what 	information must be produced, 	a 	liberal,
discovery-type 	standard 	is 	used 	in 	determining whether
12

information 	is 	relevant 	or potentially relevant. 	(NLRB v.
Truitt, 	supra, 	351 U.S. 	149 	[38 LRRM 2042] 	and Chula Vista.)
Information 	requested by 	an 	exclusive 	representative 	for 	use 	in
an 	non-contractual 	disciplinary action 	or proceeding 	can be
relevant 	to 	its 	EERA-based 	responsibilities 	and 	therefore 	must 	be
disclosed unless 	the 	employer 	can establish 	that 	the 	information
is 	plainly 	irrelevant 	and/or 	can provide 	a valid excuse 	why 	it
cannot 	furnish the 	information. 	(Los Angeles 	Unified School
District 	(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	835 	(Los Angeles) 	and 	(1994)
PERB Decision No. 	1061.)
Generally 	information 	about 	employees 	actually 	represented
by a 	union 	is 	presumptively relevant 	and 	is 	required 	to be
produced, 	except 	in narrow instances where 	the 	information is
considered confidential; 	in such circumstances, 	the 	information
need not 	be produced unless 	safeguards 	are provided. 	(See Mt.
San Antonio 	Community College 	District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No.
224 and Modesto at p. 	8, 	citing Detroit Edison Co. 	v. 	NLRB 	(1979)
440 U.S. 	301 	[100 LRRM 2728].)
The principles 	set 	forth above will 	be 	applied 	in analyzing
the 	credited evidence 	of 	record 	in this 	case.
B. 	CSEA's 	Pre-grievance 	Requests 	for the Milan Letter
CSEA made 	two oral 	requests 	for a 	copy of 	the Milan 	letter/
incident 	report 	during its 	representation of 	Ortiz 	in the
informal 	effort 	to effect 	removal of the November 7, 	1994,
written reprimand 	from his personnel 	file. 	The 	first 	request 	was
during the November 22, 	1994, 	meeting with Matsumoto, 	and the
13

second request was 	tendered during the December 5, 	1994, 	meeting
with Koehler.
CSEA knew that 	Milan had 	submitted 	some 	sort 	of written
document 	to 	the 	District 	concerning her 	encounter with Ortiz 	on
May 18, 	1994, 	because Pantoja had seen it 	in May 1994. 	Both CSEA
and Ortiz believed that 	this 	document, 	which it 	referred to as 	a
"letter," 	formed 	the basis 	for 	the 	District's 	later decision 	to
formally discipline Ortiz 	in November 1994. 	Therefore, 	this
document, 	whether it was a 	"letter" 	or an 	"incident 	report," 	was
presumptively 	relevant 	and 	needed by 	CSEA 	for 	its 	representation
of 	Ortiz 	in 	challenging the November 	1994 	disciplinary action.
And under the 	liberal, 	discovery-type 	standard adopted 	in Chula
Vista, 	it 	should have been produced. 	(Los Angeles.) 	CSEA needed
to 	review the 	contents 	of 	the Milan 	letter/incident 	report 	to
judge 	for itself what, 	if any, 	relationship existed between this
document 	and Ortiz's 	written 	reprimand. 	This 	information 	could
have 	helped CSEA assess 	the merits 	of 	its 	objections 	to 	the
discipline.
The 	uncontroverted evidence 	shows 	that 	the 	District 	never
provided 	the 	requested document 	nor 	offered 	any 	explanation 	for
its 	total 	lack of 	response 	to CSEA's 	requests. 	Even 	if 	the
District 	questioned the 	relevancy of 	the material 	sought, 	it 	had
the burden to assert 	its 	challenge 	in a timely manner, 	which 	it
did not 	do. 	If 	it 	could not provide 	the 	requested document 	in
any form, 	it was 	obligated to set 	forth adequate 	reasons 	for 	its
inability to do 	so. 	(Stockton.)
14

Instead, 	the District 	totally ignored the 	requests. 	No
explanation 	or 	justification 	has 	been 	offered 	for 	the 	nonresponse
except 	to 	claim that 	the Milan 	letter/incident 	report 	was 	not 	the
reason 	that 	Ortiz 	received 	the 	written 	reprimand.
The 	fact 	that 	the District 	never 	formally refused 	to 	supply
the 	requested document does 	not 	excuse 	its 	conduct. 	Absent 	a
valid excuse, 	the District's 	lack of 	response 	amounted to a 	flat
refusal 	to 	furnish the 	information. 	(Chula Vista.)
C. 	CSEA's 	Requests 	for the 	Information During 	the Attempts
to 	Process 	the 	Ortiz 	Grievance
Within 	the 	context 	of 	grievance 	processing 	initiated
pursuant 	to 	the provisions 	of 	a 	CBA, 	requested 	information must
be 	provided
. 	. 	. 	and if it likely would be relevant and
useful 	to 	the union's 	determination of 	the
merits 	of 	the 	grievance 	and to 	their
fulfillment 	of 	the union's 	statutory
representation duties. 	[Acme 	Industrial 	at
pp. 	437-38.]
When Ortiz 	and CSEA filed his 	grievance 	with 	the 	District 	on
January 10, 	1995, 	there were two objectives: 	(1) 	to contest the
validity of 	the November 	1994 	reprimand which CSEA regarded as 	a
special 	evaluation, 	i.e., 	a notice of unsatisfactory service;
and 	(2) 	to obtain a copy of 	the Milan document 	to aid in its
prosecution of 	the 	grievance.
However, 	CSEA was 	thwarted in its 	representation efforts 	in
both respects. 	The 	District 	refused to 	accept 	or process 	the
grievance without 	explaining why, 	and again 	it 	totally 	ignored
the 	request 	for the Milan 	letter/incident 	report.
15

When Lee 	spoke 	first 	with Chavarria 	and then with Koehler 	on
or about January 18, 	1995, 	to elicit the reason(s) 	for the
rejection of 	the grievance 	at 	Step 	1, 	neither person would tell
her what was wrong with the grievance. 	Instead, 	Koehler told Lee
to go 	through the grievance, 	"line by line" 	until 	she 	figured out
what 	the problem was. 	No other explanation was provided. 	Even
when 	Lee 	queried 	Koehler 	about 	whether 	she 	considered 	the
grievance 	untimely, 	Koehler 	refused to 	confirm or deny the
perceived timeliness problem. 	Koehler's 	refusal 	to disclose 	this
information 	denied 	CSEA and 	its 	unit 	member 	an 	early opportunity
to 	assess 	the 	District's 	position 	and respond accordingly.
Even as 	CSEA attempted to 	elevate 	the 	grievance 	to 	Step 	2
and Step 	3 	of 	the procedure, 	the District 	steadfastly refused to
explain why the grievance was 	not 	being processed, 	other 	than to
respond 	that 	it 	did not 	"follow the 	procedures 	outlined 	in
Article V" 	of 	the 	CBA. 	CSEA did not 	learn 	the 	reason 	for
District's 	refusal 	to process 	the 	Ortiz 	grievance until 	Koehler
testified at 	the 	hearing.
The District 	raises 	several 	arguments 	in its 	defense.
First, 	it 	asserts 	the 	contractual 	right 	to 	insist upon strict
compliance with all 	the 	technical 	requirements 	of 	section 	5.7.1
(Step 1) 	of the grievance procedure. 	Next, 	it contends that
since 	the document 	filed on January 10, 	1995, 	which purported to
be 	a grievance, 	was not 	filed timely, 	it was 	"null 	and void" 	and
thus 	the 	District 	had no 	legal 	or 	contractual 	obligation 	to
respond 	in any way to 	a 	"null 	and void 	situation." 	The 	District
16

also maintains 	that 	since 	the 	CBA does 	not 	require 	it 	to disclose
why it will 	not process 	a grievance, 	it has no contractual 	or
legal 	obligation to provide 	CSEA with such 	information. 	Finally,
it 	claims 	that 	CSEA has 	long known of 	the 	District's manner and
method of 	administering Article V, 	yet 	it 	has not 	attempted to
negotiate 	any 	contractual 	language 	which would obligate 	the
District 	to disclose 	its 	reasons 	for not processing alleged
grievances.
There 	is 	no question but 	that 	the 	District 	has 	the 	right 	to
strictly enforce 	all 	the provisions 	of Article V. 	It 	is 	also
true 	that 	no provision of 	the 	CBA requires 	disclosure 	to 	CSEA of
the 	District's 	reasons 	for not 	processing a unit 	member's
grievance.
However, 	the 	contractual 	rights 	do not 	supersede 	the
District's 	statutory obligation under 	EERA to provide 	the
exclusive 	representative 	of 	its 	employees 	with 	information
relevant 	to 	a pending grievance 	in order 	for the union to
intelligently evaluate the merits of 	its 	claim. 	This obligation
included the 	union's 	request 	for the Milan document.
A determination that 	information 	is producible 	is 	not 	a
decision on 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	grievance 	underlying 	a 	request 	and
it 	has been held that 	a union 	is 	not 	required to demonstrate 	that
the 	information sought 	is accurate, 	non-hearsay, 	or ultimately
reliable. 	(Acme 	Industrial 	and T. 	U. 	Electric and International
Brotherhood of 	Electrical Workers Local 	2337 	(1992) 	306 	NLRB 	654
[140 	LRRM 	1116].)
17

The 	District's 	refusal 	to 	inform CSEA of 	its 	reason 	for
rejecting the 	Ortiz 	grievance 	or to 	even acknowledge 	its 	request
for 	the 	Milan material 	in 	connection with 	this 	grievance
demonstrates 	the District's hyper-technical, 	"obstructionist"
approach 	to 	the 	grievance process 	and how it 	interferes with the
Union's 	ability to properly perform 	its 	representational 	duties.
It 	is well-settled that 	the 	obligation to bargain 	in good
faith 	is 	not 	confined to 	the 	negotiation of 	an agreement 	but 	is 	a
day-to-day process 	in which 	the 	grievance procedure 	has 	a very
important 	role 	as 	a 	continuation of 	the 	collective 	bargaining
process. 	(Stockton; 	Jefferson School District 	(198 0) 	PERB
Decision No. 	133.)10 The District's practice of refusing to
inform a unit 	member or 	CSEA about 	why it will 	not 	accept 	or
process 	a grievance 	that 	it 	considers 	facially deficient 	falls
short 	of 	this 	bargaining obligation as 	it 	pertains 	to 	the
administration 	of 	a 	CBA through 	its 	grievance machinery.
The 	District's 	restrictive 	view of 	its 	disclosure 	obligation
also appears 	to be 	at 	odds with the 	stated purpose 	of 	the
parties' 	grievance procedure which contemplates 	grievance
resolution in ". 	. 	. a n equitable manner 	. 	. 	. 	in an atmosphere
of 	courtesy and 	cooperation."
Finally, 	it 	is 	concluded that 	the District 	has not presented
any persuasive 	evidence 	that 	supports 	its 	"waiver" 	argument. 	An
10In 	fact, 	some 	authorities have declared the grievance
procedure 	to be 	the 	core 	of 	the 	collective bargaining agreement.
(See Elkouri and Elkouri, 	How Arbitration Works, 	4th Ed. 	(1985),
p. 	153, 	fn 3.)
18

employer 	asserting 	that 	an 	employee 	organization 	has 	waived 	its
statutory right 	to meet 	and negotiate 	has 	the 	burden of 	proof
with respect 	to 	this position. 	(Amador Valley Joint Union High
School District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	74.) 	In this case, 	the
evidence 	about 	the parties' 	most 	recent negotiations 	did not
establish 	that 	CSEA clearly 	and unmistakenly waived 	the 	right 	to
obtain 	information 	relative 	to grievance processing, 	and there 	is
no 	such express waiver provision in the 	CBA. 	Thus, 	the 	"waiver"
defense 	is 	rejected.
SUMMARY
For the 	all 	reasons 	discussed above, 	it 	is 	concluded that
the 	District 	violated 	section 	3543.5(c) 	by refusing to provide
relevant 	information needed by CSEA 	(1) 	for use 	in connection
with 	its 	representation of 	a unit 	member who attempted 	to
challenge 	a disciplinary action and 	(2) 	to understand why the
District 	refused 	to process 	a 	contractual 	grievance 	for 	that 	same
employee.
It 	is 	further concluded that by this 	same 	conduct, 	the
District 	violated 	section 	3543.5(b) 	by 	interfering with CSEA's
ability 	to 	effectively discharge 	its 	duty 	to 	represent 	bargaining
unit members.
Finally, 	it 	is 	concluded that 	this 	conduct 	also violated
section 	3543.5(a) 	by 	interfering with 	a 	classified unit
employee's 	right 	to 	have 	representation by his 	exclusive
representative 	in his 	employment 	relations 	with the 	District,
including 	grievance 	processing.
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REMEDY
Section 3541.5 (c) 	grants 	the Board the power to
. 	. 	. 	issue a decision and order directing an
offending party 	to 	cease 	and desist 	from 	the
unfair practice 	and 	to 	take 	such 	affirmative
action, 	. . . 	as will 	effectuate 	the policies
of 	this chapter.
Accordingly, 	it 	is 	appropriate 	to order the District 	to cease 	and
desist 	from 	failing 	and 	refusing 	to provide 	necessary and
relevant 	information to CSEA, 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative of
classified employees, 	for the performance 	of 	its 	representational
duties 	to unit 	employees, 	including grievance processing.
(Stockton.)
In the 	instant 	case, 	the 	document 	sought by CSEA was never
provided to CSEA, 	nor was 	the 	document 	produced during the
hearing.11 It 	is 	thus appropriate 	to order that, 	upon request,
the 	District 	provide 	CSEA with a 	copy of 	the Milan
letter/incident 	report 	which was 	requested on November 	22 	and
December 5, 	1994, 	and January 10, 	1995. 	(See Modesto City
Schools and High School 	District 	(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	518.)
Additionally, 	it 	is ordered that within 3 0 	calendar days after
the 	document 	is 	furnished to 	CSEA, 	upon request 	by CSEA or 	Sam
Ortiz, 	allow Ortiz 	to 	file 	a 	supplemental 	written rebuttal 	to 	the
written reprimand issued to him on November 	7, 	1994.
11In its brief, 	the District 	argues 	that 	CSEA could have
requested, 	through a subpoena duces tecum, 	that 	the District
produce 	the 	document 	at 	the 	hearing 	in order 	for 	the union to
review 	it 	and make 	a 	determination regarding 	its 	relevance 	to
this matter, 	but it chose not to do so. 	" This fact is irrelevant
to 	the 	issue 	of 	whether the 	District 	was 	mandated by EERA to
provide 	CSEA with 	the 	requested 	information.
20

It 	is 	also 	appropriate 	that 	the 	District 	be 	required to post
a notice 	incorporating the 	terms 	of 	the 	order at 	all 	sites where
notices 	are 	customarily placed 	for 	classified employees. 	The
Notice 	should be 	subscribed by an 	authorized agent 	of 	the
District, 	indicating that 	it will 	comply with the 	terms 	thereof.
The Notice 	shall 	not be 	reduced 	in size. 	Posting such a notice
will 	provide 	employees with notice 	that 	the District 	has 	acted 	in
an unlawful 	manner 	and 	is 	being 	required to 	cease 	and desist 	from
this 	activity and will 	comply with the 	order. 	It 	effectuates 	the
purposes 	of 	EERA that 	employees 	be 	informed of 	the 	resolution of
the 	controversy and will 	announce 	the 	readiness 	of 	the 	District
to 	comply with the 	ordered remedy. 	(See 	Placerville Union School
District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	69.) 	In Pandol 	and Sons v.
Agricultural 	Labor Relations Board 	(1979) 	98 	Cal.App.3d 580, 	587
[159 Cal.Rptr. 	584], 	the California District Court of Appeals
approved a 	similar posting requirement. 	(See 	also National 	Labor
Relations Board v. 	Express Publishing Co. 	(1941) 	312 U.S. 	426 	[8
LRRM 415] .)
PROPOSED 	ORDER
Upon the 	foregoing findings of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law and
the 	entire 	record in this 	case, 	it 	is 	found that 	the Hacienda La
Puente Unified School 	District 	(District) 	violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act 	(Act), 	Government Code
section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) . 	It is hereby ordered that the
District 	and 	its 	representatives 	shall:
21

A. 	CEASE AND DESIST 	FROM:
1. 	Failing and refusing 	to bargain 	in good 	faith by
failing 	to provide 	information which 	is 	relevant 	and necessary to
the 	California 	School 	Employees Association 	and 	its 	Hacienda 	La
Puente 	Chapter #115 	(CSEA) 	for the proper performance of 	its
representation of 	bargaining unit 	members 	in their 	employment
relationship with the 	District, 	including 	information which
explains 	and 	clarifies 	the 	District's 	reasons 	for not 	accepting
or processing a unit 	member's 	grievance 	that 	the 	District
perceives 	as 	procedurally defective.
2. 	Denying to 	CSEA rights 	guaranteed to 	it 	by the
Act, 	including the 	right 	to represent 	unit members 	in grievances
and other 	employment 	matters.
3. 	Interfering with the 	rights 	of 	classified unit
employees 	to 	be 	represented by 	their 	exclusive 	representative 	by
denying 	that 	representative 	information 	that 	is 	necessary and
relevant 	to 	its 	representational 	functions, 	including grievance
processing.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF THE ACT:
1. 	Upon request, 	provide 	CSEA with a copy of 	the
Julie 	Milan 	letter/incident 	report 	requested by 	CSEA on
November 22 and December 5, 	1994, 	and January 10, 	1995.
Additionally, 	within 3 0 	calendar days after the document 	is
furnished to CSEA, 	upon the 	request 	of 	CSEA or Sam Ortiz, 	allow
Ortiz 	to 	file 	a 	supplemental 	rebuttal 	to 	the written reprimand
issued to him on November 7, 	1994.
22

2. 	Further, 	upon request, 	provide CSEA with timely
information 	that 	explains 	or 	clarifies 	the 	District's 	reasons 	for
not 	accepting 	or processing 	a unit 	member grievance 	that 	the
District 	initially perceives 	as 	procedurally defective.
3. 	Within ten 	(10) 	working days of 	the 	service of a
final 	decision in this matter, 	post 	at 	all work 	locations where
notices 	to 	classified employees 	are 	customarily posted, 	copies 	of
the 	notice 	attached hereto as Appendix. 	The 	notice 	should be
subscribed by an authorized agent 	of 	the 	District, 	indicating
that 	it will 	comply with the 	terms 	of 	this Order. 	Such posting
shall 	be maintained 	for a period of 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive work
days. 	Reasonable 	steps 	shall 	be taken to ensure 	that 	the notice
shall 	not be 	reduced in size, 	altered, 	or covered with any other
material.
4. 	Upon issuance of a 	final 	decision, 	make written
notification of 	the 	actions 	taken to comply with this Order 	to
the 	San 	Francisco Regional 	Director 	of 	the 	Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	in accordance with 	the 	Regional 	Director's
instructions. 	Continue to report, 	in writing, 	to the Regional
Director thereafter as 	directed. 	All 	reports 	shall 	be
concurrently 	served 	on 	the 	charging party herein.
Pursuant 	to California Code of Regulations, 	title 	8,
section 	32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order 	shall 	become
final 	unless 	a party files 	a 	statement 	of 	exceptions with the
Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in 	Sacramento within
20 	days 	of 	service of 	this Decision. 	In accordance with PERB
23

regulations, 	the 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	should 	identify by page
citation or exhibit 	number the portions of 	the 	record, 	if 	any,
relied upon for such exceptions. 	(See Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	323 00.) 	A document 	is 	considered 	"filed" 	when actually
received before 	the close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	on the 	last day
set 	for 	filing 	". 	. 	. o r when sent 	by telegraph or certified or
Express 	United States mail, 	postmarked not 	later than 	the 	last
day set for filing 	. 	. 	. 	." 	(See Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32135; 	Code Civ. 	P r o c , 	sec. 	1013 	shall apply.) 	Any
statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting brief 	must 	be 	served
concurrently with 	its 	filing upon 	each party to 	this 	proceeding.
Proof 	of 	service 	shall 	accompany each 	copy served on a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	secs.
32300, 	32305 	and 32140.) 	!
W. JEAN THOMAS
Administrative Law Judge
24