California State Employees Association (Janowicz) (PERB 1043S)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
FRANK D. 	JANOWICZ,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, 	LOCAL 1000,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CO-52-S
PERB Decision No. 	1043-S
March 25, 	1994
Appearances; 	Frank D. 	Janowicz, 	on his own behalf; 	Michael D.
Hersh, 	Attorney, 	for California State Employees Association.
Before Blair, 	Chair; 	Caffrey and Garcia, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
GARCIA, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is before the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or Board) 	on exceptions 	filed by 	Frank D.
Janowicz 	(Janowicz) 	to a PERB administrative 	law judge's 	(ALJ)
proposed decision 	(attached). 	The ALJ dismissed Janowicz's
complaint, 	which alleged that 	the California State Employees
Association, 	Local 	1000 	(CSEA) 	had failed to assist him in
eliminating unfair 	labor practices 	directed at 	Janowicz 	by his
employer, 	conduct which allegedly constituted a breach of 	the
duty of 	fair representation in violation of 	section 3519.5(b) 	of
the Ralph C. 	Dills Act 	(Dills Act).1
1The Dills Act 	is 	codified at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3512
et seq. 	Section 3519.5 provides, 	in part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:
(b) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to

The Board has 	reviewed the 	entire 	record, 	including 	the
proposed decision, 	Janowicz's 	exceptions 	and CSEA's 	response.
Finding no prejudicial 	error, 	the Board hereby adopts 	the ALJ's
proposed decision as 	the 	decision of 	the 	Board 	itself.
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	LA-CO-52-S 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Chair Blair and Member Caffrey 	joined 	in 	this Decision.
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter.
22

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
FRANK D. 	JANOWICZ,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, 	LOCAL 1000,
Respondent.
)
)
) 	Unfair Practice
Case No. 	LA-CO-52-S
PROPOSED DECISION
(12/30/93)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Frank D. 	Janowicz, 	on his own behalf; 	Michael D.
Hersh, 	Staff Attorney, 	for California State Employees
Association, 	Local 1000.
Before W. 	Jean Thomas, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
On April 	7, 	1992, 	Frank D. 	Janowicz 	(Charging Party or
Janowicz) 	filed an unfair practice 	charge with the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(Board or PERB) 	against 	the 	California
State Employees Association, 	Local 	1000 	(Respondent or CSEA).
The 	charge alleged, 	among other things, 	a violation of 	the Ralph
C. 	Dills Act 	(Dills 	Act).1 The 	charge 	stated that 	Respondent
failed to assist 	Janowicz 	in 	"eliminating unfair 	labor practices"
directed at 	him by his 	employer.
On January 7, 	1993, 	the Office of 	the General Counsel 	of
PERB, 	after an investigation of 	the 	charge, 	issued a complaint
against 	the Respondent. 	The 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	on or about
November 3, 	1992, 	Respondent decided not to submit Janowicz'
grievances 	concerning 	his 	alleged 	layoff 	and alleged 	lack 	of 	work
1The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512
et seq. 	All section references, 	unless otherwise noted, 	are to
the Government Code.
This proposed decision has been appealed to the
Board i t s e l f and may not be cited as precedent
unless the decision and i t s rationale have been
adopted by the Board.

assignments 	since December 9, 	1991, 	to arbitration and failed to
notify him in writing of 	the decision, 	the reasons 	therefor, 	and
to direct 	him about 	how to appeal 	the 	decision. 	The 	complaint
further alleged that by this 	conduct, 	Respondent breached 	its
duty of 	fair representation 	in violation of 	section 3519.5(b) 	of
the Dills Act.2
Respondent answered the complaint 	on January 28, 	1993,
denying 	any wrongdoing and asserting 	a 	number of 	affirmative
defenses.
An informal 	conference, 	held on February 25, 	1993, 	failed to
resolve 	the dispute.
A formal 	hearing was 	held before 	the undersigned on June 	16
and July 20, 	1993. 	Respondent 	filed a motion to dismiss 	on June
16, 	1993, 	which was 	taken under submission for a ruling with the
proposed decision. 	No post-hearing briefs were 	filed. 	The 	case
was 	submitted on July 20, 	1993, 	for a proposed decision.
FINDINGS 	OF 	FACT
Background
The parties 	stipulated, 	and it 	is 	therefore 	found, 	that 	the
2In relevant part, 	section 3519.5 provides as 	follows:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:
(b) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter.
22

Charging 	Party 	is 	a 	state 	employee and the Respondent 	is 	a
recognized employee 	organization within 	the meaning 	of 	the 	Dills
Act.
Janowicz 	began 	employment 	with 	the Department 	of 	Youth
Authority 	(DYA) 	in January 1987 	as 	a permanent 	intermittent
vocational 	education teacher 	(industrial arts). 	Since that 	time,
he 	has 	worked as 	a day-to-day substitute 	teacher at 	the 	Fred 	C.
Nelles 	School, 	a 	correctional 	facility for boys 	located 	in
Whittier, 	California. 	Janowicz 	is a member of State Bargaining
Unit 	3 	(professional 	educators 	and librarians) 	which is
exclusively 	represented 	by 	CSEA.
At 	the 	time 	that 	the 	charge was 	filed, 	CSEA and the State 	of
California were parties 	to a memorandum of understanding 	(MOU),
which had an effective term from July 1, 	1988, 	through June 	30,
1991. 	Following protracted successor contract negotiations, 	in
or about 	May or June 	1992 	the parties 	entered 	into 	a 	successor
MOU with an effective term of November 1, 	1992, 	through June 30,
1995.
The 	1988-91 MOU contained a 	five-step grievance procedure.
Steps 	1 	through 3 	involve 	review at various DYA department
levels. 	Step 4 provides 	for review by the Department 	of
Personnel Administration 	(DPA). 	Step 5 	is 	the arbitration level
which 	includes 	final 	and binding arbitration.
The December 	1991 	and January 	1992 	Grievances
On December 26, 	1991, 	Janowicz 	filed a grievance alleging
violations 	of Articles 	5.5 	(Reprisals) 	and 18(j) 	(Permanent
w3

Intermittent Appointments) 	of 	the 	1988-91 MOU. 	The grievance
also alleged violations 	of various 	department policies 	and 	rules
by Janowicz' 	immediate supervisor, 	Tony Lombardo 	(Lombardo) 	and
the school principal, 	Rachel McCoy 	(McCoy).
The 	gist 	of 	the grievance was 	that his 	supervisors were
engaging 	in a 	course 	of 	harassment 	and discrimination against
him. 	They also were allegedly conspiring to 	force Janowicz 	to
quit 	his 	position as 	a day-to-day 	substitute by not 	calling him
to work since December 9, 	1991, 	even though there were teacher
vacancies. 	Janowicz was 	assisted with this 	grievance by Wayne
Shada 	(Shada), 	the CSEA job steward at Nelles School.
Janowicz 	also 	filed an employee 	complaint 	on December 26,
1991. 	The 	complaint alleged rule violations by McCoy, 	Lombardo
and acting 	supervisor Bernard 	Cadle 	regarding 	class 	assignments
for Janowicz 	and other teachers.
On January 27, 	1992, 	Janowicz 	filed another grievance which
apparently alleged 	the 	same 	conduct 	and violations 	by his
supervisors as those raised in the December 26, 	1991, 	grievance.
Both grievances 	and 	the 	complaint were 	denied at 	Step 	1 	and
2 	of 	the grievance procedure.
On March 2, 	1992, 	Shada elevated both grievances and the
complaint 	to Step 3 	for review by the DYA labor relations
division. 	In his 	cover letter to DYA, 	Shada noted that 	further
processing 	of 	the 	grievances 	would be 	handled by Yvonne Markham
(Markham), 	CSEA's southeast area labor relations representative.
A copy of 	this 	letter was 	sent 	to Janowicz.
4
4

After 	the 	labor 	relations 	division 	of 	DYA denied both
grievances and the complaint on March 27, 	1992, 	Markham submitted
the grievances 	and the 	complaint 	to 	the DPA appeal 	level 	at 	Step
4 	on April 	17, 	1992. 	In her cover letter, 	Markham took issue
with 	the DYA's 	characterization of 	the 	grievances 	as
"complaints." 	This 	reference 	by DYA apparently 	stemmed 	from the
ongoing 	dispute 	between 	CSEA and 	the 	DPA about 	processing
grievances 	filed 	subsequent 	to 	the 	expiration date 	of 	the 	1988-91
Unit 	3 	MOU. 	Both the March 27 	DYA letter and Markham's April 	17
letter show that 	copies were 	sent 	to Janowicz.
During 	this 	same period of 	time, 	Markham received a 	copy of
the 	instant 	unfair practice 	charge 	and notification 	from 	PERB
that 	the 	charge would be 	investigated. 	However, 	Markham and
Janowicz 	had no personal 	contact 	about 	the unfair practice 	charge
or 	the grievances. 	Markham did have a discussion with Shada
about 	Janowicz' 	grievances at 	some point while he was handling
them.
On August 7, 	1992, 	Dennis J. 	Fujii 	(Fujii), 	a labor
relations 	officer 	for DPA, 	denied both grievances 	as meritless.3
Markham thereafter notified DPA on September 10, 	1992, 	that
she was 	elevating 	the 	two grievances 	and the 	complaint 	to
arbitration 	"to 	comply with contractual 	time 	limits." 	She also
stated 	that 	she would notify DPA of 	CSEA's 	disposition 	of 	the
3In his 	cover letter to Markham, 	Fujii 	also 	commented that
the 	complaint 	procedure 	specified 	in 	the 	1988-91 MOU provided
that 	complaints 	are processed as 	far as 	the 	department 	head 	or
designee. 	Thus, 	DYA's March 27, 	1992, 	response constituted the
final level of appeal for Janowicz' 	December 26, 	1991, 	complaint.
5

grievances 	in the near future. 	Markham's 	letter shows 	that 	a
copy was 	also sent 	to Janowicz.
Markham testified that 	the 	September 	10 	notice 	that 	she 	sent
to DPA is 	routinely 	sent 	to preserve 	the 	contractual 	appeal
rights 	of 	CSEA and the grievant 	at 	a 	later time 	in the process.
In September 	1992, 	Markham had several 	other pending
grievances 	and 	complaints 	that 	had been 	filed by Janowicz 	during
1991. 	She did not 	evaluate the merits 	of 	any of 	the grievances
at 	the time because, 	as 	she testified, 	she needed time to sort
them out, 	since many of 	the grievances 	and complaints were
repetitive 	in nature. 	She did discuss 	the 	cases with CSEA
management, 	but no 	final 	decision about arbitration was made 	in
September.
Sometime 	in November 	1992, 	Markham spoke with Janowicz by
telephone. 	According to her, 	Janowicz 	expressed frustration
because 	of 	delays 	that 	he perceived were 	occurring 	in processing
his 	grievances 	to arbitration. 	She 	explained to him that 	a major
reason 	for 	the 	delay related 	to 	the problems 	between CSEA and 	the
DPA over the 	expiration of 	the 	1988-91 Unit 	3 MOU. 	Markham,
however, 	assured Janowicz 	that 	she would get back to him
regarding arbitration decisions 	on his 	cases 	when 	they were made.
Janowicz 	also 	spoke 	by 	telephone with Roger Herrera
(Herrera), 	another CSEA staff person, 	sometime in late November
1992. 	Herrera, 	who served as 	the southeast area arbitration
coordinator, 	told Janowicz 	that he had no current active
grievance 	files 	on him and knew nothing about 	the 	substance 	of
6
6

any of his grievances 	or the merits 	of his 	claims. 	Herrera also
mentioned 	to Janowicz 	that 	when he 	searched Markham's 	desk 	for
Janowicz' 	files, 	he did not 	find any.
Herrera vehemently denies 	that 	he 	told Janowicz 	during 	that
telephone 	conversation that 	a decision had been made 	not 	to 	take
his 	cases 	to arbitration. 	In response to Janowicz' 	complaint
about 	delays, 	he did tell 	him that 	a one 	to 	two year delay 	in
processing grievances 	was 	not 	uncommon.
According to Herrera, 	as 	the 	former southeast 	area
arbitration coordinator for six years, 	he 	is quite 	familiar with
the 	procedure 	followed by 	the 	organization 	in deciding whether 	or
not 	to 	take grievances 	to arbitration. 	The 	labor relations
representative 	handling 	the 	grievance 	is 	required 	to 	evaluate 	its
merits 	and 	submit 	written recommendations 	to 	the 	local 	area
arbitration coordinator, 	which in this 	case would have been
Herrera 	in November 1992. 	The arbitration coordinator reviews
the 	recommendation and 	the 	supporting 	data and 	then 	renders 	his
own recommendation. 	This may or may not 	agree with the 	labor
relations 	representative's 	recommendation. 	If 	the 	arbitration
coordinator recommends arbitration, 	a notice 	is 	sent 	to the CSEA
labor relations representative, 	DPA, 	and the grievant. 	If
arbitration is 	not 	recommended, 	a letter is 	sent 	to the grievant
explaining 	the 	reasons 	for 	the 	decision and 	setting 	forth 	the
member's 	rights 	of 	appeal 	to 	the CSEA area manager. 	Such appeals
are 	submitted 	to a 	three-member peer panel 	of 	CSEA members 	who
7
7

make 	the 	final 	decision. 	The panel 	has 	the authority to
supersede 	the 	recommendations 	of 	the 	CSEA staff.
At 	the 	time 	of 	his November 	1992 	conversation with Janowicz,
the 	process 	Herrera described above 	had not 	been 	initiated at 	his
level. 	Subsequent 	to this 	conversation, 	Herrera and Janowicz had
no 	further contact.
Markham testified that 	she was 	unaware 	of 	Janowicz' 	November
1992 	conversation with Herrera, 	until 	the 	commencement 	of 	the
hearing. 	At that time, 	all of Janowicz' 	grievances were still
under her consideration. 	Additionally, 	unbeknown to Herrera, 	she
had Janowicz' 	case 	files 	in the 	field with her on the day that 	he
spoke with Janowicz, 	but 	Herrera had no way of knowing 	that.
During 	the 	hearing, 	Markham acknowledged that 	she 	had
recently prepared 	recommendations 	regarding Janowicz' 	grievances
and would 	shortly 	submit 	them to 	the 	new 	local 	area 	arbitration
coordinator 	for 	review.
ISSUES
Did CSEA's processing of 	Janowicz' 	December 	1991 	and January
1992 	grievances 	amount 	to a breach of 	the duty of 	fair
representation 	in violation 	on 	section 	3519.5(b)?
CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
Standard 	for Duty 	of 	Fair 	Representation
Unlike 	the 	other 	two 	statutes 	administered by PERB, 	the
Dills Act 	does 	not 	contain a 	specific 	section stating 	that 	an
88

employee 	organization has 	a duty of 	fair 	representation.4 The
Board has 	implied 	such a duty 	from the 	fact 	that 	the Dills Act
provides 	for exclusive 	representation. 	(California State
Employees Association 	(Lemmons and Lund) 	(1985) 	PERB Decision No.
545-S.)
The 	duty of 	fair 	representation 	requires 	an 	exclusive
representative 	to 	fairly 	and 	impartially 	represent 	all 	employees
in a bargaining unit. 	The 	fair 	representation duty 	imposed upon
the 	exclusive 	representative 	extends 	to grievance 	handling.
(Fremont Teachers Association 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision No.
125.) 	To prove a violation of 	this 	duty, 	the Charging Party must
show that: 	(1) 	the acts 	complained of were undertaken by the
organization 	in 	its 	capacity as 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	all
unit employees; 	and 	(2) 	the representational 	conduct was
arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or in bad faith. 	(Rocklin Teachers
Professional Association 	(Romero) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	124,
citing precedent 	set 	by 	the National 	Labor Relations 	Board and
affirmed by the U.S. 	Supreme Court 	in Vaca v. 	Sipes 	(1967) 	386
U.S. 	171 	[64 LRRM 2369].)
- -
The Board in Rocklin, 	supra. 	affirmed the 	interpretation of
this 	concept 	set 	forth in Griffin v. 	United Auto Workers 	(4th
Cir. 	1972) 	469 	F.2d 181 	[81 	LRRM 2485], 	as 	follows:
A union must 	conform its 	behavior 	to 	each 	of
these standards. 	First, 	it must treat all
factions 	and segments 	of 	its membership
4Duty of 	fair 	representation provisions 	are 	set 	out 	in
section 3544.9 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations Act 	and
3578 	of 	the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act.
99

without hostility or discrimination. 	Next,
the broad discretion of 	the union 	in
asserting 	the 	rights 	of 	its members must be
exercised 	in 	complete 	good 	faith and honesty.
Finally, 	the union must 	avoid arbitrary
conduct. 	Each of 	these 	requirements
represents 	a 	distinct 	and 	separate
obligation, 	the breach of which may
constitute a basis 	for civil 	action. 	The
repeated 	references 	in Vaca 	to 	"arbitrary"
union 	conduct 	reflected a 	calculated
broadening 	of 	the 	fair 	representation
standard. 	Without 	any hostile motive 	of
discrimination and 	in complete good faith, 	a
union may nevertheless 	pursue 	a 	course 	of
action or 	inaction 	that 	is 	so unreasonable
and arbitrary as 	to 	constitute 	a violation of
the 	duty of 	fair 	representation.
In determining whether CSEA violated 	section 	3519.5(b) 	as
alleged, 	the 	foregoing principles will be applied.
Allegations 	in 	the 	Complaint
The 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	CSEA did not 	provide 	Janowicz
with notice 	of 	its 	decision not 	to pursue his grievances 	to
arbitration, 	the 	reasons 	therefor, 	and information on how to
appeal 	the decision within CSEA's 	internal 	appeal 	process. 	The
complaint thus presents three elements of proof: 	(1) 	failure to
give notice of a decision; 	(2) 	failure to explain reasons 	for the
decision; 	and 	(3) 	failure to provide an opportunity to appeal 	the
decision.5 The 	Charging 	Party has 	the burden of proving 	these
elements 	by a preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence.
5Although 	the 	complaint 	is 	based on CSEA conduct 	allegedly
occurring 	in November 1992, 	there 	is no evidence 	that 	the 	charge
was 	ever amended by 	the 	Charging 	Party 	to add the 	allegations 	set
forth 	in the 	complaint.
10

In this 	case, 	the Charging Party has 	failed to meet 	the
burden of 	establishing a prima 	facie 	case.
The 	record shows 	clear evidence that 	in November 1992, 	CSEA
had not made 	even a preliminary decision about 	whether or not 	to
pursue Janowicz' 	December 1991 and January 1992 	grievances 	to
arbitration.
Janowicz 	had 	telephone 	conversations 	with 	two 	CSEA
representatives 	in November 	1992 	-- 	Markham and Herrera.
Markham was unable 	to 	recall 	the 	exact 	date 	of 	her 	conversation
with Janowicz 	and Herrera 	recalls 	his 	conversation 	occurring
sometime 	in late November 1992.
Since 	Herrera was 	the person 	responsible 	for making an
arbitration recommendation regarding Janowicz' 	grievances,
Herrera's 	testimony 	is pivotal. 	Janowicz 	testified 	that 	he
learned 	from Herrera about 	the 	decision not 	to pursue 	his
grievances 	to arbitration. 	Herrera adamantly denies 	that he made
such a 	comment 	to Janowicz. 	Herrera 	recalls 	that he 	told
Janowicz 	that he had no 	current, 	active grievance 	files 	on his
cases. 	It 	is possible 	that 	Janowicz mistakenly concluded from
Herrera's 	comment 	that 	CSEA had decided not 	to 	submit 	his 	two
grievances 	to 	arbitration and 	failed 	to notify him of 	that 	fact.
In weighing 	the 	credibility of 	the 	two witnesses 	regarding
this 	conversation, 	Herrera's 	testimony is 	credited over that 	of
Janowicz. 	Herrera's 	recall 	of his 	conversation with Janowicz was
much more 	specific 	about 	the 	statements made 	and 	the 	actions
taken in response to his 	inquiry. 	Janowicz' 	recall 	of 	the
11

conversation generally lacked any 	specifics 	except 	that 	Herrera
was 	the 	CSEA staff 	person who 	informed him of 	the 	alleged
decision sometime 	in November 1992. 	Additionally, 	Herrera's
testimony about 	why he 	could not 	have 	told Janowicz 	that 	such a
decision had been made 	is 	supported by Markham's 	testimony 	that
at the time of Janowicz' 	call 	to Herrera, 	she still had the
responsibility 	for processing 	his 	grievances 	and had made 	no
recommendations 	to Herrera.
Since 	it 	has 	not been 	established 	that 	CSEA made 	a 	decision
in November 1992 	about pursuing Janowicz' 	grievances 	to
arbitration, 	as alleged, 	it 	is unnecessary to address 	the other
two elements 	of unlawful 	conduct 	alleged 	in the 	complaint. 	The
other 	two 	elements 	depend 	on an affirmative 	finding 	about 	the
alleged 	decision.
In its motion to dismiss, 	CSEA asserts 	that 	the 	complaint
should be dismissed on the 	following grounds: 	(1) 	the Charging
Party 	failed to allege 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	state a 	cause 	of
action based on a breach of duty of 	fair representation; 	(2) 	the
complaint 	is defective as vague and ambiguous; 	(3) 	the Charging
Party failed to exhaust 	internal union remedies; 	and 	(4) 	the
complaint 	is moot.
The motion 	is 	granted as 	to 	the 	first 	of 	the grounds
asserted. 	Having 	concluded 	that 	the 	Charging 	Party 	failed 	to
establish a prima facie 	case, 	it 	is not necessary to address 	the
other arguments 	raised 	in 	the motion.
12

Based upon all 	the 	evidence presented, 	and the 	credibility
determinations made, 	it 	is 	concluded that 	the Charging Party has
failed 	to 	establish a prima 	facie 	case 	of 	a breach of 	the 	duty of
fair representation. 	Thus, 	the 	complaint must be dismissed on
the merits because 	there 	is no 	factual 	support 	for the
allegations.
PROPOSED 	ORDER
Based upon the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact, 	the entire 	record
herein, 	and the conclusions 	of 	law set 	forth above, 	it 	is 	found
that 	the 	complaint must 	be 	dismissed because 	of 	the 	Charging
Party's 	failure 	to establish a prima 	facie 	case 	of 	a breech of
the duty of 	fair representation. 	It 	is 	thus 	concluded that 	the
complaint 	issued against 	the 	California 	State 	Employees
Association, 	Local 1000, 	must be DISMISSED.
Pursuant 	to California Code of Regulations, 	title 	8,
section 32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order shall 	become
final 	unless 	a party files 	a 	statement 	of 	exceptions with the
Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in Sacramento within
20 	days 	of 	service 	of 	this Decision. 	In accordance with PERB
Regulations, 	the 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	should 	identify by page
citation or exhibit number the portions 	of 	the 	record, 	if 	any,
relied upon for such exceptions. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	sec. 	323 00.) 	A document is considered 	"filed" when
actually received before 	the 	close 	of business 	(5:00 p.m.) 	on the
last day set 	for filing 	". 	. 	. o r when sent by telegraph or
certified or Express United States mail, 	postmarked not 	later
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than the 	last 	day set 	for filing 	. . . " 	(See 	Cal. 	Code 	of 	Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32135; 	Code Civ. 	P r o c , 	sec. 	1013 shall apply.) 	Any
statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting brief must 	be 	served
concurrently with 	its 	filing upon 	each party 	to 	this 	proceeding.
Proof 	of 	service 	shall 	accompany each 	copy served on a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
secs. 	32300, 	32305 and 32140.)
W. JEAN TH0MAS
Administrative 	Law 	Judge
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