San Francisco Classroom Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (Chestangue) (PERB 0544E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF 	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
M.A.
	CHESTANGUE,
Charging
	Party,
v.
SAN
	FRANCISCO
	CLASSROOM
	TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION, 	CTA/NEA,
Respondent.
Case
	No.
	SF-CO
	278
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	544
December
	13,
	1985
Appearances:	
M.A.
	Chestangue
	on
	her
	own
	behalf; 	ChristineBleuler,
	Attorney,
	California
	Teachers
	Association
	for
	San
Francisco
	Classroom Teachers
	Association,
	CTA/NEA.
Before 	Hesse,
	Chairperson;
	Jaeger,
	Morgenstern, 	Burt
	and
	Porter,
Members. 
DECISION
This 	case
	is
	before 	the 	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
on
	appeal
	by
	charging
	party 	of 	the
	Board
	agent's 	dismissal,
attached 	hereto, 	of 	her 	charge
	alleging 	that
	the
	San
	Francisco
Classroom Teachers
	Association,
	CTA/NEA
violated 	the
Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(Gov. 	Code
	sec.
	3540
	et
seq)
.
We
	have 	reviewed
	the 	dismissal
	and
	finding
	it
	free
	from
prejudicial 	error,
	adopt
	it
	as 	the 	Decision 	of 	the
	Board
	its
	f .
.ORDER
The
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	in
	Case
	No.
	SF-C0-278
	is
DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	LEAVE 	TO 	AMEND.
By
	the
	BOARD.

STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
	PETE
WILSON,
Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
San
Francisco
Regional Office
177
Post Street,
9th
Floor
San
Francisco,
CA
94108-4737
(415)
439-6940
August 5,
	1985
M, 	A.
	Chestangue
Christine
	Bleuler
California
Teachers
Assn.
Re:
	REFUSAL
TO
	ISSUE COMPLAINT
AND
DISMISSAL
OF
UNFAIR PRACTICE
	CHARGE
M,	
A.
	Chestangue
v.
	San
Francisco
	Classroom
Teachers
Association
Charge
No.
	SF-C0-278
Dear
	Parties:
Pursuant to Public
	Employment
Relations
	Board
	(PERB)
	Regulation
section
	32730,
a
	complaint
will
not
be
	issued
	in
the above-referenced case
	and
the
pending
charge
	is
hereby dismissed because
	it
fails
	to allege facts
	sufficient
	to
state
	a
	prima
facie
violation
of the Educational
	Employment
Relations
	Act
(EERA) . 1	
The
	reasoning
which
underlies
	this
	decision follows.
On
July
1,
	1985
M.A.
	Chestangue
	filed
an
unfair practice
	charge
	against 	the
San
Francisco
	Classroom Teachers
Association,
	CTA/NEA
	(Association)
	alleging
facts
	which
purport to
	set
	forth
	a
violation
of
EERA
section
3543.6(b) 	and
3544.9.
	Specifically,
	charging
party describes
	an
	incident
which
occurred
on
June 	5, 	1984 and
one
which
occurred
in
August 1984, 	and
claims
	that
	they
represent 	instances
	in
which
	the Association breached the duty
of
fair
representation
owed
to her.
On
July
18,
	1985
	the regional attorney
wrote
	a
	letter
	to charging
party
warning
	that
	the charge, 	as
written, 	failed
	to
	state
	a
	prima
facie
	violation
of
EERA
section
3543.6(b) 	and 3544.9, 	and
that
	it
would be dismissed
on
July
	25, 	1985
	if
not
withdrawn
or
amended
by such
date.
	Legal
	authorities
were
	cited in that letter,
	the reasoning
was
	explained,
	and
questions were
posed to charging party in
an
attempt to describe
what type of facts
	would
have 	to be
	alleged in order to cure the defects of the charge.
1
References to the
EERA
are to
Government Code
	sections 3540	
et seq.
PERB	
Regulations are codified at California Administrative
Code,
	Title 	8.

M.A.
	Chestangue
Christine
	Bleuler
August
	5,
	1985
Page
	2
On
July
	23,
	1985
	the
	regional attorney
had
a
	conversation
with
M.A.
	Chestangue
	concerning
	the
warning
	letter
of July
18,
	1985.
	Charging
party
	requested
additional
	time
within
which
to
	submit
an
amendment.
	It
was
agreed
that
	charging
party
would
have
	until
August
5,
	1985.
On
July
	31,
	1985
	charging
party
	filed
	an
amended
unfair practice
	charge.
2
Specifically,
	the
	first
	amended
charge
	alleges
	that
	incidents occurring
	on
November
15, 	1982,
	July
11,
	1983,
	July
15, 	1983,
	and September 29, 	1983
constitute
	instances
	in
which
	the
Association
breached
the
	duty
	of
fair
representation
owed
	to
her.
	Charging
party alleges
	that
	the
	unfair
	treatment
she
	received
from
	the
Association not only continued
but
	intensified
between
November
15,
	1982
	and
July
	31, 	1985.
	On
July
	31, 	1985,
	the
	PERB
	office
	also
received
a
	three-page
	letter
from
charging
party
which
described
	incidents
occurring
on
December
1,
	1983
	and
July
4,
	1984.
	Neither the
	charge
	nor 	the
letter
	describe 	incidents
	occuring
within
the
	six
months
	preceding
	the
	filing
of
the
	original
	charge.
The
warning
	letter
of July
18,
	1985
	sent
by
	the regional attorney
	to charging
party,
	as
	well
as 	the
July
	31,
	1985
	letter
	from
	charging
party to 	the
	regional
attorney, 	are
hereby
attached
and
	incorporated
by
	reference.
Statute of Limitations:
	Continuing
Violation
In
some
	decisions
	interpreting
the National
	Labor
Relations
Act,
	it
has been
found
	that
a
	recurrence of
unlawful conduct
	constitutes
	a
	"continuing
violation."
	Pursuant to
	that
	doctrine,
	a
	charge
will
	not
be
barred
on
the
ground
that
	it
concerns 	conduct
which
	occurred,
	and
was known
to charging
party,
	more
	than
six
months
	prior
	to being
filed
as 	long as 	the conduct
recurred within the six-month
period. 	In
San
Dieguito
Union High
School
District
	(1982)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	194,
	PERB
	discussed the
	federal 	cases,
adopted the concept
	of
a
	"continuing
violation,"
	but nevertheless 	dismissed
the charge
on
	the
	ground
that
	the 	six-month
limitation
period
had been
exceeded.
	In
	that
case,
	a
	school
	district
was
	charged with having
unilaterally
changed
a
	prior practice
when
it
	enforced
on
a
	daily basis
	a
policy that required teachers 	to 	sign-out before leaving
campus.
	PERB
was
unable 	to 	find
a
	"continuing violation"
	even though
	the employer's
	sign-out
policy
was
	enforced
on
a
	continuing basis well 	into the
	statute
	of
	limitations
period.
2
The amendment was
	not properly served
on
the charged
party.
	The
Notice of
Appearance submitted by charged party,
	and served
on
charging party,designates
	its
attorney as
	its
	representative. 	Service
was made on
the
organization instead of the attorney.

M.A.
	Chestangue
Christine
Bleuler
August
	5,
	1985
Page
	3
In
El
	Dorado
Union High
School
District
	(1984)
	PERB
	Decision
No.
	382,
	the
Board
cited
San
Dieguito
	for
	the
proposition
that,
. 	a
	continuing
violation
would
only
be found
where
	active
	conduct
or
grievances 	occurred
within
the
	limitations
	period
that
	independently
consti-
tuted
an
unfair practice.
	(Citations 	omitted.)
However,
	a
	continuing
violation
would
not
be found
where
	the
	employer's
	conduct
during the
	limitations
period
constituted
an
unfair practice
	only
by
its
relation
	to 	the
	original
	offense. 	(Citations
omitted.)
	Where
	the underlying theory
of
the
	charge
is
	an
alleged
unilateral
	change
occurring outside
the
	limitations
	period, 	the
	employer must engage
	in
conduct
during the
	limitations
	period
such as
reimplementation or
	subsequent
	refusal
	to
negotiate
	...
	[which]
	revive[s]
	the
viability
of
the
unfair practice.
In
El
	Dorado
	the
	district
unilaterally instituted
a
	new
policy requiring
	all
teachers hired
by
the
	district
	to
	s
	an addenda
	to
	their
	teaching
contract
agreeing to
	coach
at least
	two
	school
	sports
	teams
	during the year.
	The
	Board
held
	that
	the
	sole
violation
occurred
when
	the
	district
	adopted
the
new
policy.
	Requiring
new
	teachers 	to 	sign
the
	addenda
during the
	limitations
period did not
	satisfy
	the
	San
Dieguito requirement
	that
	the employer's
subsequent conduct
	constitute
	a
	"reimplementation or
	revival of the
policy."
Duty
of Fair Representation
There
	is
	no
	duty
	of
fair
	representation
owed
to
	a
	unit
member
unless 	the
exclusive representative
	possesses 	the exclusive
means
	by which such
employee
can
obtain
a
	particular
remedy.
	The
	exclusive representative
	possesses 	the
sole
	means
	by which
a
	unit
member
has access 	to 	the
	negotiation process,
	as
well as 	the grievance
and
arbitration
procedure.
	There
	are,
	however,
alternative
	sources of assistance available to
	a
	unit
member
who
	seeks 	to
enforce
	rights
	under 	the Education
Code. 	See
Archer v.
	Airline Pilots
Assn.
(9th Cir.
	1979)
	609
	F.2d
934 	[102
	LRRM
2827]
	cert.
	den. 	(1980)
	446
U.S.
	953
[104
	LRRM/2303];
	(International
Brotherhood
of
Workers
	v. 	Foust
	(1979)
442 U.S. 	42, 	46-47 	[101
LRRM
2365]; 	Lacy
v. 	Automobile Workers Local
	287
(S.D.Ind.
	1979) 	102
LRRM
2847; 	and Freeman
v. 	Teamsters Local
	135
	(7th Cir.
1984) 	746
	F.2d
1316 	[117
	LRRM
2873].
Charging
party
has
	failed to state
	a
	prima
facie violation of
	EERA
sections3543.6(b) 	and 3544.9.
	The
	allegations
which
purport to describe
unfair practices occurring
more
	than six
months
	before the 	filing of the

M.A.
	Chestangue
Christine
Bleuler
August
	5,
	1985
Page
	4
above-referenced
charge
	are 	time-barred.
	There
	is
	no
	legal
	support
	for
charging
party's
	claim
that
	the
	incidents
	she
	describes
	as
	occurring
	in
1982,
1983
	and
1984
have had
a
	continuing
effect.
	San
Dieguito
Unified
School
District,
	supra.
Charging
party
may
	intend for
	the
	incidents
	described
by
her
	in
	the
	original
as
well
	as
	the
	amended
unfair practice
	charge
	to
present
	examples
	of
	the
	type
of allegedly unfair representation
she
	received
from
	the Association.
However,
	the
	charge
	fails
	to
	satis
	the
	requirement
	of
PERB
Rule
	32615(a)(5)
which
states
	that
	the charge
must
	contain
a
	clear
and
concise statements of
	the
	facts
	and
conduct
alleged
to
	constitute
	an
unfair practice.
The
	charge, 	as
well
	as
	the
	amendment,
	are void of references 	to
	incidents
occurring within the required period. 	Additionally, 	to 	the
	extent
	charging
party
complains
	of
conduct
by
	the Association
concerning
her request
	that
	it
represent
her
	in
Education
Code
	section
44942
	proceedings, 	the
	federal
	cases
cited
above
	are
	controlling.
	Those
	cases,
	decided
under
	the
NLRA,
	are
based
on
the
	rationale
	accepted
by
PERB:
	the duty
of
fair
	representation
	is
	a
pro
	quo
	for
	the
	right
	of exclusivity
enjoyed
by
	the
	employee
	organization.
SEIU,
	Local
	99
	(Kimmett),
	supra.
	The
Association
	is
	under
no
	EERA
obligation
to
	represent the
	interests
	of
a
	unit
member
	in
areas
	where
	it
	does
	not
have
the exclusive
	right
	to seek
a
	remedy.
	Accordingly, 	the
	allegations 	of the
charge and
the
	amendment
are
	dismissed
and
no
	complaint
will
be
	issued thereon.
Pursuant to 	Public
Employment
Relations
	Board
regulation section
32635
(California
Administrative
	Code,
	title
	8,
	part
	III),
	you
may
	appeal
	the
refusal
	to 	issue
a
	complaint
	(dismissal) 	to 	the
	Board
	itself.
Right
	to
Appeal
You may
	obtain
a
	review
of
this
	dismissal of
	the charge by
filing
	an
appeal to
the
	Board
itself
within
twenty 	(20)
	calendar
days
	after
	service of
	this
	Notice
(section
32635(a)).
	To
be
	timely
filed,
	the
	original
	and
five
	(5)
	copies 	of
such appeal
must be
	actually received
by
	the
	Board
	itself
before the close of
business 	(5:00 p.m.)
	on August 25, 	1985,
	or sent
by
	telegraph or
certified
United
States
mail postmarked
not
	later
	than
August 25, 	1985
	(section
32135).
The
	Board's address
	is:
Public
Employment
Relations
	Board
1031
	18th
Street
Sacramento,
	CA
95814

M.
	A.
	Chestangue
Christine
	Bleuler
August 5,
	1985
Page
	5
If
you
	file
	a
	timely
	appeal
	of
	the
	refusal
	to
	issue
	a
	complaint,
	any
	other
party
may
	file
	with the
Board an
original
	and
	five
	(5)
	copies
	of
a
	statement
in
opposition within
	twenty
	(20)
	calendar
	days
	following
	the date
	of serviceof
	the appeal
	(section
32635(b)).
Service
All
	documents
	authorized to
be
	filed
herein
must
	also
be
	"served"
	upon
	all
parties
	to
	the proceeding,
	and
	a
	"proof
of
service"
	must
	accompany
	each
	copy
of
a
	document
served
upon
a
party
or
	filed
with the
	Board
itself
	(see
section
32140
	for 	the required contents
	and
a
	sample
	form).
	The
	document
will
be
	considered
properly
	"served"
	when
personally delivered or deposited
	in
the
first-class
	mail postage
	paid
and
properly
addressed.
Extension of
Time
A
request for
	an
	extension of
	time
	in
which
	to
	file
	a document
with the
	Board
itself
must be
	in writing
and
filed
with the
Board
at
	the
previously notedaddress.
	A.
request for
	an
extension
must be
	filed at least
	three
	(3)
	calendar
days
before the
	expiration
of the
	time
	required for
	filing
	the
	document.
	The
request
must
	indicate
	good
cause
	for
	and,
	if
known,
	the
position of
each
	other
party
	regarding the extension,
	and
shall
be accompanied by
proof of service ofthe request
upon
each
party 	(section
32132).
Final
	Date
If
no
	appeal
	is 	filed
within
	the
	specific
	time
	limits,
	the dismissal
will
become
	final
when
	the
	time
	limits
	have
	expired.
Very
	truly
yours,
DENNIS ~!.	
SULLrJ'Ai.'\f
General Co!..msel
/7
By
-P-E~;l-'.E-:1-~-HAE~-.~,,
.~R-BP-~~-F-.r...i.,-.,.-D-,..
Regional Attorn~y
.,;--
cc:
	Ge:-,,2r::1.l Counsel

'·)i.:i1 ~i"-.:ric:scr.;, ?~;;:~,1cl 1Jiff(~
l 77 ~:i3r Srie':r, 	9rn 	f!ocr
Sen 	Frcr:cjsco, 	C::!i .=vi"nia 	9,-!. l 08
(.;.15; 	557-lJ.50
July 18, 	1985
. M.A. 	Chestangue
Re: 	M. 	A. 	Chestangue v. 	San Francisco Classroom Teachers Association
Charge No. 	SF-C0-278
Dear M. 	A. 	Chestangue:
On July 1, 	1985, 	M.A. 	Chestangue filed an unfair practice charge against the
San Francisco Classroom Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA (Association) 	alleging
facts which purport to 	set forth a violation of EERA sections 3543.6(b) 	and
3544.9. 	Specifically, 	charging party describes 	two 	situations wherein the
Association allegedly breached the duty of fair 	representation owed to 	her.
The first 	incident occurred on June 5, 	1984. 	On that occasion management
personnal of the 	San Francisco Unified School District 	(District) 	and police
allegedly removed her from her classroom. 	In June, 	July and August 1984,
charging party asked the Association to 	"mediate and arbitrate on her behalf."
She complains 	that the Association did no more 	than write a 	letter on her
behalf, 	and thereby breached the contract as well as 	acted toward her in a
manner 	that was arbitrary, 	discriminatory and in bad faith.
A second incident occurred in August 1984, 	when the District allegedly put
together a 	fabricated complaint accusing her of mental 	illness. 	The District
initiated an action against her under Education Code 	section 44942. 	She
complains 	that the Association did not properly represent her in that hearing
process, 	specifically that 	it allowed the District to 	invade her personnel 	file
for material used to bolster the 	report against her, 	did not challenge use by
the District of information that dated from the 1950's and, 	did no ensure her
a hearing. 	Charging party objects on the ground that she was a dues payer and
therefore should be entitled to representation by the Association in such pro
ceedings and, 	further, 	that the contract provision requiring arbitration and
mediation of behalf of unit members gave her rights which the Association did
not enforce.
-
On June 19, 	1985 and June 21, 	1985 	charging party had telephone conversations
with the 	regional attorney in which she explained the recent history of her
employment with the District. 	Those conversations revealed the following.
Charging party was placed on mandatory leave beginning in September 1979 	and
ending in June 1980. 	However, 	on June 	2, 	1981 she was 	telephoned by personnel

director
	Seymour
and
asked
to
	resume
	teaching
with
	the
District
	at
Guadalupe
School.
	She
worked
with the
	District until
June
	5,
	1984
when
she
was
	removed
by
the
new
principal.
	She
has
	not
been
employed
by
	the
	District
	since
	that
time.
In
San
Dieguito
Union High
School
District
	(2/25/82)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	184,
PERB
held
	that,
	to
	state
	a
	prima
facie
	violation,
	charging
party
must
	allege
and
ultimately
establish that
	the
	alleged
unfair practice
	either
	occurred or
was
	discovered
within
	the
	six-month
period
immediately
prceding the
	filing
	of
the
	charge
with
	PERB.
	EERA
section
3541.5;
	Danzansky-Goldberg
Memorial
Chapels,
	Inc.
	(1982)
	264
NLRB
	112 	[112
	LRRM
1108);
	American Olean
Tile
	Co.
(1982)
	265
NLRB
No.
	206
	(112
	LRRM
1080); 	A.F.C.
	Industries,
	Inc.
	(Amcar
Division)
	(1978)
	234
NLRB
	1063 	(98
	LRRM
1287],
	enf'd
as
	modified
	(8
	Cir.
	1979)
596
	F.2d
1344 	[100
LRRM
3074].
	The
	National
Labor
Relations
	Board
cases
	cited
here hold
that
	the
	six-month
period
commences
	on
the date 	the
	conduct
	consti
tuting
	the
unfair practice
	is
	discovered.
	It
does
	not
run
from
	the discovery
of
	the
	legal significance of
that
	conduct.
-
Charging
party
has
	alleged
that
	the
	exclusive
	representative
	denied
her
	the
right
	to
	fair
	representation
guaranteed
by
section
3544.9,
	and
thereby
violated
section
3543.6(b).
	The
	fair
	representation
duty
	imposed on
	the
	exclusive
representative
	extends
	to contract negotiations
	(Redlands
	Teachers
Association
(Faeth)
	(1978)
	PERE
Decision
No.
	72;
	SEIU,
	Local
	99
	(Kimmett) 	(1979)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	106;
	Rocklin Teachers
	Professional Association
	(Romero)
	(1980)
PERB
Decision
No.
	124;
	El Centro Elementary Teachers
	Association 	(Willis)
(1982)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	232),
	contract administration
	(Castro Valley
Teachers
Association
	(McElwain)
	(1980)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	149;
	SEIU,
	Local
	99
	(Pottorff)
(1982)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	203),
	and
to grievance handling
	(Fremont
Teachers
Association
	(King) 	(1980)
	PERB
Decision
No.
	125;
	United Teachers
	of
Los
	Angeles
(Collins)
	(1983)
	PERB
	Decision
No.
	258).
	PERB
has
	ruled
that
	a
	prima
	facie
statement
of
such
a
	violation
requires 	allegations 	that:
	(1)
	the
	acts
	com
plained of
were
	undertaken
by
	the
	organization in
its
	capacity
as 	the exclusive
representative of
all
	unit
employees; 	and, 	(2)
	the
	representational
	conduct
was
	arbitrary,
	discriminatory, 	or
	in
bad
faith.
-
Whether
	the
Association's
	failure
	to pursue
	a
	hearing
	on
behalf of charging
party or to
	represent her 	in
a
	particular
manner
constitutes
	a
	breach
	of
the
duty
of
	fair
	representation
depends 	on
whether the Association
was
	obliged
by
EERA
section
3544.9
	to
	initiate
	and
represent her
	at
	a
	hearing
under Education
Code
	section
44942.
	PERB
has 	accepted the
	rationale applied
by
	the National
Labor
Relations
	Act
	(NLRA)
	(29
U.S.C.
	sections
	151
	et seq.).
	Kimmett
v.
Service
	Employees
	International
Union,
	Local
	99
	(1979)
	PERB
	Decision
No.
	106.
There,
	the doctrine
was
	fashioned
by
	the courts
	as
	a
	quid pro
	quo
	for 	the
rights
	and powers
	granted
by
	that statute
	to
	an employee
	organization
which,
by
reason of
	its
majority status, 	is 	entitled
to
	act
	as 	the exclusive 	repre
sentative for 	the bargaining unit. 	International
Brotherhood
of
Electrical
Workers
	v. 	Foust
	(1979)
	442 U.S. 	192 	[101
	LRRM
2363, 	2367]
	(citing Steel v.
Louisville
&
Nashville
RR
Co.
	(1944) 	323
U.S. 	192 	[15
	LRRM
708);
	Humphrey
v.
Moore 	(1964) 	375 U.S.
	335 	[55
	LRRM
2031]; 	Vaca
v. 	Sipes 	(1967) 	386
U.S. 	171
-
2

[64
LRRM
2369]).
	It
	follows
	that
	the
union's 	obligation
does
	not
	extend
beyond
its
	duty to
	represent
fairly
	the
	interests
	of
all
bargaining
unit
members
	during the
	negotiation, 	administration
and
enforcement
of
collective
bargaining
agreements.
	IBEW
v.
	Foust,
	supra,
	p.
	2367.
The
Association
has
	no
	obligation
under
	the
	EERA
to
	represent
unit
members
concerning infringements
	of
non-contractual
	rights.
	Although
	PERB
has
	not
yet
had
occasion to
	so
hold,
	it
	appears
	that
	the
	exclusive
	representative
	is
	not
obligated
under
	EERA's
	"duty
of representation" 	(section
3544.9)
	to
	represent
a
	unit
member's
	rights
	under Education
Code
	section
49442.
1	
It
may
be,
however,
	that
	such
representation
will
be
	provided
by
	the
	organization
as
	a
benefit
	of
membership.
The
	charge,
	as
	presently
set
	forth,
	fails
	to
	state
	a
	prima
facie
	violation
of
EERA
sections
	3543.6(b)
	and
	3544.9.
	First,
	to 	the
	extent
	the
	charge
	is
based
on
events
which
	occurred
prior
	to
	January
1,
	1985,
	they
are 	time-barred.
San
Dieguito, 	supra.
	Of
what
	conduct
	is
	charging
party
complaining?
	On
what
date date did
	it
occur?
	When,
	if
at
	all,
	did the hearing
under Education
Code
section
44942
	take place?
	When
should
	it
have
	taken place?
	What
	did
charging
party request
	the
Association
	to
	do
	on
her behalf?
	To whom
did charging
party
make
	the request?
	When
was
	the
	request
made?
	Was
	it
made
	in
writing?
	If
	so,
please
	attach
	a
	copy. 	Did
the Association
representative
	to
whom
	the
	request
was made
	agree 	to
	do
	something
on
charging
party's
behalf?
	If
so,
	what?
	w-nat
facts
	does
	charging
party
have which
could demonstrate
	that
	the exclusive
representative's
	action
or
	inaction
was
	arbitrary,
	discriminatory or
	in
bad
faith?
	Without such
facts,
	occurring within
the
	six
months
	preceding
	the
filing
of
	the charge
	on
July
1,
	1985,
	the
	charge
	does
	not
state
	a
	prima
	facie
violation.
Second,
	the
	charge
	fails
	to
	set
	forth
	terms
	of the
	collective
bargaining
agreement
	in
effect
between
the
	District
and
	the Association
which
	guaranteed
charging
party rights 	that
	she
	allegedly
asked the
Association.to
	assert,
	and
in
regard to
which she
	received
no
	representation.
	Absent
	reference 	to
	the
relevant contract provisions,
	assuming
	they
	exist,
	charging
party
has
	failed
to
meet
	the standard
set forth 	in
PERB
Rule
	32615(a)(5).
2
If
you
feel 	that
	there are 	facts
	which would
correct
	the
	deficiencies
explained
above,
	please
	amend
	the charge
	accordingly.
	The amended
charge
1
Education
Code
	section
44942
	is
	attached to
	this 	letter
as Appendix
1.
2 PERB
Rule 	32615(a)(5)
	states 	that
an
unfair practice
	charge must
contain 
a
	clear
	and concise statement of the 	facts
	and
conduct alleged to constitute
	an
unfair practice.
3

should
be
	prepared
on
a
	standard
PERB
unfair practice
	charge
	form
	clearly
labeled
First
Amended
Charge,
	contain
all
	the
	facts
	and
allegations
	you wish
to
make,
	and
be
	signed
under
	penalty of perjury
by
the charging
party.
	The
amended
	charge
must
be
	served
on
the
	respondent
	and
	the
	original
proof
of
service
must
be
	filed
with
	PERB.
	If
	I
	do
	not receive
	an
amended
charge orwithdrawal
	from you on
or before
July
	25, 	1985,
	I
	shall
	dismiss
	your
	charge.
If
you
have
	any
	questions
	on
how
	to
	proceed,
	please
	call
me
	at
	(415)
	557-1350.
Si.r:.cerely
yours,
Peter
F...al::-erfela
Regional Attorney
./1
I
~	
•
i
4

M. A. Chestangue
Friday, July 26th, 1985.
(415) 668 - 6467
Public Employment Relations Board
1 7 7 Post Street
San Francisco, California 94108
ATTENTION: Peter Haberfeld an amended charge - SF-C0-278
In response to your letter of July 18, 1985 beginning with the second
complete paragraph of page 3...
1. The SFCTAssociation was asked to conduct an investigation about
the annual salary of M.A.Chestangue(Jonas). The request was made
November 15, 1982.
2. An old brief case that contained all of the salary documentation
that pertained to M.A.Jonas-Chestangue dating back to 1951 with the
SFUSDistrict was taken to the SFCTAssociation so that Mr.McMurray
could check and compare what I had received from the SFUSDistrict
as salary and what I should have received from the SFUSDistrict.
This was done on July 11, 1983.
3. A letter was sent to President Dellamonica and ExecutiveDirector
McMurray asking the SFCTAssociation to investigate and to then
file a grievance on behalf of M.A.Jonas-Chestangue about previous
Sick Leave Times; Sick Days that the District used of mine-wrong
fully; State Teachers Retirement Time that has been with-held
from the M.AJonas-Chestangue Retirement Fund; Improper Salary pay
ments to M.A.Jonas-Chestangue and Reclassification of M.A.Jonas
Chestangue at wILL and without benefit of pay. Friday, July 15'83.
4. The SFCTAssociation was asked in a letter to do something about
these various issues: Assignments to Classes, Salary, Harassment,
Intimidation, Teacher Aid Time, Starting and Stopping Teaching
Time, Class Size Stipends inaccurately computed for the yearsl983
and 1984 and release times to have the use of the rest rooms. The
date for item 4. is September 29, 1983.
Mr. Haberfeld your statement"The charge, as presently set forth, fails
to state a prima facie violation of EERA sections 3543.6(b)and 3544.9.
First, to the extent the charge is based on events which occured prior to
January 1, 1985, they are time-barred." is being challenged.
The start of this amended charge begins with November 15, 1982 and
continues to today's date; not just continued but intensified; therefore
I can not believe that the EERA section 3543.6(b)and 3544.9 will or can
time-bar the M.A.Jonas-Chestangue Charge against the SFCTAssociation be
cause what was done by the SFCTAssociation was insufficient based upon
-1-

the Contract
	that
	the
Association
of
Teachers has
	with
	the
	SFUSDistrict.
On
Monday,
	December
1,
	1983
	I
	met
Mr.
	McMurray
at
	the
	SFCTAssociation
Office
	about
	3:15p.m.
	for
	the
purpose
	of
seeing
an
attorney(A.
	Leonard
Bjonklund,
	765
	Bridgeway
Sausalito,Calif.453-7121).
	Mr.
	McMurray
took
me
in
his
	automobile
	to
	San
Raphael,Calif. 	to discuss
my
	case with
attorney
Bjonklund. 	There
has been
no
	other
communication
with
AttorneyBjonklund
about
	the
	problems
	of
M.
	A.
	Chestangue
	from
December
1,
	1983
	to
	this
	day
in
1985
...
to
me
	this
	non-response
	is totally
	incredible!
Wednesday,
	July
4,
	1984
a
	letter
was
	sent
to 	the
	SFCTAssociation
asking
McMurray
what
he
was
	doing
	to resolve 	the
Grievances
	of
M.A.Jonas-
Chestangue.
	On
July
	9,
	1984
a
	letter
came
back
to
me
	from
Mr.
	McMurray
putting
	the
	total
blame
	of
	the
	Chestangue
	issue
upon
M.A.Chestangue.This
is
	a
	quote
	from
	that
	letter"the
	initial
Disciplinary
Action
was
	a
	sur
prise
	to
us
	all
because
	you
did not pick
up
	your
	certified
mail."
	My
response 	to
	that
quote
	is
	that
	the
	SFUSDistrict has 	adamantly
refused to
use
my
name
	as
	it
	is
	and
should
be;
	therefore,
	the mail
	that
was
	sent
	to
me
by
	the
	SFUSDistrict
was
	not
picked
up from
	the Post
Office.
	The
	District
used
this 	tactic
	to
	'time-bar'
	the
	Chestangue
	issue.
	The
	opinion of M.A.
Chestangue
	is 	that this
	is
	a
	method
	that 	is
	used
by
	the 	SFUSDistrict
	to
harass, 	intimidate
	and
try
to
	de-humanize
me
	to 	the
	point
	that
	I
	will
abandon
my
case,
	That
	is
	fallacious
	thinking
on
the
	part
	of
	the
	SFUSDis-
trict
	and
the
	SFCTAssociation.
	M.A.
	Chestangue
will
	continue
	this 	strug
gle
until
	she
	gets
	justice
under
	the
LAW
OF THIS LAND.
-
-
M.
	A.
	Chestangue
was
	born
in
these United
States of
America on
August 9, 	1923.
	She
has 	served the United
States of
America
	in
the
Women's
Army
Corporation
from
April
	1944
through June
	1946.
	She
	graduated
from
the State
Teachers College
of
San
Francisco
	in
January
1951
with
	a
	Cert
ificate
	to
Teach any where
	in
the State of California.
	A
LIFE
	CREDENTIAL
from
	the State of California
was
	granted to
M.A.Jonas-Chestangue
	in
1958.
M.
	A.
	Jonas 	Chestangue began
to 	teach for 	the SFUSDistrict
on
	the
	first
Monday
	in
February
1951.
-
The
	SFUSDistrict and
the professional organizations 	that
have had
CONTRACTS
	to represent the 	teachers here 	in
San
Francisco have
	'run-ruff-
shod' 	overM.A.Jonas-Chestangue
	for 	too 	long!!!
-2-

I 	am
entitled
to
	DUE
	PROCESS
	of
the
	LAW
as
	a
	citizen
in
excellent
standing
	in
	this
	Country;
	yet,
	I 	am
being thwarted
by
	the very
legal
bodies(PERB
	for
	example)that should
be
aiding
me. 	You,
	Mr.
	Haberfeld,
know
as
	well
as
	I
	know
that
	the 	information
	that
	I
	have
	presented to
you
is
sufficient
	to
proceed with the case
	of
M.A.Chestangue.
	I
	do
	not
know
what
your
	reasons
	are
...
Please,
	Mr.
	Haberfled,
	use
	this
	information
as
	an
amended
charge
and
	'get-on'
	with the
M.A.Chestangue
	Complaint
against
	the
	SFCTAssociation,
I
	implore
you!
	not 	to dismiss
	this
	charge
	that
M.
	A.
	Chestangue
has
made
	against
	the
	San
Francisco
	Classroom
Teachers
Association.
Signed
M,
	A.
	Chestangue
-3-