Los Angeles Unified School District (Glass) (PERB 0526E)

STATE 	OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
ROBERT GLASS,
Charging 	Party,
v.
LOS ANGELES 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CE-1622
PERB Decision No. 	526
September 30, 	1985
ROBERT GLASS,
Charging 	Party,
v.
UNITED TEACHERS-LOS 	ANGELES,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CO-245
Appearances: 	Law Offices 	of 	Garber 	& 	Riskin by Marilyn Garber
for 	Robert 	Glass; 	Geffner 	& 	Satzman by Jeffrey Paule 	for 	United
Teachers-Los 	Angeles; 	O'Melveny & Myers 	by Joel M. 	Grossman 	for
Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School 	District.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Jaeger and Porter, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
HESSE, 	Chairperson: 	Robert Glass 	excepts 	to the attached
decision of 	the 	administrative 	law 	judge 	dismissing his 	charges
that 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School 	District 	and 	United
Teachers-Los 	Angeles 	violated 	the 	Educational 	Employment
1l	Relations Act.
1 The 	EERA is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	sections 	3540 	et
seq.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
------------··i
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
~

The 	Board has 	considered 	the 	entire 	record 	and 	the proposed
decision 	in light 	of 	the 	exceptions 	and briefs 	and hereby
affirms 	the 	rulings, 	findings, 	and 	conclusions 	of 	the
administrative 	law 	judge 	and 	adopts 	his 	proposed 	Order.
Accordingly, 	the unfair practice charges 	in Case Nos.
LA-CE-1622 	and 	LA-CO-245 	are 	DISMISSED 	in 	their 	entirety.
Member Jaeger 	joins 	in this 	Decision.
Member 	Porter's 	concurrence 	begins 	on page 	3.
22

- -
PORTER, 	Member, 	concurring: 	I concur in the dismissals.
I 	would 	also agree 	with 	the ALJ's 	discussion and determination
as 	to equitable 	tolling principles 	if 	equitable 	tolling 	is
applicable 	to 	Government 	Code 	section 	3541.5's 	six-month
proscription. 	This 	Board's 	regulations 	and prior 	decisions
have 	treated 	section 	3541.5's 	six-month proscription 	as 	a
statute of limitations and not 	jurisdictional. 	If, 	however,
section 	3541.5's proscription 	is 	jurisdictional, 	then equitable
tolling principles 	are 	not 	applicable. 	But 	jurisdictional 	or
not, 	the results would still be dismissals 	in these cases.
33

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 	BOARD
ROBERT GLASS,
Charging 	Party,
v.
LOS 	ANGELES 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Unfair 	Practice
Case Nos. 	LA-CE-1622
LA-CO-245
ROBERT GLASS,
Charging 	Party,
v.
UNITED 	TEACHERS 	- 	LOS 	ANGELES,
Respondent.
PROPOSED 	DECISION
(10/29/84)
Appearances: 	Marilyn Garber, 	Attorney, 	Garber and Riskin, 	for
Charging Party; 	Jeffrey Paule, 	Attorney, 	Geffner 	& Satzman, 	for
Respondent, 	United Teachers - Los Angeles; 	Joel M. 	Grossman,
Attorney, 	O'Melveny and Myers , 	for Respondent, 	Los Angeles
Unified 	School 	District.
Before Allen R. 	Link, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
Case No. 	LA-CE-1622
On August 	11, 	1982, 	Robert Glass 	filed an unfair practice
charge 	with 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(hereafter
PERB 	or 	Board) 	against 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School 	District
(hereafter 	LAUSD 	or 	District) 	alleging 	violations 	of 	sections
This Board agent decision has been appealed to
the Board itself and is not final. 	Only to the
extent the Board itself adopts this decision and
rationale may it be cited as precedent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-------------- 	!	)
)
)
}
)
)
)
-------------- 	i

3543, 	3543.5(a) 	and 	(c) 	and 3548.51 of the Educational
Employment 	Relations Act 	(hereafter 	EERA or 	Act) 	(commencing
with section 3540 et seq, 	of the Government Code).2
On November 	15, 	1982, 	the Charging 	Party filed a First
Amended 	Charge 	with 	the 	Board. 	This 	amended 	charge 	alleged
violations 	of 	the 	same sections 	as 	the 	original 	charge.
On November 	30, 	1982, 	the General 	Counsel of 	the PERB
issued 	a 	Complaint 	against 	the 	District.
On December 	20, 	1982, 	the District filed 	its Answer 	to the
Unfair 	Practice 	Charge 	and 	Complaint.
On January 26, 	1983, 	Judge Barbara E. 	Miller 	issued an
Order 	to 	Particularize 	requiring 	the 	District 	to 	particularize
its 	answer 	so 	that 	it would 	be more 	responsive to 	the 	specific
allegations 	set 	forth 	in the charge. 	On February 	17, 	1983,
Judge 	Miller 	issued 	an 	Amended 	Order 	to 	Particularize. 	On
March 	7, 	1983, 	the District 	filed an Amended Answer 	to
Complaint.
On March 	7, 	1983, 	the District 	filed a Motion to Dismiss
the 	Charge and 	Complaint. 	On April 	4, 	1983, 	the Charging 	Party
filed 	its Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 	On June 	6, 	1983,
Judge 	Miller 	denied 	the motion 	to 	Dismiss.
1Charging 	Party 	actually 	alleged 	a 	violation 	of 	section
3543(c). 	As there is no subdivision 	(c) 	contained 	in 	section
3543, 	it 	is assumed that a violation 	of 	section 	3543 	was
alleged.
2Unless 	otherwise noted, 	all 	section 	references 	are 	to
the 	Government 	Code.
N	2

On May 	20, 	1983, 	the 	Charging Party 	filed a Request 	for
Hearing. 	The matter 	was 	set 	for 	a 	formal 	hearing 	to 	commence
on October 	6, 	1983.
On October 	21, 	the third day of 	the 	formal 	hearing, 	after
the 	Charging 	Party 	had put 	on 	its 	entire 	case 	against 	the
District, 	the District 	renewed 	its motion 	to dismiss. 	After
extensive 	discussions, 	the motion was 	granted 	and 	all 	charges
against 	the 	District 	were 	dismissed.
Case No. 	LA-CO-245
On August 	11, 	1982, 	Robert Glass 	filed an unfair practice
charge 	with 	the 	PERB 	against 	the 	United 	Teachers 	- 	Los 	Angeles
(hereafter UTLA), 	the exclusive 	representative of the
certificated 	employees 	of 	the 	LAUSD. 	The 	charge 	alleged
violations of sections 3543.5(a), (c), 3543.6(a), (b) and
3544.9. 	A First 	Amended 	Charge was 	filed on November 	15, 	1982,
and a 	Second Amended Charge was 	filed 	on November 	22, 	1982.
The 	Second Amended 	Charge 	omitted 	the 	allegations 	of 	a
violation of 	sections 	3543.5(a) 	and 	(c), 	but continued to
allege violations of sections 3543.6(a), 	(b) 	and 3544.9. 	A
complaint 	was 	issued 	by PERB's 	General 	Counsel 	on November 	30,
1982. 	On December 	21, 	1982, 	an Answer was filed by UTLA. 	On
January 	26, 	1983, 	Judge Miller 	issued 	an Order 	directing UTLA
to particularize 	its answer. 	On February 17, 	1983, 	Judge
Miller 	issued 	a 	second 	Order 	to 	Particularize Answer. 	On
February 	28, 	1983, 	UTLA filed an Amended Answer.
W	
3

Cases 	Consolidated
The 	two 	cases 	were 	consolidated 	for 	formal 	hearing 	and 	were
heard on October 	6, 	7, 	21 and November 	3, 	1983, 	before
Judge Allen R. 	Link. 	The issues raised 	at 	the 	hearing 	were
briefed 	by 	attorneys 	for 	the parties 	and 	the 	case 	was 	submitted
on March 8, 	1984.
JURISDICTION
Robert 	Glass 	is 	a 	high 	school 	teacher 	at Van Nuys 	High
School 	and 	is 	a 	member 	of 	the 	certificated 	employee bargaining
unit 	of 	the LAUSD. 	He 	is a public 	school 	employee within the
meaning of 	section 	3540.l(j) 	of 	the 	EERA. 	UTLA is the
exclusive 	representative 	of 	the 	certificated 	employees 	of 	the
LAUSD within the meaning of 	section 	3540.l(e). 	The LAUSD 	is 	a
public 	school 	employer within 	the meaning 	of 	section 	3540.l(k).
INTRODUCTION
Case 	No 	LA-CE-1622
Robert 	Glass 	alleged 	the 	District 	violated 	section
3543.5(a) 	of 	the 	Act 	when 	it 	discriminated 	against 	him due 	to
his 	exercise 	of 	protected 	rights. 	He 	stated 	that 	his
activities 	on 	behalf 	of 	the 	Teaching 	Faculty 	Association
(hereafter 	TFA) 	led Van Nuys 	High 	School 	Principal 	Koster 	to
(1) 	castigate 	and 	berate 	him at 	a 	faculty meeting 	in 	January
1982 	and 	(2) 	refuse 	to permit 	him to 	speak 	at 	that 	faculty
meeting. 	He 	further 	alleges 	that 	the 	contractual 	grievance
procedure 	is 	administered 	in 	such 	a way 	as 	to violate
A	4

section 	3543.5(c) 	of 	the Act 	in that 	the 	District 	interpreted
specified 	sections 	of 	the 	contract 	in 	such a manner 	as 	to
render 	them 	inoperative. 	According 	to Mr. 	Glass 	such
interpretations 	reveal, 	retroactively, 	that 	the District 	had 	no
intention 	at 	the 	time 	of 	negotiating 	the 	collective 	bargaining
contract 	of 	honoring 	those portions 	of 	the Agreement 	or 	to
administer 	them 	in 	good 	faith 	during 	the 	life 	of 	the 	contract.
The 	District 	insists 	the 	charge 	regarding 	Principal
Roster's 	comments 	at 	the 	faculty meeting 	are 	time 	barred 	and
that 	there 	was 	insufficient 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	"failure 	to
bargain" 	charge.
Case No. 	LA-CO-245
Charging 	Party 	alleged 	that 	the 	UTLA 	discriminated 	against
him because 	of 	his 	employee 	representational 	activities 	in 	the
past. 	This 	discrimination took 	the 	form of 	the Association's
failure 	to 	represent 	him 	in 	the 	preliminary 	steps 	of 	two
grievances 	against 	the 	District 	and 	its 	failure 	to 	either 	take
such grievances 	to 	arbitration 	or 	to permit 	him to 	use 	his 	own
attorney 	to 	take 	such 	grievances 	through 	the 	arbitration 	phase
of 	the contractual 	grievance procedure. 	Mr. 	Glass 	insists 	that
due 	to 	these 	actions 	the 	UTLA has 	violated 	its 	statutory 	duty
of 	fair 	representation.
UTLA insists 	it 	has 	no animosity towards Mr. 	Glass 	and 	the
decision not 	to provide 	representation for Mr. 	Glass' 	two
grievances was 	due 	to 	lack 	of merit 	in 	those grievances.
5

STATEMENT OF 	FACTS
Prior 	to 	1970 	Robert 	Glass 	was 	an active member 	and 	officer
of 	the American Federation of 	Teachers 	(hereafter 	AFT) 	chapter
at 	the 	LAUSD and Roger 	Segure was 	on 	the 	staff 	of 	that 	AFT
chapter. 	In 	such positions 	they worked 	closely. 	AFT merged
with 	the 	National 	Education 	Association 	(hereafter 	NEA) 	chapter
in 	1970. 	This 	merger 	created 	the UTLA. 	After 	the AFT and NEA
merger, 	Mr. 	Glass 	refused to 	join 	the new organization and
publicly 	disagreed 	with 	many positions 	taken by 	it. 	Roger
Segure became, 	and 	is presently, 	the director of grievance
services 	for 	UTLA.
Mr. 	Glass 	periodically meets with other members 	of 	the
Van Nuys 	faculty 	to discuss 	items 	of mutual 	concern. 	They 	call
themselves 	the 	Teaching 	Faculty Association. 	The 	organization
has been 	in 	existence 	for 	two or 	three years. 	Only
certificated personnel 	who 	teach a minimum of 	four 	classes 	a
day with a 	specified 	number 	of 	students 	can 	join TFA.
Mr. 	Glass 	is 	the Chair 	of this Association. 	On January 	3,
1982, 	at the direction of that group, 	Mr. 	Glass sent a letter
to 	Assistant 	Superintendent 	Harry 	Handler, 	immediate 	supervisor
of 	Van Nuys High School 	Principal Koster, 	regarding a 	recent
Koster 	decision 	concerning 	a 	specified 	District-wide 	policy.
The nature 	of 	the 	specified policy 	is 	not 	relevant 	to this 	case.
Mr. 	Glass 	originally 	obtained permission 	from his
supervisor 	to make 	copies 	of 	this 	letter 	on a 	school 	copy
6

V
machine. 	Mr. 	Koster 	learned 	of 	this 	and 	countermanded 	the
supervisor's 	permission 	stating 	it 	would 	have 	been 	an 	improper
use 	of 	the 	school's property. 	Mr. 	Glass 	copied the 	letter 	on
private 	facilities 	and 	distributed 	copies 	of 	that 	letter 	to
persons attending the January 	12, 	1982, 	faculty meeting. 	There
were 	approximately 	60 	teachers 	and 	numerous 	non-teaching
personnel 	at 	the 	faculty meeting.
The 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	(CBA) 	between 	UTLA and
LAUSD 	contained 	a 	provision with 	regard 	to 	faculty 	meetings.
This provision was 	designated Article 	IX, 	Section 	4.2, 	and 	is
set 	forth 	in 	its 	entirety as 	follows:
Such 	[faculty] 	meetings 	shall be held at 	a
reasonable 	time and place, 	and 	shall 	not,
except 	in 	special 	situations 	or 	emergencies,
exceed 	one 	hour 	in duration 	or 	be 	held more
than 	three 	times 	per 	calendar 	month.
Agendas 	for 	faculty meetings 	are 	to be
distributed 	at 	least 	one 	day 	in 	advance;
employees 	shall 	be 	permitted 	to propose
agenda 	items 	and 	to participate 	in a
professional 	manner 	in 	discussions 	during
the meetings.
On January 7, 	1982, 	Mr. 	Glass 	submitted a letter 	to
Mr. 	Koster proposing 	two agenda 	items: 	campus 	sweeps 	and
attendance 	policy. 	He 	further 	suggested 	that 	the 	following
problems 	should 	be 	addressed 	at 	faculty 	meetings:
(1) 	wandering football players 	(during) 	6th period; 	(2) 	radios
on campus; 	(3) 	bicycle riders on campus; 	(4) 	vandalism and
graffiti; 	(5) 	freeing of 	xerox machine for 	classroom teachers;
and 	(6) 	discipline procedures. 	The 	agenda for 	the 	January 12,
7

1982, 	faculty meeting was prepared 	and 	the 	items proposed 	by
Mr. 	Glass were 	included 	under 	the 	heading 	"Other 	Items 	as 	Time
Permits."
During 	the 	January meeting 	Principal 	Koster, 	at 	the
conclusion 	of 	all 	other 	items on the agenda, 	but prior 	to
mentioning 	Glass 1 items, 	announced 	to 	the 	assembled 	faculty
that 	Mr. 	Glass 	seemed 	to 	think 	he 	represented 	a part 	of 	the
faculty 	and 	he 	did 	not. 	Koster 	held 	a piece of 	paper 	in 	his
hand—a 	paper 	a 	number 	of 	faculty members 	believed 	to 	be 	a 	copy
of 	the 	letter 	distributed by Mr. 	Glass—and 	said 	that 	he 	only
recognized 	UTLA and 	that 	if 	there 	were 	any 	other 	such 	faculty
associations, 	anyone 	could 	join. 	He went 	on to 	state 	that 	he
had 	told 	Glass 	not 	to duplicate 	this 	letter 	but 	that 	Glass 	had
duplicated 	it 	anyway. 	He 	stated 	that 	such 	actions 	were
unprofessional. 	Koster 	was 	acting 	in a 	raging manner. 	Such a
manner 	was 	more 	than 	being mad 	and 	was 	more 	extreme 	behavior
than 	he 	had 	manifested 	in 	any past 	faculty meeting. 	Koster
went 	on 	in 	this manner 	for 	two 	to 	five minutes.
Koster 	finished 	the 	formal 	faculty meeting 	and, 	as 	was 	his
custom, 	turned 	the meeting over 	to teacher 	Steve Reilly, 	UTLA's
site 	representative, 	for 	a UTLA meeting. 	Before Mr. 	Koster
left 	the auditorium, 	Reilly asked 	if 	there was 	anyone 	in 	the
audience 	that 	wanted 	to make 	any 	announcements 	or 	anything.
Glass 	raised 	his 	hand 	and Reilly 	asked 	Koster 	if 	he 	should 	call
on him. 	Koster 	said 	"no."
Co	
8

On January 14, 	1983, 	Robert Glass 	filed a grievance
alleging a 	violation of 	Article 	IX, 	Section 	4.2 	of 	the 	CBA.
Although Mr. 	Glass1 agenda 	items were 	not 	discussed prior 	to
Principal Roster's 	final 	remarks 	in January, 	they were
discussed 	during 	the 	next 	faculty meeting 	in 	February, 	after
the 	grievance 	had 	been 	filed.
The 	grievance 	stated 	that 	the principal 	violated
Article 	IX, 	Section 	4.2 	of 	the 	contract 	when he 	failed 	to 	call
on Glass 	to 	introduce 	his 	agenda 	items. 	The grievance 	listed
as 	its 	requested 	remedy, 	that 	the District 	develop a 	set 	of
guidelines 	for 	faculty meetings 	which 	include 	the 	following:
(1) 	teachers' 	concerns occupy the first 	half of any meeting;
(2) 	concise 	ways 	that 	teachers 	can present 	and 	argue motions
(parliamentary 	rules); 	and 	(3) 	allowances for 	the Teaching
Faculty 	Association 	to 	propose 	items 	and 	have 	them 	discussed.
A 	first 	step 	grievance 	meeting 	was 	scheduled 	by 	Principal
Roster's office for January 	21, 	1982, 	at 	2:15 p.m.
Steve Reilly 	testified 	that 	Glass 	told 	him 	that 	he 	(Glass) 	did
not 	want 	UTLA 	representation 	at 	this 	first 	step meeting. 	Glass
preferred 	to have 	a 	fellow teacher 	and 	friend, 	Jack 	Doerr,
represent 	him. 	Glass 	then 	informed 	Principal 	Koster 	of 	this
choice.
Glass 	testified 	that 	he 	asked Reilly 	to 	go with 	him 	to 	his
Step 	I 	meeting 	and 	that 	Reilly 	stated 	that 	he 	would 	go 	into 	the
meeting 	as 	a witness, 	not 	as 	an official 	UTLA 	representative 	as
9

the 	UTLA 	staff 	didn't 	want 	him 	representing 	Glass 	on 	this
grievance. 	(Reilly had, 	however, 	represented Glass 	on a
grievance 	approximately 	six 	months 	prior 	to 	this 	early 	1982
incident.) 	Glass 	felt 	that 	having 	a UTLA 	representative 	in 	a
witness 	role would be a 	sign of 	weakness. 	He 	felt 	Jack 	Doerr
would 	be 	a 	better 	person 	to 	join 	him at 	the 	"first 	step"
meeting.
Reilly 	doesn't 	remember 	anything 	about 	being 	told 	to 	stay
away from Glass, 	in general, 	by any UTLA staff person, 	but may
have 	been 	told 	not 	to 	represent 	him with 	regard 	to 	this
particular 	grievance. 	UTLA paid 	staff 	personnel 	usually
represent members 	at 	the 	Step 	I meetings.
Upon 	learning 	that 	Doerr 	would 	be 	Glass1 representative
Koster 	changed 	the 	time 	of 	the meeting 	to 	3:15 p.m. 	so 	that
Doerr 	would 	be 	able 	to 	attend 	the 	grievance 	meeting without
missing 	any 	teaching 	time. 	Glass 	replied 	that 	neither 	he 	nor
Mr. 	Doerr 	could meet 	at 	3:15 p.m. 	on that 	date and 	that 	Koster
should 	keep 	the 	original 	2:15 p.m. 	time 	and provide 	a
substitute 	teacher 	for 	Doerr. 	The principal 	refused 	to 	do 	this
but 	suggested 	Glass 	waive 	the 	five-day 	time 	limit 	so 	that 	an
alternative 	date 	could be 	selected. 	Glass 	refused 	to waive 	the
time 	limit. 	Glass 	attended the 	2:15 p.m. 	Step 	I meeting
without 	Mr. 	Doerr 	or 	any 	other 	representative. 	Principal
Koster 	and 	Jack 	Thompson 	of 	LAUSD 	staff 	relations 	represented
the District.
10

On January 25, 	1983, 	Mr. 	Glass filed another grievance
alleging a 	violation of 	Article V, 	Sections 	2 	and 	3 	of 	the
CBA. 	The grievance 	alleged 	that 	Koster 	and 	Thompson 	denied
Mr. 	Glass 	the 	right 	to have his 	representative, 	Jack 	Doerr,
present 	at 	a Step 	I 	grievance meeting.
Article V, 	Sections 	2 and 	3, 	in pertinent part, 	are as
follows:
2.0 	Representation Rights: 	At 	all
grievance meetings 	under 	this 	Article, 	the
grievant 	shall 	be 	entitled 	to 	be 	accompanied
and/or 	represented 	by 	a UTLA
representative. 	A grievant 	shall 	also be
entitled, 	prior to arbitration, 	to represent
himself 	or 	herself, 	or 	to be 	represented by
any other 	person, 	so 	long as 	that person 	is
not 	a 	representative 	of 	another 	employee
organization. 	The administrator 	shall 	have
the 	right 	to be 	accompanied 	by 	another
administrator 	or 	District 	representative.
By mutual 	agreement 	other 	persons 	such 	as
witnesses 	may 	also 	attend 	grievance 	meetings.
3.0 	Released 	Time 	For 	Employees 	and 	UTLA
Representatives: 	Grievance meeting and
hearing 	will 	be 	scheduled 	by 	the 	District 	at
mutually 	convenient 	times 	and 	places 	during
District 	business 	hours. 	Such meetings 	will
be 	scheduled 	so 	as 	to 	minimize 	interference
with 	regular 	employee duties. 	If 	a
grievance 	meeting 	is 	scheduled 	during 	duty
hours, 	reasonable employee 	released time,
including 	necessary 	travel 	time, 	without
loss 	of 	salary 	and with mileage
reimbursement, 	will be provided 	to the
grievant, 	to a UTLA representative 	if 	one 	is
to be present, 	and 	to any witness who
attends by mutual agreement. 	. 	. 	.
(Emphasis 	added.)
Glass 	telephoned Roger 	Segure, 	UTLA's 	grievance
coordinator, 	after 	the Step 	I meeting on his 	"agenda"
11

grievance, 	to 	inquire about 	representation on both grievances
at 	all 	subsequent 	steps. 	Glass 	insists 	that 	Segure 	told 	him
that 	(1) 	he could 	represent himself, 	(2) 	the real decisions
were made at 	the arbitration level, 	and 	(3) 	his 	"released time"
grievance 	had merit 	but 	that 	the 	"agenda" 	grievance 	did 	not.
Segure 	testified 	that 	he 	told 	Glass 	that 	neither 	grievance
had 	merit 	and 	that 	therefore 	UTLA 	declined 	to 	represent 	him 	in
these matters. 	He 	admitted 	he may 	have 	responded 	in 	some 	other
fashion 	if 	something 	had 	been misrepresented 	but 	once 	he 	saw
the written 	formal 	grievance 	he 	told 	Glass 	that 	there was 	no
merit 	to 	either 	grievance.
Segure 	stated 	that 	he 	has 	encountered 	the 	"agenda" 	problem
a 	number 	of 	times 	each year 	and 	his 	response 	has 	always 	been
the 	same—the 	contract 	does 	not 	guarantee 	the 	right 	to 	discuss
the 	subject 	items 	but 	merely 	guarantees 	the 	employee's 	right 	to
get 	the 	items 	on 	the agenda.
In 	1978 	Glass 	himself 	had 	come 	to 	Segure 	regarding 	a
grievance 	on 	this 	issue 	when 	the 	"teacher-proposed 	agenda
items" 	was 	still 	in 	District 	board policy 	and 	had 	not yet 	been
incorporated 	into 	the 	CBA. 	Segure 	testified 	that 	he 	gave 	Glass
the 	same 	response 	at 	that 	time. 	Glass 	testified 	that 	he 	did 	in
fact 	go 	to UTLA for 	representation 	on 	the 	same 	type 	of
grievance 	in 	1978. 	The 	difference 	between 	his 	testimony 	and
Segure's 	on 	this matter 	is 	that 	Glass 	insists 	that 	UTLA 	staff
personnel 	represented 	him 	through 	the 	first 	two 	steps 	of 	the
12

grievance 	procedure 	on 	this 	very 	same 	issue. 	UTLA 	recommended
that 	he 	drop 	the grievance at 	that point. 	He believes 	they
made 	this 	recommendation because 	of 	the 	cost 	of 	taking 	the 	case
to 	arbitration. 	He 	remembers 	that 	Sam Kresner 	represented 	him
at 	Step 	I 	and 	he 	believes 	it was Ray Butler 	representing 	him at
Step 	II. 	Both 	of 	these men are UTLA staff members.
Segure 	testified 	that 	the 	"released 	time" 	grievance 	was
without 	merit. 	He 	explained 	that 	the 	contract 	only 	requires
release time for 	(1) 	the 	involved employee, 	(2) 	a UTLA
representative, 	and/or 	(3) 	a mutually agreed upon witness. 	He
explained 	that 	the 	"agenda" 	grievance 	lacked merit 	because 	the
contract 	does 	not 	guarantee 	that 	teacher-proposed 	agenda 	items
will 	be 	discussed 	at 	any particular 	faculty meeting. 	Due 	to
these 	views 	it 	was 	UTLA's position 	that 	the contract 	had not
been 	violated 	and 	that 	UTLA 	representation 	for 	Mr. 	Glass 	was
not 	appropriate.
After 	Glass 	filed 	his 	"released 	time" 	grievance Mr. 	Koster
stated 	that, 	as 	they 	had previously 	discussed 	the matter 	at
length, 	he would give Glass 	a 	"first 	step" 	response but 	that 	it
was 	not 	necessary 	to 	hold 	a 	"first 	step" 	meeting. 	No 	such
meeting 	was 	held.
Prior 	to 	initiating 	Step 	II 	of 	the 	grievance procedure
Mr. 	Glass 	retained a private attorney, 	Marilyn Garber, 	to
represent 	him. 	Garber 	contacted 	Segure 	to 	request
representation 	for 	the grievance 	step meetings. 	She 	testified
13

that 	Segure 	told 	her 	that 	he 	had 	known Glass 	for 	a 	long 	time
and 	that 	he 	(Glass) 	was a 	"gadfly," 	wanted to have fun, 	that 	he
was 	"strange" 	and 	"kiddish." 	She 	further 	testified 	that 	Segure
told 	her 	that 	Glass 	could 	take UTLA to PERB, 	that 	he 	certainly
knew how to do 	that 	as 	he 	had 	done 	it 	before. 	She 	insisted
that 	she was 	told 	that 	Glass 1 "agenda" 	grievance 	had merit but
that 	the 	"released 	time" 	grievance 	did 	not. 	Glass 	had
previously 	testified 	that 	Segure 	had 	told 	him 	the 	"released
time" 	grievance 	had merit 	but 	the 	"agenda" 	grievance 	did 	not.
Glass 	attended 	the 	Step 	II 	grievance meeting 	accompanied 	by
Ms. 	Garber. 	Robert F. 	Coutts, 	another Van Nuys High School
teacher, 	was present as a witness for Mr. 	Glass. 	Mr. 	Thompson,
the 	District's 	labor 	relations 	representative, 	represented 	the
District. 	Mr. 	Parry, 	a LAUSD administrator, 	presided over the
meeting 	and 	had 	the power 	to grant 	or 	deny 	the 	grievance. 	Mr.
Parry 	stated 	that 	he 	would 	rely 	heavily 	upon 	the 	advice 	and
counsel of Mr. 	Thompson.
Glass 	pursued 	his 	grievances 	through 	the 	first 	three 	steps
of 	the 	contractual 	procedure 	and 	at 	each 	step 	the 	grievances
were 	denied. 	At 	the 	third 	step an 	actual 	hearing 	is 	held 	only
at 	the 	option 	of 	the 	District. 	A hearing 	was 	not 	held 	in 	these
cases.
On March 20, 	1982, 	Mr. 	Glass sent a letter to Roger Segure
requesting 	that 	UTLA 	take 	the 	necessary 	steps 	to 	initiate 	the
arbitration of 	his 	two grievances. 	In 	that 	letter 	he
14

referenced 	an 	earlier meeting, 	on February 	9, 	in Segure's
downtown 	office, 	in which 	he 	stated 	the 	two men discussed 	the
probability 	that 	Glass 	would 	have 	to 	repay 	UTLA 	for 	its 	costs
if 	this 	matter 	came 	to 	arbitration. 	Glass 	testified 	that
Segure 	told 	him 	that 	he 	would 	recommend 	to 	the 	UTLA board 	that
the matters be 	taken to arbitration 	if Glass, 	as a nonmember,
would 	bear 	the 	costs. 	He 	assured 	Glass 	that 	the 	board 	would
follow 	his 	recommendation.
Segure 	denied 	telling 	Glass 	he 	would 	have 	to 	reimburse 	UTLA
for 	its 	costs 	of 	arbitration. 	He 	did 	state 	that 	UTLA had been
considering 	asking 	for 	an 	arbitration 	hearing 	under 	the
conditions 	that 	Glass 	represent 	himself 	and 	be personally
billed 	for 	all 	costs.
Glass 	believed 	that 	UTLA 	would 	not 	represent 	nonmembers
without 	charge. 	Segure and Sam Kresner, 	a UTLA official at
some 	unstated 	time 	in the past, 	had 	told 	him that 	UTLA does 	not
like 	to 	represent 	nonmembers. 	Other members of 	the unit 	had
the 	same 	impression.
Jack 	Doerr 	had 	had 	some 	difficulty 	three 	or 	four 	years 	ago
with 	his 	principal 	due to a 	heated 	conflict 	with another
faculty 	member. 	Doerr 	testified 	that 	when 	requesting
representation 	on 	this 	matter 	he 	was 	told 	by Steve Reilly 	that
he 	would predate Doerr's membership 	if 	he 	would 	join 	so 	that 	it
would 	appear 	he was 	a member prior 	to 	the 	events 	relating 	to
the 	grievance. 	Doerr 	declined to 	join UTLA. 	He 	talked 	to
15

Roger 	Segure 	and was 	told 	that 	he 	had 	a 	good grievance. 	He
mentioned 	his 	nonmembership 	status 	to 	Segure who was 	surprised
as 	they 	had 	worked 	together 	prior 	to 	the 	establishment 	of
UTLA. 	He 	was 	directed 	to 	discuss 	his problem with a 	UTLA 	staff
person named 	Estes. 	Estes 	told 	him that 	he 	did not 	have a good
grievance. 	Doerr 	testified 	that 	when 	his 	request 	for
representation was 	denied, 	he believed 	it was 	due 	to his
nonmembership 	status. 	Doerr 	admitted 	that 	a major 	difficulty
with 	his 	case 	at 	that 	time was 	that 	there was 	no 	contractual
breach 	alleged. 	He 	just 	felt 	that 	the principal's 	contemplated
action was unfair. 	Mr. 	Doerr 	is a member 	of 	the Teaching
Faculty 	Association.
Reilly admits 	to trying 	to get 	Mr. 	Doerr 	to 	join UTLA, 	but
insists 	he 	did 	not 	condition 	representation 	on 	such
membership. 	He 	testified 	that 	he put 	Doerr 	into 	contact 	with
the 	staff 	members 	at 	UTLA 	headquarters 	and 	that 	the 	UTLA 	staff
members 	knew of 	his 	nonmember 	status. 	Reilly 	doesn't 	believe
that 	a 	staff member 	has 	ever 	asked 	him 	if 	someone was 	a member
when 	he 	called 	in 	on a grievance. 	Roger 	Segure 	stated 	that 	he
never 	asks 	the caller 	if 	the 	involved 	teacher 	is a member 	or
not.
Mr. 	Robert F. 	Coutts, 	a Van Nuys High School teacher and
the 	local 	site 	vice-president 	of 	UTLA, 	believes 	"that 	UTLA is
somewhat 	reluctant 	to 	represent 	nonmembers 	although 	it 	claims
to be willing 	to 	do 	so." 	He based 	this belief 	solely on cases
16

that 	he 	has 	heard 	about 	and 	not 	any written policy. 	Nor 	did 	he
base 	this 	opinion 	on 	any 	specific 	cases 	or 	observation 	of
Mr. 	Reilly's 	behavior 	on behalf 	of 	UTLA at Van Nuys 	High
School. 	He personally has 	never 	represented 	teachers 	on
grievances. 	He 	never 	brought 	the matter 	to 	the 	attention of
the UTLA 	staff. 	Mr. 	Coutts 	is 	a member 	of 	the Teaching Faculty
Association.
Mr. 	Morton S. 	Sirkus, 	a social 	studies teacher 	at the
District's 	Cleveland 	High 	School 	is 	a 	chapter 	chairperson 	for
UTLA at 	his 	site. 	He 	is 	also on 	the 	city-wide UTLA House 	of
Representatives. 	He was 	on the 	faculty at 	Van Nuys 	High School
for 	18 years 	until 	he 	left 	in January 	1980. 	He 	was 	under 	the
impression, 	until 	a 	few days 	before 	the 	hearing, 	that UTLA did
not 	represent 	nonmembers, 	didn't 	carry 	their 	grievances 	and 	if
they 	did, 	the 	nonmember 	had 	to pay his/her 	own expenses. 	He
received 	that 	impression 	from an 	announcement 	that 	was 	made 	at
a 	school 	that 	he was 	assigned 	to 	at 	some 	unstated 	time 	in 	the
past. 	He 	checked 	with UTLA 	shortly 	before 	the 	hearing 	and 	was
informed 	that 	his previous 	impression was 	incorrect, 	and 	that
because 	of 	some 	recent 	ruling, 	UTLA now has 	to 	represent 	both
members 	and 	nonmembers. 	For 	approximately 	six 	years 	prior 	to
1980, 	while at Van Nuys High School, 	Mr. 	Sirkis was
periodically 	the grievance 	chairperson. 	In 	that 	role 	he would
represent 	various 	members 	of 	the 	certificated 	staff. 	He 	never
inquired 	as 	to whether 	or 	not 	those 	teachers were members 	of
17

UTLA. 	He 	represented 	them 	irrespective 	of 	their 	membership.
He 	never 	received 	a 	communication 	from UTLA 	headquarters 	that
he 	should 	vary 	that 	policy 	of 	representation.
Mr. 	Reilly 	stated 	that 	UTLA membership would 	not 	have
played a part 	in deciding 	to 	support 	or 	not 	to 	support 	a
grievance, 	but 	that 	both 	Glass 	and 	Doerr 	may have 	complained 	in
the 	past 	about 	nonmembers 	being 	represented.
Mr. 	Glass 	filed 	an 	unfair practice 	charge 	against 	UTLA
during 	1981 	or 	1982. 	The case was 	settled at 	the 	informal
conference 	level. 	As a 	condition of 	that 	settlement, 	UTLA
provided 	assistance 	to 	Mr. 	Glass 	in 	obtaining 	remuneration 	for
the 	day 	he 	spent 	at 	PERB's 	Los Angeles Regional 	Office
attending 	the 	informal 	conference. 	Roger 	Segure 	contacted 	the
District on Mr. 	Glass1 behalf 	in this matter. 	The salary
payment 	was made 	to Mr. 	Glass and 	thereafter 	he withdrew his
charge 	against 	UTLA 	with 	prejudice.
Roger 	Segure 	admitted 	that 	between 	5 	and 	10 percent 	of 	the
grievances 	filed 	are 	given 	representation 	by UTLA 	for 	what 	he
termed 	"therapeutic" 	reasons. 	He 	described 	this 	term as
covering 	grievances 	that were 	good for 	the members, 	but 	had 	no
potential 	of 	providing 	a 	real 	winning 	result. 	It 	could 	be 	that
such 	grievances 	have 	no merit 	or 	there 	is 	no adequate 	remedy,
or perhaps 	the 	issue 	has become moot. 	He 	believes 	that 	the
representation 	of 	such 	grievances 	is 	consistent 	with UTLA's
duty of 	representation. 	The decision 	to accept 	such
18

therapeutic 	grievances 	is 	a 	result 	of 	a decision of 	a majority
of 	three UTLA grievance 	staff 	employees 	(one 	of 	whom 	is
Segure). 	Such group decision 	is 	not 	based 	on UTLA membership.
ISSUES
1. 	Whether 	the 	District 	violated 	section 	3543.5(c)3 by
(1) 	handling Mr. 	Glass1 January 1982 grievances 	in a
perfunctory 	manner 	without 	a 	good 	faith 	consideration 	of 	the
facts 	or 	a 	reasonable 	interpretation 	of 	the 	contractual
provisions; 	(2) 	failing to give an 	independent consideration of
the grievance at 	each step of 	the procedure; 	or 	(3) 	de facto
abolition 	of 	Step 	III 	(deputy 	superintendent 	level) 	of 	the
grievance 	procedure 	as 	virtually 	all 	grievances 	reaching 	this
level 	are 	denied 	and 	actual 	hearings 	are 	never 	held.
2. 	Whether 	Principal 	Roster's 	reproval 	of Mr. 	Glass
4 A4
before the school 	faculty was violative of 	section 3543.5(a)
3Section 	3543.5(c) 	is as follows:
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	a public 	school
employer 	to:
(c) 	Refuse 	or 	fail 	to meet 	and 	negotiate 	in
good 	faith 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
4Section 3543.5(a):
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	a public 	school
employer 	to:
(a) 	Impose or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on 	employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
19

even 	though 	it 	occurred 	more 	than 	six 	months prior 	to 	the
filing 	of 	the 	charge?
3. 	Whether 	UTLA violated 	section 	3543.6(b)5 or
3544.966 in 	its 	representation 	of 	Robert 	Glass 	in 	the matter
of 	his 	two 	January 	1982 	grievances 	against 	the District?
CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
As set 	forth above, 	in the Procedural History, 	the
District's 	Motion, 	made 	on 	the 	third 	day 	of 	the 	formal 	hearing,
was 	granted, 	thereby 	dismissing 	all 	charges 	and 	the 	complaint
against 	the 	District. 	Set 	forth 	below are 	the 	involved 	issues
and 	conclusions 	of 	law relied 	upon 	in 	such 	dismissals.
Issue No. 	1, 	Allegation 	re District's Violation of 	section
3543.5(c)
The 	Charging 	Party argues 	that 	the 	District 	violated
section 	3543.5(c) 	in 	that 	it 	failed 	to 	negotiate 	in good 	faith
5Section 3543.6(b):
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	an 	employee
organization 	to:
(b) 	Impose or 	threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or 	threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
6Section 	3544.9:
The 	employee 	organization 	recognized 	or
certified 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative
for 	the purpose 	of 	meeting 	and 	negotiating
shall 	fairly 	represent 	each 	and 	every
employee 	in 	the 	appropriate 	unit.
20

when 	it 	negotiated 	the 	grievance procedure 	in 	the 	1980-82
collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	with 	the UTLA. 	The 	Charging
Party's 	general 	argument 	is 	that 	because 	the District 	so
blatantly 	violated 	and 	circumvented 	the 	contractual 	grievance
procedure 	in the spring of 	1982, 	it couldn't possibly have
negotiated 	in 	good 	faith 	those 	same 	procedures 	in 	the 	spring 	of
1980. 	There was 	no 	evidence proffered 	to 	show what 	the
negotiating 	history 	was 	concerning 	these procedures. 	There 	was
no 	evidence 	proffered 	to 	show whether 	the manner 	in 	which 	the
District 	dealt 	with 	the 	grievance procedures 	with 	regard 	to 	the
hundreds 	of 	grievances 	filed 	during 	this 	two-year 	period 	was
better, 	worse, 	different or 	the same as 	the manner 	in which 	it
dealt with Mr. 	Glass' 	grievances. 	The only evidence to support
the 	allegations 	came 	from Mr. 	Glass 1 personal 	belief 	that 	the
District:
1. 	Did 	not 	give 	his 	grievances 	a 	good 	faith 	consideration
and 	that 	the 	District's 	interpretation 	of 	two 	specific
contractual 	provisions 	was 	not 	reasonable;
2. 	Permits 	the 	administrators 	charged 	with 	the
responsibility 	of 	ruling 	on a grievance 	at 	each 	step 	to 	be
unduly 	influenced 	by 	the 	District's 	labor 	relations
representative; and
3. 	Has 	unilaterally 	expunged 	the 	Step 	III 	level 	as 	it
never 	holds 	an 	actual 	hearing 	at 	that 	level 	and 	that 	virtually
all 	such grievances 	are 	denied.
21

It 	is 	acknowledged 	that 	a District, 	through 	its
post-negotiating 	behavior, 	could manifest 	an 	attitude 	towards 	a
contract 	or 	a particular 	provision 	of 	that 	contract 	that 	could
retroactively 	bring 	into 	question 	its 	"good 	faith" 	state 	of
mind while 	negotiating. 	However, 	the 	evidence 	offered 	in 	this
case 	by 	the 	Charging 	Party 	is little more 	than 	a 	bold 	assertion
of 	wrongdoing 	and 	falls 	far 	short 	of 	any 	sort 	of 	minimum 	level
necessary 	to prove 	such a 	charge.
Therefore, 	it 	is 	determined 	that 	the District 	did 	not
violate 	section 	3543.5(c) 	with 	regard 	to 	the manner 	in which 	it
dealt with Mr. 	Glass' 	January 1982 grievances.
Issue No. 	2, 	Allegation re District's Violation of
section 	3543.5(a)
The 	District's primary 	defense 	to 	this 	charge 	is 	that 	the
events 	complained 	of 	occurred 	more 	than 	six 	months 	prior 	to 	the
date 	the 	charge was 	filed with 	the 	PERB. 	The 	faculty meeting
at 	which 	Principal 	Koster 	allegedly 	berated 	Mr. 	Glass 	for 	his
"unprofessional" 	conduct 	occurred on January 	12, 	1982. 	The
charge 	against 	the 	District 	was 	filed 	at 	the 	Los 	Angeles
Regional Office of the PERB on August 	11, 	1982, 	almost 	seven
months 	later.
However, 	a 	charge may still 	be 	considered 	to be 	timely
filed 	if 	(1) 	the alleged violation is a continuing one, 	(2) 	the
violation 	has 	been 	revived 	by 	subsequent 	unlawful 	conduct
within 	the 	six-month period, 	or 	(3) 	the 	limitation period was
tolled 	while 	the 	Association 	was 	diligently 	and 	reasonably
22

pursuing 	alternative 	procedures 	for 	obtaining 	relief 	and 	other
alternative 	remedies. 	San Dieguito Union 	High 	School 	District
(2/25/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	194.
Section 	3541.5 	prohibits 	PERB 	from 	issuing 	a 	complaint 	"in
respect 	of 	any 	charge 	based 	upon 	an 	alleged 	unfair 	practice
occurring 	more 	than 	six 	months prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the
charge." 	The 	section provides, 	however, 	that 	the 	running 	of
the 	six-month 	period 	will 	be 	tolled 	during 	the 	time 	that 	a
complainant 	was 	pursuing 	grievance 	machinery which 	is 	provided
by 	agreement 	between 	the parties 	and which 	has 	culminated 	in
settlement 	or 	binding 	arbitration.
PERB 	has 	approved 	the 	application 	of 	the 	doctrine 	of
"equitable tolling" 	in appropriate cases. 	State of 	California,
Department of Water Resources, 	et al. 	(12/29/81) 	PERB Order
No. Ad-122-S.
In 	recognition 	of 	the 	fact 	that 	the
principal purpose 	of 	a 	statute of
limitations 	is 	to prevent 	surprise 	and
prejudice 	to 	a 	party 	from 	having 	to 	defend
against 	stale claims, 	the doctrine of
equitable 	tolling provides 	that 	a 	statute 	of
limitations will 	not 	be 	imposed 	to bar 	a
claim where 	no 	such 	risk 	exists 	because 	the
defendant 	has 	been 	kept 	on 	sufficient 	notice
by 	the plaintiff's pursuit 	of 	his 	claim 	in
another 	forum. 	The general 	rule 	is 	that 	the
doctrine 	is 	applicable where 	"an 	injured
person 	has 	several 	legal 	remedies 	and
reasonably 	and 	in 	good 	faith pursues 	one."
Elkins v. 	Derby 	(1974), 	12 Cal.3d 410. 	See
also, Addison v. 	State of California 	(1978),
21 	Cal.3d 	313. 	Thus, 	in State of
California, 	Department of Water Resources,
supra, 	we 	found 	that 	a complaint 	should
23

issue 	even 	though more 	than 	six 	months 	had
passed 	since 	the 	alleged 	violation 	of 	SEERA
because 	the 	respondent 	had 	been placed 	on
sufficient 	notice 	by 	the 	timely 	filing 	and
prosecution 	of 	a 	complaint 	involving 	the
same 	issues 	before 	the 	State Personnel
Board. 	State 	of 	California, 	Department 	of
Health Services, 	(12/22/82) 	PERB Decision
No. 	269-S. 	("Emphasis added. )
In San Dieguito UHSD, 	supra, 	at p. 	13, 	the Board set forth
a 	two 	step 	test 	for 	the 	equitable 	tolling 	doctrine 	to 	be
applicable. 	The first 	step 	is 	that 	it 	is 	necessary 	that
tolling 	not 	frustrate achievement 	of 	the 	purpose 	underlying 	the
statute 	of 	limitations. 	The purpose was 	defined 	as 	the
prevention 	of surprises through 	the 	revival 	of 	claims 	that 	have
been 	allowed 	to 	slumber 	until 	evidence 	has 	been 	lost, 	memories
have 	faded, 	and witnesses 	have 	disappeared. 	The 	second 	step
permits 	tolling 	of 	the 	limitations 	period when 	an 	injured
person 	has 	several 	legal 	remedies 	and 	reasonably 	and 	in 	good
faith pursue 	one. 	Both 	requirements must 	be present 	in order
to permit 	the 	tolling of 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations.
This 	test 	assumes 	that 	there 	is 	only 	one 	dispute, 	such as
an 	allegedly 	improper 	termination or 	a 	refusal 	to promote. 	The
test 	is 	then 	applied 	to 	the 	charging party's 	various 	actions 	in
attempting 	to 	overturn 	such termination or 	refusal. 	In 	this
case 	against 	the 	District 	we 	have 	at 	least 	two 	separate 	and
distinct 	disputes. 	The principal's 	reproval 	for 	copying 	the
Association's 	letter 	and 	the 	principal's 	failure 	to 	call 	on
Mr. 	Glass 	to discuss his 	agenda 	items. 	Complaining of 	one did
24

not 	put 	the District 	on notice 	the 	other 	was 	in dispute. 	The
"representation" 	grievance 	had 	no 	factual 	relevance 	to 	the
subject 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	and 	did 	not 	effectively put 	the
District 	on notice 	re any aspect 	of 	such 	charge.
The 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	in 	this 	case 	complains 	of 	an
employee 	having 	been 	subjected 	to 	reprisals, 	discrimination,
interference, 	restraint 	and/or 	coercion by an agent 	of 	the
District 	because 	of 	that 	employee's 	exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed 	by 	the 	EERA.
The 	"agenda 	grievance 	was 	directed 	toward 	remedying 	an
alleged 	breach 	of 	Mr. 	Glass' 	contractual 	right 	to have 	a
specified 	level 	of 	input 	into 	faculty 	meeting 	agenda 	and
discussions. 	That 	grievance 	complained 	the principal 	"did 	not
call 	on 	me 	to 	introduce 	. . . " 	and 	did 	not 	"allow me 	to
participate 	. . . 	in discussions 	. 	. 	. 	." 	This is an entirely
different 	dispute 	than 	one 	dealing 	with 	the 	manner 	in which 	the
principal 	acted 	and 	the words 	he 	directed 	towards 	Mr. 	Glass.
Neither 	the principal's 	demeanor 	nor 	his 	intent 	would 	have 	been
necessary 	elements 	of 	proving 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	contractual
breach. 	If 	there 	was 	a 	duty 	on 	the principal's part 	to 	discuss
Glass' 	agenda 	items 	at 	the January meeting, 	there was a breach
when 	he 	failed 	to 	do 	so.
The unfair practice charge, 	however, 	was directed towards
remedying 	an 	alleged 	attempt 	on 	the 	part 	of 	the principal 	to
discriminate, 	intimidate, 	interfere, 	or coerce Mr. 	Glass due to
25

his 	exercise 	of 	rights protected by the Act. 	In 	its
investigation 	and 	preparation 	for 	the 	grievance 	the 	District
would 	have 	had 	no 	reason 	to pay 	any 	attention 	to 	potential
testimony 	or 	any 	other 	evidence 	regarding 	Glass 1 organizational
activities 	the 	administration's 	general 	knowledge 	of 	such
activities, 	more 	specifically 	the principal's personal
knowledge 	of 	such 	activities, 	or 	the principal's 	specific
intent 	towards 	Glass' 	right 	under 	the 	Act 	at 	the 	faculty
meeting. 	Therefore, 	it 	is determined that the 	"agenda"
grievance, 	as 	submitted, 	failed to put 	the District 	on notice
that 	Glass 	was 	complaining 	of 	improper 	statements 	made 	by 	the
principal.
The 	"representation" 	grievance 	failed 	to put 	the 	District
on 	notice 	of 	any matter 	relevant 	to 	the 	subject 	charge.
With 	regard 	to 	the 	second 	step 	of 	the 	San 	Dieguito 	test,
the 	charging 	party was 	not 	pursuing 	the 	same 	claim 	in 	another
forum, 	nor 	had 	he 	chosen 	one 	of 	several 	alternative 	legal
remedies 	available 	to 	him. 	The 	charging party's grievances 	had
an 	entirely 	different 	objective 	than 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge
in 	this 	case. 	An 	examination 	of 	the 	two grievances 	and 	the
charge 	filed with 	PERB 	leads 	to 	the 	conclusion 	that 	Mr. 	Glass
was 	referencing 	three 	separate 	and 	distinct 	disputes 	with 	three
separate 	and 	distinct 	remedies. 	He 	was 	not 	complaining 	of 	one
single 	dispute 	and 	pursuing 	alternative 	routes 	to 	resolving
such 	dispute.
26

An 	examination 	of 	these 	two 	grievances 	and 	their 	requested
remedies 	vis-a-vis 	the 	charge 	in 	this 	case 	leads 	to 	the
conclusion 	that 	the 	defendant 	District 	"has 	not 	been 	kept 	on
sufficient 	notice 	by 	the plaintiff's 	pursuit 	of 	his 	claim 	in
another 	forum. 	Grievances 	asking 	for 	modifications 	in 	faculty
meetings 	and 	in grievance procedural 	rules 	do 	not 	reasonably
put 	an 	employer 	on 	notice 	that 	an 	employee 	is 	complaining 	about
being 	discriminated 	against, 	interfered with, 	or 	coerced 	due 	to
protected 	activities.
In Siamis v. 	LAUSD & UTLA 	(5/20/83) 	PERB Decision No. 	311,
the 	Board 	supported 	its 	decision with 	a 	quote 	from San
Dieguito, 	supra which is as follows:
The 	limitations period, 	as a consequence,
would 	not 	run until 	after 	it 	became clear
that 	the possibility 	of 	a 	remedy 	via 	[the
grievance procedure] 	was 	foreclosed.
In 	this 	case 	there was 	never 	the 	remotest 	possibility 	that
a 	relevant 	remedy 	would 	flow 	from 	either 	of 	the 	two 	grievances
filed by Mr. 	Glass. 	Even 	if 	the District 	had agreed 	to
everything 	that 	Glass prayed for 	in 	those grievances, 	the 	issue
before us, 	the alleged discrimination, 	interference or 	coercion
of 	Mr. 	Glass 	for protected activities, 	would not 	have been
addressed 	nor 	remedied.
It 	is 	found, 	therefore, 	that 	the Charging Party's filing of
the 	two 	grievances 	in 	January 	1982 	does 	not 	come within 	the
parameters 	of 	the 	"equitable tolling" 	doctrine. 	Therefore,
such grievances 	failed 	to 	toll 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	set
27

forth in subdivision 3541.5(a). 	Consequently, 	the charge
alleging 	coercion 	of 	the 	Charging 	Party 	because 	of 	his 	exercise
of 	rights 	guaranteed 	by the Act 	is 	barred 	by 	such 	statute.
Issue No. 	3, 	allegation re UTLA's violation of 	section
3543.6(b) 	and 	3544.9
A. 	Duty 	of 	Fair 	Representation General 	Precepts
In Rocklin Teachers Professional 	Association 	(3/26/80) 	PERB
Decision No. 	124, 	the Board, 	following precedent set by the
National 	Labor 	Relations 	Board 	and 	affirmed 	by 	the 	Supreme
Court 	in Vaca v. 	Sipes 	(1967) 	386 U.S. 	171, 	adopted the concept
that 	a 	breach 	of 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	occurs 	when a
union's 	conduct 	toward 	a member 	of 	the 	bargaining 	unit 	is
arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or 	in bad faith.
The Board, 	in Rocklin, 	supra, 	affirmed the 	interpretation
of 	this 	concept 	set 	forth 	in Griffin 	v. 	United Auto Workers
(4th 	Cir. 	1972) 	469 	F.2d 	181 	[81 	LRRM 	2485], 	as 	follows:
A 	union 	must 	conform 	its 	behavior 	to 	each 	of
these standards. 	First, 	it must treat all
factions 	and 	segments 	of 	its membership
without 	hostility 	or 	discrimination. 	Next,
the 	broad 	discretion 	of 	the 	union 	in
asserting 	the 	rights 	of 	its members must 	be
exercised 	in 	complete 	good 	faith 	and
honesty. 	Finally, 	the union must 	avoid
arbitrary 	conduct. 	Each 	of 	these
requirements 	represents 	a 	distinct 	and
separate 	obligation, 	the breach of which may
constitute 	the 	basis 	for 	civil 	action.
The 	repeated 	references 	in Vaca 	to
"arbitrary" 	union 	conduct 	reflected 	a
calculated 	broadening 	of 	the 	fair
representation 	standard. 	(Citations
omitted) 	. 	. 	. 	Without any hostile motive
of 	discrimination 	and 	in 	complete 	good
28

faith, 	a union may nevertheless pursue a
course 	of 	action or 	inaction that 	is 	so
unreasonable 	and 	arbitrary 	as 	to 	constitute
a 	violation 	of 	the 	duty 	of 	fair
representation.
A prima 	facie 	case 	alleging 	arbitrary 	conduct 	violative 	of
the 	duty of 	fair 	representation must, 	at 	a minimum, 	include an
assertion 	of 	sufficient 	facts 	from which 	it 	becomes 	apparent
how 	or 	in what 	manner 	the 	exclusive 	representative's 	action 	or
inaction was 	without 	a 	rational 	basis 	or 	devoid 	of 	honest
judgment. 	DeArroyo 	v. 	Sindicato de 	Trabajadores 	Packing 	(1970)
425 	P.2d 	281.
However, 	an employee does not 	have an
absolute 	right 	to 	have a grievance 	taken to
arbitration 	regardless 	of 	the provisions 	of
the 	applicable 	collective 	negotiations
agreement. 	(Citations 	omitted.) 	An
exclusive 	representative's 	reasonable
refusal 	to 	proceed 	with 	arbitration 	is
essential 	to 	the 	operation 	of a 	grievance
and 	arbitration 	system. 	(Citations
omitted.) 	Castro 	Valley Unified 	School
District 	and 	Castro 	Valley 	Teachers
Association 	(12/17/80) 	PERB Decision No. 	149.
A 	union may 	exercise 	its 	discretion 	to
determine 	how far 	to pursue 	a 	grievance 	in
the 	employee's 	behalf 	as 	long 	as 	it 	does 	not
arbitrarily 	ignore 	a 	meritorious 	grievance
or process 	a grievance 	in a perfunctory
fashion. 	A union 	is 	also 	not 	required 	to
process 	an 	employee's 	grievance 	if 	the
chances for 	success are minimal. 	See, 	e.g.,
Gleason v. T.I.M.E.-DC, 	Inc. 	(D. 	Colo. 	1972)
84 LRRM 2107. 	United Teachers 	of
Los Angeles 	(11/17/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	258.
B. 	Charging 	Party's 	Specific Allegations 	Re 	Failure 	of
Duty 	of 	Fair 	Representation
The 	specific 	allegations 	to 	be 	inferred 	from 	the 	charge 	are
that 	UTLA 	violated 	its 	duty 	to 	represent 	Charging 	Party 	in 	good
29

faith by: 	(1) 	failing 	to provide 	representation 	for Mr. 	Glass
at 	the preliminary 	steps 	of 	the 	grievance procedure with 	regard
to both 	grievances, 	and 	(2) 	failing 	to 	take the 	two grievances
to arbitration or, 	in the alternative, 	to permit Mr. 	Glass to
take 	such grievances 	to 	arbitration at 	his 	own 	expense.
(1) 	Representation 	Denial 	During 	Grievance 	Steps
This 	allegation may 	be 	divided 	into 	two 	separate
chronological 	instances: 	(a) 	the alleged 	request 	for
representation 	re 	the 	"agenda" 	grievance at 	Step 	I meeting made
to Reilly; 	and 	(b) 	the 	request 	for 	representation at 	subsequent
grievance 	"step" 	meetings 	from Roger 	Segure.
(a) 	Mr. 	Glass made his first 	contact with UTLA
through Mr. 	Reilly, 	Van Nuys 	High School 	site 	representative,
regarding 	the 	upcoming 	Step 	I 	meeting 	on 	the 	"agenda"
grievance. 	The 	two 	gentlemen 	involved 	have 	distinctly
different 	recollections 	of 	what 	occurred 	in 	that 	conversation.
Glass 	insists 	he 	asked 	for 	UTLA 	representation, 	and 	was 	turned
down; 	Reilly 	insists 	Glass 	had 	already 	decided 	to 	use 	Doerr
rather 	than 	a 	UTLA 	representative. 	Each 	of 	these men 	testified
credibly 	although 	they 	have 	different 	personal 	styles.
Mr. 	Reilly 	is more cautious 	and 	is 	inclined 	to add 	"maybe" 	and
"it 	could haves" 	to his 	testimony. 	He also used 	"I 	don't
remember" more than Mr. 	Glass. 	Mr. 	Glass 	is more assertive and
positive 	in his 	recollection. 	These differences are more 	a
reflection 	of 	different 	personalities 	rather 	than 	a
30

manifestation of 	credibility or 	lack 	thereof. 	It must 	also be
remembered 	that 	Mr. 	Glass 	is 	the 	Charging 	Party 	and 	directly
involved 	in the 	outcome of 	this 	case. 	He 	filed 	it, 	he's paying
for 	it, 	and he has 	a 	strongly partisan 	interest 	in the
outcome. 	Mr. 	Reilly 	is 	a colleague and a friend of 	long
standing of Mr. 	Glass. 	On the other hand, 	he 	is an elected
representative 	of 	UTLA. 	He 	manifested 	no 	strong 	personal
interest 	in 	the 	eventual 	outcome of 	this 	case.
The 	conflict 	in 	testimony 	between 	these men 	as 	to 	whether
or 	not 	Glass 	originally 	asked 	for 	UTLA 	representation 	is
unresolvable. 	As 	the burden of proof 	is 	upon 	the Charging
Party 	it 	must 	be 	determined 	that 	Mr. 	Glass 	has 	not proven 	his
case 	that 	UTLA 	refused 	him 	representation with 	regard 	to 	his
"first 	step" 	meeting on the 	"agenda" 	grievance.
(b) 	The 	second 	representation denial 	instance
occurred when UTLA declined 	to 	represent 	Mr. 	Glass 	at 	the
subsequent 	steps 	of 	the 	grievance. 	The 	evidence proffered by
both 	sides 	on 	this point 	is 	replete with 	charges 	and 	counter
charges 	regarding 	attitudes 	and 	circumstances 	over 	the past 	15
or more years. 	Irrespective of 	these charges, 	a basic question
must 	be addressed. 	Did the grievances, 	as propounded by
Mr. 	Glass, 	have sufficient merit 	so as 	to 	require UTLA to
represent Mr. 	Glass, 	in his advocacy of 	them?
The 	"agenda" 	grievance 	hinges 	on 	the 	following 	contractual
language: 	"employees 	shall 	be permitted 	to propose 	agenda
31

items 	and 	to participate 	in 	a professional 	manner 	in
discussions 	during 	the meetings." 	Mr. 	Glass 	insists 	that 	this
language 	should 	be 	interpreted 	to mean 	that 	the principal 	is
contractually 	required 	to 	reach, 	introduce 	and 	discuss 	every
item proposed 	by 	every 	teacher 	at 	the 	very 	next 	meeting 	after
such proposal. 	UTLA 	insisted 	that 	the 	intent 	of 	the parties
when 	negotiating 	this 	contractual 	provision was 	not 	to 	give 	the
individual 	teachers 	such 	a 	right. 	It 	also pointed 	out 	the
conflict 	between 	Charging 	Party's 	interpretation 	and 	the
one-hour 	limitation 	in 	the 	same 	contractual 	provision.
It 	is 	unknown how he 	resolves 	the 	obvious 	conflict 	between
this 	interpretation 	and 	the 	one-hour 	limitation 	in 	the 	same
contractual 	provision. 	It 	would 	seem 	reasonable 	that 	if 	a
particular 	principal 	had 	a 	continuing 	practice 	of 	accepting 	and
including 	teacher 	proposed 	items 	on 	the 	agenda 	and 	then
refusing 	to permit 	any 	subsequent 	introduction 	or 	discussion 	of
such 	item, 	an argument 	could 	be made 	that 	the 	intent 	of 	the
contractual 	section was 	being violated. 	In 	this 	case, 	we have
no evidence 	of 	such a practice. 	On the basis 	of 	a one-time
only circumstance 	it 	is determined that Mr. 	Glass"
interpretation 	is 	without 	sufficient 	support 	in 	the 	applicable
contractual 	language 	so as 	to 	deem his 	"agenda" 	grievance
meritorious.
The 	Charging 	Party's 	"released 	time" 	grievance 	hinges 	on
his 	interpretation 	of 	the 	following 	contractual 	language: 	"if
32

a 	grievance meeting 	is 	scheduled 	during 	duty hours, 	reasonable
employee released time 	. 	. 	. 	without loss of salary 	. 	. 	. 	will
be provided to the grievant, 	to a UTLA representative 	. 	. 	. 	and
to 	any 	witness 	who 	attends 	by 	mutual 	agreement 	. . . "
Once 	Principal 	Koster 	scheduled 	the 	meeting 	for 	2:15 	p.m.,
a nonduty time for Mr. 	Glass, 	it 	is Mr. 	Glass 1 contention that
the 	District 	was 	contractually 	bound 	to provide 	a 	substitute
for 	any 	representative 	of 	his 	choosing 	that 	would 	otherwise 	be
unable 	to 	attend 	the meeting. 	There 	are 	a 	number 	of
contractual 	difficulties with 	that 	interpretation. 	First, 	the
contract 	specifically 	states 	that 	the 	grievance 	meetings 	will
"be 	scheduled 	so 	as 	to minimize 	interference with 	regular
employee 	duties." 	Secondly, 	the 	contract 	only provides 	release
time to a 	limited number of persons: 	(a) 	grievant, 	(b) 	a UTLA
representative, 	and 	(c) 	any witness who attends by mutual
agreement. 	Mr. 	Doerr did not 	fall 	into 	either 	of 	the 	first 	two
categories 	and 	there 	is 	a 	serious 	question as 	to whether 	or 	not
Mr. 	Doerr was a 	representative or a witness. 	Mr. 	Glass was
assertively 	vague 	on 	this 	issue 	and 	called 	him 	both 	a
representative 	and 	a witness.
If he was a non-UTLA representative, 	and Mr. 	Glass
specifically 	identified 	him 	in 	the 	written 	grievance 	as 	"my
representative, 	Mr. 	Jack Doerr," 	he would have no 	right 	to
release 	time under 	this 	section. 	If 	he was a witness, 	an---d 	if
the District 	agreed 	to his 	attendance, 	he may 	have been
33

entitled to 	release time. 	However, 	it 	is 	logical 	to assume
that the District, 	through Mr. 	Koster, 	in rescheduling the
meeting 	from 	2:15 p.m. 	to 	3:15 p.m., 	was making 	its 	"agreement1•
conditional 	upon 	Mr. 	Doerr 	attending 	the meeting 	during 	his
nonduty 	hours.
Charging 	Party 	continually 	stressed 	that 	UTLA's
interpretation 	of 	the 	applicable 	contractual 	provisions 	would
render 	these provisions meaningless. 	It 	is 	determined 	that
this position 	is 	inaccurate. 	UTLA's position 	regarding 	the
agenda 	controversy 	acknowledges 	that 	an 	individual 	teacher 	has
a 	right 	to 	have 	a 	limited 	degree 	of 	access 	into 	the 	agenda 	of
faculty 	meetings. 	Its position 	regarding 	the 	representation
grievance 	acknowledges 	the 	dual 	nature 	of 	the 	designation 	and
attendance of 	a witness. 	Neither 	of UTLA's positions 	renders
any part 	of 	the 	contract 	inoperative 	or meaningless.
It must 	also 	be 	stressed 	that 	a union's 	interpretation 	of
the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	is 	entitled 	to 	substantial
weight 	in determining whether 	the 	grievance 	is 	unmeritorious.
Freeman 	v. 	O'Neal 	Steel 	Company 	(5th Cir. 	1980) 	609 F.2d 1123
[103 	LRRM 	2398].
The 	Courts 	and 	the 	NLRB 	have 	also 	held 	that 	if 	the 	union's
interpretation 	of 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	is
reasonable, 	the union is 	under 	no duty to 	investigate 	the
grievance 	and process 	it. 	Washington-Baltimore Newspaper
Guild, 	Local 	35 Communication Workers of America 	(1979) 	239
NLRB 1321.
34

Therefore, 	an examination of 	the grievances 	vis-a-vis 	the
contractual 	language 	they 	are 	based 	on 	results 	in 	a 	conclusion
that 	the 	grievances 	are without merit.
We 	have 	a 	number 	of 	additional 	conflicts 	as 	yet
unresolved. 	Attorney Garber 	stated 	that 	she was 	told 	by
Mr. 	Segure 	that 	the 	"agenda" 	grievance had merit but 	the
"released 	time" 	grievance 	did 	not. 	Glass 	testified 	that 	he 	was
told by Mr. 	Segure 	the exact 	opposite was true. 	Mr. 	Segure
admits 	he 	may 	have 	commented 	favorably 	on 	any 	given 	grievance
when 	discussing 	them over 	the phone, 	his 	decisions 	are 	no
better 	than 	the 	information given 	to 	him, 	but 	that 	once 	he
actually 	saw 	the 	grievances 	in writing 	he made 	his 	decision
that 	neither 	grievance was 	meritorious. 	The 	conflict 	between
the 	three 	witnesses 	need 	not 	be 	resolved by means 	of 	a
credibility 	determination. 	All 	three 	witnesses 	are 	credible
witnesses 	who 	testified 	as 	to what 	they 	saw and 	heard, 	or 	at
least 	what 	they 	thought 	they 	saw and 	heard. 	Testimony
regarding 	statements 	made 	in 	admittedly 	adversarial 	telephone
conversations 	with 	no mechanical 	means 	of 	transcription 	is 	not
the most 	reliable manner 	of 	deriving 	evidence 	in a 	formal
hearing. 	In other words, 	interested parties, 	although
testifying 	in a credible manner, 	sometimes 	have a 	tendency to
hear 	what 	they 	want 	to 	hear 	and 	remember 	what 	they 	want 	to
remember 	regarding 	such matters. 	There 	is 	a 	continuing
conflict 	but 	the 	evidence 	proffered 	was 	not 	sufficiently
35

conclusive 	so 	as 	to 	support 	a 	determination 	that 	any 	one 	of
these 	witnesses 	had 	greater 	credibility 	than 	any 	other.
It 	is 	determined 	that 	UTLA processed Mr. 	Glass1 requests
for 	representation 	in 	the 	same manner 	as 	it 	would process 	any
request 	for 	representation 	by 	any 	other 	member 	of 	the
bargaining 	unit. 	It 	made 	a 	reasonable 	determination 	that 	the
grievances 	were 	without 	merit 	and 	they 	declined 	to 	provide
representation 	at 	the grievance procedure 	steps. 	It 	is 	further
determined 	that 	such 	decisions 	were 	not 	arbitrary,
discriminatory 	nor 	made 	in 	bad 	faith 	and 	therefore 	did 	not
violate 	UTLA's 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation.
(2) 	Representation Denial 	at 	Arbitration Level
The 	second 	allegation 	of 	wrongdoing 	to 	be 	inferred 	from
Mr. 	Glass 1 charges 	deal 	with UTLA's 	decision not 	to take 	the
case 	to 	arbitration. 	The 	above 	exhaustive 	discussion 	regarding
the merits 	of 	the grievances 	is 	applicable 	to 	this 	discussion
as well. 	If 	the grievances 	are not 	meritorious, 	in the
reasonable 	interpretation 	of 	the 	exclusive 	representative,
there 	is 	no duty to 	take 	them to arbitration. 	The decision 	to
decline 	to permit Mr. 	Glass 	to 	take 	the matters 	to arbitration
is 	a 	decision 	uniquely within 	the province 	of 	the 	union.
Employees 	have 	traditionally 	been 	given 	certain 	individual
rights 	vis-a-vis 	the grievance procedure, 	but 	a contractual
arbitration 	procedure 	belongs 	exclusively 	to 	the 	contracting
union. 	The 	union 	has 	reasonably 	determined 	that 	the 	underlying
36

grievances 	have 	no merit. 	It 	is 	therefore determined 	that
there was 	no 	violation 	of 	the 	union's 	duty 	of 	fair
representation when 	it 	chose 	not 	to make 	its 	arbitration
procedure 	available 	to 	an 	individual 	employee 	to pursue 	such
grievance(s).
It 	is 	further 	determined 	that 	UTLA's 	decision 	not 	to 	take
such 	grievances 	to 	arbitration was 	based 	on 	the merits 	of 	the
grievances 	and was 	not 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory 	or 	made 	in bad
faith.
C. 	Implied 	Allegations 	Regarding 	UTLA's 	Policy 	Regarding
Representation 	of 	Nonmembers
There 	were 	a 	number 	of 	additional 	allegations 	and 	some
rather 	specific 	testimony 	that 	UTLA has 	or 	had 	a policy 	of
nonrepresentation 	for 	all 	nonmembers 	or 	at 	least 	required 	such
nonmembers 	to 	pay 	directly 	for 	any 	representational 	services.
The 	testimony proffered 	with 	regard 	to 	such 	allegations 	was
elicited 	from three witnesses. 	These 	three witnesses, 	all
teachers with the 	LAUSD, 	testified as 	follows:
Jack 	Doerr 	is 	a 	teacher 	at 	Van Nuys High School, 	a member
of 	the 	Teaching 	Faculty Association, 	and 	a nonmember 	of 	the
UTLA. 	He 	testified 	that 	he was 	involved 	in a 	conflict with 	his
principal 	three 	or 	fours years 	ago 	and went 	to UTLA
representative Reilly 	for 	help. 	He was 	told 	initially by
Roger 	Segure 	that 	he 	had 	a 	good 	grievance 	but 	was 	turned 	over
to 	another 	UTLA 	representative. 	After 	discussing 	the 	specifics
with 	this 	new 	representative 	he was 	told 	he 	did 	not 	have 	a
37

meritorious 	grievance. 	He 	admitted 	there was 	no 	contractual
breach 	involved. 	He 	nevertheless 	believed he was 	denied
representation 	because 	of 	his 	nonmembership 	status.
Robert P. 	Coutts 	is a Van Nuys High School teacher, 	the
local 	site 	vice 	representative 	for 	UTLA, 	and a member 	of 	the
Teaching 	Faculty Association. 	He 	testified 	that 	he 	"believes
UTLA 	is 	somewhat 	reluctant 	to 	represent 	nonmembers." 	He 	bases
this 	belief 	on 	general 	hearsay.
Morton S. 	Sirkus 	is 	a teacher 	at Cleveland 	High School 	in
the 	LAUSD, 	a 	chapter 	chairperson 	for 	UTLA at 	his 	site 	and 	is
also 	on 	the 	city UTLA House 	of 	Representatives. 	He 	previously
was 	a Van Nuys 	High School 	teacher. 	He was 	under 	the
impression 	that 	UTLA did 	not 	represent 	nonmembers, 	and 	if 	they
did, 	the nonmember 	had 	to pay his/her 	own expenses. 	He called
UTLA 	shortly 	before 	the 	hearing 	and 	determined 	that 	his
impression was 	incorrect, 	at 	least 	with 	regard 	to present
policy.
To whatever 	extent 	the 	evidence 	accuses Respondent 	UTLA of
violating 	its 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation by a 	general 	refusal
to 	represent 	nonmembers 	or 	to 	charge 	them 	for 	representational
services, 	it 	is 	determined 	that 	such charge fails 	for 	lack 	of
proof.
CONCLUSION
Based 	on 	all 	of 	the 	foregoing 	it 	is 	specifically 	determined
that 	the 	Los Angeles 	Unified 	School 	District 	has 	not 	violated
38

sections 	3543.5(a) 	or 	(c) 	and 	that 	the United Teachers-
Los Angeles 	has 	not 	violated 	sections 	3543.6(b) 	or 	3544.9. 	All
other 	sections 	referred 	to 	in 	the 	charge 	are 	enforceable
through 	these 	sections. 	It 	is 	determined 	that 	all 	charges
filed 	by 	the 	Charging 	Party 	in 	this 	case 	are without 	merit 	and
should 	be 	dismissed.
PROPOSED 	ORDER
Based 	on the 	foregoing 	statement 	of 	facts, 	conclusions 	of
law and 	the 	entire 	record, 	the 	unfair practice 	charges 	and
companion complaints 	in Case Nos. 	LA-CE-1622 and LA-CO-245,
Robert 	Glass 	v. 	Los 	Angeles Unified 	School 	District 	and
Robert 	Glass 	v. 	United 	Teachers-Los Angeles 	are 	hereby
DISMISSED.
Pursuant 	to California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order 	shall
become final on November 	19, 	1984, 	unless a party files a
timely 	statement 	of 	exceptions. 	In accordance with 	the 	rules,
the 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	should 	identify 	by page 	citation 	or
exhibit 	number 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	record 	relied 	upon 	for 	such
exceptions. 	See California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
Part 	III, 	section 	32300. 	Such statement 	of exceptions and
supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	actually 	received 	by 	the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in
Sacramento before 	the close of 	business 	(5:00 p.m.) 	on
November 	19, 	1984, 	or 	sent by telegraph or 	certified United
39

States 	mail, 	postmarked 	not 	later 	than 	the 	last 	day 	for 	filing
in 	order 	to 	be 	timely 	filed. 	See 	California Administrative
Code, 	title 8, 	part III, 	section 32135. 	Any statement of
exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served 	concurrently
with 	its 	filing 	upon 	each party 	to 	this proceeding. 	Proof 	of
service 	shall 	be 	filed 	with 	the Board 	itself. 	See 	California
Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	part 	III, 	section 32300 and 	32305.
Dated: 	October 	29, 	1984
,Alle '
n 	R. 	Link
Administrative 	Law 	Judge
40
I