Los Angeles Unified School District (PERB 0464E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

GUST SIAMIS,
Charging Party, Case No. LA-CE-1163
Ve PERB Decision No. 464

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, December 18, 1984

Respondent.

Appearances: Gust Siamis, on his own behalf; O'Melveny &
Myers, by Richard N. Fisher and Joel M. Grossman for the
Los Angeles Unified School District.

Before Hesse, Chairperson; Jaeger and Morgenstern, Members.
DECISION

HESSE, Chairperson: Gust Siamis appeals the attached
proposed decision of a Public Employment Relations Board
administrative law judge granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss his charge alleging a violation of section 3543.5(a) of
the Educational Employment Relations Act.

We have reviewed the hearing officer's decision in light of
the appeal and, finding it free from prejudicial error, adopt
it as the decision of the Board itself.

ORDER
The unfair practice charge and complaint in Case

No. LA-CE-1163 are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Members Jaeger and Morgenstern joined in this Decision.

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
GUST 	SIAMIS,
Charging 	Party,
v.
LOS 	ANGELES 	UNIFIED SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
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)
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____________________ )
Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	LA-CE-1163
PROPOSED DECISION
(3/8/84)
Appearances: 	Gust Siamis, 	on 	behalf 	of 	himself; 	Joel 	Grossman,
Esq. 	(O'Melveny 	& Myers), 	for 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School
District.
Before 	Barbara E. 	Miller, 	Administrative 	Law Judge.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. 	The Board's 	Decision
On May 	20, 	1983, 	the 	Public Employment 	Relations 	Board
(hereinafter 	PERB 	or Board) 	issued 	its 	Decision 	in Los Angeles
Unified 	School District 	(5/20/83) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	311, 	and
remanded 	the 	instant 	case 	to 	the 	General 	Counsel 	for 	further
processing 	consistent 	with 	its 	Decision.I 	In 	that 	Decision,
the Board 	reversed 	the 	Proposed 	Decision 	of 	the Administrative
Law Judge 	and 	held 	that 	the 	Unfair 	Practice Charge 	filed 	by
lDecision No. 	311 	concerned 	four 	cases 	which 	had 	been
consolidated 	for 	the 	formal 	hearing. 	In 	its 	decision, 	the
dismissal 	of 	the 	other 	three 	cases 	was 	sustained. 	Recently, 	in
Los Angeles 	Unified School 	District 	(2/23/84) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	311a, 	the 	Board 	denied 	a 	request 	for_reconsideration.

Gust Siamis 	(hereinafter 	Mr. 	Siamis 	or 	Charging 	Party) 	was 	not
barred 	by 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	provision 	set 	forth 	in
subsection 	3541.S(a) 	of 	the 	Educational Employment Relations
Act 	(hereinafter 	EERA) .2
B. 	The 	Case 	on Remand
Subsequent 	to 	the 	issuance 	of 	the 	PERB 	Decision No. 	311,
this 	case 	was 	transferred 	to 	the Office 	of Administrative 	Law
and 	an 	Informal 	Conference 	was 	scheduled 	and 	held 	on August 	19,
1983, 	before Administrative Law Judge 	W. 	Jean Thomas. 	The
parties 	were 	unable 	to 	resolve 	their 	differences 	and 	the 	case
was 	set 	for 	formal 	hearing.
Before 	commencing 	the 	formal 	hearing, 	a 	Pre-hearing
Conference 	was 	held 	on September 	14, 	1983. 	At 	that 	time, 	the
parties 	set 	forth 	their 	respective 	positions 	and 	were 	advised
of 	the 	rules 	which 	would 	govern 	the 	conduct 	of 	the 	hearing.
The 	parties 	were 	advised 	and 	agreed 	that 	the 	issue 	to 	be
decided 	was 	whether 	Mr. 	Siamis 	received 	an 	unsatisfactory
evaluation 	and 	was 	transferred 	from 	the 	Union Avenue 	Elementary
School 	because 	he 	engaged 	in 	protected 	activity. 	Mr. 	Siamis
was 	advised 	that 	he 	might 	be 	required 	to 	first 	present 	evidence
that 	he 	engaged 	in 	protected 	activity, 	next 	that 	the 	District
knew 	of 	that 	activity, 	and 	then, 	and 	only 	then, 	evidence
2The EERA 	is 	codified 	beginning 	at 	Government 	Code
section 	3540, 	et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all
statutory 	references 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code.
2

regarding 	the 	alleged 	inaccuracies 	or 	improprieties 	in 	the
unsatisfactory 	evaluation 	itself. 	Subsequently, 	by 	letter
dated September 	15, 	1983, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	was 	advised 	that 	he 	would
indeed 	be 	required 	to 	present 	his 	evidence 	in 	that 	order.
During 	the 	course 	of 	the 	Pre-hearing 	Conference, 	the
District 	filed 	a Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	the 	case 	on 	the 	grounds 	that
the 	District, 	by way 	of 	settlement, 	had 	offered 	to 	provide
Mr. 	Siamis 	essentially 	all 	the 	relief 	he 	would 	receive 	if 	he
were 	to 	prevail 	in 	the 	evidentiary 	hearing. 	The 	District's
Motion 	to Dismiss 	was 	taken 	under 	submission.
On 	the 	first 	date 	set 	for 	hearing, 	September 	26, 	1983, 	in
order 	to 	evaluate 	whether 	the 	District 	was 	indeed 	offering 	to
provide 	Mr. 	Siamis 	with 	all 	the 	affirmative 	relief 	he 	might
gain 	from PERB, 	he 	was 	asked 	to 	clarify 	the 	remedy 	he 	sought.
Mr. 	Siamis 	made 	it 	clear 	that 	he 	wanted 	the 	following 	remedies:
(1) 	removal 	from 	his 	personnel 	file 	of 	any 	derogatory material
relating 	to 	the Notice 	of 	Unsatisfactory 	Service; 	(2) 	the
option 	of 	transferring 	back 	to 	the 	school 	where 	he 	had 	served
prior 	to 	receipt 	of 	the 	Notice; 	and 	(3) 	a 	finding 	that 	the
District 	was 	guilty 	of 	discriminating 	against 	him.
The 	District 	indicated 	that 	it 	would 	remove 	all 	the
material 	from Mr. 	Siamis' 	file 	and 	that 	it 	would 	post 	a 	notice
that 	it 	would 	not 	discriminate 	against Mr. 	Siamis 	or 	other
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of 	protected 	rights. 	In
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other 	respects, 	the 	District 	would 	not 	acquiesce 	in Mr. 	Siamis'
demands 	and, 	accordingly, 	the 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	was 	denied.3
The 	formal 	hearing 	was 	conducted 	on September 	26, 	27,
and 	28, 	1983. 	It was 	scheduled 	to 	reconvene 	on 	several 	dates
thereafter. 	However, 	as 	set 	forth 	in 	greater 	detail 	in
Section 	II, 	Findings 	of 	Fact 	Relevant 	to 	the 	Conduct 	of 	the
Hearing, 	infra, 	the 	case 	did 	not 	proceed 	as 	scheduled.
On November 	22, 	1983, 	the 	parties 	were 	sent 	a 	letter
notifying 	them 	that 	after 	the Administrative 	Law Judge 	received
the 	transcript 	of 	the 	proceedings, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	could 	file 	a
brief 	or 	position 	paper 	showing 	cause 	why 	the 	case 	should 	not
be 	dismissed; 	the 	Respondent 	would 	also 	have 	an 	opportunity 	to
submit 	written 	support 	for 	its 	position. 	The 	Charging 	Party
did 	not 	avail 	himself 	of 	the 	opportunity 	to 	show 	cause 	why 	the
case 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed. 	A letter 	setting 	forth
Respondent's 	position was 	timely 	filed 	and 	received 	on
February 	8, 	1984, 	at 	which 	time 	the 	case 	was 	submitted 	for
decision.
II. 	FINDINGS 	OF 	FACT 	RELEVANT 	TO
THE 	CONDUCT 	OF THE 	HEARING
The 	formal 	hearing 	convened 	on September 	26, 	1983. 	Despite
some 	difficulty 	with 	the 	Charging 	Party's 	identification 	of 	his
3Neither 	the 	rules 	of 	the 	Board 	nor 	its 	decisions 	provide
guidance 	regarding 	under 	what 	circumstances, 	if 	any, 	an
Administrative 	Law Judge 	may 	accept 	a 	settlement 	and 	dismiss
the 	charge 	over 	the 	objection 	of 	the 	Charging 	Party.
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exhibits 	and 	some 	dispute 	regarding 	the 	Charging 	Party's
presentation 	of 	evidence, 	the 	case 	proceeded, 	although 	not
always 	in 	an 	orderly 	fashion. 	The 	Charging 	Party 	called
Dolores 	Renari, 	the 	Principal 	of 	Union Avenue Elementary
School, 	and 	William J. 	Sharp, 	the 	District's 	former
Superintendent 	in charge 	of 	the 	Office 	of 	Staff 	Relations. 	The
hearing 	reconvened 	on September 	27 	and Mr. 	Siamis 	recalled
Dolores 	Renari 	and 	also 	called 	Robert 	E. 	Searle, 	who 	had 	served
as 	the 	Director 	of 	the Teacher 	Integration Unit 	for 	the
District 	in 	the 	school 	year 	1978-1979.
On September 	28, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	called Sidney A. 	Thompson 	to
testify 	regarding 	events 	which 	occurred 	when 	he 	was 	the
Principal 	of 	Crenshaw High School 	in 	1974. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	also
called Barbara E. 	LaBranch, 	who 	is 	a 	Coordinator, 	Staff
Relations, 	for 	the 	District, 	and Theodore 	F. 	Johnson, 	a 	teacher
at 	Union Avenue 	Elementary School 	when 	Mr. 	Siamis 	received 	his
Notice 	of 	Unsatisfactory Service. 	The 	hearing 	did 	not 	conclude
on September 	28, 	1983, 	but 	at 	the 	close 	of 	that 	day 	it was
continued 	to October 	24, 	25, 	and 	26.
At 	the 	close 	of 	the 	hearing 	on September 	28, 	1983, 	the
undersigned 	issued 	an Order 	regarding 	the October 	hearing.
That 	verbal 	order 	was 	confirmed 	by 	a 	written 	Order 	dated
September 	29, 	1983, 	which 	provided 	as 	follows:
1. 	The 	Charging 	Party will 	provide 	a
complete 	package 	of 	his 	exhibits 	for 	the
witnesses;
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2. 	The 	Charging 	Party 	will 	have 	a 	list 	of
his 	exhibits 	or 	be 	sufficiently 	familiar
with 	them 	so 	that 	he 	can 	refer 	to 	them 	by
their 	designated 	numbers 	during 	the
examination 	of 	witnesses;
3. 	Any 	subpoenas 	to 	be 	requested 	by 	either
party 	will 	be 	submitted 	to 	the 	Los Angeles
Regional 	Office 	of 	the 	Public Employment
Relations Board 	no 	later 	than 	5:00 	p.m. 	on
October 	12, 	1983;
4. 	Any 	subpoenas 	to 	be 	served 	by 	either
party will 	be 	served 	no 	later 	than
October 	17, 	1983;
5. 	If 	the 	Respondent 	intends 	to 	move 	to
quash 	any 	subpoena, 	a 	reasonable 	effort 	will
be 	made 	to 	notify 	the 	undersigned 	no 	later
than October 	20, 	1983;
6. 	The 	Charging 	Party will 	notify 	the
undersigned 	and 	the 	Respondent 	of 	the
witnesses 	he 	intends 	to 	call 	and 	the 	order
of 	such 	witnesses 	no 	later 	than October 	20,
1983; 	and
7. 	When 	the 	hearing 	commences, 	the 	Charging
Party must 	be 	prepared 	to 	examine 	his
witnesses; 	no 	delays 	or 	continuances 	for
further 	preparation 	will 	be 	allowed.
[Emphasis 	added.]
On October 	13, 	1983, 	the 	Board 	itself 	received 	a 	document
from Mr. 	Siamis 	entitled:
Appeal 	of 	Hearing 	Officer's 	(Miller)
continuance, 	3 day Hearings 	on Motion(s)
(other 	than 	the 	Unfair 	- 	as 	remanded 	by The
Board) 	and 	Rulings 	on 	Interlocutory Matters;
Request 	for 	Continuance 	Date 	Extension 	until
said Matters 	are 	Ruled Upon 	and 	Clearly
defined 	in writing 	prior 	to 	re-convening; 	&
Request 	for 	Hearing 	Officer MILLER
replacement 	with 	other 	than 	a 	Los Angeles
based 	or 	Smith, 	designee; 	and Motions.
After 	citing 	his 	numerous 	objections 	to 	the 	conduct 	of 	the
hearing, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	made 	the 	following 	motions:
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Motion 	1 	Mr. 	Siamis 	Motions 	that 	Grossman
be 	ordered 	to 	attempt 	to 	quash 	any 	subpoenas
3 	days 	after 	first 	filed 	with PERB, 	unless
improperly 	served 	by 	Siamis.
Motion 	2 	GS 	moves 	that H.O. 	Miller 	Declare
what 	step 	••• 	the 	Hearing 	has 	now 	reached
so 	that Siamis 	can 	prepare 	his 	case 	& proper
witnesses 	in order.
Motion 	3 	Mr. 	Joel 	Grossman 	be 	held 	in
contempt 	for: 	{a) 	Failure 	to 	comply 	with
PERB 	32646 	in 	obtaining 	surprise 	dismissal,
{b) 	Failure 	to 	give 	Mr. 	Siamis 	advance
notice 	of 	his 	intended 	non-compliance 	with
Siamis 	pre-trial 	courtesy 	letter 	of 	6/4/81
re: 	LA 	CE 	1163.
Motion 	4 	and 	Request 	- 	that H. 	Officer
Miller 	be 	replaced 	with 	a Board member, 	or
some 	designee 	{not 	biased 	to O'Melveny 	&
Myers 	nor 	the LAUSD 	size/"stature") 	other
than 	a 	member 	of 	the 	LA 	Region 	{sic) 	Office
or 	a 	designee 	of 	W.P. 	Smith.
Motion 	5 	That 	the 	Reconvening 	Date 	of
10/24/83 	& subpoena 	order 	dates 	be 	suspended
until 	the 	Matters 	cited 	herein 	are 	resolved,
ruled 	upon, 	& 	defined 	in 	writing 	so 	as 	to
allow 	the 	Plaintiff 	his 	right 	to 	establish
proof 	of 	guilt 	as 	per 	32178 	and 	3543.5
without 	disruption.
On October 	12, 	1983, 	the 	undersigned 	communicated 	with 	the
parties, 	indicating 	the 	disposition 	of 	Mr. 	Siamis' 	"Appeal." 	A
letter 	of 	that 	date 	stated:
To 	the 	extent 	the Appeal 	is 	filed 	pursuant
to 	California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32200, 	I 	do 	not 	join 	in.
the 	charging 	party's 	request 	that 	the 	Board
itself 	rule 	on matters 	raised 	in 	the
Appeal. 	I 	cannot 	join 	in 	the 	request
because 	pursuant 	to 	the 	requirements 	of
section 	32200, 	the 	issues 	involved 	are 	not
ones 	of 	law, 	the 	issues 	involved 	are 	not
controlling 	in 	the 	case 	and, 	an 	immediate
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appeal 	will 	not materially 	advance 	the
resolution 	of 	the 	case.
To 	the 	extent 	that 	the 	Appeal 	is 	construed
as 	a 	request 	for 	disqualification 	pursuant
to 	California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32155, 	the 	request 	is
denied. 	The 	request 	is 	denied 	because 	my
continuing 	to 	sit 	as 	the 	Administrative 	Law
Judge 	does 	not 	conflict 	with 	any 	of 	the
provisions 	of 	section 	32155(a) (1)-(4).
Moreover, 	I 	know 	of 	no 	facts 	which 	would
otherwise 	require 	disqualification 	and 	have
no 	reason 	to 	believe 	that 	the 	charging 	party
cannot 	receive 	fair 	and 	impartial
consideration 	of 	the 	case 	now 	pending •••
Given 	the 	rulings 	set 	forth 	herein, 	the
formal 	hearing 	will 	go 	forward 	on October
24, 	1983 	at 	9:00 	a.m. 	and 	all 	orders
pertaining 	to 	the 	hearing 	are 	still 	in
effect.
The 	hearing 	did 	reconvene 	on October 	24, 	1983. 	On 	that
date 	Mr. 	Siamis 	resumed 	his 	examination 	of 	Dolores 	Renari,
whose 	testimony 	had 	been 	interrupted 	to 	accommodate 	her
schedule 	and 	that 	of 	other 	witnesses. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	also 	called
Remedus 	L. 	Altar, 	and 	he 	recalled Theodore 	F. 	Johnson. 	On
October 	25, 	Dolores 	Renari 	was 	recalled, 	examined,
cross-examined 	and 	excused. 	On 	that 	date 	Evert E. 	Anderson
testified 	as 	did Frank 	I. 	Kampelman 	and Lora Drogin. 	On
October 	25, 	in 	an 	effort 	to 	conclude 	with 	the 	witnesses 	who 	had
been waiting 	several 	hours, 	the 	hearing 	proceeded 	until
approximately 	9:00 	p.m., 	at 	which 	time 	it was 	adjourned 	until
10:00 	a.m. 	the 	next 	day.
On October 	26, 	at 	9:50 	a.m., 	Mr. 	Siamis 	telephoned 	the
Los Angeles Regional Office 	of 	the 	Public Employment Relations
8

Board 	and 	spoke 	with Ethel Balkin, 	a 	senior 	legal 	secretary.
Mr. 	Siamis 	informed Ms. 	Balkin 	that 	he 	would 	not 	be 	attending
the 	hearing 	and 	that 	the 	undersigned 	was 	not 	to 	contact 	him 	by
telephone 	either 	at 	his 	school 	or 	at 	his 	home 	and 	that 	all
communications 	should 	be 	in 	writing. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	further
indicated, 	however, 	that 	he 	would 	try 	to 	reach 	the
Administrative Law Judge 	later 	that 	day. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	did
telephone 	the 	office 	at 	10:00 	a.m. 	and 	spoke 	with 	the
undersigned. 	He 	again 	indicated 	that 	he 	did 	not 	intend 	to
appear, 	he 	offered 	no 	explanation 	for 	his 	failure 	to 	appear,
and 	he 	declined 	to 	answer 	questions 	as 	to 	whether 	he 	was
requesting 	a 	continuance.
When 	the 	phone 	conversation 	with Mr. 	Siamis 	concluded, 	the
Respondent 	was 	present 	as 	was Joan Humphrey, 	the 	witness
Mr. 	Siamis 	had 	requested 	who 	was 	voluntarily 	produced 	by 	the
District. 	The Respondent 	was 	advised 	by 	the 	undersigned, 	on
the 	record, 	that Mr. 	Siamis 	would 	not 	attend 	the 	hearing, 	but
he 	would 	be 	given 	one 	final 	opportunity 	to 	indicate 	whether 	he
wished 	to 	proceed 	with 	his 	case. 	The 	Respondent 	made 	an 	oral
motion 	for 	dismissal, 	which 	subsequently 	was 	submitted 	in
writing 	and 	denied.
After 	the 	hearing 	adjourned, 	the 	undersigned 	sent
Mr. 	Siamis 	a 	letter 	outlining 	the 	events 	of 	the 	day 	and 	which
then 	stated 	as 	follows:
Notwithstanding 	your 	unexplained 	failure 	to
proceed 	at 	the 	date 	and 	time 	scheduled 	for
9

the 	hearing, 	you 	are 	being 	given 	one 	final
opportunity 	to 	indicate 	if 	you 	wish 	to 	put
on 	any 	further 	evidence 	in 	support 	of 	your
affirmative 	case. 	A form 	upon 	which 	you
should 	indicate 	your 	intentions 	is 	enclosed
and 	must 	be 	received 	in 	this 	office 	not
later 	than 	5:00 	p.m. 	on November 	2, 	1983.
If 	you 	do 	not 	return 	the 	form, 	or 	if 	you
return 	the 	form 	with 	the 	"no" 	box 	checked, 	I
will 	conclude 	that 	you 	have 	elected 	not 	to
put 	on 	any 	additional 	evidence 	in 	support 	of
your 	affirmative 	case 	and 	that 	you 	have
rested 	your 	case.
On November 	1, 	1983, 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Regional 	Office 	received
from Mr. 	Siamis 	the 	form 	described 	above. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	checked
the 	box 	indicating 	that 	he 	was 	requesting 	that 	the 	formal
hearing 	be 	reconvened 	at 	the 	earliest 	possible 	date 	so 	that 	he
could 	put 	on 	additional 	evidence 	in 	support 	of 	his 	affirmative
case, 	but 	he 	qualified 	that 	statement 	with 	the 	following:
While 	I 	have 	several 	more 	witnesses 	to
present, 	in 	light 	of 	what 	appears 	to 	be
extreme 	rigid 	limitations 	on 	witnesses 	&
their 	testimony, 	harassment, 	bias, 	and 	an
excessive 	use 	of 	technical 	court 	language~
techniques 	to 	create 	disruption 	of 	my 	case,
I 	will 	rest 	my 	case, 	UNLESS 	Mr. 	Grossman 	has
a 	case 	he 	intends 	to 	present. 	IF 	SO, 	then 	I
shall 	be 	available, 	but 	I 	must 	then 	first 	be
allowed 	to 	continue 	and 	complete 	my 	case
prior 	to 	his.
After 	receiving Mr. 	Siamis' 	communication, 	the 	undersigned
contacted Mr. 	Grossman 	who 	indicated 	that, 	although 	he 	had 	not
received 	a 	copy 	of Mr. 	Siamis' 	communication, 	the 	Respondent
would 	rest 	and 	not 	put 	on 	evidence 	if 	Mr. 	Siamis 	rested. 	That
conversation was 	commemorated 	by 	a 	subsequent 	letter.
10

Notwithstanding 	the 	position 	of 	the 	parties, 	on November 	2,
1983, 	the 	undersigned 	sent 	a 	letter 	to Mr. 	Siamis, 	which 	stated
as 	follows:
As 	I 	understand 	your 	communication of
October 	28, 	1983, 	you 	have 	additional
evidence 	and 	wish 	to 	present 	additional
evidence 	in 	support 	of 	your 	affirmative
case. 	However, 	because 	of 	your 	expressed
dissatisfaction 	with 	the 	conduct 	of 	the
hearing, 	you 	are 	prepared 	to 	waive 	the 	right
I 	have 	granted 	you 	to 	present 	additional
evidence 	if 	the 	Respondent 	will 	waive 	its
right 	to 	present 	rebuttal 	evidence 	to 	the
case 	you 	have 	presented 	thus 	far. 	The
Respondent 	has 	advised me 	by 	telephone, 	to
be 	followed 	by 	a 	letter, 	that 	it 	is 	prepared
to 	waive 	its 	right. 	Accordingly. 	based 	upon
your 	communication, 	I 	could 	find 	that 	you
have 	rested 	your 	case.
Nevertheless, 	I 	am 	reluctant 	to 	make 	that
finding 	before 	again 	reassuring 	you 	that 	I
know 	of 	no 	reason 	why 	you 	will 	not 	have 	fair
and 	impartial 	consideration 	of 	your 	case 	if
you 	elect 	to 	proceed. 	Therefore, 	please
advise me 	by 	telephone 	or 	in 	writing, 	not
later 	than 	5:00 	p.m. 	on November 	9, 	1983,
whether 	or 	not 	you 	are 	waiving 	your 	right 	to
proceed 	with 	the 	hearing. 	If 	you 	elect 	to
waive 	that 	right, 	I 	will 	close 	the 	record
and 	advise 	the 	parties 	of 	the 	deadlines 	for
the 	filing 	of 	post-hearing 	briefs. 	If 	you
elect 	to 	exercise 	the 	right 	to 	proceed, 	the
hearing 	will 	be 	reconvened 	on November 	15,
1983, 	along 	lines 	consistent 	with 	the
attached Notice.
In order 	to 	avoid 	any 	further 	delay 	in 	the 	processing 	of 	the
instant 	case, 	a 	Notice 	of 	Hearing Reconvened 	and Orders 	was
sent 	to 	the 	parties 	on November 	2, 	1983. 	That Notice 	provided
as 	follows:
For 	purposes 	of 	the 	reconvened 	hearing, 	the
following 	rules, 	in 	addition 	to 	those
previously 	set 	forth 	shall 	apply.
11

1. 	The 	Charging 	Party must 	be 	prepared 	to
call 	his 	first 	witness 	at 	9:00 	a.m. 	when 	the
hearing 	reconvenes;
2. 	Any 	subpoenas 	to 	be 	issued 	should 	be
submitted 	to 	this 	office 	so 	as 	to 	allow
reasonable 	time 	for 	service 	on 	the 	parties
to 	be 	subpoenaed 	and 	to 	provide 	the 	District
with 	reasonable 	time 	to make 	substitutions,
if 	necessary;
3. 	Respondent 	will 	be 	informed 	of 	the 	order
in 	which 	witnesses 	will 	be 	called 	no 	later
than November 	10, 	1983, 	so 	that 	the
Respondent 	can make 	arrangement 	for 	those
witnesses, 	who~ 	subject 	to 	previous
agreements, 	will 	appear 	without 	being
subpoenaed.
4. 	Absent 	extraordinary 	circumstances, 	no
further 	continuances 	or 	delays 	will 	be
allowed. 	[Emphasis 	added.]
Late 	in 	the 	afternoon 	of November 	9, 	1983, 	Mr. 	Siamis
contacted 	the 	undersigned 	and 	indicated 	that 	he 	wanted 	to 	go
ahead 	with 	the 	hearing 	and 	agreed 	that 	he 	would 	appear 	at
9:00 	a.m. 	on November 	15, 	1983. 	During 	the 	course 	of 	the
conversation, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	indicated 	that 	he 	wanted 	to 	call 	as
his 	witnesses 	Dolores 	Renari, 	Howard 	Russell, 	and 	himself.
Mr. 	Siamis 	was 	advised 	that 	he 	had 	already 	called Ms. 	Renari,
that 	she 	had 	been 	examined, 	cross-examined 	and 	excused.
Mr. 	Siamis 	indicated 	that 	he 	wished 	to 	call 	her 	again 	in 	light
of 	the 	testimony of Lora Drogin 	during 	the 	formal 	hearing
conducted 	on October 	25, 	1983. 	Since 	the 	testimony 	given 	was
in 	response 	to 	questions 	asked 	by 	the 	undersigned, 	Mr. 	Siamis
was 	advised 	that 	he 	would 	be 	allowed 	to 	recall 	Ms. 	Renari 	for
12

that 	limited 	purpose 	only 	and 	that 	his 	next 	witness 	should 	be
available 	at 	9:30 	a.m. 	on November 	15, 	1983.
The 	next 	day, 	on November 	10, 	1983, 	the 	District 	advised
the 	undersigned 	that Ms. 	Renari 	was 	not 	available 	on
November 	15, 	and 	could 	not 	be 	produced 	for 	the 	hearing. 	When
this 	information 	was 	communicated 	to Mr. 	Siamis 	he 	indicated
that 	he 	would 	not 	attend 	the 	hearing. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	was 	advised
that Ms. 	Renari 	could 	be 	called 	on 	another 	day, 	if 	necessary,
and 	that 	the 	hearing 	would 	proceed 	at 	9:00 	a.m. 	on November 	15,
1983. 	Despite Mr. 	Siamis' 	insistence 	that 	there 	would 	be 	no
hearing 	without Ms. 	Renari, 	that 	he 	would 	not 	take 	the 	witness
stand 	until 	all 	her 	testimony 	had 	been 	concluded, 	and 	that 	the
Administrative Law Judge 	would 	have 	to 	select 	a 	different 	date
for 	the 	hearing, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	was 	advised 	repeatedly during 	the
course 	of 	three 	phone 	conversations 	that 	he 	was 	required 	to
appear 	at 	9:00 	a.m. 	on November 	15, 	1983.
On November 	15, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	failed 	to 	attend 	the 	hearing.
The 	Respondent 	appeared 	and 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	case 	for 	the
Charging 	Party's 	failure 	to 	proceed. 	The 	Respondent 	was
advised 	that 	the 	Administrative 	Law Judge 	would 	consider
whether 	or 	not 	to 	reach 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	case 	and 	notify 	the
parties. 	Dates 	were 	established 	for 	the 	filing 	of 	post-hearing
briefs 	and 	the 	hearing 	was 	adjourned.
On November 	22, 	1983, 	a 	letter 	was 	sent 	to Mr. 	Siamis
advising 	him 	that 	the 	undersigned 	did 	not 	intend 	to 	reach 	the
13

merits 	of 	his 	case 	and 	intended 	to 	dismiss 	the 	case 	because 	of
his 	failure 	to 	proceed. 	He 	was 	advised, 	however, 	that 	he 	would
be 	given 	40 	days 	after 	the 	receipt 	of 	the 	transcript 	by 	the
Administrative 	Law Judge 	to 	file 	a 	brief 	or 	position 	paper
showing 	cause 	why 	the 	case 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed.
III. 	CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
In Service Employees 	International Union, 	Local 	99, 	AFL-CIO
(5/18181) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	163, 	the Board 	upheld 	the 	dismissal
of 	an 	Unfair 	Practice 	Charge 	under 	circumstances 	similar 	to
those 	presented 	in 	the 	instant 	case. 	In 	that 	case, 	the
charging 	party 	first 	failed 	to 	appear 	on 	a 	scheduled 	day 	of
hearing 	because 	he 	insisted 	that 	the 	case 	set 	for 	hearing 	could
not 	be 	heard 	until 	a 	charge 	he 	had 	subsequently 	filed 	was
disposed 	of. 	Over 	objections 	from 	the 	respondent 	union, 	the
Administrative 	Law Judge 	refused 	to 	dismiss 	the 	Complaint.
Subsequently, 	the 	case 	was 	rescheduled 	for 	hearing 	and 	the
Administrative 	Law Judge 	cautioned 	both 	parties 	that 	sanctions
would 	be 	imposed 	if 	either 	failed 	to 	appear. 	When 	the 	charging
party 	failed 	to 	appear 	for 	the 	hearing, 	the 	union 	moved 	to
dismiss 	the 	case 	and 	the 	motion 	was 	granted. 	Although 	the
present 	case 	is 	not 	identical 	to 	Service Employees
International Union, 	et 	al., 	the 	cases 	are 	sufficiently 	similar
to 	warrant 	dismissal.
In 	addition 	to 	the 	Board's 	Decision, 	support 	for 	granting
the 	Respondent's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	is 	found 	in 	the 	Board's
14

Rules 	and Regulations. 	Section 	32170, 	California
Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8, 	part 	III, 	provides 	that 	"[t]he
Board 	agent 	conducting 	a 	hearing 	shall 	have 	the 	powers 	and
duties 	to: 	••• 	(d) 	regulate 	the 	course 	and 	conduct 	of 	the
hearing II 	Throughout 	the 	course 	of 	the 	hearing 	of 	the
instant 	case, 	the 	Charging 	Party 	tried 	to 	usurp 	the 	control
properly 	vested 	in 	the Administrative Law Judge. 	In 	regulating
the 	course 	and 	conduct 	of 	the 	hearing, 	it 	is 	often 	necessary 	to
take 	witnesses 	out 	of 	order, 	or 	to 	require 	that 	the 	Charging
Party 	first 	prove 	certain elements 	of 	the 	offense 	alleged.
Moreover, 	once 	a 	case 	is 	set 	for 	hearing, 	neither 	party 	can
unilaterally 	determine 	that 	the 	date 	is 	inappropriate 	or 	that
he 	doesn't 	like 	certain 	procedural 	rulings 	and 	therefore 	fail
to 	appear. 	By 	his 	unjustified 	failure 	to 	appear 	on 	two 	days 	of
scheduled 	hearing, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	prevented 	the 	presentation 	of 	his
case 	in 	addition 	to 	inconveniencing 	his 	own 	witnesses 	and 	the
District. 	In 	exercising 	the 	discretion 	vested 	in 	the
Administrative 	Law Judge, 	in 	order 	to 	regulate 	the 	conduct 	of
the 	hearing, 	it 	is 	determined 	that 	dismissal 	is 	the 	appropriate
result.
In 	addition, 	in 	both 	instances 	when 	he 	failed 	to 	appear,
the 	Charging 	Party 	failed 	to 	comply 	with 	section 	32205 	of 	the
Board's 	Rules 	and 	Regulations. 	That 	section 	provides 	as
follows:
Continuances. 	A party may 	file 	a 	request
for 	a 	continuance 	of 	the 	formal 	hearing 	no
15

later 	than 	five 	days 	before 	the 	hearing.
The 	request 	shall 	be 	in writing, 	signed 	by
the 	party 	or 	its 	agent, 	state 	the 	grounds
for 	the 	request, 	and 	state 	the 	position 	of
each 	party 	regarding 	the 	request. 	An 	oral
request 	or 	a 	request 	for 	continuance
submitted 	less 	than 	five 	days 	prior 	to 	the
hearing may 	be 	made 	only 	under 	unusual
circumstances. 	A request 	for 	a 	continuance
shall 	be 	granted 	only 	under 	unusual
circumstances 	and 	if 	the 	other 	party 	will
not 	be 	prejudiced 	thereby.
On October 	26 	Mr. 	Siamis 	did 	not 	request 	a 	continuance 	and
refused 	to 	respond 	to 	inquiries 	from 	the 	undersigned 	as 	to
whether 	he 	wanted 	a 	continuance. 	With 	respect 	to 	the 	hearing
scheduled 	for 	November 	15, 	even 	if 	one 	construes 	the 	Charging
Party's 	verbal 	protest 	to 	the 	hearing 	date 	as 	a 	request 	for 	a
continuance, 	grounds 	for 	a 	continuance 	did 	not 	exist 	and 	the
Charging 	Party 	was 	expressly 	told 	that 	a 	continuance 	would 	not
be 	granted.
The 	Charging 	Party objected 	to 	the 	hearing 	date 	and
requested 	a 	continuance 	because 	Dolores 	Renari 	would 	not 	be
available on 	the 	scheduled 	hearing 	date. 	Because 	she 	was 	not
available 	"as 	ordered 	by" 	the 	Charging 	Party, 	Mr. 	Siamis
complained 	that 	the 	hearing 	might 	take 	two 	days 	rather 	than 	one
and 	he 	objected 	to 	taking 	the 	witness 	stand 	himself 	before
Ms. 	Renari 	had 	concluded 	all 	of 	her 	testimony.
The 	position 	of 	the 	Charging 	Party 	was 	patently
unreasonable 	and 	did 	not 	constitute 	grounds 	for 	a 	continuance.
Ms. 	Renari 	had 	already 	testified 	during 	four 	days 	of 	the
hearing 	and 	she 	had 	been 	excused. 	Mr. 	Siamis 	was 	told 	that 	he
16

could 	recall 	her 	for 	the 	limited 	purpose 	of 	asking 	her
questions 	pertaining 	to 	some 	testimony 	elicited 	by 	the
Administrative Law Judge 	from Lora Drogin 	on 	the 	last 	day 	of
the 	hearing. 	For 	that 	purpose, 	Ms. 	Renari 	was 	not 	essential 	at
that 	juncture 	in 	the 	Charging 	Party's 	case. 	Moreover, 	given
that 	Mr. 	Siamis 	had 	already 	spent 	five 	days 	of 	hearing 	in 	the
presentation 	of 	his 	affirmative 	case, 	it 	was 	reasonable 	to
conclude 	that 	the 	hearing 	would 	extend 	beyond November 	15 	and
the 	Charging 	Party 	would 	have 	been 	able 	to 	put 	on Ms. 	Renari
even 	if 	the 	Respondent 	had 	concluded 	its 	case.
Finally, 	by 	analogy, 	the 	California Code 	of 	Civil Procedure
lends 	support 	to 	the 	decision 	to 	dismiss 	this 	case. 	Section
581 	provides:
An 	action 	may 	be 	dismissed 	in 	the 	following
cases:
3. 	By 	the 	court, 	when 	either 	party 	fails 	to
appear 	and 	the 	other 	party 	appears 	and 	asks
for 	the 	dismissal, 	•••
4. 	By 	the 	court, 	with 	prejudice 	to 	the
cause, 	when 	upon 	the 	trial 	and 	before 	the
final 	submission 	of 	the 	case, 	the 	plaintiff
abandons 	it.
In 	the 	present 	case, 	a 	court 	could 	exercise 	its 	discretion 	and
dismiss 	the 	action 	pursuant 	to 	either 	subsection 	3 or 	4. 	(See,
generally, 	O'Day 	v. 	Superior 	Court 	(1941) 	18 	Cal.2d 	540;
Campbell 	v. 	Security 	Pacific National Bank 	(1976) 	62 	Cal.App.3d
379; 	Souza v. 	Capital Co. 	(1963) 	220 	Cal.App.2d 	744.)
17

Moreover, 	in Souza 	and 	in Union Bond 	and Trust Company 	v. 	Mand
M Wood Working 	Company 	(1960) 	179 	Cal.App.2d 	673, 	the 	Courts 	of
Appeal 	noted 	that 	the 	power 	of 	a 	trial 	court 	to 	dismiss 	actions
for 	failure 	to 	prosecute 	is 	not 	contingent 	upon 	statute 	but
derives 	from 	the 	court's 	inherent 	power 	of 	control 	over 	its
proceedings. 	In 	a 	judicial 	forum 	or 	in 	the 	PERB's
quasi-judicial 	arena, 	discretion may 	properly 	be 	exercised 	to
dismiss 	the 	instant 	case.
A Charging 	Party who 	seeks 	to 	or 	is 	forced 	to 	represent
himself 	may 	face 	difficulties. 	Indeed, 	in 	the 	instant 	case
those 	problems 	were 	undoubtedly 	compounded 	because 	of 	the
Charging 	Party's 	frustration 	over 	the 	initial 	wrongful
dismissal 	of 	this 	case 	and 	the 	disposition 	of 	the 	other 	cases
he 	had 	filed 	against 	the 	District 	and 	his 	exclusive
representative. 	Nevertheless, 	at 	virtually 	every 	stage 	in 	the
proceedings, 	attempts 	were 	made 	to 	accommodate 	the 	handicaps 	of
a 	person 	representing 	himself 	and 	opposed 	by 	experienced 	legal
counsel.
The 	Charging 	Party made 	known 	his 	displeasure 	with 	the
conduct 	of 	the 	hearing 	and 	the 	evidentiary 	rulings. 	Had 	that
conduct 	or 	those 	rulings 	ultimately worked 	to 	his 	prejudice 	in
a 	Proposed Decision, 	the 	Board 	itself 	would 	have 	been 	able 	to
address 	those 	matters 	upon 	the 	filing 	of 	exceptions 	pursuant 	to
section 	32300 	of 	title 	8, 	part 	III, 	California Administrative
Code. 	That 	would 	have 	been 	the 	appropriate 	avenue 	for 	the
18

redress 	of 	the 	Charging 	Party's 	alleged 	grievances. 	Disruption
of 	the 	duly 	scheduled 	procedures 	and 	hearing 	by 	refusing 	to
appear 	is 	not 	an 	appropriate 	self 	help measure.
As 	previously 	noted, 	the 	Charging 	Party 	also made 	known 	his
displeasure 	and 	moved 	to 	disqualify 	the Administrative Law
Judge. 	By 	letter 	and 	subsequently 	on 	the 	record 	on October 	24,
1983, 	Mr. 	Siamis 	was 	told 	that 	there 	was 	no 	basis 	for
disqualification, 	but 	that 	if 	he 	wished 	to 	challenge 	that
determination, 	he 	could 	file 	a 	request 	with 	the Board 	itself
within 	10 	days 	pursuant 	to 	section 	32155(d) 	of 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	California Administrative 	Code.4 	He 	again elected
not 	to 	pursue 	the 	avenues 	of 	redress 	available 	to 	him 	and
thereby 	committed 	himself 	to 	the 	continuation 	of 	the 	hearing.
Finally, 	at 	the 	close 	of 	the 	hearing 	on November 	15, 	1983,
the 	Charging 	Party was 	informed 	of 	the 	undersigned's 	intention
to 	dismiss 	the 	case. 	The 	case 	was 	not 	dismissed 	on 	the 	record,
although 	such 	a 	ruling 	would 	have 	been 	consistent 	with 	the
procedures 	followed 	by 	the Administrative Law Judge 	and 	upheld
by 	the 	Board 	in Service Employees 	International 	Union, 	supra.
The 	Charging 	Party 	was 	given 	an 	opportunity 	to 	show 	cause 	why
his 	case 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed. 	He 	again 	failed 	to 	avail
himself 	of 	the 	opportunity 	to 	articulate 	what 	reasons, 	if 	any,
he 	had 	to 	justify his 	positioni 	he 	failed 	to 	do 	so.
4see 	Gonzales 	Union High 	School Teachers Association
(2/27/84) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	379.
19

To 	allow 	the 	Charging 	Party 	to 	proceed 	with 	his 	case, 	given
his 	refusal 	to 	appear 	on 	two 	occasions 	and 	given 	his 	failure 	to
show 	cause 	why 	this 	case 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed 	would 	be
inconsistent 	with 	the Board's 	Decision 	and 	its 	rules.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based 	upon 	the 	foregoing, 	it 	is 	concluded 	that 	the 	Charging
Party 	has 	refused 	to 	cooperate 	and 	satisfy 	his 	burden 	of
presenting 	his 	case. 	He 	has 	failed 	to 	appear 	and 	failed 	to
show 	cause 	why 	his 	case 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed. 	His 	conduct
can 	only 	be 	construed 	as 	an 	abandonment 	of 	his 	claim.
Accordingly, 	the 	Complaint 	is 	dismissed.
V. 	PROPOSED ORDER
Based 	upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of
law 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	the 	case, 	it 	is 	ordered 	that 	the
unfair 	practice 	charge 	and 	companion 	complaint 	in 	the 	matter
filed 	against 	Los Angeles 	Unified 	School 	District 	by
Gust 	Siamis 	is 	hereby 	DISMISSED.
Pursuant 	to 	California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32305, 	this 	Proposed 	Decision 	shall 	become
final 	on March 	28, 	1984 	unless 	a 	party 	files 	a 	timely 	statement
of 	exceptions. 	(See 	California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32300.) 	Such 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and
supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	actually 	received 	by 	the 	executive
assistant 	to 	the 	Board 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	of 	the 	Public
Employment Relations 	Board 	in Sacramento 	before 	the 	close 	of
20

business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on March 	28, 	1984, 	or 	sent 	by 	telegraph 	or
certified 	United 	States 	Mail, 	postmarked 	no 	later 	than 	the 	last
day 	for 	filing 	in 	order 	to 	be 	timely 	filed. 	(See 	California
Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8, 	part 	III, 	section 	32135.) 	Any
statement of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served
concurrently 	with 	its 	filing 	upon 	each 	party 	to 	this
proceeding. 	(See 	California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	sections 	32300 	and 	32305.)
DATED: 	March 	8, 	1984
21
Barbara 	E. 	Miller
Administrative Law Judge