State of California (Agricultural Labor Relations Board) (Cauchon, et al.) (PERB 0431S)

STATE 	OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
HELENE CAUCHON, 	EUGENE CARDENAS,
ANTONIO BARBOSA, 	DARRELL LEPKOWSKY
AND JORGE VARGAS,
Charging 	Parties,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	(AGRICULTURAL
LABOR RELATIONS 	BOARD),
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
) 	Case No. 	S-CE-187-S
PERB Decision 	No. 	431-S
November 	13, 	1984
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Eugene E. 	Cardenas for Charging Parties;
Christine A. 	Bologna, 	Attorney for 	State of California
(Agricultural Labor Relations Board).
Before Hesse, Chairperson; 	Tovar, 	Jaeger and Morgenstern,
Members.
DECISION
MORGENSTERN, Member: 	This case is before the Public
Employment Relations Board 	(PERB or 	Board) 	on the basis of an
appeal filed by Helene Cauchon et al. 	(Charging Parties) 	of 	the
dismissal of their 	charge against 	the State of California
(Agricultural Labor 	Relations Board) 	(ALRB). 	For 	the reasons
set forth below, 	the Board affirms 	the regional attorney's 	(RA)
dismissal of 	the charge 	attached hereto.
FACTUAL 	SUMMARY
On June 23, 	1983, 	five trial attorneys employed in regional
offices of 	the ALRB 	filed a charge 	objecting 	to a new
"mandatory advisory 	procedure" 	announced 	by 	the ALRB general
__.)

counsel by memorandum on February 4, 	1983. 	The memorandum
amended 	the ALRB 	Unfair 	Labor 	Practice Manual 	so as 	to 	require
trial attorneys 	to obtain 	the approval 	of 	the general counsel
in 	Sacramento before 	issuing 	unfair 	labor 	practice complaints
or 	amendments 	to 	those complaints 	and before 	filing 	exceptions
to an administrative law judge's 	(ALJ) 	decision. 	Prior 	to 	the
change, 	the practice had been to permit these decisions 	to be
made by 	the 	regional director 	and 	regional 	attorney without 	the
approval of the general counsel.
The 	initial 	charge alleged 	that 	the 	change 	"had 	a 	serious
impact on 	[Charging Parties'] 	working conditions 	as 	attorneys"
and was not discussed with 	the exclusive 	representative,
Association 	of California 	State Attorneys 	and Hearing 	Officers
(ACSA), 	prior to implementation.1 	Attachments to the charge
further 	alleged 	that 	the 	change 	interfered with 	the 	employees'
exercise 	of 	their 	professional 	judgment, 	caused delay and
curtailed 	available 	research 	support 	assistance.
In a first amended charge, 	filed on August 8, 	1983,
Charging 	Parties described cases 	in which 	the new procedures
allegedly materially 	affected 	working 	conditions.
Specifically, 	Charging Parties alleged as 	follows:
(1) 	Because of a one-day delay 	in obtaining approval 	to
file 	an 	interim appeal of 	a 	procedural 	ruling during 	hearing,
1In
N
lrn 	light of our conclusion in the 	instant case, 	it 	is
unnecessary 	to 	address 	the ALRB's 	contention 	that 	the 	Charging
Parties 	are 	"not aligned" 	with ACSA.
2

the 	hearing may have 	to 	be 	reopened, 	in which case 	the
attorneys 	will 	have 	to 	relocate 	and re-subpoena witnesses 	and
the 	judge 	and 	interpreter 	will have 	to 	return, 	resulting 	in
inconvenience 	and 	an 	extra 	expenditure 	of 	time 	and money.
(2) 	Because 	the 	Sacramento ULP 	Litigation 	Unit 	is 	now
required 	to provide 	the advice decisions, 	it 	is 	unable 	to
provide 	research 	assistance 	requested 	by 	a 	region 	as 	it 	had 	in
the past.
(3) 	Because 	of 	a 	one-day delay 	in 	obtaining 	approval 	to
amend 	a complaint during 	hearing, 	the 	attorney was 	required 	to
re-contact witnesses, 	incurring unnecessary expenditure of time
and 	money.
(4) 	An 	attorney was denied 	approval 	to 	except 	to 	an ALJ's
decision denying 	attorney's 	fees, 	thereby 	denying 	the
attorney's 	"opportunity 	to 	fully 	exercise 	her 	professional
discretion 	and 	judgment," 	undermining 	her 	professional
integrity 	and 	interfering 	with 	her 	professional 	judgment.
In 	addition 	to 	these 	specific 	instances 	of 	alleged 	harm,
the 	amended 	charge 	generally 	alleged 	that 	the 	new policy
affected 	their 	workloads 	by 	requiring 	them 	to 	"spend 	extra 	time
educating, 	arguing, 	and convincing people 	in Sacramento" 	and
"writing 	legal memoranda 	to 	Sacramento" 	in 	order 	to get 	prior
approval 	for 	legal 	decisions 	which 	they 	are 	experienced 	and
trained 	to make 	themselves.
W	
3

DISCUSSION
At 	the 	time 	the RA issued his dismissal letter, 	the Board
had not yet 	reviewed 	the 	scope of 	representation 	section 	of 	the
2
State 	Employer-Employee 	Relations Act 	(SEERA).2 Since 	then,
however, 	two Board decisions have addressed 	the meaning of
section 	3516, 	including 	the 	"organization of any service or
activity" proviso.333
In 	State 	of California 	(Department of Transportation)
(8/18/83) 	PERB Decision No. 	333-S, 	the Board first reviewed the
scope 	of 	representation 	language 	of 	SEERA 	section 	3516 	and
found 	that employee 	transfers, 	employee 	opportunity for
overtime 	and 	use of a 	state vehicle were all negotiable
subjects.
In 	State of California 	(Department of Transportation)
(11/28/83) 	PERB Decision No. 	361-S, 	the Board again considered
the 	scope 	of 	representation question 	and 	specifically 	reviewed
the proviso language of 	section 3516. 	It relied on the
decision 	in Fire Fighters v. 	City of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 Cal.3d
608 	interpreting 	identical 	language 	found 	in 	the 	scope 	of
representation 	provision 	of 	the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
2SEERA 	is codified at Government Code 	section 	3512 	et
seq. 	All 	statutory references herein are 	to 	the Government
Code 	unless otherwise 	indicated.
3Section 	3516 	provides as 	follows:
The 	scope 	of 	representation 	shall be 	limited
to wages, 	hours, 	and other terms and
conditions of employment, 	except, however,
4

(MMB).4 In 	that case, 	the Supreme Court held that the MMB
proviso 	language was meant only 	to 	forestall 	the 	expansion of
wages, 	hours and working conditions 	to 	include more general
managerial policy decisions 	that would deprive an employer 	of
legitimate managerial prerogatives. 	Given 	this 	interpretation,
the 	Board 	found 	the proviso of 	section 3516 	to be 	essentially a
codification 	of 	that portion of 	the Board's 	scope 	test which
removed 	from 	the 	bargaining 	process 	essential managerial
prerogatives. 	See Anaheim Union High 	School District
(10/28/81) 	PERB Decision No. 	177.
Although 	the RA's 	dismissal 	issued without 	benefit 	of 	the
Board decisions 	interpreting 	SEERA, 	we 	believe 	he correctly
concluded 	that 	the ALRB general counsel was 	free 	to
unilaterally adopt 	the new case processing procedures. 	Thus,
while 	the 	subject of case processing 	procedures may well
that 	the 	scope of 	representation 	shall not
include consideration of 	the merits,
necessity, 	or organization of any service or
activity 	provided 	by 	law or 	executive 	order.
4MMB 	is codified at Government Code 	section 3500 	et 	seq.
Section 3504 	provides as 	follows:
The 	scope 	of 	representation 	shall 	include
all matters 	relating 	to 	employment
conditions 	and employer-employee 	relations,
including, but not limited to, wages, hours,
and 	other 	terms and conditions 	of
employment, except, however, 	that the scope
of representation 	shall not 	include
consideration of the merits, 	necessity, 	or
organization 	of any 	service 	or 	activity
provided by 	law or 	executive 	order.
5

satisfy 	the 	first two prongs of 	the Anaheim test, 	we conclude
that, 	by requiring 	the ALRB attorneys 	to get prior 	approval
before 	issuing 	complaints 	and 	amendments 	and before 	submitting
exceptions to ALJ decisions, 	the general counsel was exercising
his managerial 	prerogative 	to direct his 	staff 	and 	to 	exercise
his 	statutory control over 	the 	agency's 	complaint processing
procedures.555
Beyond 	the subject of 	the processing procedures 	themselves,
the 	RA appropriately considered whether 	the 	allegations 	in 	this
charge 	otherwise 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	nonnegotiable 	managerial
decision 	had an 	impact on 	items within 	the 	scope 	of
representation. 	We 	find 	that 	the RA appropriately concluded
that no 	logical 	or 	reasonable 	relationship 	to negotiable 	items
appears from these allegations. 	Anaheim, 	supra. 	While delays
in case 	processing 	and decreased 	availability of 	research
assistance could impact on an employee's hours, 	Charging
Parties made 	no such 	allegation herein.
5Labor 	Code 	section 1149 provides 	as 	follows:
The general 	counsel of 	the board 	shall
exercise general 	supervision over 	all
attorneys 	employed by 	the 	board 	(other 	than
administrative 	law officers 	and 	legal
assistants to board members), 	and over 	the
officers 	and employees 	in 	the 	regional
offices. 	He shall have final authority, 	on
behalf of the board, 	with respect to the
investigation of charges and 	issuance 	of
complaints 	under Chapter 	6 	(commencing with
Section 1160) 	of this part, 	and with respect
to 	the 	prosecution 	of 	such 	complaints 	before
the board. 	(Emphasis added.)
6

V
The final paragraph of 	the 	amended charge reads as 	follows:
(5) 	Workload: 	The new mandatory advice
policy has 	directly affected 	the
attorneys' workloads. 	We must now
spend extra time educating, 	arguing,
and convincing 	people 	in Sacramento
before we can make 	legal decisions
which 	we are experienced 	and 	trained 	in
making ourselves. 	We must 	spend extra
time writing 	legal memoranda 	to
Sacramento 	in order 	to convince 	them
that a prima facie case exists on a
given charge. 	. 	. 	.
In his dismissal letter, 	the RA 	found the allegation 	that
the 	change 	affected 	workload 	to 	be deficient
for 	it does not present clear 	and concise
facts 	indicating 	that 	the 	change has caused
field 	attorneys 	to 	increase 	their 	hours
beyond 	the 	limits of 	their 	workweek
specification and past practice. 	(Emphasis
supplied.)
In 	accordance with the RA's 	analysis of the allegations, 	we
agree 	that 	the 	Charging Parties have 	failed 	to allege
sufficient 	facts 	to establish 	that 	the general counsel's
directive mandated 	these ALRB attorneys 	to work more 	hours per
day or per 	week 	than they had prior 	to 	the 	advisory procedure.
While 	it 	is conceivable 	that an otherwise permissible
managerial directive could 	impact on a 	negotiable 	subject by
virtue of an employee's need 	to adhere 	to 	a code of
professional responsibility or ethics, 	the allegations 	in the
instant case do not 	support 	such an 	assertion.
7

ORDER
Based on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	PERB regional attorney's
dismissal 	of 	this charge 	is AFFIRMED.
Chairperson 	Hesse 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
Tovar, 	Member, 	concurring: 	I 	agree with my colleagues that
the 	regional 	attorney 	properly concluded 	that 	the ALRB general
counsel was 	free 	to unilaterally adopt 	the case processing
procedures. 	The subject of case processing procedures does
satisfy the first two prongs of the Anaheim test; 	however, 	the
general counsel exercised his managerial 	prerogative 	to direct
his 	staff 	and 	to exercise his 	statutory control 	over 	the
complaint 	processing 	procedure 	of 	the 	agency when he 	instituted
the policy requiring his 	staff attorneys 	to get prior 	approval
before 	issuing complaints 	and 	amendments 	and 	before 	submitting
exceptions 	to ALJ decisions.
I 	concur with my colleagues that, 	in the 	instant case,
charging parties have 	failed 	to 	establish 	a prima 	facie case.
However, 	I 	arrive at this conclusion based on the 	standard 	of
workload 	set 	out 	in 	Davis 	Joint 	Unified 	School 	District
88

(8/2/84) 	PERB Decision No. 	393. 	Perhaps the author here fails
to make 	this analysis 	since he was 	in the minority position 	in
the Davis case.
As 	the Board 	said 	in Davis;
Plainly, hours, 	in its strict sense, 	is an
incomplete 	standard 	for 	the measurement 	of
work. 	Equally as 	important as 	the concept
of time 	in measuring 	the amount 	of labor
rendered by an employee 	is 	the 	intensity of
effort expended. 	. 	. 	. 	Thus, the term
"hours," 	. 	. 	. has never been restricted to
its literal definition, 	but is recognized as
authorizing 	the 	negotiability of 	the 	amount
of labor, 	however quantified, 	which will be
provided 	to 	the 	employer 	by 	the 	employees 	as
their 	obligation under 	the bargain. 	Davis,
pp. 	13-14, emphasis in the original.
Here, 	the charging party impliedly attempted 	to make a
workload claim. 	However, 	it failed 	to make clear what 	the
measurement 	of work was before 	the policy change and how the
change affected the workload. 	Thus, 	there 	is no demonstrable
impact brought about by the change, 	making dismissal
appropriate in this 	instance.
Member 	Jaeger 	joined 	in this Concurrence.
9

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	GEORGE 	DEUKMEJIAN. Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
1031 18th Street, Suite 102
Sacramento, 	California 95814
(916) 322-3198
August 	18, 	1983
319 Waterman Ave.
Eugene Cardenas
El Centro, 	CA 	92243
Re: 	Cauchon et al. v. 	State of California, ALRB
Charge No. 	S-CE-187-S, 	1st Amended Charge
Dear Mr. Cardenas:
On July 26, 	1983 	I wrote to you that the above-referenced
charge did not 	state 	a prima facie case 	and 	that 	unless you
amended 	it or withdrew it, 	the charge would be dismissed. 	On
August 	8, 	you 	filed a first amended charge which added factual
examples of 	the alleged change outlined 	in 	the original
charge. 	After 	reviewing 	the amended charge as well as
authority 	(Los Angeles County Employees Association, 	Local 660
v. 	County of Los Angeles 	(1973) 	33 Cal.App.3d 1) 	cited by the
charging party during telephone conversations, 	I 	am of 	the
opinion that 	the charge 	as 	amended 	still does 	not state a prima
facie case 	as 	explained below.
The 	above-referenced charge 	as 	amended 	alleges 	that 	the 	State
of California, 	Agricultural Labor 	Relations Board 	(ALRB)
through 	its 	General 	Counsel 	unilaterally 	changed 	internal
procedural requirements 	for 	the 	issuance of complaint or
amendments 	to 	the complaint and 	the filing 	of exceptions 	to the
decision of an administrative law judge. 	This conduct 	is
alleged 	to violate 	section 3519(c) 	of 	the State
Employer-Employee Relations Act 	(SEERA).
My 	investigation revealed 	the following: 	On February 4, 	1983,
the General Counsel 	of 	the ALRB 	issued 	a memorandum which
immediately amended Part 2, 	sections 	2120 	through 2160 of 	the
Unfair Labor Practice Manual. 	As amended, 	the sections
required 	the 	trial 	attorney to 	seek 	the General Counsel's
advice before 	filing 	exceptions 	to 	an administrative 	law
judge's decision 	and 	before 	issuing 	unfair 	labor 	practice
complaints or amendments 	to these complaints. 	State Labor Code
section 1149 states 	in pertinent part:

Eugene 	Cardenas
August 18, 1983
Page 	2
The 	general counsel of 	the 	board 	shall
exercise 	general 	supervision 	over 	all
attorneys 	employed 	by 	the 	board 	(other 	than
administrative 	law officers 	and 	legal
assistants to board members), 	and over 	the
officers 	and employees 	in 	the 	regional
offices. 	He shall have 	final authority, 	on
behalf of 	the board, 	with 	respect 	to 	the
investigation of 	charges 	and 	issuance 	of
complaints 	under 	Chapter 	6 	(commencing 	with
Section 1160) 	of this part, 	and with respect
to 	the prosecution of 	such 	complaints 	before
the board. 	(Emphasis added.).
Based on 	the facts 	stated above, 	this charge does 	not make out
a prima 	facie 	violation of 	the SEERA for 	the 	reasons 	explained
below.
Although 	the Public Employment Relations Board 	(PERB) 	has 	not
issued 	a 	case which 	involves a 	unilateral 	change 	under 	the
SEERA, 	it 	is 	reasonable to assume because of 	the similarity in
language between section 	3519(c) 	of 	the SEERA and 	3543.5(c) 	of
the Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA) 	that 	the PERB
would 	use 	the EERA 	test.
In determining 	whether 	a party has 	violated 	section 	3543.5(c)
of EERA, 	the Public Employment Relations Board 	utilizes either
the 	"per 	se" 	or 	the 	"totality of 	the conduct" 	test, 	depending
on 	the specific 	conduct 	involving 	and 	the 	effect of 	such
conduct 	on 	the 	negotiating 	process. 	Stockton Unified 	School
District 	(11/3/80) 	PERB Decision No. 	143. 	Unilateral changes
are 	considered 	"per 	se" 	violations 	if 	certain criteria are
met. 	Those 	criteria are: 	(1) 	the employer 	has 	implemented a
change 	in policy 	concerning 	a matter 	within 	the 	scope of
representation, 	(2) 	the change 	is 	implemented prior 	to the
employer 	notifying 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	and 	giving 	it
an opportunity 	to 	request negotiations. 	Walnut Valley Unified
School District 	(3/30/81) 	PERB Decision No. 	160, Grant Joint
Union High School District 	(2/26/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	196.
The 	instant case 	raises 	the 	issue of whether 	the General
Counsel's 	change 	concerns a matter 	within 	the scope of
representation, Government Code section 3516, which reads:

Eugene Cardenas
August 18, 1983
Page 3
The 	scope of 	representation 	shall be 	limited
to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, except, however,
that 	the 	scope of 	representation shall 	not
include consideration of 	the merits,
necessity, 	or organization of 	any service or
activity provided 	by 	law or 	executive 	order.
The boundaries of 	the 	scope of 	representation 	under 	the SEERA
have yet 	to 	be examined 	by the PERB, 	but similar 	scope language
in 	the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act has 	been examined 	by 	the 	state
courts.1 In 	Sa
n Jose 	Peace Officers Association v. 	City of
Jose 	(1978) 	78 Cal.App.3d 935, 	the Court of Appeal held
that before managerial decisions 	are within 	the 	scope of
representation, 	they must have a 	significant or material
relationship to working conditions. 	Under 	this 	test, 	the
change 	in 	the 	instant case falls outside 	the scope of
representation.
Sa
First, 	the change primarily concerns a managerial decision over
the 	"organization of 	any 	service or 	activity provided 	by law"
(Gov. Code section 3516). 	Labor Code section 1149 provides
that 	the General Counsel shall the "final authority" 	with
respect 	to 	issuance of 	complaints 	and 	prosecution of 	them
before 	the board; 	the General Counsel's determination 	to
1The 	scope 	of 	representation 	for 	the Meyers-Milias-Brown
Act 	is 	contained 	in Government Code 	section 	3504 which 	reads:
The 	scope of 	representation 	shall 	include
all matters 	relating 	to employment
conditions 	and 	employer-employee 	relations,
including, 	but not limited to, wages, hours,
and 	other 	terms 	and 	conditions of
employment, except, however, 	that the scope
of 	representation 	shall 	not 	include
consideration of the merits, 	necessity, or
organization of 	any service or 	activity
provided 	by law or 	executive order.
Although not 	identical to section 3516, 	this language, 	if
anything, 	is broader 	than 	its counterpart 	in the SEERA.
~--------	
n

Eugene 	Cardenas
August 18, 	1983
Page 4
require 	an 	"advice" 	session before 	issuance of an amended
complaint or 	appeal of 	adverse ALJ 	determinations 	is 	an aspect
of 	the 	organization of 	the 	service 	and 	activity provided 	by
section 1149 of 	the ALRA, 	and 	thus 	is not, 	standing alone,
negotiable 	under 	section 	3516.
Second, 	neither 	the amended charge 	nor 	the 	investigation
revealed 	that 	the 	change 	had 	a 	significant of material
relationship 	to working 	conditions 	(San Jose Peace Officer's
Association, 	supra.) 	The 	amended charge alleges 	that the
change 	has 	(a) 	caused 	some 	time delays 	in prosecuting cases,
e.g., 	when 	the 	attorney assigned 	a case 	believes 	that 	amendment
during a hearing 	is appropriate; 	(b) 	altered the
responsibilities 	of 	the General Counsel's headquarters 	staff 	by
requiring 	them to 	review 	the new 	"advice" matters, 	and that 	the
headquarters 	staff 	consequently has 	not 	been available, 	as 	in
the past, 	to do 	research 	for 	the prosecuting 	attorneys 	in 	the
field; 	and 	(c) 	"directly affected the attorneys' 	workloads"
because, 	under 	that policy, 	the 	field attorneys must "spend
extra 	time educating, 	arguing 	and 	convincing people 	in
Sacramento 	before we 	can make 	legal 	decisions 	which we 	are
experienced 	and 	trained 	at 	making ourselves."
The 	allegations 	concerning 	delays 	and 	diminution 	in 	research
help reflect minor 	time delays 	in processing cases 	and 	an
unspecified 	reduction 	in 	unspecified 	research 	support 	services;
they do 	not 	reflect 	that 	the delays or 	unspecified 	reduction of
research 	service 	relate materially 	and 	substantially 	to any
negotiable 	issue. 	The 	allegation 	that 	the change has
"affected" 	workloads is deficient, 	for 	it does not present
clear 	and 	concise 	facts 	indicating 	that 	the 	change has caused
field 	attorneys 	to 	increase 	their 	hours 	beyond 	the 	limits of
their 	workweek 	specification 	and 	past 	practice. 	The 	charge
thus fails 	to present a clear 	and 	concise 	statement of 	facts
constituting 	a prima facie case of 	unilateral change, 	and 	the
evidence 	uncovered 	in 	the 	investigation 	fails 	to cure 	that
deficiency. 	The 	charge 	therefore 	is 	dismissed.
Pursuant 	to Public Employment Relations Board 	regulation
section 32635 	(California Administrative Code, 	title 8,
part III), 	you may appeal 	the refusal 	to 	issue a complaint
(dismissal) 	to 	the Board 	itself.

Eugene 	Cardenas
August 18, 	1983
Page 5
Right 	to Appeal
You may obtain a 	review of 	this 	dismissal of 	the charge by
filing 	an 	appeal 	to 	the Board 	itself 	within 	twenty 	(20)
calendar 	days after 	service of 	this 	dismissal
(section 	32635(a)). 	To be 	timely filed, 	the original and 	five
(5) 	copies 	of 	such appeal must be actually received 	by the
Board 	itself 	before 	the close of 	business 	(5:00 p.m.) 	on
September 	7, 	1983, 	or 	sent by telegraph or 	certified United
States mail postmarked 	not later 	than September 	7, 	1983
(section 32135). 	The Board's address 	is:
Public Employment Relations Board
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
If you 	file a timely appeal of 	the 	refusal to 	issue 	a
complaint, 	any other 	party may 	file with 	the Board 	an original
and 	five 	(5) 	copies of a statement 	in opposition within twenty
(20) 	calendar days 	following 	the date of 	service of 	the appeal
(section 32635(b)) .
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to 	be 	filed 	herein must 	also be
"served" 	upon all parties 	to 	the proceeding, 	and a "proof of
service" 	must 	accompany 	the 	document 	filed 	with 	the Board
itself 	(see 	section 	32140 	for 	the 	required 	contents 	and 	a
sample 	form). 	The document will be considered properly
"served" 	when personally delivered or 	deposited 	in 	the
first-class 	mail 	postage 	paid 	and 	properly addressed.
Extension of Time
A 	request 	for 	an 	extension of 	time 	in which 	to 	file a document
with 	the Board 	itself must 	be 	in writing 	and 	filed with 	the
Board 	at 	the previously noted 	address. 	A request 	for 	an
extension must be 	filed 	at least 	three 	(3) 	calendar 	days 	before
the 	expiration of 	the 	time 	required 	for 	filing 	the document.
The request must 	indicate good cause for 	and, 	if 	known, 	the
position of 	each 	other 	party regarding 	the 	extension, 	and 	shall
be 	accompanied 	by proof of 	service of 	the 	request 	upon 	each
party 	(section 32132).

Eugene 	Cardenas
August 18, 	1983
Page 6
Final Date
If no appeal 	is 	filed within the specified 	time limits, 	the
dismissal 	will become 	final when 	the 	time limits have expired,
Very 	truly yours,
DENNIS M. 	SULLIVAN
General Counsel
By Robert Thompson
Regional Attorney