State of California (Department of Transportation) (PERB 0333S)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CALIFORNIA 	STATE 	EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA 	(DEPARTMENT 	OF
TRANSPORTATION) ,
Respondent.
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____________________ )
Case No. 	LA-CE-105-S
PERB 	Decision 	No. 	333-S
August 	18, 	1983
Appearances: 	Robert W. 	Feinstein, 	Attorney 	for 	California 	State
Employees' 	Association; 	Barbara 	T. 	Stuart, 	Attorney 	{Department 	of
Personnel Administration} 	for 	State 	of 	California· (Department 	of
Transportation).
Before 	Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Tovar 	and 	Burt, 	Members.
DECISION
BURT, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is 	before 	the 	Public Employment
Relations Board 	(PERB 	or 	Board} 	on 	an 	appeal 	filed 	by 	the
California 	State Employees' 	Association 	(CSEA) 	of 	the 	regional
attorney's 	attached Notice 	of 	Refusal 	to 	Issue 	Complaint 	and
Dismissal Without 	Leave 	to Amend 	pursuant 	to 	PERB 	regulation
section 	32630.1
lpERB 	rules 	and 	regulations 	are 	codified 	at 	California
Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8, 	section 	31001 	et. 	seq.; 	section
32630 	states:
32630. 	Dismissal/Refusal 	to 	Issue 	Complaint.
If 	the 	Board 	agent 	concludes 	that 	the 	charge
or 	the 	evidence 	is 	insufficient 	to 	establish

The 	charge 	alleges 	that 	the 	State 	of 	California 	(Caltrans)
violated 	subsection 	3519 (a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	of 	the 	State
Employer-Employee 	Relations 	Act 	(SEERA) 	by 	unilaterally
transferring 	two 	maintenance 	supervisors 	from 	highway
maintenance 	crews 	to 	landscape 	maintenance 	crews, 	with 	the
effect 	of 	altering 	their 	wages 	and 	working 	conditions,
specifically 	overtime 	opportunities 	and 	privilege 	to 	use 	a
State 	vehicle 	for 	commuting 	purposes.2
The 	regional 	attorney 	found 	that 	the 	evidence 	was
insufficient 	to 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	case. 	Upon 	review 	of
a 	prima 	facie 	case, 	the 	Board 	agent 	shall
refuse 	to 	issue 	complaint, 	in 	whole 	or 	in
part. 	The 	refusal 	shall 	constitute 	a
dismissal 	of 	the 	charge. 	The 	refusal,
including 	a 	statement 	of 	the 	grounds 	for
refusal, 	shall 	be 	in 	writing 	and 	shall 	be
served 	on 	the 	charging 	party 	and 	respondent.
2sEER11~ 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3512
et 	seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	herein 	are 	to 	SEERA 	unless
otherwise 	noted. 	Subsections 	3519 (a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	provide 	as
follows:
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	the 	state 	to:
(a) 	Impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on 	employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny 	to 	employee 	organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them 	by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse 	or 	fail 	to 	meet 	and 	confer 	in
good 	faith 	with 	a 	recognized 	employee
organization.
* * *
2

her 	basis 	for 	dismissal, 	CSEA's 	appeal, 	Caltrans' 	response
thereto, 	and 	the 	entire 	record, 	we 	conclude 	that 	the 	regional
attorney 	erred 	in 	refusing 	to 	issue 	a 	complaint, 	for 	the
reasons 	discussed 	below.
DISCUSSION
In 	considering 	an 	appeal 	of 	dismissal 	of 	an 	unfair 	practice
charge, 	all 	facts 	alleged 	in 	the 	charge 	must 	be 	deemed 	true.
State 	of 	California 	(Department 	of 	General 	Services) 	(4/8/83)
PERB 	Decision No. 	302-S. 	In 	any 	event, 	the 	critical 	facts 	are
not 	in 	dispute 	in 	this 	case. 	CSEA 	alleges, 	and 	Caltrans 	does
not 	deny, 	that 	it 	unilaterally 	transferred 	two 	maintenance
supervisors 	from 	highway 	maintenance 	to 	landscape 	maintenance
crews. 	It 	further 	alleges 	that 	this 	transfer 	had 	the 	effect 	on
the 	employees 	of 	reducing 	opportunities 	for 	overtime 	and
depriving 	them 	of 	a Home Use 	Permit 	which 	allowed 	them 	to 	drive
their 	State 	cars 	to 	and 	from 	work.
In 	addition 	to 	the 	factual 	allegations 	contained 	in 	the
charge, 	the 	regional 	attorney's 	investigation 	in 	this 	case
produced 	additional 	facts. 	Thus, 	it 	appears 	from 	judicially
noticeable 	documents 	that 	prior 	to 	July 	17, 	1979, 	two 	separate
and 	distinct 	job 	classifications, 	"highway maintenance
supervisor" 	and 	"landscape 	maintenance 	supervisor," 	existed.
On 	that 	date, 	the 	State 	Personnel Board 	(SPB) 	consolidated 	the
positions 	under 	the 	general 	classification 	of 	"maintenance
supervisor." 	Separate 	"highway" 	and 	"landscape"
3

classifications 	continued 	to 	exist 	for 	the 	Caltrans 	worker 	and
leadworker 	series.3
Caltrans 	contends 	that, 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law, 	it must 	be 	free
to 	unilaterally 	transfer 	employees 	within 	the 	merged
classification 	created 	by 	the 	SPB. 	To 	hold 	that 	such 	transfers
are 	within 	scope 	and 	must 	be 	negotiated, 	contends 	Caltrans,
would 	impermissibly 	curtail 	the 	SPB's 	authority 	to 	establish
classifications 	for 	civil 	service 	employment, 	in 	contravention
of 	Article 	VII, 	section 	3 of 	the 	California Constitution, 	and
the 	facilitating 	provisions 	of 	Government Code 	section 	18800
et 	seq.4
3The 	motivation 	for 	the 	change 	in 	classification 	is 	not
in 	evidence 	at 	this 	stage 	of 	the 	case. 	Caltrans 	contends 	that
the 	consolidation 	was 	intended 	to 	allow 	Caltrans 	flexibility 	in
maRing 	assignments, 	and 	that 	it 	was 	anticipated 	that 	incumbents
of 	the 	formerly 	distinct 	maintenance 	supervisor 	classification
would 	henceforth 	be 	assigned 	interchangeably 	to 	landscape 	or
highway 	crews.
4Article VII, 	section 	3 provides 	as 	followsi
[Enforcement 	and 	administration]
(a) 	The 	board 	shall 	enforce 	the 	civil
service 	statutes 	and, 	by majority 	vote 	of
all 	its 	members, 	shall 	prescribe
probationary 	periods 	and 	classifications,
~dopt 	other 	rules 	authorized 	by 	statute, 	and
review 	disciplinary 	actions.
(b) 	The 	executive 	officer 	shall 	administer
the 	civil 	service 	statutes 	under 	rules 	of
the 	board.
Government 	Code 	section 	18801 	provides 	as 	follows:
Allocation 	of 	position 	to 	appropriate 	class.
4

PERB 	has 	not 	yet 	determined 	the 	scope 	of 	representation
under 	SEER.~. 	The 	statutory 	scope 	language 	of 	SEERA 	parallels
that 	of 	the 	National 	Labor 	Relations 	Act 	(NLRA) .5
Section 	8(d) 	of 	the 	NLRA 	requires 	good 	faith 	negotiations
regarding" ..• 	wages, 	hours, 	and 	other 	terms 	and 	conditions
of 	employment. 	" 	Similarly, 	section 	3516 	of 	SEERA 	limits
the 	scope 	of 	representation 	to" ... 	wages, 	hours, 	and 	other
terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	employment 	... " 	with 	the 	proviso 	that
" 	. 	consideration 	of 	the 	merits, 	necessity, 	or 	organization
of 	any 	service 	or 	activity 	provided 	by 	law 	or 	executive 	order"
is 	outside 	scope.
Every 	position 	in 	the 	state 	civil 	service
shall 	be 	allocated 	to 	the 	appropriate 	class
in 	the 	classification 	plan. 	The 	allocation
of 	a 	position 	to 	a 	class 	shall 	derive 	from
and 	be 	determined 	by 	the 	ascertainment 	of
the 	duties 	and 	responsibilities 	of 	the
position 	and 	shall 	be 	based 	on 	the 	principle
that 	all 	positions 	shall 	be 	included 	in 	the
same 	class 	if:
(a) 	Sufficiently 	similar 	in 	respect 	to
duties 	and 	responsibilities 	that 	the 	same
descriptive 	title 	may 	be 	used.
(b) 	Substantially 	the 	same 	requirements 	as
to 	education, 	experience, 	knowledge 	and
ability 	are 	demanded 	of•incumbents.
(c) 	Substantially 	the 	same 	tests 	of 	fitness
may 	be 	used 	in 	choosing 	qualified 	appointees.
(d) 	The 	same 	schedule 	of 	compensation 	can
be 	made 	to 	apply 	with 	equity.
5The 	NLRA 	is 	codified 	at 	29 	u.s.c. 	152 	et 	seq.
5

In 	interpreting 	language 	of 	SEERA, 	cognizance 	should 	be
taken 	of 	the 	decisions 	of 	the 	National 	Labor 	Relations 	Board
(NLRB) 	interpreting 	identical 	or 	similar 	language 	in 	the 	NLRA.
Fire 	Fighters 	v. 	City of 	Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 Cal.3d 	608. 	In
light 	of 	the 	virtually 	identical 	scope 	language 	of 	SEERA 	and
the 	NLRA,. PERB 	finds 	private 	sector 	precedent 	regarding 	scope
to 	be 	applicable 	to 	SEERA 	cases. 	In 	the 	private 	sector,
transfer 	of 	employees 	has 	long 	been 	held 	within 	scope.
Continental 	Insurance 	Co. 	v. 	NLRB 	(2d 	Cir. 	1974) 	495 	F.2d 	44,
86 	LRRM 	2003. 	The 	Developing 	Labor 	Law, 	Morris 	(1971) 	p. 	406.
See 	also Metromedia, 	Inc-. 	(1977) 	232 	NLRB 	486. 	Caltrans'
argument 	that 	it 	can 	unilaterally 	transfer 	employees 	within
classifications 	established 	by 	the 	SPB 	is 	unpersuasive. 	If
Caltrans' 	argument 	were 	accepted, 	the 	scheme 	of 	collective
negotiations 	established 	by 	SEERA 	would 	potentially 	be
frustrated. 	SEERA provides 	that 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment 	must 	be 	negotiated. 	In 	Caltrans' 	view, 	however, 	it
may 	unilaterally move 	employees 	around 	within 	the
classifications 	set 	by 	the 	SPB 	without 	negotiating, 	even 	where
such 	transfers 	materially 	alter 	employees' 	terms 	and 	conditions
of 	employment. 	If 	this 	view 	were 	accepted, 	an 	agency 	desiring
to 	unilaterally 	transfer 	employees 	could 	circumvent 	the
negotiating 	process 	by 	seeking 	and 	obtaining 	a 	consolidation 	of
classifications 	from 	the 	SPB. 	Such 	a 	procedure 	would 	be
inconsistent 	with 	SEERA's 	mandate 	of 	negotiability. 	The 	terms
6

and 	conditions 	of 	a 	given 	employee 	are 	not 	established 	by 	the
job 	title 	per 	se1 	the 	reality 	is 	that 	terms 	and 	conditions 	may
vary 	within 	classifications. 	Terms 	and 	conditions 	which 	were
different 	under 	two 	different 	classifications 	cannot 	logically
be 	said 	to 	have 	become 	congruent 	simply 	because 	the
classifications 	are 	merged.
Requiring 	negotiations 	regarding 	transfer 	within SPB
classifications 	does 	not 	impermissibly 	usurp 	the 	SPB's
constitutional 	authority 	to 	establish 	classifications. 	There
is 	nothing 	implicit 	or 	explicit 	in·that authority 	which
indicates 	that 	varying 	wages, 	hours, 	and 	working 	conditions
within 	those 	classifications 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	SEERA's
collective 	negotiating 	requirements. 	Caltrans' 	argument 	in
this 	regard 	is 	similar 	to 	that 	rejected 	by 	the 	California
Supreme 	Court 	in 	Pacific 	Legal 	Foundation 	v. 	Brown 	(1981) 	29
Cal.3d 	168 	[172 	Cal.Rptr. 	487]. 	In 	that 	case, 	Pacific 	Legal
Foundation 	argued 	that 	the 	SPB's Article VII 	authority 	to
"classify" 	positions 	in 	civil 	service 	carried 	with 	it 	the
authority 	to 	set 	salaries, 	which 	would· be 	interfered 	with 	by
SEERA's 	scheme 	vesting 	final 	authority 	to 	set 	wages 	in 	the
Governor 	and 	Legislature·pursuant 	to 	negotiations 	with
exclusive 	representatives. 	The 	Court 	held 	that 	nothing 	in 	the
SPB's 	authority 	to 	"classify" 	positions 	carried 	with 	it 	the
authority 	to 	set 	salaries. 	Similarly, 	nothing 	in 	that
authority 	provides 	SPB 	with 	authority 	to 	set 	other 	negotiable
7

terms 	and 	conditions 	by 	or 	within 	classifications. 	It 	is 	the
reality 	of 	the 	workplace, 	and 	not 	the 	artificial 	classification
title, 	which 	is 	crucial.
Caltrans 	contends 	that 	even 	if 	the 	transfers 	herein 	are
within 	scope, 	it 	has 	established 	a 	practice 	of 	unilateral
transfer 	of 	incumbents 	of 	the 	merged 	categories 	from 	highway
crews 	to 	landscape 	crews, 	and 	vice 	versa, 	pursuant 	to 	the
reclassification, 	and 	hence 	no 	unilateral 	change 	has 	occurred.
First, 	we 	note·that CSEA 	contends 	that 	each 	example 	cited 	by
Caltrans 	involved 	a 	voluntary 	transfer, 	whereas 	in 	the 	instant
case 	the 	incumbents 	were 	transferred 	involuntarily. 	This
raises 	a 	factual 	question 	to 	be 	addressed 	at 	a 	hearing.
Further, 	we 	note 	that 	memoranda 	submitted 	in 	support 	of
Caltrans' 	contention 	indicate 	that 	the 	practice 	has 	varied 	from
district 	to 	district.6 	In 	some 	districts, 	it 	appears 	that
Caltrans 	has 	merged 	the 	composition 	of 	crews, 	so 	that 	each 	crew
is 	comprised 	of 	some 	highway 	workers 	and 	some 	landscape
workers, 	and 	is 	thus 	capable 	of 	performing 	all 	necessary
maintenance 	tasks 	in 	its 	area, 	"fence-line 	to 	fence-line." 	In
other 	districts, 	supervisors 	who 	formerly 	had 	only 	highway
maintenance 	responsibility 	have 	allegedly 	been 	unilaterally
transferred 	in 	such 	a 	manner 	as 	to 	add 	landscape 	maintenance 	to
their 	responsibilities. 	In 	another 	district, 	it 	appears 	that
6caltrans 	is 	organized 	for 	administrative 	purposes 	into
geographic 	districts 	statewide.
8

some 	but 	not 	all 	crews 	have 	been 	merged. 	In 	District 	7 	(in
which 	the 	transfers 	complained 	of 	occurred), 	some maintenance
supervisors 	have 	been 	allegedly 	"rotated" 	from 	specialized
landscape 	or 	highway 	crews 	to 	"fence-line 	to 	fence-line"
crews. 	However, 	it 	appears 	that 	some 	district 	highway 	crews
and 	some 	district 	landsc~pe 	crews 	still 	exist 	in 	District 	7.
At 	this 	stage 	of 	the 	proceeding, 	we 	cannot 	hold 	that
Caltrans 	has 	conclusively 	demonstrated 	that 	it 	has 	an
established 	past 	practice 	of 	unilaterally 	transferring 	highway
maintenance 	supervisors 	to 	landscape 	maintenance 	duties.
Thus, 	we 	reject 	Caltrans' 	contention 	that 	it 	has
conclusively 	demonstrated 	a 	past 	practice 	of 	unilaterally
engaging 	in 	transfers 	of 	the 	sort 	complained 	of 	here. 	We
further 	reject 	its 	legal 	argument 	that 	it 	must 	be 	free 	to
unilaterally 	effect 	such 	a 	transfer 	and 	reassignment 	within
broad 	classifications 	established 	by 	the 	SPB.7
Caltrans' 	remaining 	contention 	is 	that 	the 	opportunity 	for
overtime 	and 	privilege 	to 	commute 	in 	a 	State 	vehicle 	are 	not
negotiable 	effects. 	We 	disagree. 	The 	right 	to 	use 	a 	State 	car
in 	commuting 	is 	a 	negotiable 	term 	and 	condition. 	The 	Board 	has
so 	held 	pursuant 	to 	EERA 	(Office 	of 	the 	Santa 	Clara 	County
Superintendent 	of 	Schools 	(8/12/82) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	233),
[vacated 	on 	other 	grounds, 	(10/26/82) 	PERE 	Decision No. 	233a]
7The 	issue 	of 	whether 	the 	State 	employer 	may 	unilaterally
seek 	reclassification 	of 	unit 	employees 	by 	the 	SPB 	is 	not
presented 	by 	this 	case.
9

as 	have 	the 	NLRB 	and 	courts 	pursuant 	to 	the 	NLRA. 	Wil-Kil
(1970) 	181 	NLRB 	749 	[73 	LRRM 1556], 	enf'd. 	{7th 	Cir. 	1971) 	440
F.2d 	371 	[76 	LRRM 	2735]; 	Eagle Material 	Handling 	(1976) 	224
NLRB 	1529; 	George 	Webel 	& Pike 	Transit 	Company 	(1975) 	217 	NLRB
815. 	As 	noted 	in Santa Clara, 	suEra, 	commuting 	use 	of 	an
employer-provided 	car 	is 	a 	direct 	economic 	benefit 	to 	the
employee, 	saving, 	at 	least, 	wear 	and 	tear 	on 	a 	personal 	car.
Diminution 	of 	overtime 	opportunity 	constitutes 	a 	change 	in
wages, 	an 	enumerated 	scope 	item, 	and 	is 	clearly 	subject 	to
negotiations. 	Willamette 	Industries, 	Inc. 	(1975) 	220 	NLRB 	707.
SUMMARY
An 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	shall 	be 	dismissed 	only 	if 	the
Board 	agent 	concludes 	that 	the 	charge 	or 	the 	evidence 	is
insufficient 	to 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	case. 	PERB 	rule 	32630,
supra.
The 	charge 	alleges, 	the 	evidence 	establishes, 	and 	Caltrans
does 	not 	deny, 	that 	Caltrans 	unilaterally 	transferred 	the
complainants, 	and 	that 	attendant 	unilateral 	changes 	in 	working
conditions 	did 	occur. 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	in 	the
discussion 	section 	above, 	we 	find 	that 	the 	transfer 	of
employees 	by 	the 	State 	employer 	is 	within 	the 	scope 	of
representation 	and 	that 	a 	holding 	of 	negotiability of 	transfers
of 	this 	sort 	will 	not 	impermissibly 	interfere 	with 	the 	SPB's
constitutional 	authority 	to 	set 	classifications.
10

Because 	the 	charge 	and 	the 	evidence 	in 	support 	thereof
establishes 	that 	a 	unilateral 	change 	in 	matters 	within 	scope
occurred, 	the 	Board 	finds 	that 	CSEA 	has 	made 	out 	a 	prima 	facie
case.
We 	cannot 	hold 	at 	this 	stage 	of 	the 	case 	that 	Caltrans
established 	a 	past 	practice 	which 	would 	validate 	the 	unilateral
changes 	involved. 	Rather, 	a 	triable 	issue 	of 	fact 	has 	been
raised 	as 	to 	whether 	an 	established 	past 	practice 	exists.
We 	therefore 	conclude 	that 	the 	charge 	should 	not 	have 	been
dismissed.
ORDER
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	Decision 	and 	the 	record 	as 	a 	whole, 	the
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board ORDERS 	that 	the 	regional
attorney's 	Refusal 	to 	Issue 	Complaint 	and 	Dismissal Without
Leave 	to 	Amend 	is 	reversed. 	The 	matter 	is 	REMANDED 	to 	the
General 	Counsel 	for 	further 	proceedings 	consistent 	with 	this
Decision.
Chairperson 	Gluck 	and 	Member 	Tovar 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
11

PU8UC Er,WlO'fMENT RELATIONS BOARD
lo: f...n;;cl'o'~ F;,;;-gio0ol Office
3478 V/ilsnirE, Bivd., Suite 1001
'.os Ang-s-1es, California 	90010
,213) 736-31 27
0::::to:Jer 12, 	1982
~·is. Lo.vor.ne Cannon
So1thern Area Field Director
California State Employees Association
3407 West 6th Street, Suite 614
L'.JS Angeles, CA 	90020
~tr. 	Robert Rici'.JTOnd
I'-":::pt. 	of Transportation
Division of Administrative Services
1120 N Street
Sacrai_uento, CA 	95807
Ms. Barbara Stuart, General Counsel
Department of Personnel Administration
lllS - 	11th Street, 	4th Floor
S2.cr.2.mento, CA 	95814
Dear Parties:
CSEA vs. 	State of calif. 	(Dep:trtment of Tr an~p:xtation)
Purs1.1ari.t to P8Rl3 Regulation section 32630, 	the al:x:>ve-captioned charge
is h2reby dismissed. 	The charge is dismissed because it fails 	to
allege facts sufficient to state a prima facie violation o[ 	the Stat'?
Employer-Employee Relations Act 	(SEERA).
The Charging Party, California State Employees Asso:iation 	(CSFA or
Association) 	alleges that Res_pondent, 	the State of California
Dep:31rt.rnent of Transp::>rtation 	(Department) 	violated SEERA sections
3519 (a) (b} 	and 	(c) 	by involuntarily transferring 	two unit. #12
enployees, 	Ted Jernelian and Al Gallegus, 	fron _positions as M.a.intenance
Crew supervisors to PJSitions as Landscape Cred Supervisors. 	CSE.A
alleges 	that the transfers adversely affected the anployees 1 wages, 	in
that Maintenance Su_pervisors accrue an abundance of overtime on
ane.rgency callouts. 	Maintenance Supervisors are also provided with a
Ear.e Storage :permit for a state vehicle. 	They thus enjoy free
transp:xtation to a11a frcrn wark, while La11dscape Supervisors do not
e:ijoy this benefit. 	The transfers were effective on Janu3ry 15 ana
February 1, 	1982. 	The Dep::irtment did not notify CSEA pr.i.rn· 	to
r-.,,Jt:.i f y ing the affected E:t'Tr?loyees. 	It refoscd to meet. and confer with
CS-.t:::i. prior to taking acticn, 	despite Asso::iation dEiP~nds 	that it do&~.

My in;1estigation revealed the follo,.,.ing:
On July 17, 	1979 	the Sta~e Personnel Bc-Brd consolidu t.ed t~,e ~ :-:,	0
specif icatior1s 	for Cal trans Highway Maintenance Suf>=:rv.isor a;!d
Caltrans Landscape Maintenance Supervisor into one job
classification, Caltr2.ns Maintenance supervisor. 	Tne
consolidation, 	which v.r2LS vigorously opp:Jsed by C3Rl\, was a
roinpco.nise between Caltrans' 	propJsal to merge all p:isitions in
the Highway lanoscal?= ana Highway ~..aintemm(:e series into a
single serles, 	and CSEA's ORSXJSition to any consoliaation of
p:isitions fran the two classification series. 	The
resfOnsibilities of t.he ne.w Maintenance Supervisor p:,sition
encanpass duti,es in either highway maintenance or landscape
. maintenance. 	Qualifications for 	the fOSition 	include the
kncwledge and abilities listed for ooth C~ltrans Highway
Maintenance Lead.·10rker and Caltrans Maintenance Leadwor:ker.
Since 1979, 	the Der:,art:ment has re-assigned maintenance
supervisors frcm highway maintenance to landscape duties, 	fran
landscape to highway maintenance duties, or to a canbination of
the two types of auties, 	consistent with the cross-utilization
alloved by the new job sp;;cifications. 	Management jurisdiction
over 	the Department's operations 	is divided 	into eleven
geographical areas, called 	"Districts". 	While the transfers of
,Jenel.ian and G;:ilJac;us 	(r:cg,-:>ther:- with tf-tP tr;,:msfe.c:=' of 	four
()th~::t 	c-3T:}1l.oyc.:;-s) 	·:8;:{.f,;~ tl1e fir~:/~~ :·::it..~cr1 ro:._-~1. · c)n~~ ~C) 	C•;.::'\-2 1Jlac.>2- 	Ln
Di~:;tr ict 1, a similar reassignment had been made in District L~
in July 1981. 	Furtherrrore, 	the Department had consolidated tile
duties of roadway and landscape maintenance su1,---:ervision in
District 6 during the 1979-1980 fiscal year, 	in District S in
FeLruary 1980, 	in District 4 since July 1979 ana 	in District 8
in Feb:i:-uary 1981. 	In District 7, 	three other supervisors were
transferrea fran lanasca~ to road cre:,.,,s and one other
supervisor transferred fran a road crE'!-N to a landscar::e ere:,.,,
during 	the perioo December 	1981 - February 	1982. 	At the sume
time six other Maintenance Supervisors in District 7 were
reassigned frcm specialized landscape or 	road crews to
multip.1rp::,se fence line crews with resp:,nsibility for all
maintenance work within their assignea areas.
An anployer co:nmits an unfair practice if it unilaterally
L"-nple-nents a change in any term or condition of 811ployment
prior 	to the cvnclusion of the bilateral negotiations process.
Moreno Valley Unifiec:l School District 	(4/30/82) 	PERB Decision

IA-2--105-S
Page 3
No. 	206. 	While transfer a11d reassignment p::)licies are w ithir.
the So:Jf)e of r,2present2.'::.ion under SEE.RA, 	the Department's
action 	in reassigning Je-::elian and Gallegus was consisc€nt with
its past practice sir:c~ 1979 in consolidating the job
resp::msibilities of the t,..;o types of supervisors, pursua.11t to
the job descriptions acopted by the State Personnel Board. 	The
use of 	state vehicles for 	ei'Tlergency callouts was not a benefit
or 	form of canpensation enjoyed by incumbents of one jo!:)
classification a~a not toose of another, 	but a condition that
acccmpanies the job assi9.~,,ent of higl-r.-Jay manintnance
S1Jp:rvision.
Thus, 	the factual allegations of the charge do not supp::irt an
allegation that the Defa,rt:ment changed 	its past practice with
respect to reassignment of n:iaintenance supervisors. 	Therefore,
the charge does not state a prima facie unfair practice
violation of SEERA.
Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board regulation 32635
{California A&ninsitrati ve coae, 	title 8, 	party III), you may
appeal the refusal to issue a complaint 	(dismissal) 	to the
Board itself.
Right to Appeal
f i:L:ing an uf-l}?=c1l i_:.o t:1e Board it::;e1i:" within twenty 	(20)
calenaar days after ser1ice of this Notice 	(section 32635 {a.) •
To be tiinely filec1, 	the original ana five 	{5) 	copies of such
ap-feal must b2 actually received by the Boara itself before the
close of business 	{5:00 p.m.) 	on November 1, 1982, or sent by
telegrap:1 or certified United States mail fOStmarked not 	later
than November 1, 1982 	(section 32135). 	The Board's address is:
Public E'mplcyment Relations Boara
1031 18th 	Stre&
Sacramento, Cl\. 	958)4
If you file a 	tirnely ap,?=al of the refusal, any other party may
file with the executive assistant to the Board an original and
five 	(5) 	copies of a statene..l"lt in opp:::,sition within twenty 	(20)
calendar days folla,.,,ing the aate of service of 	the appeal
{section 32635(b)).

Cctc:::..:::r 12, 	1982
I.A---G:-:-105-S
.Pag,.:: 4
Se:::-vice
All documents authorized to be filed herein except for
a11encments to the charge must also be "served" up::xi. all p--:i.rties
to the prcceeding, and a 11 prcoE of service" must accomfany the
do::ument filed with the Regional Office or the Boara itself
{s:::::: section 32140 for the required contents and a sample
form). 	The aocuments will b€ considered properly "served" when
;-ersonally delivered or dep::,sited in the first-class mail
?')Stage pa.id and pr~:perly addressed.
Extension of Time
A request for ·an extension of time in which to file a doct.rrne.nt
with th~ Board itself must be in writing and filed with the
~ecutive assistant to the Eoard at the previously noted
address. 	A request for 	ar1 extension in which to file a
cb::ume...~t with the Re,giona1 Office should be aaaressed to the
?-egional Attorney. 	A req,..1est for 	an extension must be filed 	at
least 	three 	(3) 	calendar days before the expiration of 	the time
reguired for 	filing the subject dccurnent. 	The request mu.;;t
inaicate gcod cause for 	t.~e p::isition of each other 	party
regarding the extension a11d shall be accanpa.nied by proo.f of
service of the request up::m each pa.rty 	(section 32] 32) .
If r:o apf)=al is filed within the specified 	time limits, 	the
ciismi.ssal will becaue final when the time limits have expired.
Vc'-Y trul,7 yours,
Denn.is Sullivan
General Ccunsel
'fi~p~ ~fl<,'l'"a
P..arJor1e We1nzwe1g
Reg ion.al Attorney
Mii:djm
Se:::-vice