San Mateo County Community College District (PERB 0094E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF 	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
CALIFORNIA
	SCHOOL
	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
	and
	its
CHAPTER
	#33,
Charging
	Party,
v.
SAN
	MATEO 	COUNTY 	COMMUNITY
COLLEGE
	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case
	No.
	SF-CE-224,
	245
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	94
June
	8,
	1979
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_________________ )
Appearances:	
Charles
	Morrone,
	Attorney 	for
	California
	School
Employees
	Association
	and
	its
	Chapter
	#33;
	William
	Brown
	andNancy 	Osogomonian,
	Attorneys
	(Brown
	and
	Conradi)
	for
	San
	Mateo
County
	Community
	College
	District.
Before 	Gluck,
	ChairpersonJ 	Gonzales,
	Member.*
DECISION
This 	case 	concerns 	the 	response
	of
	one 	community
	college
district
	to 	the
	June
	6,
	1978
	passage 	of 	Proposition
	13,
California's
	state-wide
	tax-relief 	initiative.
	A
certified
employee
	organization 	claims
	that	
the	
district's
	adoption 	of
new
	policies
	on 	wages 	and
	other
	terms
	of
	employment
	constituted
unilateral
	changes
	that
	breached 	the
	district's
	statutory
	duty
to 	negotiate
	about 	the
	actual
	or
	anticipated 	effects
	of 	the
financial 	roll-back.	
The	
district
	defends 	the 	measures 	taken
on
	the 	grounds,
	among
	others, 	that 	business	
and	
legal 	necessity
compelled 	the 	changes	
and	
that,
	in
	any
	event, 	the
	employee
*Member 	Moore 	di.d
	not 	participate 	in 	this 	case.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION and its
CHAPTER #33 ,
Charging Party, 	Case No. SF-CE-224, 245
v .
SAN MATEO COUNTY COMMUNITY 	PERB Decision No. 94
COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Respondent. 	June 8, 1979
Appearances: Charles Morrone, Attorney for California School
Employees Association and its Chapter #33; William Brown and
Nancy Osogomonian, Attorneys (Brown and Conradi) for San Mateo
County Community College District.
Before Gluck, Chairperson; Gonzales, Member. *
DECISION
This case concerns the response of one community college
district to the June 6, 1978 passage of Proposition 13,
California's state-wide tax-relief initiative. A certified
employee organization claims that the district's adoption of
new policies on wages and other terms of employment constituted
unilateral changes that breached the district's statutory duty
to negotiate about the actual or anticipated effects of the
financial roll-back. The district defends the measures taken
on the grounds, among others, that business and legal necessity
compelled the changes and that, in any event, the employee
*Member Moore did not participate in this case.

organization
	waived
	negotiations
	after
	having
	been
	given
	notice
and
	opportunity
	to
	negotiate
	with 	the
	district.
	Similar
	issues
were
	raised 	in 	nearly
	two
	hundred
	cases
	filed
	with
	the 	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board
	(hereafter
	PERB
	or
	Board)
	after
voter
	approval
	of 	Proposition
	13. 	In
	light
	of
	the
	importance
of
	the
	issues,
	the
	Board
	approved
	direct
	review
	of
	the
testimony 	in
	this
	matter,
	without 	the
	customary
	hearing
	officer
decision.
	We
	have
	concluded
	that
	the
	district
	in
	this
	case
adopted
	two
	unilateral,
	unexcused
	changes:
	salaries
	of
	its
classified
	employees
	were
	reduced
	6.25%,
	and
	annual
	step
increments
	were
	frozen.
	We
	have
	also
	concluded,
	however,
	that
the
	employee
	organization
	waived
	negotiations
	over
	two
	other
subjects:
	involuntary 	leaves 	without
	pay
	after
	cancellation 	of
summer
	school,
	and 	payment
	of 	health
	and
	welfare 	insurance
premium
	increases.
FACTS
This 	proceeding
	arises
	out 	of 	the 	aftermath 	of 	Proposition
13,
	the
	California 	election
	initiative
	that
	based
	property
taxes
	on 	1975
	property 	assessments.
	Community
	college
	district
revenues 	are 	derived
	largely
	from
	these 	taxes,
	and, 	without
assistance
	from
	the
	Legislature, 	losses 	resulting
	from
Proposition
	13
	might 	have
	reached
	50%
	in
	1978-1979
	relative 	to
prior 	years.
	On
	June 	24,
	the 	Legislature
	approved
	a
	"bail-out"
measure 	(S.B. 	154)
	to 	help
	local 	agencies 	(counties,
	cities,
special
	districts,
	school
	and 	community
	college
	districts)	
by
distribution 	of 	surplus 	funds 	in 	the
	state 	treasury
	and 	by
permitting
	a
	one-month 	extension 	beyond 	normal 	budget
2
organization waived negotiations after having been given notice
and opportunity to negotiate with the district. Similar issues
were raised in nearly two hundred cases filed with the Public
Employment Relations Board (hereafter PERB or Board) after
voter approval of Proposition 13. In light of the importance
of the issues, the Board approved direct review of the
testimony in this matter, without the customary hearing officer
decision. We have concluded that the district in this case
adopted two unilateral, unexcused changes: salaries of its
classified employees were reduced 6.258, and annual step
increments were frozen. We have also concluded, however, that
the employee organization waived negotiations over two other
subjects: involuntary leaves without pay after cancellation of
summer school, and payment of health and welfare insurance
premium increases.
FACTS
This proceeding arises out of the aftermath of Proposition
13, the California election initiative that based property
taxes on 1975 property assessments. Community college district
revenues are derived largely from these taxes, and, without
assistance from the Legislature, losses resulting from
Proposition 13 might have reached 508 in 1978-1979 relative to
prior years. 	On June 24, the Legislature approved a "bail-out"
measure (S.B. 154) to help local agencies (counties, cities,
special districts, school and community college districts) by
distribution of surplus funds in the state treasury and by
permitting a one-month extension beyond normal budget

deadlines.
	The
	bill
	also
	included
	a
	prohibition
	on
	any
	local
agency
	granting
	its
	own
	employees
	a
	wage
	increase
	greater
	than
that
	received
	by
	State
	employees.
	Subsequently,
	State
	worker
wages 	were
	frozen 	for 	the
	fiscal
	year
	commencing
	July 	1,
1978.
1 	On
	June
	30
	the
	Legislature
	approved
	another
	measure
(S.B.
	2212)
	to
	clarify
	the
	scope
	of 	the
	bail-out
	legislation.
This
	bill
	was
	signed
	by
	the
	Governor
	on
	the
	same
	day
	and,
	among
other
	provisions,
	it
	exempted
	benefit
	and
	longevity
	payments
from
	the
	restriction
	on
	salary
	increases
	contained 	in
	S.B. 	154.
The
	parties
	to
	this
	proceeding 	are 	the
	San 	Mateo
	County
Community
	College
	District
	(hereafter
	District)
	and
	the
California
	School
	Employees
	Association
	and
	its
	Chapter
	#33
(hereafter
	CSEA
	or
	Association),
	the 	exclusive
	representative
of
	the
	District's
	classified
	employees.
	The
	parties
	negotiated
a
	collective
	agreement
	that
	went
	into
	effect
	in 	April
	1978
	and
will
	expire 	in
	June 	1980.
	The
	agreement
	permits 	the
	parties 	to
reopen
	negotiations
	on 	wages 	and 	on
	health
	and
	welfare
	benefits
in
	each
	of
	the
	fiscal
	years
	1978/79
	and
	1979/80,
	and 	on 	one
other 	subject 	at
	the 	option 	of
	either 	party.
	The
	agreement
does 	not
	specify
	a
	salary
	schedule 	during 	the 	reopener
	period.
Before
	and
	after
	the 	passage 	of 	Proposition
	13,
	the
District
	took
	a
	number
	of 	actions 	related 	to 	the
	potential
lThe
	California
	Supreme
	Court
	recently 	held
	that
	the
condition 	linking 	local 	to 	state 	salary 	levels
	was 	an
unconstitutional
	impairment
	of 	contractual 	obligations, 	as 	wellas
	a
	violation 	of 	the
	state's
	home-rule
	principles.
	The
	court
found
	that 	the 	Legislature's 	action
	was
	not 	premised 	on
	a
showing
	of
	emergency
	sufficient 	to 	override 	pre-existing
contracts.
	Sonoma 	County 	Organization 	of 	Public 	Employees 	v.
Sonoma 	County 	(1979) 	23
	Cal.3d 	296.
3
deadlines. The bill also included a prohibition on any local
agency granting its own employees a wage increase greater than
that received by State employees. Subsequently, State worker
wages were frozen for the fiscal year commencing July 1,
1978. On June 30 the Legislature approved another measure
(S.B. 2212) to clarify the scope of the bail-out legislation.
This bill was signed by the Governor on the same day and, among
other provisions, it exempted benefit and longevity payments
from the restriction on salary increases contained in S.B. 154.
The parties to this proceeding are the San Mateo County
Community College District (hereafter District) and the
California School Employees Association and its Chapter #33
(hereafter CSEA or Association), the exclusive representative
of the District's classified employees. 	The parties negotiated
a collective agreement that went into effect in April 1978 and
will expire in June 1980. 	The agreement permits the parties to
reopen negotiations on wages and on health and welfare benefits
in each of the fiscal years 1978/79 and 1979/80, and on one
other subject at the option of either party. 	The agreement
does not specify a salary schedule during the reopener period.
Before and after the passage of Proposition 13, the
District took a number of actions related to the potential
1The California Supreme Court recently held that the
condition linking local to state salary levels was an
unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations, as well
as a violation of the state's home-rule principles. The court
found that the Legislature's action was not premised on a
showing of emergency sufficient to override pre-existing
contracts. 	Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v.
Sonoma County (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 296.
3

though 	still 	uncertain 	impact 	of 	the 	initiative.
Between 	May 	31 	and 	June 	21 	the 	chancellor 	of 	the 	District
had 	four 	meetings 	with 	various 	employee 	organization
representatives 	in 	order 	to 	informally 	discuss 	the 	District's
budgetary 	prospects. 	Original 	projections 	of 	an 	$8 	to 	$9
million 	shortfall 	from 	anticipated 	revenues 	if 	Proposition 	13
passed 	were 	gradually 	scaled 	down 	as 	the 	District 	speculated
about 	possible 	program 	cuts 	and 	eventual legislative
assistance. 	Once 	the 	decisions 	on 	bail-out 	distribution 	were
made, 	the 	District 	projected 	a 	$4.5 	million 	reduction. 	The
level 	of 	operations 	that 	was 	ultimately 	attained, 	about 	85% 	of
the 	District's 	budget, 	was 	known 	with 	an 	increasing 	degree 	of
probability 	from 	the 	end 	of 	June 	to 	mid-July. 	This 	amount, 	by
the 	District's 	admission, 	was 	sufficient 	to 	meet 	existing
employee 	salary 	levels. 	In 	addition, 	the 	District 	entered 	the
new 	fiscal 	year 	with 	an 	uncommitted 	reserve 	carry-over 	of 	about
$2 	million.
One 	of 	the 	first 	cost-related 	steps 	taken 	by 	the 	District
was 	the 	cancellation 	of 	summer 	school 	on 	June 	14, 	five 	days
before 	it 	was 	scheduled 	to 	begin, 	because 	of 	rumors 	that
bail-out 	money 	might 	be 	denied 	if 	the 	District 	maintained 	its
summer 	program. 	This 	led 	to 	a 	District 	determination, 	at 	least
partially 	concurred 	in 	by 	CSEA 	representatives, 	that 	certain
classified 	employees 	would 	not 	be 	needed 	over 	the 	summer.
About 	June 	22 	District 	and 	Association 	officials 	informally
considered 	alternatives 	for 	workers 	affected 	by 	the 	closure,
including 	use 	of 	vacation 	or 	compensation 	time, 	leave 	without
4
though still uncertain impact of the initiative.
Between May 31 and June 21 the chancellor of the District
had four meetings with various employee organization
representatives in order to informally discuss the District's
budgetary prospects. Original projections of an $8 to $9
million shortfall from anticipated revenues if Proposition 13
passed were gradually scaled down as the District speculated
about possible program cuts and eventual legislative
assistance. 	Once the decisions on bail-out distribution were
made, the District projected a $4.5 million reduction. The
level of operations that was ultimately attained, about 858 of
the District's budget, was known with an increasing degree of
probability from the end of June to mid-July. This amount, by
the District's admission, was sufficient to meet existing
employee salary levels. In addition, the District entered the
new fiscal year with an uncommitted reserve carry-over of about
$2 million.
One of the first cost-related steps taken by the District
was the cancellation of summer school on June 14, five days
before it was scheduled to begin, because of rumors that
bail-out money might be denied if the District maintained its
summer program. This led to a District determination, at least
partially concurred in by CSEA representatives, that certain
classified employees would not be needed over the summer.
About June 22 District and Association officials informally
considered alternatives for workers affected by the closure,
including use of vacation or compensation time, leave without

pay, 	or 	temporary
	transfer
	to 	other
	job
	classifications.
District
	officials
	claim
	that
	they
	wanted
	to
	displace
	only
	a
minimal
	number
	of
	workers.
	The
	District
	also
	claims
	that
	in
the
	last
	week
	of
	June
	an
	arrangement
	had
	been
	worked
	out
	with
CSEA
	to
	by-pass 	the
	strict
	terms
	of
	the
	collective
	agreement 	by
assigning
	out-of-classification
	work
	without
	extra
	pay,
	thereby
minimizing
	the
	number
	of
	leaves.
	Regardless
	of
	this
	possible
solution,
	on
	June
	28
	the 	governing
	trustees
	approved
	an
emergency
	resolution 	creating
	a 	new
	policy 	of 	involuntary
leaves 	without
	pay. 	This
	action
	presumably
	enabled 	the
District
	to
	maximize
	its
	summer
	cost-savings
	by
	releasing
surplus
	employees
	without 	the
	30-day
	"lay-off" 	notice 	required
by	
statute.
However,
	any
	proposed 	arrangement 	the
	District
	hoped 	would
reduce
	leaves 	of
	absence
	fell
	through
	in
	the
	first
	week
	of
July.
	During
	that
	week,
	Association
	members
	reportedly
rejected
	the
	District's
	suggestion 	of
	out-of-classification
transfers
	coupled 	with
	a
	nominal
	number
	of 	involuntary 	leaves
without 	pay.
	CSEA
maintained
	that
	any
	previous
	arrangement
	was
a
	misunderstanding,
	and
	told
	the
	District
	it
	wanted
	to 	abide 	by
the
	contract
	terms
	requiring
	full
	payment
	for
	out-of-class
work.
	On
	July
	12,
	relying
	on
	the 	June
	28
	trustee 	resolution,
the
	District
	placed 	seventeen 	workers
	on
	involuntary 	leave
without
	pay
	for 	periods 	ranging
	from 	two
	to
	thirty
	days.
(Three
	of 	these 	leaves
	were 	modified
	later
	in 	July.)
A
second 	major
	cost 	revision
	was
	presented 	June 	21.
	On
that 	date 	the
	District's
	6.25%
	unilateral 	reduction 	of
5
pay, or temporary transfer to other job classifications.
District officials claim that they wanted to displace only a
minimal number of workers. The District also claims that in
the last week of June an arrangement had been worked out with
CSEA to by-pass the strict terms of the collective agreement by
assigning out-of-classification work without extra pay, thereby
minimizing the number of leaves. Regardless of this possible
solution, on June 28 the governing trustees approved an
emergency resolution creating a new policy of involuntary
leaves without pay. This action presumably enabled the
District to maximize its summer cost-savings by releasing
surplus employees without the 30-day "lay-off" notice required
by statute.
However, any proposed arrangement the District hoped would
reduce leaves of absence fell through in the first week of
July. During that week, Association members reportedly
rejected the District's suggestion of out-of-classification
transfers coupled with a nominal number of involuntary leaves
without pay. CSEA maintained that any previous arrangement was
a misunderstanding, and told the District it wanted to abide by
the contract terms requiring full payment for out-of-class
work . 	On July 12, relying on the June 28 trustee resolution,
the District placed seventeen workers on involuntary leave
without pay for periods ranging from two to thirty days.
(Three of these leaves were modified later in July.)
A second major cost revision was presented June 21. On
that date the District's 6. 258 unilateral reduction of

classified
	employee
	salaries
	was
	disclosed
	to
	CSEA
	at
	a
governing
	board
	meeting
	in
	the
	form
	of
	a
	proposed
	emergency
resolution.
	The
	following
	day,
	during 	informal
	talks
	with
Association
	representatives,
	the
	District
	proposed
	a
	trade-off
of 	increased
	hours
	of
	work
	from
	37.5
	to
	40
	hours
	per
	week
	in
order 	to
	avoid
	salary 	level
	reductions.
	The
	talks
	continued
	on
June
	23.
	On
	June
	27 	CSEA
	told
	the
	District
	that
	the
	salary 	for
hours
	trade-off
	was
	rejected.
	On
	June
	30
	the 	governing
trustees
	acted
	on
	the
	emergency
	resolution
	introduced 	nine
	days
before,
	cutting
	salaries
	6.25%
	and
	freezing
	annual
	step
increments 	in
	pay.
	An
	Association
	spokesman
	objected 	to
	the
action
	taken, 	claiming
	that
	the
	District
	had
	committed
	an
	unfair
practice.
	This 	charge
	had
	not
	been
	resolved
	when,
	nearly
	a
month
	later
	on
	July
	26,
	with 	the
	parties 	at
	impasse
	five
	days
after
	negotiations
	began,
	the
	District
	restored 	the
	6.25%
salary
	reduction,
	but 	did 	not
	lift
	the
	step 	freeze.
	(At
	the
same
	time,
	though,
	the
	step 	freeze
	was
	removed
	for
	supervisors,
managers
	and
	confidential
	employees.)
At
	the
	June
	30
	trustee
	meeting,
	a
	third 	cost
	measure
	was
approved
	regarding
	payment
	of 	health
	and
	welfare 	insurance
premium
	increases
	set
	to
	go
	into 	effect
	on
	July 	1.
	A
written
resolution 	stated 	that
	the
	cost 	increase
	would 	be
	passed
	on
	to
employees.
	However,
	testimony
	and
	the 	minutes	
of 	the 	meeting
indicate 	that
	the
	trustees 	instead
	approved 	the	
District's
90-day 	absorption 	of	
the	
cost 	increases	
pending	
negotiations
between 	the
	parties.	
The	
District
	claims 	that 	the 	90-day
absorption
	was
	agreed 	to
	on 	June
	29 	by 	CSEA 1 s
	chapter
6
classified employee salaries was disclosed to CSEA at a
governing board meeting in the form of a proposed emergency
resolution. The following day, during informal talks with
Association representatives, the District proposed a trade-off
of increased hours of work from 37.5 to 40 hours per week in
order to avoid salary level reductions. The talks continued on
June 23. On June 27 CSEA told the District that the salary for
hours trade-off was rejected. On June 30 the governing
trustees acted on the emergency resolution introduced nine days
before, cutting salaries 6.25% and freezing annual step
increments in pay. 	An Association spokesman objected to the
action taken, claiming that the District had committed an unfair
practice. This charge had not been resolved when, nearly a
month later on July 26, with the parties at impasse five days
after negotiations began, the District restored the 6.258
salary reduction, but did not lift the step freeze. 	(At the
same time, though, the step freeze was removed for supervisors,
managers and confidential employees.)
At the June 30 trustee meeting, a third cost measure was
approved regarding payment of health and welfare insurance
premium increases set to go into effect on July 1. A written
resolution stated that the cost increase would be passed on to
employees. However, testimony and the minutes of the meeting
indicate that the trustees instead approved the District's
90-day absorption of the cost increases pending negotiations
between the parties. The District claims that the 90-day
absorption was agreed to on June 29 by CSEA's chapter
6

president.
	This
	claim
	was
	not
	controverted
	by
	that
	official's
testimony.
Testimony
	was
	offered
	on
	past
	practices
	in
	the
	District
relevant
	to 	those
	aspects 	of
	employment
	at
	issue 	in
	this
	case.
There 	has
	been
	no
	past
	practice
	by
	the
	District
	of
	withholding
salary
	or
	step 	increases.
	There 	has 	been
	past 	history
	of
	the
District
	absorbing
	health
	and
	welfare
	cost 	increases,
	although
the
	recent
	collective
	agreement
	expressly
	supercedes
	that
practice
	and
	limits
	District
	payment
	to
	a
	flat
	amount.
Finally,
	there
	has 	been
	no
	past 	practice
	in 	the
	District
	of
giving 	notice 	to
	the
	Association,
	prior
	to
	trustee
	meetings,
	of
forthcoming
	negotiating 	proposals; 	here, 	for
	example,
	the
District
	did 	not 	give
	notice 	to
	CSEA
	prior
	to
	the
	meeting
	at
which
	the
	June
	21
	salary
	reduction
	resolution
	was
	introduced.
CSEA,
	however,
	did 	receive
	an
	offer
	to 	negotiate
	about
	all
the
	changes
	eventually
	made 	by
	the
	District.
	In
	addition 	to
the 	informal
	talks
	described
	above,
	there
	was
	at 	least
	one
negotiating 	inquiry,
	and
	probably
	a
	second, 	extended
	by
District
	representatives.
	On
	June 	20,
	the
	District's
	attorney
telephoned
	an
	Association 	business 	agent 	to
	invite 	negotiations
on
	a 	new
	agreement.
	They
	set
	a
	tentative
	meeting
	for
	June 	28,
which
	later
	was
	not 	confirmed
	by
	CSEA
	and
	therefore
	never 	took
place.
	The
	Association 	did 	not
	call
	the 	business 	agent 	as
	a
witness.
	A
second 	comment, 	which
	could	
be	
construed 	as
	an
invitation 	to 	negotiate,
	was 	made 	by
	the	
chancellor 	to
	a
	local
Association
	official 	at 	the 	informal 	meeting 	of 	June 	21.	
The
Association 	representative 	testified 	that
	he
	told 	the
7
president. This claim was not controverted by that official's
testimony.
Testimony was offered on past practices in the District
relevant to those aspects of employment at issue in this case.
There has been no past practice by the District of withholding
salary or step increases. There has been past history of the
District absorbing health and welfare cost increases, although
the recent collective agreement expressly supercedes that
practice and limits District payment to a flat amount.
Finally, there has been no past practice in the District of
giving notice to the Association, prior to trustee meetings, of
forthcoming negotiating proposals; here, for example, the
District did not give notice to CSEA prior to the meeting at
which the June 21 salary reduction resolution was introduced.
CSEA, however, did receive an offer to negotiate about all
the changes eventually made by the District. In addition to
the informal talks described above, there was at least one
negotiating inquiry, and probably a second, extended by
District representatives. On June 20, the District's attorney
telephoned an Association business agent to invite negotiations
on a new agreement. They set a tentative meeting for June 28,
which later was not confirmed by CSEA and therefore never took
place. The Association did not call the business agent as a
witness. A second comment, which could be construed as an
invitation to negotiate, was made by the chancellor to a local
Association official at the informal meeting of June 21. The
Association representative testified that he told the

chancellor
	that
	CSEA
	did 	not
	want
	to
	formally
	negotiate
	until
the
	Legislature
	had
	determined
	what
	funds
	would 	be
	available 	to
help
	local
	districts.
	The
	chancellor
	testified
	that
	the
Association
	told
	him
	that
	negotiations
	should
	be
	deferred
	until
July.
	The
	Board
	does
	not
	find
	this
	testimony
	of 	the
	parties
	to
be
	inconsistent,
	as 	both
	sides
	were 	aware
	that
	legislative
action 	to 	soften
	the
	impact
	of 	Proposition
	13
	was
	pending
during 	the
	last
	part
	of
	June.
Formal
	negotiations
	between
	the
	parties
	did 	take 	place 	in
July.
	On
	July
	12
	the 	Association
	submitted
	its
	own
	proposal
and
	the
	District
	put
	forward
	its
	offer
	on
	July
	21.
	The
	parties
met 	on
	July
	21
	and
	July
	25,
	with
	the
	District
	conditioning
restoration
	of
	salaries
	and
	step 	increases
	on 	CSEA's
	dropping
the
	unfair 	practice
	charge.
	On
	July
	26
	the
	District
	declared
impasse
	in 	order 	to
	seek 	the
	assistance
	of
	a
	mediator.
Two
	unfair 	practice
	charges
	were
	filed
	by
	the 	Association
challenging
	the
	District
	actions 	described
	above.
	(The
	second
charge
	was 	amended
	in
	August 	1978, 	supplementing
	the
	initial
allegations.) 	Specifically,
	the 	Association 	claims
	that
	the
District
	violated 	section
	3543.S(c)
	of 	the 	Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	EERA)
	by
	unilaterally
adopti 	resolutions
	and
	taki 	action
	with 	respect 	to:
1. 	the 	involuntary	
s	
thout
2.	
the
	6.25%
	sal
	cutback;
3. 	increment 	eeze;
4. 	the 	health
	and
	welfare 	cost 	pass-on 	to 	oyees;
5. 	the 	health
	and
	welfare 	90-day 	cost 	increase
absorption
	by
	the 	District;
8
chancellor that CSEA did not want to formally negotiate until
the Legislature had determined what funds would be available to
help local districts. The chancellor testified that the
Association told him that negotiations should be deferred until
July. The Board does not find this testimony of the parties to
be inconsistent, as both sides were aware that legislative
action to soften the impact of Proposition 13 was pending
during the last part of June.
Formal negotiations between the parties did take place in
July. On July 12 the Association submitted its own proposal
and the District put forward its offer on July 21. The parties
met on July 21 and July 25, with the District conditioning
restoration of salaries and step increases on CSEA's dropping
the unfair practice charge. On July 26 the District declared
impasse in order to seek the assistance of a mediator.
Two unfair practice charges were filed by the Association
challenging the District actions described above. 	(The second
charge was amended in August 1978, supplementing the initial
allegations.) Specifically, the Association claims that the
District violated section 3543.5 (c) of the Educational
Employment Relations Act (hereafter EERA) by unilaterally
adopting resolutions and taking action with respect to:
1. the involuntary leaves without pay;
2. the 6. 258 salary cutback;
3. the step increment freeze;
4. 	the health and welfare cost pass-on to employees;
5 . 	the health and welfare 90-day cost increase
absorption by the District;
Co

6.	
the
	rescission
	of
	the
	salary
	reduction.
In
	its
	brief
	to
	the
	Board
	the
	Association
	withdrew
	its
charge
	regarding 	the
	salary
	cut
	rescission,
	and
	also
	withdrew
	a
charge
	that
	all
	of
	the
	measures
	taken
	by
	the
	District
	violated
the
	organization's 	rights
	under
	section
	3543.S(b)
	of
	the
	EERA.
The
	District
	offers
	three
	main
	defenses 	to
	the
	charges
filed.
	The
	first
	defense
	is 	that
	the
	income
	loss
	flowing
	from
Proposition
	13,
	in
	light
	of
	budgetary
	legal
	requirements
	facing
the
	District,
	created
	a
	business
	necessity 	to
	take
	unilateral
actions.
2	
One
	legal
	argument
	relied
	upon
	is
	a
	California
constitutional 	prohibition 	against 	public
	agency
	indebtedness.
The
	other
	legal
	argument
	is
	premised
	on
	a
	theory
	that
	employee
salary 	contracts
	would
	have 	been
	automatically 	created 	in
	July
at
	the
	salary 	level
	then
	in 	force,
	and
	any
	subsequent
	salary
reduction
	would
	have 	been
	precluded.
	In
	support 	of
	this
"necessity"
	argument
	the
	District 	states
	it
	acted 	in
	good
	faith
on
	the 	advice
	of
	its
	lawyers.
	The
	District
	also
	makes
	a
general
	argument
	that
	the
	rules
	of
	restraint
	on
	employer
unilateral
	actions 	in
	private 	sector 	labor
	relations
	should
	not
apply 	as
	strongly, 	or
	at
	all,
	in 	the 	public 	sector.
2The
	District 	raises
	a
	related
	argument
	that
	itsunilateral 	actions
	were
	excused 	or
	mitigated
	because	
the
governing 	board's 	resolutions 	of
	June
	28
	and
	June
	30
	stated
that
	the
	District
	would 	be
	available 	for 	negotiations
	with
exclusive
	employee
	representatives.
	For
	this
	reason, 	the
District 	asserts 	that 	its 	unilateral 	actions
	were
	"qualified."
However, 	the 	June	
30	
resolution 	covering	
the 	salary 	reduction
and	
the 	step 	freeze 	also 	stated	
that 	the	
District
	could
continue 	to 	take
	unilateral 	actions 	if 	financially 	required 	to
do	
so.
9
6. the rescission of the salary reduction.
In its brief to the Board the Association withdrew its
charge regarding the salary cut rescission, and also withdrew a
charge that all of the measures taken by the District violated
the organization's rights under section 3543.5 (b) of the EERA.
The District offers three main defenses to the charges
filed. The first defense is that the income loss flowing from
Proposition 13, in light of budgetary legal requirements facing
the District, created a business necessity to take unilateral
actions. One legal argument relied upon is a California
constitutional prohibition against public agency indebtedness.
The other legal argument is premised on a theory that employee
salary contracts would have been automatically created in July
at the salary level then in force, and any subsequent salary
reduction would have been precluded. In support of this
"necessity" argument the District states it acted in good faith
on the advice of its lawyers. 	The District also makes a
general argument that the rules of restraint on employer
unilateral actions in private sector labor relations should not
apply as strongly, or at all, in the public sector.
2The District raises a related argument that its
unilateral actions were excused or mitigated because the
governing board's resolutions of June 28 and June 30 stated
that the District would be available for negotiations with
exclusive employee representatives. For this reason, the
District asserts that its unilateral actions were "qualified."
However, the June 30 resolution covering the salary reduction
and the step freeze also stated that the District could
continue to take unilateral actions if financially required to
do so.
LO

The
	District's
	second
	defense
	is 	that
	the 	Association
waived
	its
	right
	to
	negotiate
	about 	the
	changes
	that
	were
adopted,
	after
	having
	been
	given
	notice
	and
	opportunity 	to
negotiate.
Finally,
	the
	District
	contends
	that
	the
	public
	interest
justified
	the
	partial
	contractual 	rescission
	approved
	by
	the
District,
	citing
	Civil
	Code
	section
	1689(b)
(6)
	as 	support 	for
this
	position.3
DISCUSSION
A. 	The
	District's
	"Necessity" 	Defense.4
It
	is
	unlawful
	for
	a
	public
	school
	employer
	to 	"refuse
	or
fail
	to
	meet
	and
	negotiate 	in
	good
	faith
	with
	an
	exclusive
representative"
5	
about
	a
	matter 	within
	the
	scope
	of
3civil
	Code
	section
	1689(b)
(6)
	states:
(b)
	A
party 	to
	a
	contract
	may
	rescind 	the
contract
	in
	the 	following
	cases:
(6)
	If
	the
	public
	interest 	will
	be
prejudiced
	by
	permitting 	the
	contract 	to
stand.
4The
	District
	makes 	a
	thresho 	claim
	that 	restoration 	ofthe
	1977-78
	salary 	level
	on
	July
	26 	mooted
	the
	earlier
cutback. 	But, 	the
	District's
	mootness 	argument 	can
dismi
	at 	the
	outset.
	The
	defense
	is
	not
	available
	where
the 	governing 	board, 	as 	here,
	has
	expressly 	reserved
	its 	rightto 	take 	further 	unilateral 	action 	in 	the 	future.
	Amador
	Valley(10/2/78)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	74. 	Also 	see
	NLRB
	v. 	AlliedProducts 	(6th
	Cir.
	1977) 548
	F.2d
	644 	[94
	LRRM
	2433].
5Government 	Code
	section 	3543.5,
	a
	provision 	of 	the
	EERA,
Government 	Code
	section
	3540,
	et 	seq. 	(Hereafter,
	allreferences 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code 	and 	EERA
	unless 	otherwiseind i ca tea
. )
10
The District's second defense is that the Association
waived its right to negotiate about the changes that were
adopted, after having been given notice and opportunity to
negotiate.
Finally, the District contends that the public interest
justified the partial contractual rescission approved by the
District, citing Civil Code section 1689 (b) (6) as support for
this position. 3
DISCUSSION
A. 	The District's "Necessity" Defense. 4
It is unlawful for a public school employer to "refuse or
fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive
representative" about a matter within the scope of
3civil Code section 1689 (b) (6) states:
(b) A party to a contract may rescind the
contract in the following cases:
(6) If the public interest will be
prejudiced by permitting the contract to
stand.
4The District makes a threshold claim that restoration of
the 1977-78 salary level on July 26 mooted the earlier
cutback. But, the District's mootness argument can be
dismissed at the outset. The defense is not available where
the governing board, as here, has expressly reserved its right
to take further unilateral action in the future. 	Amador Valley
(10/2/78) PERB Decision No. 74. Also see NLRB v. Allied
Products (6th Cir. 1977) 548 F. 2d 644 [94 LRRM 2433] .
Government Code section 3543.5, a provision of the EERA,
Government Code section 3540, et seq. (Hereafter, all
references are to the Government Code and EERA unless otherwise
indicated.)
10

representation.6	
The
	District
	does 	not
	deny
	that
	the
employment
	terms
	and
	conditions
	on
	which
	they
	took
	action 	are
within
	the
	mandatory 	scope
	of
	negotiations.
	The
	District
nevertheless
	argues
	that
	special
	circumstances,
	particularly
business
	and
	legal 	necessity,
	excused 	the
	District's
	duty
	to
negotiate
	prior
	to
	approval
	of
	unilateral
	changes.
The
	Board
	has
	previously
	determined
	that
	the 	duty
	to
negotiate
	derived
	from
	section
	B(a)
(5)
	of
	the
	Labor-Management
Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	LMRA)
	may
	be
	used
	to
	guide
interpretation
	of
	similar
	language
	in 	the
	EERA. 7	
See
	Pajaro
Valley 	Unified
	School
	District
	(5/22/78)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	51,
citing
	Sweetwater
	Union 	High
	School
	District
	(11/23/76)
	EERB
Decision
	No.
	4.
8	
Also
	see
	Fire 	Fighters
	Union
	v.
	City 	of
Vallejo
	(1974) 	12
	Cal.3d
	608. 	In
	Pajaro 	Valley,
	PERB
	dismissed
6section
	3543.2
	states:
The
	scope
	of 	representation 	shall
	be
	limited
to matters
	relating
	to
	wages, 	hours
	of
employment, 	and
	other
	terms
	and
	conditions
of
	employment.
	"Terms 	and
	conditions 	of
employment"
	mean
	health
	and
	welfare
benefits
..•
,
	leave, 	transfer
	and
reassignment
	policies, 	safety 	conditions 	of
employment,
	class 	size,
	procedures 	to
	be
used
	for 	the
	evaluation 	of
	employees,
organizational 	security
..•
,	
and	
procedures
for 	processing 	grievances
•..
, 	and
	the
	layoff
of 	probationary
	certificated
	school
	district
employeees
.•••
729 	u.s.c. 	151,
	et
	seq.
	LMRA,
	Section
	8
(a)
(5),
	29
	u.s.c.158
(a) (5), 	states:
an 	un
	ir 	act ice
	an• 	•
	to 	re 	se 	to 	bar 	inco
	ectively
	with 	the 	representatives 	of 	hisemployees
	•.••
8
Prior 	to 	July 	1, 	1978,
	PERB 	was 	known
	as 	the 	EducationalEmployment
	Relations 	Board, 	or 	EERB.
11
representation. The District does not deny that the
employment terms and conditions on which they took action are
within the mandatory scope of negotiations. The District
nevertheless argues that special circumstances, particularly
business and legal necessity, excused the District's duty to
negotiate prior to approval of unilateral changes.
The Board has previously determined that the duty to
negotiate derived from section 8 (a) (5) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (hereafter LMRA) may be used to guide
interpretation of similar language in the EERA. See Pajaro
Valley Unified School District (5/22/78) PERB Decision No. 51,
citing Sweetwater Union High School District (11/23/76) EERB
Decision No. 4. Also see Fire Fighters Union v. City of
Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 608. In Pajaro Valley, PERB dismissed
Section 3543.2 states:
The scope of representation shall be limited
to matters relating to wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions
of employment. "Terms and conditions of
employment" mean health and welfare
benefits. . ., leave, transfer and
reassignment policies, safety conditions of
employment, class size, procedures to be
used for the evaluation of employees,
organizational security. . ., and procedures
for processing grievances. . ., and the layoff
of probationary certificated school district
employeees. . . .
729 U.S.C. 151, et seq. LMRA, Section 8 (a) (5) , 29 U.S.C.
158 (a) (5), states:
It shall be an unfair practice for an
employer . 	to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his
employees
8Prior to July 1, 1978, PERB was known as the Educational
Employment Relations Board, or EERB.
11

an
	unfair
	practice
	charge 	based
	on
	a
	district's
	unilateral
deduction 	of
	dental
	and
	vision
	care
	costs
	from
	employee
	pay.
The
	Board 	found
	that
	the 	deductions
	were
	consistent
	with
	past
practice
	and
	the
	status
	quo
	in
	the
	district,
	and
	therefore
	did
not
	constitute
	unlawful
	unilateral
	action.
	Pajaro Valley,
however,
	does
	establish
	the
	EERA
	general 	rule 	barring
	an
employer's
	unilateral
	change
	of 	matters 	within 	the
	scope
	of
representation, 	relying
	on
	the 	holding
	of
	the 	United
	States
Supreme
	Court
	in
	NLRB
	v.
	Katz
	(1962)
	369
	U.S.
	736 	[50
	LRRM
2177] .
In
	Katz
	the
	court
	affirmed
	a
	National
	Labor
	Relations
	Board
finding
	that
	a
	unilateral
	grant 	of
	benefits, 	prior
	to
	any
negotiating
	impasse,
	without
	notice
	to
	or
	consultation
	with
	the
union,
	and
	without
	any 	showing
	of
	special
	circumstances
justifying
	the
	action, 	constituted
	an
	illegal
	refusal 	to
bargain.
	The
	court
	held
	that
	an
	employer's
	good
	faith
	or
subjective
	bad
	faith 	is 	irrelevant
	to 	finding
	a
	refusal
	to
bargain:
Unilateral 	action
	by 	an 	employer
	without
prior 	discussion
	with 	the 	union 	does
	amount
to
	a
	refusal
	to 	negotiate
	about 	the
	affectedconditions 	of
	employment 	under
	negotiation,
and 	must
	of 	necessity 	obstruct 	bargaining,
contrary 	to 	the 	congressional 	policy.
	It
will 	often 	disclose
	an
	unwillingness 	toagree 	with 	the 	union.
	It
	will 	rarely	
be
justified
	by
	any
	reason 	of 	substance.
	It
follows
	that
	the
	Board
	may
	hold 	such
unilateral 	action 	to
	be 	an
	unfair 	labor
practice 	in 	violation 	of
	8
(a)
(5),
	without
also 	finding 	the 	employer	
guilty
	of 	overall
subjective	
bad
	faith.	
[NLRB
	v. 	Katz, 	supra,369
	U.S.
	at
	747-748.J
12
an unfair practice charge based on a district's unilateral
deduction of dental and vision care costs from employee pay.
The Board found that the deductions were consistent with past
practice and the status quo in the district, and therefore did
not constitute unlawful unilateral action. Pajaro Valley,
however, does establish the EERA general rule barring an
employer's unilateral change of matters within the scope of
representation, relying on the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz (1962) 369 U.S. 736 150 LRRM
2177] .
In Katz the court affirmed a National Labor Relations Board
finding that a unilateral grant of benefits, prior to any
negotiating impasse, without notice to or consultation with the
union, and without any showing of special circumstances
justifying the action, constituted an illegal refusal to
bargain. 	The court held that an employer's good faith or
subjective bad faith is irrelevant to finding a refusal to
bargain:
Unilateral action by an employer without
prior discussion with the union does amount
to a refusal to negotiate about the affected
conditions of employment under negotiation,
and must of necessity obstruct bargaining,
contrary to the congressional policy. It
will often disclose an unwillingness to
agree with the union. It will rarely be
justified by any reason of substance. 	It
follows that the Board may hold such
unilateral action to be an unfair labor
practice in violation of 8 (a) (5) , without
also finding the employer guilty of overall
subjective bad faith. 	[NLRB v. Katz, supra,
369 U.S. at 747-748.]
12

The
	federal 	rule 	against
	unilateral
	changes 	has
	also
	been
applied 	in 	cases
	where 	an
	employer
	has
	asserted 	financial
necessity
	as
	a
	justification
	for
	its
	action.
	Although
	an
employer
	may
	be
	free 	to
	exercise
	its
	management
	prerogative
	to
close
	all
	or
	part
	of
	its
	business 	for
	financial
	reasons, 	the
employer
	must
	still
	give
	the
	employee
	organization 	notice
	and
opportunity 	to 	negotiate
	over
	the
	effects
	of
	the
	decision; 	for
example,
	the 	order
	and
	timing
	of
	employee
	layoffs,
	severance
payments,
	relocation, 	retraining,
	re-employment
	rights,
	and
	so
on.
	Oak
	Cliff-Golman
	Baking
	Co.
	(1973)
	207
	NLRB
	No.
	1063
	[85
LRRM
	1035];
	NLRB
	v.
	Royal
	Plating	
&	
Polishing
	Co.
	(3rd
	Cir.
1965)
	350 	F 	2d 	191 	[60
	LRRM
	2033].
	As 	a
	basis
	for 	these
negotiations
	the
	employer 	must 	be
	willing 	to
	provide
	an
employee
	organization
	with
	information 	supporting 	the
employer's 	claim 	of
	financial
	inability.
	NLRB
	v.
	Truitt
	Mfg.
Co.
	(1956) 	351
	U.S.
	149
	[38
	LRRM
	2024];
	NLRB
	v.
	Palomar 	Corp.
(5th
	Cir.
	1972)
	465
	F.2d
	731 	[80
	LRRM
	3217].
	However,
	a
	party
may
	also 	defer
	negotiations,
	maintaining 	the
	status
	quo,
	until
information
	is
	secured 	about 	the
	effects
	of
	a
	serious 	financial
change.
	NLRB
	v.
	Minute
	Maid
	Corp. 	(5th
	Cir.
	1960) 	283
	F.2d
	705
[47
	LRRM
	2072).
In
	sum,
	under
	ral
	law,
	inability
	to
	pay
	is
	a
negotiating 	ition 	rather
	than
	an 	excuse
	to
	avo
	the
negotiating 	obligation 	entirely.
The
	facts 	of
	is
	case,
	r,
	ar
	raise 	issues 	of
special 	concern 	to 	public 	sector
	employers 	seeking
	an
	exception
to 	the 	full-blown 	negotiating 	obligations 	of 	Pajaro 	Valley 	and
13
The federal rule against unilateral changes has also been
applied in cases where an employer has asserted financial
necessity as a justification for its action. Although an
employer may be free to exercise its management prerogative to
close all or part of its business for financial reasons, the
employer must still give the employee organization notice and
opportunity to negotiate over the effects of the decision; for
example, the order and timing of employee layoffs, severance
payments, relocation, retraining, re-employment rights, and so
on . 	Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co. (1973) 207 NLRB No. 1063 [85
LRRM 1035] ; NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co. (3rd Cir.
1965) 350 F 2d 191 [60 LRRM 2033]. As a basis for these
negotiations the employer must be willing to provide an
employee organization with information supporting the
employer's claim of financial inability. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co. (1956) 351 U.S. 149 [38 LRRM 2024]; NLRB v. Palomar Corp.
(5th Cir. 1972) 465 F. 2d 731 [80 LRRM 3217]. 	However , a party
may also defer negotiations, maintaining the status quo, until
information is secured about the effects of a serious financial
change. NLRB v. Minute Maid Corp. (5th Cir. 1960) 283 F. 2d 705
[47 LRRM 2072) .
In sum, under federal law, inability to pay is a
negotiating position rather than an excuse to avoid the
negotiating obligation entirely.
The facts of this case, however, arguably raise issues of
special concern to public sector employers seeking an exception
to the full-blown negotiating obligations of Pajaro Valley and
13

Katz.
	The
	District
	was
	confronted
	with
	the 	prospect 	of
	a
substantial
	budget
	reduction,
	brought
	on
	by
	an
	upsurge
	of
taxpayer
	unrest
	expressing
	itself
	through
	the
	ballot-box.
	In
comparison,
	the
	power
	of
	large 	corporation 	shareholders
	is
rarely
	exercised,
	as
	a
	legal
	or
	practical
	matter, 	in
	as
upsetting
	a
	fashion 	in
	the
	private
	business
	world. 	Here,
	these
problems
	were
	compounded
	because
	the
	District
	was
	operating
within
	a 	web
	of
	constitutional
	and
	statutory
	provisions
affecting
	a
	variety
	of
	employment
	matters,
	with 	but
	brief
experience 	in 	the
	field
	of
	collective
	negotiations
	touching
many
	of 	the
	same
	issues. 	Additionally, 	speculation
	and
	rumors
about
	financial
	prospects 	contributed
	to
	a
	sense
	of
	urgency
about
	the
	future.
But
	these
	considerations 	will
	not 	prevent
	an
	unfair
practice
	finding
	against
	a
	public
	employer.
	As
	in
	Katz,
subjective
	"good
	faith" 	is
	not
	sufficient
	excuse,
	"for
	it
	is
circumvention
	of 	the 	duty
	to 	negotiate
	which
	frustrates
	the
objectives 	of 	section
	B(a)
(5)
	much
	as
	does
	a
	flat
	refusal."
NLRB
	v. 	Katz, 	supra,
	369
	U.S.
	at
	743. 	There
	are 	several
reasons 	for
	this
	general
	principle,
	stemming 	from
	the
	potential
inherent
	dangers
	of
	uni
	teral
	conduct, 	including 	those
specifica 	relevant 	to 	the 	public 	sector
	These
	reasons 	are
convincing
	even 	though
	case-by-case 	nations
	employer
intent
	might
	reveal, 	as 	in
	this
	proceeding,
	that
	the
d
	not
	act
	wi
	subjective 	fai
One
	reason
	unilateral
	changes 	are 	disfavor 	is 	their
destabilizing
	and
	disorienting 	impact 	on 	employer-employee
14
Katz. 	The District was confronted with the prospect of a
substantial budget reduction, brought on by an upsurge of
taxpayer unrest expressing itself through the ballot-box. 	In
comparison, the power of large corporation shareholders is
rarely exercised, as a legal or practical matter, in as
upsetting a fashion in the private business world. Here, these
problems were compounded because the District was operating
within a web of constitutional and statutory provisions
affecting a variety of employment matters, with but brief
experience in the field of collective negotiations touching
many of the same issues. Additionally, speculation and rumors
about financial prospects contributed to a sense of urgency
about the future.
But these considerations will not prevent an unfair
practice finding against a public employer. As in Katz,
subjective "good faith" is not sufficient excuse, "for it is
circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the
objectives of section 8 (a) (5) much as does a flat refusal."
NLRB v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at 743. There are several
reasons for this general principle, stemming from the potential
inherent dangers of unilateral conduct, including those
specifically relevant to the public sector These reasons are
convincing even though case-by-case determinations of employer
intent might reveal, as in this proceeding, that the employer
did not act with subjective bad faith.
One reason unilateral changes are disfavored is their
destabilizing and disorienting impact on employer-employee
14

affairs.
	Fibreboard
	Paper
	Products
	Corp.
	v.
	NLRB
	(1964)
	379
U.S.
	203, 	211.
	This
	rationale
	applies
	when
	times
	are
	bad
	as
well 	as
	when
	times
	are
	good.
	An
	employer's 	single-handed
assumption
	of
	power
	over
	employment
	relations
	can
	spark
	strikes
or
	other
	disruptions
	at
	the
	work
	place. 	Similarly, 	negotiating
prospects
	may
	also
	be 	damaged
	as
	employers 	seek
	to 	negotiate
from
	a
	position
	of
	advantage,
	forcing
	employees
	to 	talk
	the
employer 	back
	to
	terms
	previously
	agreed
	to.
	This 	one-sided
edge
	to
	the
	employer
	surely 	delays,
	and
	may
	even
	totally
frustrate,
	the 	process
	of
	arriving
	at
	a
	contract.
A
second
	reason
	to
	prohibit
	unilateral
	changes
	of
employment
	conditions
	is
	to
	protect
	employer-employee 	freedom
of 	choice 	in
	selecting
	an
	exclusive
	representative.
	Employer
unilateral
	actions
	derogate 	the
	representative's
	negotiating
power 	and
	ability
	to
	perform 	as
	an
	effective 	representative 	in
the
	eyes
	of
	employees.
	Such
	action
	may
	divide
	one
	group
	of
workers
	from
	another
	group 	seeking
	special
	favors
	from
management,
	thereby
	undermining 	the
	principle 	of 	"exclusivity"
as 	well 	as 	organizational
	ability
	to
	fairly
	represent
	all
members
	of
	a
	single 	unit.
	NLRB
	v. 	Katz, 	supra,
	369
	U.S.
	at
	744.
Third, 	the
	rule 	against 	unilateral
	changes 	promotes
negotiating 	equality 	consistent
	with 	the
	statutory 	sign.
EERA
	compe
	negotiations
	with
	an
	exclusive 	resentative
(section 	3543.5), 	gives
	employee
	organizations 	negotiating
rights 	ior 	to 	final
	t-maki 	(section
3543.7), 	establishes 	public 	notice 	procedures 	to 	prevent
behind-closed-doors 	decision-making 	(section 	3547), 	and,
15
affairs. 	Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB (1964) 379
U. S. 203, 211. This rationale applies when times are bad as
well as when times are good. An employer's single-handed
assumption of power over employment relations can spark strikes
or other disruptions at the work place. Similarly, negotiating
prospects may also be damaged as employers seek to negotiate
from a position of advantage, forcing employees to talk the
employer back to terms previously agreed to. This one-sided
edge to the employer surely delays, and may even totally
frustrate, the process of arriving at a contract.
A second reason to prohibit unilateral changes of
employment conditions is to protect employer-employee freedom
of choice in selecting an exclusive representative. Employer
unilateral actions derogate the representative's negotiating
power and ability to perform as an effective representative in
the eyes of employees. Such action may divide one group of
workers from another group seeking special favors from
management, thereby undermining the principle of "exclusivity"
as well as organizational ability to fairly represent all
members of a single unit. NLRB v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at 744.
Third, the rule against unilateral changes promotes
negotiating equality consistent with the statutory design.
EERA compels negotiations with an exclusive representative
(section 3543.5), gives employee organizations negotiating
rights prior to final budget-making by management (section
3543.7), establishes public notice procedures to prevent
behind-closed-doors decision-making (section 3547) , and,
15

provides 	for
	neutral
	third
	party
	mediation
	and
	factfinding
	when
impasse
	has
	occurred
	(sections
	3548,
	3548.3).
	Given
	this
statutory 	structure
	and
	the
	sometimes
	delicate
	political
framework
	within
	which
	public 	sector
	labor
	relations
	takes
place,
	an
	employer's
	unilateral
	act 	prior
	to
	negotiations
inherently
	tips
	the
	negotiating
	balance
	so
	carefully 	structured
by
	the
	various 	provisions 	of 	the
	EERA.
	In
	short,
	the
	bilateral
duty 	to
	negotiate
	is
	negated
	by
	the
	assertion
	of
	power 	by
	one
party
	through
	unilateral
	action
	on
	negotiable
	matters.
Finally,
	when
	carried
	out 	in
	the
	context 	of 	declining
revenues,
	an
	employer's
	unilateral
	actions
	may
	also 	unfairly
shift
	community 	and
	political
	pressure
	to
	employees
	and
	their
organizations,
	and
	at
	the
	same
	time 	reduce
	the 	employer's
accountability
	to 	the
	public.
	This 	type
	of
	potential
competition
	is
	unique
	to 	the 	public 	sector
	and 	may
	occur 	even
though
	public
	employees
	"are
	not
	basically 	different
	from
private
	employees:
	on
	the
	whole,
	they
	have
	the
	same
	sort
	of
skills,
	the
	same
	needs,
	and
	seek 	the
	same
	advantages."
	Abood
v.
	Detroit
	Board
	of
	Education
	(1977) 	431
	U.S. 	209,
	at
	229-230
[95
	LRRM
	2411].
	An
	important 	purpose
	of 	public 	sector
collective
	bargaining
	is
	recognition 	of 	these
	employee
similarities	
and
	the	
related 	public
	employee 	need
	for	
effective
collective 	representation 	in
	a
	political
	system 	where
	there
	is
competition 	with 	other 	claims
	upon
	limited 	funds.
	The
Legislature's
	enactment
	of
	EERA	
attempts 	to 	deal 	with 	the
reality 	of 	possible 	conflict
	by
	establishing
	a
	balance 	of
rights
	and
	obligations
	between 	the 	parties. 	It
	was
	certainly
16
provides for neutral third party mediation and factfinding when
impasse has occurred (sections 3548, 3548.3). Given this
statutory structure and the sometimes delicate political
framework within which public sector labor relations takes
place, an employer's unilateral act prior to negotiations
inherently tips the negotiating balance so carefully structured
by the various provisions of the EERA. In short, the bilateral
duty to negotiate is negated by the assertion of power by one
party through unilateral action on negotiable matters.
Finally, when carried out in the context of declining
revenues, an employer's unilateral actions may also unfairly
shift community and political pressure to employees and their
organizations, and at the same time reduce the employer's
accountability to the public. 	This type of potential
competition is unique to the public sector and may occur even
though public employees "are not basically different from
private employees: 	on the whole, they have the same sort of
skills, the same needs, and seek the same advantages. " Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.s. 209, at 229-230
[95 LRRM 2411]. An important purpose of public sector
collective bargaining is recognition of these employee
similarities and the related public employee need for effective
collective representation in a political system where there is
competition with other claims upon limited funds. The
Legislature's enactment of EERA attempts to deal with the
reality of possible conflict by establishing a balance of
rights and obligations between the parties. It was certainly
16

not 	the
	Legislature's 	intent
	to 	permit
	the
	employer, 	through
its
	use
	of
	economic
	power,
	to 	upset
	this
	balance,
	intentionally
or
	innocently,
	and
	thereby
	pit
	one
	social
	interest
	against
another.
	Summers,
	"Public
	Employee
	Bargaining:
	A
Political
Perspective,"
	83
	Yale
	Law
	Journal
	1156,
	1192
	(1974).
This
	reasoning
	in
	support
	of
	the
	unilateral
	change
prohibition 	applies
	fully
	to
	the
	constitutional
	and
	statutory
framework
	within
	which
	public
	school
	employers
	and
	employee
organizations
	must
	operate.
	The
	District's
	invitation
	in
	its
brief
	to
	follow 	those
	jurisdictions 	that
	have
	excepted
	public
employers
	from
	the
	unilateral
	change
	prohibition
	after
	a
contract
	has
	expired 	and/or
	prior
	to 	negotiations
	is
	not
persuasive.
	See,
	e.g.,
	Board
	of
	Cooperative 	Educational
	Series
of
	Rockland 	County
	v.
	N.Y.
	State
	PERB
	(1977)
	41
	N.Y.2d
	753 	[95
LRRM
	3046].
	We
	also
	find
	no
	special
	justification
	in
	this
	case
to 	upset 	the
	collective
	negotiations 	structure
	and
	expectations
created	
by	
EERA.9
9To
	the
	extent
	the
	District
	has 	impliedly 	put
	forth
	a
claim of
	fiscal
	"emergency"
	as 	the 	ultimate
	reason 	for
	its
actions,
	the
	District
	has
	failed 	to 	offer
	an
	adequate
foundation
	and
	the
	assertion
	must 	be
	rejected.
	Sonoma
	County
Organization 	of 	Public
	Emplo
	ees 	v.
	Sonoma
	County,
	supra:
Pose
	man
	v.
	Dumke 	(1973) 	31
	Cal. 	.3d 	932.
	Nor 	may
	the
District
	find
	special
	excuse 	with
	its
	argument
	that
	the
	trustee
reso 	tions 	"qualifi
	II
	unilateral 	actions
	by
	the
possibili
	of 	future 	negotiations.
	This
	qualification
language
	was
	meaningless 	in 	the 	context 	of 	the 	additionalclause 	that 	reserved 	the
	Distr
	t's
	unilateral 	authoritv 	to
	act
in 	the 	future.
	The
	qualification
	did 	not 	have 	metamorpGic
powers, 	transforming 	the
	trustee's 	refusal 	to 	negotiate 	into
some 	II
	ical,
11
	de 	minimus
	vi 	tion 	of
	EERA.
	Ins
	,
the 	language 	supports 	the 	view
	of 	this 	decision 	that 	the
District 	interfered 	with 	the 	negotiations 	process
	by
17
not the Legislature's intent to permit the employer, through
its use of economic power, to upset this balance, intentionally
or innocently, and thereby pit one social interest against
another. Summers, "Public Employee Bargaining: A Political
Perspective, " 83 Yale Law Journal 1156, 1192 (1974) .
This reasoning in support of the unilateral change
prohibition applies fully to the constitutional and statutory
framework within which public school employers and employee
organizations must operate. The District's invitation in its
brief to follow those jurisdictions that have excepted public
employers from the unilateral change prohibition after a
contract has expired and/or prior to negotiations is not
persuasive. See, e.g. , Board of Cooperative Educational Series
of Rockland County v. N. Y. State PERB (1977) 41 N. Y. 2d 753 195
LRRM 3046]. We also find no special justification in this case
to upset the collective negotiations structure and expectations
created by EERA. 9
9To the extent the District has impliedly put forth a
claim of fiscal "emergency" as the ultimate reason for its
actions, the District has failed to offer an adequate
foundation and the assertion must be rejected. Sonoma County
Organization of Public Employees v. Sonoma County, supra;
Poschman v. Dumke (1973) 31 Cal . App. 3d 932. Nor may the
District find special excuse with its argument that the trustee
resolutions "qualified" the unilateral actions by the
possibility of future negotiations. This qualification
language was meaningless in the context of the additional
clause that reserved the District's unilateral authority to act
in the future. 	The qualification did not have metamorphic
powers, transforming the trustee's refusal to negotiate into
some "technical, " de minimus violation of the EERA. Instead,
the language supports the view of this decision that the
District interfered with the negotiations process by
17

The
	District
	argues, 	for
	example,
	that
	article
	XIII,
section
	40
	of
	the
	California 	Constitution
	prohibits
	public
agency
	operations
	on
	a
	deficit
	budget
	and
	that
	therefore
	the
District
	was
	required 	to
	take
	prompt
	cost
	reduction
	measures
	in
response
	to
	information
	it
	was
	receiving
	about
	anticipated
revenues
	for 	the
	next
	fiscal
	year.
	The
	need
	for
	a
	balanced
budget
	and
	debt
	limitation 	is
	only
	a
	general
	directive,
however,
	and
	may
	not
	be
	asserted 	to
	avoid
	a
	mandatory
obligation
	imposed
	by
	law,
	as
	distinguished
	from
	one
voluntarily
	incurred.
	Los
	Angeles
	County
	v.
	Byram 	(1951) 	36
Cal.2d
	694; 	Wright 	v.
	Compton
	Unified
	School
	District
	(1975)
	46
Cal.App.3d 	177;
	cf.
	Goleta 	Educators
	Association
	v. 	Dell'Armi
(1977)
	68
	Cal.App.3d 	830.
	In
	this
	proceeding
	there
	were
	lawful
obligations
	imposed 	on
	the
	District
	to
	pay 	employee
	salaries
(Ed.
	Code
	section
	88160,
	et
	seq.);
	to 	negotiate 	in
	good
	faith
with 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	(sections 	3540.l(h),
3543.S(c));
	and,
	to
	comply
	with 	the
	collective
	agreement's
reopener	
and	
step 	increase 	provisions.
The
	District
	did 	not 	abide
	by
	these 	obligations.
	Indeed,
first,
	the
	District
	did 	not
	assert
	indebtedness 	as
	a
	bar
	to
	all
salary 	claims, 	but 	objected 	to 	only
	a
	portion
	of
	the 	sa
	y
obligation, 	partially
	cutting
	wages 	on
	the 	basis
	a
speculative 	indebtedness
	that
	might
	arise
	in 	future.
Second, 	although 	the
	statutory
	and
	contractual 	negotiati 	duty
on
	ties
	did 	not 	compel
	District
	CSEA
	to 	re	
a
qualifying
	a
	statutory 	right
	CSEA
	already 	possessed,
	and 	by
setting 	itself
	up
	as 	the 	sole 	judge 	of 	the 	timing 	and 	nature 	ofunspecified 	changes 	in 	the 	future.
18
The District argues, for example, that article XIII,
section 40 of the California Constitution prohibits public
agency operations on a deficit budget and that therefore the
District was required to take prompt cost reduction measures in
response to information it was receiving about anticipated
revenues for the next fiscal year. The need for a balanced
budget and debt limitation is only a general directive,
however, and may not be asserted to avoid a mandatory
obligation imposed by law, as distinguished from one
voluntarily incurred. Los Angeles County v. Byram (1951) 36
Cal. 2d 694; Wright v. Compton Unified School District (1975) 46
Cal . App. 3d 177; cf. Goleta Educators Association v. Dell'Armi
(1977) 68 Cal. App. 3d 830. In this proceeding there were lawful
obligations imposed on the District to pay employee salaries
(Ed. Code section 88160, et seq. ) ; to negotiate in good faith
with the exclusive representative (sections 3540.1(h) ,
3543.5 (c)) ; and, to comply with the collective agreement's
reopener and step increase provisions.
The District did not abide by these obligations. Indeed,
first, the District did not assert indebtedness as a bar to all
salary claims, but objected to only a portion of the salary
obligation, partially cutting wages on the basis of a
speculative indebtedness that might arise in the future.
Second, although the statutory and contractual negotiating duty
on the parties did not compel the District and CSEA to reach a
qualifying a statutory right CSEA already possessed, and by
setting itself up as the sole judge of the timing and nature of
unspecified changes in the future.
18

final
	agreement,10	
the
	parties
	were
	required 	to
	make 	a
sincere
	collective 	effort.11	
The
	negotiating 	obligation
imposed 	on
	both
	parties
	would
	have
	permitted 	modification 	of
salary 	levels
	adopted
	in
	the 	school 	employer's
	final
	budget,
taking
	into
	account
	available
	revenues 	or
	a
	change
	in
	financial
circumstances
	(Ed.
	Code
	sections
	88162
	-
	88163).
	Rather 	than
pursue
	alternatives
	with
	CSEA
	that
	might
	have
	resolved
	its
potential 	financial
	problems
	expeditiously
	and
	lawfully,
	the
District
	acted
	on
	its
	own.
	Third, 	the
	District
	disregarded 	the
employees'
	vested
	contractual
	right
	to
	step 	increases.
	The
employees'
	lawful
	interest
	had
	accrued 	over
	time
	and
	was
incorporated 	in 	the
	collective
	agreement.
	California
	League
	of
City
	Employee
	Associations 	v. 	Palos
·\0erdes
	Library
	District
(1978)
	87
	Cal.App.3d 	135.
The
	District
	also
	argues 	in 	support
	of
	its
	"necessity"
defense
	that
	unless 	the 	cutbacks
	were
	in
	effect
	by
	July 	1, 	the
start
	of 	the
	second
	year
	of
	the
	collective
	agreement, 	the
existing 	contract 	salary 	level
	would
	remain
	in 	force
	at
	the
time 	the
	"publication
	budget"
	was
	approved
	in
	late 	July,
	and
that 	there
	would 	be 	no 	way
	to
	reduce
	salaries 	after 	that 	date.
lOFederal
	law 	does 	not
	"compel
	either 	party 	to 	agree 	to
	a
propos 	or 	require
	making
	of
	a
	concession
••.•
" 	LMRA,
section
	8
(d),
	29 	u.s.c.
	section
	158
(d).
llp1acentia 	Fire 	Fighters
	v. 	City 	of 	Placentia
	{1976) 	57
.App.3d 	9, 	25; 	NLRB
	v.
	Herman
	Sausage
	Co. 	(5th
	Cir.
	1960)5
	F.2d 	229, 	231-232
	[45
	LRRM
	2829];
	Cox
	(1958)
	toBargain 	in
	Good
	Faith
	71
	Harv.L.Rev. 	1401, 	1416
19
final agreement, 10 the parties were required to make a
sincere collective effort. 1l The negotiating obligation
imposed on both parties would have permitted modification of
salary levels adopted in the school employer's final budget,
taking into account available revenues or a change in financial
circumstances (Ed. Code sections 88162 - 88163). Rather than
pursue alternatives with CSEA that might have resolved its
potential financial problems expeditiously and lawfully, the
District acted on its own. Third, the District disregarded the
employees' vested contractual right to step increases. 	The
employees' lawful interest had accrued over time and was
incorporated in the collective agreement. California League of
City Employee Associations v. Palos Verdes Library District
(1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 135.
The District also argues in support of its "necessity"
defense that unless the cutbacks were in effect by July 1, the
start of the second year of the collective agreement, the
existing contract salary level would remain in force at the
time the "publication budget" was approved in late July, and
that there would be no way to reduce salaries after that date.
10Federal law does not "compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession. ..." LMRA,
section 8 (d) , 29 U.S.C. section 158 (d) .
1lplacentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976)
Cal. App. 3d 9, 25; NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co. (5th Cir. 1960)
275 F. 2d 229, 231-232 [45 LRRM 2829] ; Cox (1958) The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1416 (1958).
19
57

Fearful
	of
	being 	locked
	into
	a
	salary
	schedule
	it
	could 	not
meet,
	the
	District
	chose
	to
	lower
	salaries
	by 	6.25%,
	roughly
approximating
	the
	speculative
	revenue
	loss
	for 	the 	next
	fiscal
year.
	To
	support
	this
	position
	the
	District 	relies,
	first,
	on
the
	Education
	Code
	requirement
	that 	classified 	salaries
	be
fixed
	by
	the
	date 	of 	the
	publication
	budget,12	
and, 	second,
on 	an
	analogy
	to 	teacher
	contract
	cases
	interpreting
	the
Education
	Code
	as
	a
	bar	
to	
lowering 	next
	year's
	teacher
salaries 	after
	July
	1.13
However,
	for
	either
	reason, 	there
	is
	no
	basis	
to	
assume,
	as
the
	District
	does,
	that
	the 	previous
	year's
	salary
	would
	remain
inflexible.
	The
	statutes 	relied
	upon 	by
	the
	District
	to 	fix
	a
salary
	schedule 	by 	the 	date 	of
	the
	publication
	budget
	also
permit
	deferral
	of
	a
	final
	decision
	as 	well 	as
	eventual
reduction 	of
	salaries
	already
	approvea.14 	In
	this
	regard 	the
District
	was
	simply 	not
	under
	the
	time
	pressure
	it
	describes,
but, 	instead, 	expressly 	declined 	to 	take 	advantage
	of
	the
one-month 	budget
	extension 	provided 	in 	the
	bail-out
legislation.
	Had
	the
	District
	acted 	with
	less 	haste, 	in
	light
of 	the
	money
	available,
	the
	salary 	reduction
	and
	step 	freeze
12Eaucation
	Code
	section
	88162.
13ABC
	Federation 	of 	Teachers 	v.
	ABC
	Unified 	School
District
	(1977) 	75
	Cal.App.3d
	332, 	337-338, 	and
	cases
	citherein.
	The
	cases 	relied
	upon
	the
	District 	refer 	to
tion 	sections
	5101, 	13510,
	now
	sections
	79000
87806
	following 	reorganization 	of 	the 	code.
14Education 	Code
	sections 	88162-88163.
20
Fearful of being locked into a salary schedule it could not
meet, the District chose to lower salaries by 6.258, roughly
approximationthe speculative revenue loss for the next fiscal
year . 	To support this position the District relies, first, on
the Education Code requirement that classified salaries be
fixed by the date of the publication budget, 12 and, second,
on an analogy to teacher contract cases interpreting the
Education Code as a bar to lowering next year's teacher
salaries after July 1. 13
However, for either reason, there is no basis to assume, as
the District does, that the previous year's salary would remain
inflexible. 	The statutes relied upon by the District to fix a
salary schedule by the date of the publication budget also
permit deferral of a final decision as well as eventual
reduction of salaries already approved. 4 In this regard the
District was simply not under the time pressure it describes,
but, instead, expressly declined to take advantage of the
one-month budget extension provided in the bail-out
legislation. Had the District acted with less haste, in light
of the money available, the salary reduction and step freeze
12Education Code section 88162.
13ABC Federation of Teachers v. ABC Unified School
District (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 332, 337-338, and cases cited
therein. The cases relied upon by the District refer to former
Education Code sections 5101, and 13510, now sections 79000 and
87806 following reorganization of the code.
14Education Code sections 88162-88163.
20

could
	have 	been
	considered
	in
	negotiations.15	
Too,
	those
cases
	cited
	by
	the
	District,
	establishing
	next
	year's
individual
	teacher
	contracts
	and
	salaries
	as
	of
	July 	1,
	were
all
	decided
	prior
	to
	EERA's
	passage,
	and
	have
	only
	applied 	to
teachers,
	not
	to
	classified
	employees. 	There
	are
	no
	parallel
statutory
	grounds
	or
	decisions
	setting
	the
	classified
	employee
school 	year
	and
	salary
	as
	of
	July 	1.
	Finally,
	the
	employer 	and
CSEA
	had
	a
	potential
	negotiating
	duty
	arising
	out
	of 	the
contract
	reopener
	clause
	as 	well 	as
	a
	duty
	to
	negotiate
	over
the
	effects
	of 	prospective
	revenue
	cuts 	within 	the
	scope
	of
representation.
	For
	all
	of 	these 	reasons, 	the
	District's
actions
	were
	not
	justified.
As 	a
	last
	argument
	in 	support
	of
	its
	"necessity"
	defense
the
	District 	asserts 	that
	it
	acted 	in
	good
	faith
	on
	the 	advice
of
	its
	legal
	counsel.
	"Good
	faith" 	is
	not
	a
	defense 	in
	a
unilateral
	change
	situation
	because
	such
	actions
	are
inconsistent
	with 	the
	statutory
	duty 	to 	negotiate
	and
	are
equivalent 	to
	a
	refusal
	to 	negotiate.
	NLRB
	v. 	Katz,
	supra.
There
	is 	also
	no
	authority
	for 	the
	proposition 	that
	a
	lawyer's
counseling
	may
	be
	relied
	upon
	to
	avoid
	this
	express
	statutory
duty.
B. 	The
	District's
	"Waiver" 	Defense.
In 	order 	to 	prove
	that
	the 	Association
	waived
	its
	r 	t
	to
15we 	do
	not 	the 	question
	whe 	r
	the
	t
had
	a 	g
	faith 	obli
	ion 	to
	a
	into
	it's
	uncommit
reserves,
	a
	position 	the
	District
	firmly
	resists.
	We
	observe,however,
	that
	it
	appears 	the 	school 	employer
	is 	free 	to
	draw
upon
	those 	funds
	if 	it
	wishes. 	Education
	Code
	section 	85443;
California
	School 	Employees 	Association v. 	Pasadena 	Unified
School 	District
	(1977) 	71 	Cal.App.3d 	318.
21
could have been considered in negotiations. Too, those
cases cited by the District, establishing next year's
individual teacher contracts and salaries as of July 1, were
all decided prior to BERA's passage, and have only applied to
teachers, not to classified employees. There are no parallel
statutory grounds or decisions setting the classified employee
school year and salary as of July 1. Finally, the employer and
CSEA had a potential negotiating duty arising out of the
contract reopener clause as well as a duty to negotiate over
the effects of prospective revenue cuts within the scope of
representation. For all of these reasons, the District's
actions were not justified.
As a last argument in support of its "necessity" defense
the District asserts that it acted in good faith on the advice
of its legal counsel. "Good faith" is not a defense in a
unilateral change situation because such actions are
inconsistent with the statutory duty to negotiate and are
equivalent to a refusal to negotiate. NLRB v. Katz, supra.
There is also no authority for the proposition that a lawyer's
counseling may be relied upon to avoid this express statutory
duty .
B. 	The District's "Waiver" Defense.
In order to prove that the Association waived its right to
15we do not reach the question of whether the District
had a good faith obligation to dip into it's uncommitted
reserves, a position the District firmly resists. 	We observe,
however, that it appears the school employer is free to draw
upon those funds if it wishes. Education Code section 85443;
California School Employees Association v. Pasadena Unified
School District (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 318.
21

negotiate
	over
	the
	changes 	adopted
	by
	the
	District,
	the
employer
	must
	show
	either 	clear
	and
	unmistakable 	language,
Amador
	Valley, 	supra,
	or
	demonstrative 	behavior
	waiving
	a
reasonable
	opportunity 	to 	bargain
	over
	a
	decision
	not
	already
firmly
	made
	by
	the
	employer.
	NLRB
	v.
	Cone
	Mills
	(4th
	Cir.
1967)
	373
	F.2d
	595 	[64
	LRRM
	2536];
	Caravelle
	Boat
	(1977)
	227
NLRB
	No.
	162 	[95
	LRRM
	1003];
	Textron, 	Inc.
	(1973) 	180
	NLRB
	No.
96
	[73
	LRRM
	1097]. 	In
	this
	regard,
	the
	Board
	is
	mindful
	of 	the
particular
	burdens
	that
	public
	sector
	finances
	may
	impose 	on
employee
	representatives
	to
	reach
	speedy
	resolution
	of
	hard
economic
	problems.
	Employee
	organizations
	may
	not
	shield
themselves 	behind
	a
	restraint
	on
	unilateral
	employer
	actions 	as
a 	way
	of
	avoiding
	a
	measure
	of
	responsibility
	for
	mitigating 	or
resolving
	financial
	dilemmas
	confronting
	a
	public
	employer.
As 	a
	threshold
	concern
	relevant 	to 	the
	District's
	"waiver"
defense,
	both
	parties
	concur
	that 	their
	meetings
	in
	late
	June
were
	only 	informal
	efforts
	to
	work
	out 	interim
	arrangements,
and 	were
	not
	true 	negotiations.
	These
	informal
	talks
	may
	have
provided
	CSEA
	with
	some
	notice 	of 	possible
	changes 	(as
	did
other 	events 	during
	that 	period),
	but 	they 	cannot
	be
	construed
as 	waiving
	the 	employer's 	duty 	to 	negotiate
	over 	the
	salary
reduction
	or 	the 	freeze
	on
	year
	step
	increments.
	The
testimony
	shows
	that
	the 	Association
	responded
	to 	the
District's
	negotiati 	invitation
	and
	expression 	of 	interest
	by
stating
	CSEA's
	ference 	to 	wait
	a
	reasonable
	amount
	t
to 	secure 	the 	information 	needed
	actual 	negotiations.
	NLRB
v. 	Minute 	Maid
	Corp., 	supra.
	The
	District
	was
	not 	under 	any
22
negotiate over the changes adopted by the District, the
employer must show either clear and unmistakable language,
Amador Valley, supra, or demonstrative behavior waiving a
reasonable opportunity to bargain over a decision not already
firmly made by the employer. 	NLRB v. Cone Mills (4th Cir.
1967) 373 F. 2d 595 [64 LRRM 2536] ; Caravelle Boat (1977) 227
NLRB No. 162 [95 LRRM 1003]; Textron, Inc. (1973) 180 NLRB No.
96 [73 LRRM 1097]. In this regard, the Board is mindful of the
particular burdens that public sector finances may impose on
employee representatives to reach speedy resolution of hard
economic problems. Employee organizations may not shield
themselves behind a restraint on unilateral employer actions as
a way of avoiding a measure of responsibility for mitigating or
resolving financial dilemmas confronting a public employer.
As a threshold concern relevant to the District's "waiver"
defense, both parties concur that their meetings in late June
were only informal efforts to work out interim arrangements,
and were not true negotiations. These informal talks may have
provided CSEA with some notice of possible changes (as did
other events during that period) , but they cannot be construed
as waiving the employer's duty to negotiate over the salary
reduction or the freeze on yearly step increments. 	The
testimony shows that the Association responded to the
District's negotiating invitation and expression of interest by
stating CSEA's preference to wait a reasonable amount of time
to secure the information needed for actual negotiations. NLRB
v. Minute Maid Corp. , supra. The District was not under any
22

legal
	compulsion
	to
	adopt
	its
	policies
	on
	salaries
	and
	step
increases,
	or
	to
	reject
	the
	Association's
	request
	for
	time
	and
information
	prior
	to
	negotiations.
	Indeed,
	the
	District
	freely
admits
	that
	its
	resolution
	was
	predicated
	on
	speculation
	and
rumor
	about
	amounts
	to
	be
	available
	as
	a
	result
	of
	bail-out
legislation.
	And,
	once
	money 	was
	available,
	it
	is
	also 	evident
the
	District
	had 	enough
	to 	get
	by
	without
	cutting
	salaries 	at
all.
	In
	the
	end
	the
	facts
	did 	not
	justify
	the
	salary
	measures
taken
	by
	the
	District.16
Our
	analysis
	differs,
	however,
	on
	the
	issue 	of
	the
Association's
	waiver
	of 	negotiations
	regarding 	the
	policy 	of
involuntary 	leaves 	without
	pay.
	CSEA
	had
	actual 	notice 	of 	the
District's
	exercise 	of
	its
	management
	prerogative 	to 	cancel
summer
	school
	and
	agreed 	the
	closing
	would 	have
	consequences
for
	employees
	in 	the
	District
	who
	would
	not
	be
	needed
	over
	the
summer.
	It
	was
	the
	Association's
	burden
	to
	demand
	negotiations
over 	the
	effects
	of
	that 	cancellation
	once
	the
	District
	had
extended 	the
	invitation
	to
	negotiate.
	U.S.
	Lingerie
	(1968) 	170
NLRB
	No. 	77 	[67
	LRRM
	1482]. 	This 	burden
	to 	take
	up
	the
16The
	District
	contends
	that
	maintenance
	of 	the
	stepfreeze
	after
	the 	July
	26
	negotiating
	impasse
	was
	excusablebecause 	the 	Association
	had
	rejected
	a
	package
	offer 	to 	rescindthe
	District's 	unilateral
	measures. 	Impasse
	did 	not
	relieve
the
	District 	of	
responsiblity 	to 	correct
	its
	misdeed 	(Cf.
California
	League
	of 	City
	EmEloyee
	Associations 	v. 	Palos
Verde
Library
	District, 	supra),
	an
	error 	that
	was
	aggravated 	by
reinstating 	step 	allowances 	to 	non-unit 	employees.
itionally, 	the 	District
	improperly 	coupled
	its 	negotiati
offer
	wi 	a
	ition
	CSEA
	dismiss
	its
	un
	ir 	acticecharge. 	This 	proposed 	condition 	casts 	another
	shadow
	of
illegality
	over 	the 	Distr
	t's
	conduct. 	Morris,
	The
	DevelopiLabor 	Law 	(1971) 	p. 	301, 	n. 	205 	and 	cases 	cited 	therein.
23
legal compulsion to adopt its policies on salaries and step
increases, or to reject the Association's request for time and
information prior to negotiations. Indeed, the District freely
admits that its resolution was predicated on speculation and
rumor about amounts to be available as a result of bail-out
legislation. And, once money was available, it is also evident
the District had enough to get by without cutting salaries at
all. In the end the facts did not justify the salary measures
taken by the District. 16
Our analysis differs, however, on the issue of the
Association's waiver of negotiations regarding the policy of
involuntary leaves without pay. CSEA had actual notice of the
District's exercise of its management prerogative to cancel
summer school and agreed the closing would have consequences
for employees in the District who would not be needed over the
summer . 	It was the Association's burden to demand negotiations
over the effects of that cancellation once the District had
extended the invitation to negotiate. U.S. Lingerie (1968) 170
NLRB No. 77 [67 LRRM 1482]. This burden to take up the
16The District contends that maintenance of the step
freeze after the July 26 negotiating impasse was excusable
because the Association had rejected a package offer to rescind
the District's unilateral measures. 	Impasse did not relieve
the District of responsiblity to correct its misdeed (Cf.
California League of City Employee Associations v. Palos Verde
Library District, supra) , an error that was aggravated by
reinstating step allowances to non-unit employees.
Additionally, the District improperly coupled its negotiating
offer with a condition that CSEA dismiss its unfair practice
charge. This proposed condition casts another shadow of
illegality over the District's conduct. Morris, The Developing
Labor Law (1971) p. 301, n. 205 and cases cited therein.
23

District's
	offer
	was
	not
	relieved
	by
	the
	need
	for 	information
relevant
	to
	the
	salary
	cutbacks.
	This
	is
	so
	because
	time
	was
of
	the 	essence
	in
	order
	to 	release
	surplus
	employees	
by
by-passing 	the
	30-day
	"layoff" 	notice
	requirement
	--
	a
necessary
	step
	if
	summer
	school
	closure
	was
	to
	have
	meaningful
cost-saving
	benefit,
	regardless
	of
	any
	future
	legislative
action 	to
	ease 	the
	revenue
	losses 	associated
	with
	Proposition
13.17
At
	the 	very
	least
	CSEA
	could
	have
	negotiated
	over
	the
non-economic
	aspect 	of
	the 	leave 	of
	absence
	policy
	and
	its
impact
	on
	employees, 	even
	if
	the
	Association
	did 	not
	have
information
	needed
	to 	negotiate
	over
	wages.
	The
	failure
	of
CSEA
	to
	call
	its
	own
	business
	agent 	as
	a
	witness 	leaves 	the
Association 	without
	any
	explanation,
	beyond
	a
	need
	for
information, 	of
	why
	the
	organization
	did 	not 	respond
	to 	the
District's
	negotiating
	invitation.
	CSEA's
	claim
	that
	it
misunderstood 	the
	terms
	of
	an
	apparent
	arrangement 	with 	the
District 	that
	would 	have 	minimized
	the 	involuntary 	leaves
	by
shifting
	workers
	to 	other classifications,
	does 	not 	excuse 	the
17Eaucation
	Code
	section
	88017(c)
	permits 	layoffswithout
	30-day
	notice 	"for 	lack 	of
	funds
	in 	the 	event 	of
	an
actual
	and
	existing 	inability
	to
	pay
	salaries
	of
	c
	ssified
employees, 	[or) 	for 	lack 	of
	work
	res 	ting
	from
	causes 	not
foreseeable 	or 	preventable
	by
	the 	governing 	board."
	There
	is
no
	evidence 	of 	record
	that
	the
	District
	could
	have
	or 	did
	rely
on
	this 	provision. 	Rather, 	the 	evidence
	shows
	that
	the
District
	acted
	on
	the 	basis 	of
	its
	management
	prerogative 	to
allocate
	programmatic 	resources 	because 	of
	rumors
	that 	bail-out
f 	s
	ght
	be 	i
	to
	s 	s
	maintaini
	summer
	sessions.
Once
	the 	decision
	was 	made
	the
	District 	arrived 	at 	its
	new
leave 	policy 	to 	get 	around 	the 	statutory 	notice 	requirement
(see 	Education 	Code
	section 	88017(b)) 	in 	order 	to
	maximize
	the
cost-saving 	effect 	of
	summer 	school 	cancellation.
24
District's offer was not relieved by the need for information
relevant to the salary cutbacks. This is so because time was
of the essence in order to release surplus employees by
by-passing the 30-day "layoff" notice requirement -- a
necessary step if summer school closure was to have meaningful
cost-saving benefit, regardless of any future legislative
action to ease the revenue losses associated with Proposition
13. 17
At the very least CSEA could have negotiated over the
non-economic aspect of the leave of absence policy and its
impact on employees, even if the Association did not have
information needed to negotiate over wages. The failure of
CSEA to call its own business agent as a witness leaves the
Association without any explanation, beyond a need for
information, of why the organization did not respond to the
District's negotiating invitation. 	CSEA's claim that it
misunderstood the terms of an apparent arrangement with the
District that would have minimized the involuntary leaves by
shifting workers to other classifications, does not excuse the
17Education Code section 88017(c) permits layoffs
without 30-day notice "for lack of funds in the event of an
actual and existing inability to pay salaries of classified
employees, [or] for lack of work resulting from causes not
foreseeable or preventable by the governing board. " There is
no evidence of record that the District could have or did rely
on this provision. Rather, the evidence shows that the
District acted on the basis of its management prerogative to
allocate programmatic resources because of rumors that bail-out
funds might be denied to schools maintaining summer sessions.
Once the decision was made the District arrived at its new
leave policy to get around the statutory notice requirement
(see Education Code section 88017 (b) ) in order to maximize the
cost-saving effect of summer school cancellation.
24

Association's 	inaction,
	but
	actually
	argues
	that
	CSEA
	had
	a
full
	opportunity
	to
	negotiate
	and
	declined.
	This
	conclusion
	is
also
	supported
	by
	the
	District's
	timely
	institution
	of
involuntary 	leaves
	once
	the
	Association
	gave
	the
	District
official
	rejection
	of
	the 	informal
	trade-off
	previously
	worked
out.
The
	Association
	also
	waived
	its
	negotiating
	right
	over
	the
District's
	90-day
	health
	and
	welfare
	cost
	increase 	absorption
pending
	negotiations.
	Uncontradicted 	testimony 	as 	well 	as
	the
minutes
	of
	the
	June
	30
	meeting
	at
	which
	the
	action
	was
	adopted,
indicate 	that
	the 	governing
	board's
	formal 	motion
	to
	pass
	on
all
	fringe 	costs
	to
	the
	employees
	was
	altered
	to
	reflect
	the
District's
	readiness 	to 	absorb 	the
	costs
	for
	90
	days.
	A CSEA
official
	agreed
	to
	the
	District's
	90-day
	proprosal
	the
	day
before 	the
	trustee
	action
	and
	knew
	of
	the
	need
	for
	speedy
decision 	in
	light
	of 	the
	July
	1
	effectiveness 	of
	the
	cost
increase.
	The
	Association
	official
	did 	not
	testify
	on
	the
issue,
	thereby 	leaving 	uncontroverted 	the
	District's
	claim
	that
she 	agreed 	to 	the
	90-day
	proposa1.l8
C. 	The
	District's
	"Public
	Interest"
	Defense.
The
	District
	takes
	an
	additional
	tack 	in
	its
	effort
	to
18our
	conclusion
	would 	be
	dif 	rent,
	however
	if
	the90-day
	absorption
	was
	not
	a
	formal
	substitution
	for 	the
	totalcost 	pass-on 	language 	in 	the
	original 	resolution.
	Although
	a
total
	pass-on
	would 	have 	been
	consistent
	with 	the 	terms
	of 	the
contract
	between 	the
	parties,
	which
	express 	superseded
previous 	understandings 	provi 	for
	a
	specific
	r
dollar 	contribution 	figure 	(Pajaro 	Valley, 	supra~ 	Motor 	Car
Dealers 	Association
	(1976) 	225
	NLRB 	No. 	168 	[93
	LRRM
	1474]),
the 	original 	resolution
	on
	its
	face 	constituted
	a
	prospective
refusal 	to 	negotiate. 	(Ante, 	fn. 	9.)
25
Association's inaction, but actually argues that CSEA had a
full opportunity to negotiate and declined. This conclusion is
also supported by the District's timely institution of
involuntary leaves once the Association gave the District
official rejection of the informal trade-off previously worked
out .
The Association also waived its negotiating right over the
District's 90-day health and welfare cost increase absorption
pending negotiations. Uncontradicted testimony as well as the
minutes of the June 30 meeting at which the action was adopted,
indicate that the governing board's formal motion to pass on
all fringe costs to the employees was altered to reflect the
District's readiness to absorb the costs for 90 days. A CSEA
official agreed to the District's 90-day proprosal the day
before the trustee action and knew of the need for speedy
decision in light of the July 1 effectiveness of the cost
increase. 	The Association official did not testify on the
issue, thereby leaving uncontroverted the District's claim that
she agreed to the 90-day proposal. 18
C. 	The District's "Public Interest" Defense.
The District takes an additional tack in its effort to
18our conclusion would be different, however if the
90-day absorption was not a formal substitution for the total
cost pass-on language in the original resolution. Although a
total pass-on would have been consistent with the terms of the
contract between the parties, which expressly superseded
previous understandings and provided for a specific employer
dollar contribution figure (Pajaro Valley, supra; Motor Car
Dealers Association (1976) 225 NLRB NO. 168 [93 LRRM 1474]) ,
the original resolution on its face constituted a prospective
refusal to negotiate. (Ante, fn. 9.)
25

support 	the
	salary
	cutbacks
	and
	step 	freeze,
	claiming
	that
	the
public
	interest
	would
	have 	been
	prejudiced
	if
	certain
	portions
of
	the
	existing 	collective
	agreement
	had
	not
	been
	unilaterally
rescinded.
	The
	District 	cites
	Civil
	Code
	section
	1689 {b) (6)
	as
authority
	for
	this
	view.
	(See
	ante,
	fn. 	3.)
	This
	argument
	is
essentially
	the
	same
	as 	the
	"necessity"
	defense
	already
discussed
	and
	the
	District 	offers
	no
	additional
	legislative
declaration
	or
	public 	policy
	rationale
	for 	applying
	this
	code
provision.
	Some
	showing
	of
	legislative
	or
	public
	interest
policy
	has
	been
	required 	to
	support
	contract 	rescission.
	l
Witkin,
	Summary
	of 	Cal.
	Law,
	(8th
	ed.
	1973)
	section
	373,
	pp.
314-315.
	Nor
	does
	the
	District
	explain
	how
	it
	justifies
rescinding
	only
	certain
	provisions 	of
	a
	complex,
	interrelated
employment
	contract 	that
	does
	not 	appear
	to
	be
	severable.
Lessinq	
v.	
Gibbons
	(1935) 	6
	Cal.App.2d
	598. 	For
	these 	reasons
we
	reject
	the
	District's
	so-called 	public
	interest
	defense.
REMEDY
Section
	3541.S(c)
	provides
	that:
The
	board
	shall
	have
	the
	power
	to 	issue
	a
decision
	and
	order
	directing
	an
	offending
party 	to 	cease
	and
	desist
	from
	the 	unfair
practice
	and
	to 	take 	such
	affirmative
action, 	including 	but 	not
	limited 	to 	the
reinstatement	
of	
employees 	with 	or 	without
back 	pay, 	as
	will 	effectuate
	the
	policies
	of
this 	chapter.
The
	District 	violated 	section 	3543.S(c) 	by
	refusing 	to
negotiate 	with 	the 	exclusive 	representative	
regarding 	changes
of 	employee 	wages 	and 	increment
	benefits.
26
support the salary cutbacks and step freeze, claiming that the
public interest would have been prejudiced if certain portions
of the existing collective agreement had not been unilaterally
rescinded. The District cites Civil Code section 1689 (b) (6) as
authority for this view. (See ante, fn. 3.) This argument is
essentially the same as the "necessity" defense already
discussed and the District offers no additional legislative
declaration or public policy rationale for applying this code
provision. Some showing of legislative or public interest
policy has been required to support contract rescission.
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, (8th ed. 1973) section 373, pp.
314-315. Nor does the District explain how it justifies
rescinding only certain provisions of a complex, interrelated
employment contract that does not appear to be severable.
Lessing v. Gibbons (1935) 6 Cal. App. 2d 598. For these reasons
we reject the District's so-called public interest defense.
REMEDY
Section 3541.5(c) provides that:
The board shall have the power to issue a
decision and order directing an offending
party to cease and desist from the unfair
practice and to take such affirmative
action, including but not limited to the
reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this chapter.
The District violated section 3543.5 (c) by refusing to
negotiate with the exclusive representative regarding changes
of employee wages and increment benefits.
26
1

Although
	the
	District's
	salary
	reduction
	has 	been
	restored
by
	the 	governing
	board
	resolution
	of
	July
	26,
	the 	freeze
	on
	the
yearly
	step 	increases
	has
	not
	been 	removed.
	It
	is
	appropriate
to 	order
	lifting
	of
	the
	freeze
	on
	step
	increments,
	and
	payment
with
	interest
	of
	any
	step 	increases
	that
	have
	not
	been
	paid
during 	the 	period 	of
	the
	freeze.
	See
	Sanders
	v.
	Los
	Angeles
(1970)
	3
	Cal.3d
	252;
	Isis
	Plumbing 	and
	Heating
	Co.
	(1962) 	138
NLRB
	No. 	97 	[51
	LRRM
	1122].
	Additionally,
	it
	is
	appropriate
	to
order
	that
	the
	District 	refrain
	from 	any
	unilateral
	reduction
or
	freeze 	of
	employee
	wages
	without 	providing 	the
	exclusive
representative
	with
	notice
	and
	opportunity 	to
	negotiate.
	To
publicize
	this
	decision,
	the
	District
	should
	post 	notice
	of
	the
Board's
	order. 	Individual 	notice 	of
	the 	order
	should
	also
accompany 	one 	round
	of
	District
	salary
	payments
	to
	all
employees
	as 	well 	as
	payment
	of 	the
	improperly 	withheld
	step
increases.
	This
	step 	will
	insure
	that
	employees
	are
	directly
informed
	in
	a
	relevant 	context 	(that
	is,
	the
	pay
	envelope)
	of
the 	reasons 	for 	previous
	wage
	losses
	as 	well 	as
	current 	benefit
restoration.
The
	remaining
	unfair 	practice
	charges 	should
	be
	dismissed.
ORDER
Upon
	the 	foregoing
	facts,
	conclusions 	of
	law 	and
	the
	entire
record 	in
	this 	case,
	it
	is
	hereby
	ORDERED
	that
	the
	San 	Mateo
Coun 	Communi
	Distr
	t
	its
	sentatives 	11:
(1) 	Cease 	and
	desist
	from
	taking 	unilateral 	action
regarding 	proposed 	changes 	of 	employee 	wages, 	hours 	or 	terms
and
	conditions 	of 	employment 	as 	defined 	in 	Government 	Code
27
Although the District's salary reduction has been restored
by the governing board resolution of July 26, the freeze on the
yearly step increases has not been removed. It is appropriate
to order lifting of the freeze on step increments, and payment
with interest of any step increases that have not been paid
during the period of the freeze. See Sanders v. Los Angeles
(1970) 3 Cal. 3d 252; Isis Plumbing and Heating Co. (1962) 138
NLRB No. 97 [51 LRRM 1122]. Additionally, it is appropriate to
order that the District refrain from any unilateral reduction
or freeze of employee wages without providing the exclusive
representative with notice and opportunity to negotiate.
publicize this decision, the District should post notice of the
Board's order. Individual notice of the order should also
accompany one round of District salary payments to all
employees as well as payment of the improperly withheld step
increases. 	This step will insure that employees are directly
informed in a relevant context (that is, the pay envelope) of
the reasons for previous wage losses as well as current benefit
restoration.
The remaining unfair practice charges should be dismissed.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing facts, conclusions of law and the entire
record in this case, it is hereby ORDERED that the San Mateo
County Community College District and its representatives shall:
(1) 	Cease and desist from taking unilateral action
regarding proposed changes of employee wages, hours or terms
and conditions of employment as defined in Government Code
27

section
	3543.2,
	without 	providing 	the
	exclusive
	representative
with
	notice
	and
	opportunity 	to
	negotiate.
(2) 	Take
	the 	following
	affirmative 	action
	which
	is
necessary 	to
	effectuate
	the
	policies
	of 	the 	Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act:
(a)
	Reinstate
	step
	increment
	payments
	for
	classified
employees,
	with
	payment
	of
	interest 	at
	7%
	for 	the
	amount 	due
from
	the 	date
	of
	suspension 	of
	said
	increments
	to 	the 	date 	of
reinstatement.
(b)
	Post
	at
	all
	school
	sites,
	and
	all
	other
	work
locations
	where
	notices 	to
	employees
	customarily 	are 	placed,
immediately
	upon
	receipt 	thereof,
	copies 	of 	the
	notice 	attached
as
	an
	appendix
	hereto.
	Such
	posting
	shall
	be
	maintained 	for
	a
period 	of
	30
	consecutive
	days
	from
	receipt 	thereof.
	Reasonable
steps
	should
	be
	taken
	to 	insure
	that
	said 	notices 	are
	not
altered,
	defaced 	or 	covered
	by
	any
	other 	material.
(c)
	Mail
	or
	distribute
	to
	classified
	employees
	a
	copy
of
	the
	notice 	attached
	as
	an
	appendix
	hereto
	by
	giving
individual 	notice
	accompanying 	one 	round
	of
	District 	salary
payments
	and 	payment
	of 	step 	increases.
(d)
	Notify 	the
	San
	Francisco
	Regional
	Director
	of 	the
Public
	Employment
	Relations
	,
	in 	writi
	,
	within
	20
from
	the 	date 	of
	this
	Decision, 	of
	what
	steps 	the 	Distr
	t
	has
taken 	to
	comply
	herewith.
(3)
	It
	is
	fur
	r
	that
	the 	remaini
violations 	of 	section 	3543.S(c), 	regarding 	involuntary 	leaves
without 	pay 	and
	health
	and
	welfare 	costs, 	are 	hereby 	dismissed.
28
section 3543.2, without providing the exclusive representative
with notice and opportunity to negotiate.
(2) Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Educational
Employment Relations Act:
(a) Reinstate step increment payments for classified
employees, with payment of interest at 78 for the amount due
from the date of suspension of said increments to the date of
reinstatement.
( b ) 	Post at all school sites, and all other work
locations where notices to employees customarily are placed,
immediately upon receipt thereof, copies of the notice attached
as an appendix hereto. Such posting shall be maintained for a
period of 30 consecutive days from receipt thereof. Reasonable
steps should be taken to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail or distribute to classified employees a copy
of the notice attached as an appendix hereto by giving
individual notice accompanying one round of District salary
payments and payment of step increases.
) Notify the San Francisco Regional Director of the
Public Employment Relations Board, in writing, within 20 days
from the date of this Decision, of what steps the District has
taken to comply herewith.
(3) It is further ordered that the remaining alleged
violations of section 3543.5(c), regarding involuntary leaves
without pay and health and welfare costs, are hereby dismissed.
28

This
	order
	shall
	become
	effective
	immediately
	upon
	service
of
	a
	true
	copy
	thereof
	on
	the
	San 	Mateo
	County
	Community
College
	District.
By : / Harry Gluck, Chairperson 	/ Raymond J. Gonzales , Member	By: 	/
Harr/
Giuck,
	Ch~rperson
29
This order shall become effective immediately upon service
of a true copy thereof on the San Mateo County Community
College District.
29

Appendix:
	Notice.
NOTICE
	TO
	EMPLOYEES
POSTED
	BY
	ORDER OF
	TH.E
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD,
An
	Agency
	of
	the
	State
	of
	California
After
	a
	hearing
	in
	which
	all
	parties
	had
	the
	right
	to
participate,
	it
	has 	been
	found
	that
	the
	San 	Mateo
	County
Community
	College
	District
	violated
	the 	Educational
	Employment
Relations
	Act
	by
	taking
	unilateral
	action
	regarding
	proposed
changes
	of
	employee
	wages 	and
	step
	increments, 	without
providing 	the
	exclusive
	representative, 	California
	School
Employees
	Association,
	with
	notice
	and
	opportunity 	to 	bargain.
(Other
	alleged
	violations,
	regarding 	involuntary 	leaves 	without
pay
	and
	health
	and
	welfare
	costs,
	were
	dismissed.)
	As 	a
	result
of
	this
	conduct,
	we
	have
	been
	ordered
	to 	post
	this
	notice
	as
well 	as 	mail 	or
	distribute 	this
	notice
	with
	one 	round
	of
	salary
and
	step
	increment 	payments.
	We
	will
	abide
	by
	the 	following:
(a)
	Cease
	and
	desist
	from
	taking
	unilateral
	action
regarding
	proposed 	changes
	of
	employee 	wages,
	hours 	or 	terms
	or
conditions 	of
	employment,
	without 	providing 	the
	exclusive
representative
	with
	notice
	and
	opportunity 	to 	negotiate.
(b)
	Reinstate 	step
	increment
	payments
	for
	classified
employees, 	with
	payment
	of
	interest 	at
	7%
	for 	the
	amount 	due
from
	the 	date 	of 	suspension 	of 	said
	increments 	to 	the 	date 	of
reinstatement.
SAN MATEO 	COMMUNITY
	COLLEGE
	DISTRICT
By:
Superintendent	
---------------------
Da
This
	is
	an
	icial
	notice.
	It
	must 	remain 	ted
30
	consecutive 	days 	from
	the 	te 	of 	posting
	must 	not
	be,
	te 	or 	cove
	material.
30
Appendix : 	Notice.
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD,
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in which all parties had the right to
participate, it has been found that the San Mateo County
Community College District violated the Educational Employment
Relations Act by taking unilateral action regarding proposed
changes of employee wages and step increments, without
providing the exclusive representative, California School
Employees Association, with notice and opportunity to bargain.
(Other alleged violations, regarding involuntary leaves without
pay and health and welfare costs, were dismissed. ) As a result
of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this notice as
well as mail or distribute this notice with one round of salary
and step increment payments. We will abide by the following:
a) Cease and desist from taking unilateral action
regarding proposed changes of employee wages, hours or terms or
conditions of employment, without providing the exclusive
representative with notice and opportunity to negotiate.
(b) Reinstate step increment payments for classified
employees, with payment of interest at 78 for the amount due
from the date of suspension of said increments to the date of
reinstatement.
SAN MATEO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
By :
Superintendent
Dated :
This is an official notice. It must remain posted for
30 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be
defaced, altered or covered by any material.
30