Chula Vista City School District (PERB 0070E)

)
_____________ )
STATE 	OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CHULA VISTA 	ELEMENTARY 	EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, CTA/NEA,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CHULA VISTA CITY 	SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
)
)
) 	Case No. 	LA-CE-73
PERB 	Decision 	No.70
September 18, 	19 78
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances; 	Charles Gustafson, 	Attorney 	for 	Chula Vista
Elementary Education Association, 	CTA/NEA; 	Arlene Prater,
Attorney 	for 	Chula 	Vista 	City 	School 	District.
Before Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Cossack Twohey and Gonzales, Members,
DECISION
On October 	3, 	1977, 	Hearing Officer 	Kenneth Perea 	rendered
the 	attached 	recommended 	unfair 	practice 	decision. 	The 	case
involved 	a 	charge 	filed 	by 	Chula Vista 	Elementary 	Education
Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(hereafter 	Association) 	against 	Chula
Vista 	City 	School District 	(hereafter 	District). 	The 	charge
alleged 	that 	the 	District 	permitted 	the 	Chula Vista 	Federation
of Teachers 	(hereafter 	Federation) 	to address 	the District 	at a
public meeting 	on 	the 	subject 	of 	increasing 	the 	wages 	of
teachers. 	The 	charge 	further 	alleged 	that 	this 	act 	violated
the Association's 	right, 	as 	the exclusive 	representative 	of
certificated 	employees, 	to 	be 	the 	sole 	representative 	of 	those

2
lemployees 	in 	their 	employment 	relations with 	the District.1
The 	hearing 	officer 	found 	that 	the 	District 	did 	not 	meet 	and
negotiate 	with 	the 	Federation 	within 	the 	meaning 	of 	section
3540.1(h) 	of 	the 	Educational Employment 	Relations 	Act
(hereafter 	EERA).2 The 	hearing 	officer 	further 	found 	that
the 	acts 	alleged did 	not violate 	section 	3543.1(a) 	of 	the
-'•Government Code section 3543.1 (a) 	states:
Employee 	organizations 	shall 	have 	the 	right
to 	represent 	their 	members 	in 	their
employment 	relations 	with 	public 	school
employers, 	except 	that once 	an employee
organization 	is 	recognized 	or 	certified 	as
the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	an
appropriate 	unit 	pursuant 	to 	Section 	3544.1
or 	3544.7, 	respectively, 	only that employee
organization may 	represent 	that 	unit 	in
their 	employment 	relations 	with 	the 	public
school 	employer. 	Employee 	organizations 	may
establish 	reasonable 	restrictions 	regarding
who may 	join 	and 	may make 	reasonable
provisions 	for 	the 	dismissal 	of 	individuals
from membership.
EERA 	is 	codified 	at Government 	Code 	sections 	3540 	et
seq. 	Hereafter, 	all 	statutory references 	are 	to 	the Government
Code 	unless 	otherwise 	noted.
Section 3540.l(h) 	states:
(h)"Meeting 	and 	negotiating" 	means meeting,
conferring, 	negotiating, 	and discussing by
the 	exclusive 	representative 	and 	the 	public
school 	employer 	in 	a good 	faith 	effort 	to
reach 	agreement 	on matters 	within 	the 	scope
of 	representation and 	the execution, 	if
requested 	by either 	party, 	of 	a written
document 	incorporating 	any 	agreements
reached, 	which document 	shall, 	when accepted
by 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	and 	the
public 	school 	employer, 	become 	binding 	upon
both 	parties 	and, 	notwithstanding 	Section
3543.7, 	shall not be 	subject to subdivision
2 of 	Section 1667 	of 	the Civil Code. 	The
agreement may be 	for 	a period 	of 	not 	to
exceed 	three 	years.

5
3
EERA.3 Citing 	the 	decision 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Supreme
Court 	in Madison 	School 	District 	v. 	Wisconsin Employment
Relations 	Commission,4 the 	hearing 	officer 	concluded 	that
representatives 	of 	minority 	employee 	organizations 	have 	a 	First
Amendment 	right 	of 	free 	speech, 	and 	that 	the 	record 	in 	this
case 	showed 	no 	danger 	to 	the Association's 	status 	as 	exclusive
representative 	that 	would 	justify curtailing 	the 	right 	of 	free
speech 	of 	the Federation's 	representative.
The 	Association 	filed 	exceptions 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's
decision, 	claiming 	that 	the 	actions 	of 	the 	Federation
constituted more 	than 	"a mere 	expression of 	views," 	in 	that 	the
speech 	made 	by 	the 	Federation's 	representative 	was 	"meeting 	and
negotiating" 	within 	the meaning 	of 	the 	EERA.
We 	have 	considered 	the 	record 	as 	a whole, 	and 	have
evaluated 	the 	recommended 	decision 	in 	light 	of 	the 	exceptions
filed 	by 	the Association. 	We affirm 	the 	rulings, 	findings 	and
conclusions 	of 	the 	hearing 	officer 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	they 	are
consistent with this opinion.5
text of 	section 3543.1(a) 	is 	quoted 	at 	footnote 	1,
supra.
4 (1976) 	429 U.S. 	167 	[93 LRRM 2970].
5In 	addition 	to 	the 	facts 	found 	by 	the 	hearing 	officer,
there 	are 	three 	other 	facts 	discernible 	from 	the 	record.
First, 	a 	representative 	of 	the 	Federation made presentations 	at
two school board meetings 	after 	January 18. 	These
presentations 	were 	similar 	in 	content 	to 	the 	presentation 	of
January 18, 	and 	thus 	they provide 	no 	greater 	support 	for 	CTA's
position 	than 	does 	the 	January 	18 	presentation. 	Second,
members 	of 	the 	Federation 	picketed 	a 	school 	board 	meeting 	that
occurred on April 12, 	1977. 	This 	fact 	is 	irrelevant 	to the
charge 	that 	the 	District 	negotiated 	with 	the 	Federation 	in

4
The 	fundamental purpose 	of 	the 	EERA 	is 	to guarantee
collective 	negotiating 	rights 	to public 	school employees. 	The
principle 	of exclusive 	representation, 	adopted 	in 	the 	private
sector,6 is 	the 	key medium prescribed 	by 	the 	EERA 	for
effectuating 	collective 	negotiations. 	See 	sections 	3540,
3540.1(a), 	and 	3543.3.7 Negotiations 	that 	take place between
minority 	representatives 	and 	public 	school 	employers 	are
inimical 	both 	to 	the 	EERA and 	to 	the 	cardinal 	principle 	of
exclusivity, 	and 	are 	prohibited 	by 	the EERA.
(cont. 	of footnote 5)
violation of CTA's 	rights 	under 	the 	EERA. 	Third, 	uncorrob-
orated 	hearsay testimony indicated 	that 	the 	superintendent 	of
the 	District 	held 	meetings 	with 	the 	presidents 	of 	five 	employee
organizations 	biweekly, 	and 	that 	the 	superintendent 	had 	taken
the 	position 	that 	any matter, 	including 	those 	within 	the 	scope
of 	representation, 	could 	be discussed 	at 	those meetings. 	We
decline 	to give 	any weight 	to 	this 	evidence, 	both 	because 	it
constitutes 	uncorroborated 	hearsay, 	and 	because 	no 	evidence
indicates 	that matters 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation 	in
fact were discussed 	at 	those meetings. 	We 	note 	that 	the
original charge 	filed 	by 	the 	Association 	does 	not 	allege 	that
such 	meetings 	occurred, 	and 	that 	the 	charging 	party did 	not
amend 	its 	charge 	to 	allege 	that 	such 	meetings 	occurred.
6See 	Houde 	Engineering Corps 	(1934) 	1 	NLRB 	(old 	series)
35; Medo Photo Supply Co. 	v. NLRB 	(1944) 	321 U.S. 	678.
7Section 	3540 	states 	in 	pertinent part:
It 	is 	the purpose of 	this 	chapter 	to promote
the 	improvement 	of personnel management 	and
employer-employee 	relations 	within 	the
public 	school 	systems 	in 	the 	State 	of
California 	by providing 	a 	uniform 	basis 	for
recognizing 	the 	right 	of 	public 	school
employees 	to 	join 	organizations 	of 	their 	own
choice, 	to be 	represented 	by such
organizations 	in 	their 	professional 	and
employment 	relationships 	with 	public 	school
employers, 	to select one employee
organization 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative

5
We 	find, 	however, 	that 	considering 	the entire 	record 	in
this 	case, 	the District 	and 	the Federation were 	not 	engaged 	in
negotiations, 	nor 	did 	the District violate 	the Association's
right 	to be 	the 	sole 	representative 	of 	unit employees 	in 	their
employment 	relations 	with 	the 	District. 	We 	accordingly 	uphold
the 	hearing 	officer's 	conclusions.
(cont. 	of 	footnote 7)
of the employees 	in an appropriate unit, 	and
to afford 	certificated 	employees 	a 	voice 	in
the 	formulation 	of 	educational 	policy.
Section 	3543.1(a) 	is 	set 	forth 	at 	footnote 	1,
supra.
Section 	3543.3 	states:
A public 	school 	employer 	or 	such
representatives 	as 	it may 	designate who may,
but 	need 	not be, 	subject 	to either
certification 	requirements 	or 	requirements
for 	classified 	employees 	set 	forth 	in 	the
Education Code, 	shall meet 	and 	negotiate
with 	and 	only with 	representatives 	of
employee 	organizations 	selected 	as 	exclusive
representatives 	of 	appropriate 	units 	upon
request with 	regard 	to matters 	within 	the
scope 	of 	representation. 	(Emphasis 	added.)

ORDER
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	decision 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this
case, 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board ORDERS 	that :
The 	charge 	filed 	by 	Chula 	Vista 	Elementary 	Education
Association 	against 	Chula 	Vista 	City 	Elementary 	School 	District
is 	hereby DISMISSED .
By : 	Harry 	Gluck, 	Chairperson 	Raymond 	J . 	Gonzales 	-Mem~r
Jerilou Cossack Twohey, 	Member, 	concurring :
I 	agree with my 	colleagues' 	decision 	to 	dismiss 	the 	unfair
practice 	charges 	against 	the 	District . 	While 	upholding 	the
conclusions 	of 	the 	hearing 	officer, 	my 	colleagues 	have 	conspicuously
refrained 	fro m adopting 	the 	rationale 	of 	the 	hearing 	officer, 	yet
have 	not 	fully 	stated 	their 	own 	reasoning . 	My 	colleagues 	merely
admonish 	that 	minority organizations 	possess 	a 	right 	to 	freedom
of 	speech, · and baldly 	conclude 	that 	curtailment 	of 	that 	constitu -
tional 	freedom 	could not 	be 	justified 	in 	this 	case 	since 	the
District 	did not 	negotiate 	with 	the minority 	organization 	or vio-
late 	the 	right 	of 	the Association 	to 	be 	sole 	representative .
Their 	discussion gives 	little 	guidance 	on how 	the 	Board will
distinguish 	expressions 	of 	view 	fro m attempts 	to 	usurp 	the 	role
of 	the 	exclusive 	representative,
-6-

The 	circumstances 	of this 	case raise one of 	the most 	sensi-
tive and delicate problems 	of public 	sector 	labor relations: 	how
to 	reconcile 	the 	freedom of 	speech of minority 	organizations
before 	public meetings 	of 	a 	governmental 	body with 	the 	requirements
of 	the principle of 	exclusive representation. 	A 	similar 	question
does 	not 	arise 	in private 	sector 	labor 	relations 	as 	there 	are no
comparable 	public 	forums 	by which minority 	organizations 	have
access 	to 	the 	employer.1 In 	this 	delicate field 	it 	is 	incumbent
upon 	the 	Board 	to 	delineate 	the 	contours 	of 	acceptable and
unacceptable 	behavior.
The Board deals 	in 	this 	case with a charge brought by an
exclusive representative 	against 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	alleg-
ing 	that 	the 	employer violated 	sections 	3543.5 	and 	3543.1(a) 	by
allowing 	a minority 	employee 	organization 	to 	represent 	the 	unit
after 	the 	time 	the 	charging 	party was 	established 	as 	exclusive
representative. 	Such a 	charge may be 	sustained by a 	showing
that 	the public 	school 	employer: 	(1) 	negotiated or attempted
to negotiate with the minority organization; 	or 	(2) 	allowed the
minority organization 	to 	represent 	the 	unit 	in 	some manner 	other
than negotiating or 	attempting 	to negotiate.
In either 	instance, 	the first 	step 	of the analysis 	is 	to
determine whether 	the 	conduct 	of 	the minority 	organization
constituted negotiating, 	an attempt 	to negotiate, 	or representa-
tion of 	the unit. 	The 	second 	step 	is 	to 	determine 	to what 	extent
1 See Madison v. 	WERC 	(1976) 	429 U.S. 	167, 	174-75 	(majority
opinion), 	178-180 	(separate concurring opinions 	of Justices Brennan
and Stewart) 	[93 LRRM 2970, 	2973, 	2975-76].
-7-

the 	employer participated in 	the action of 	the minority-
organization.
Conduct 	of the 	Minority 	Organization
The United 	States 	Supreme 	Court has 	repeatedly held 	that
exclusivity 	is 	so 	central 	to 	the 	legislatively created 	structure
of 	industrial relations 	that 	some 	infringement 	of First Amend-
ment 	rights 	of 	association 	is 	justified.2 Only 	the 	exclusive
representative may negotiate with 	the 	employer 	about matters
within 	the 	scope 	of representation.
Negotiation 	is 	the process 	whereby 	an employee 	organization
and 	an 	employer 	seek to 	secure 	agreement.3 When 	a minority 	or
non-exclusive 	organization 	strives 	to 	reach 	an 	agreement with
the 	employer, 	the 	employer 	is 	subject 	to 	conflicting 	demands
which may 	severely 	disrupt 	the 	foundations 	of 	stable 	labor
relations. 	In these circumstances, 	a minority organization may
be 	forbidden from continuing 	to press 	its 	demands. 4 Constitutional
2 Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson 	(1956) 	351 U.S. 	225, 	233-
235 	(federal 	statute 	authorizing 	agency 	shop 	agreements 	for 	private
railway employees held constitutional) 	[38 LRRM 2099, 	2104];
Abood vo 	Detroit Bd., of Ed. 	(1977) 	431 U.S. 	209, 	220-21, 	232
(state 	statute 	authorizing 	agency 	shop 	agreements 	in public
sector held constitutional) 	[95 LRRM 2411, 	2415, 	2420].
3 Section 3540.l(h) 	defines meeting and negotiating as 	"meet-
ing ... in 	a 	good 	faith 	effort 	to 	reach 	agreement 	(Emphasis
added.) 	See Madison, 	supra. 	429 U.S. 	at 176 	[93 LRRM at 2973];
Abood, 	supra. 	431 U.S. 	at 221 	[95 LRRM at 2416-17]; 	The Emporium
(1971) 	192 NLRB 173, 	185-86 	[77 LRRM 1669, 	1671] 	affmd. 	420 U.S.
50, 	60-61 	[88 LRRM 2660, 	2664-65].
4 See Abood, 	supra. 	431 U.S. 	at 221 	[95 LRRM 2415].
-8-

protection of 	speech certainly 	extends 	to 	an organization's mere
expression of its viewpoint. 	But, 	when a minority organization moves
beyond 	a mere 	expression of view and begins 	to 	press 	for 	an
accommodation with 	the 	employer, 	or 	indicates 	to 	the 	employer
that harmonious 	employment 	relations will 	be 	secured only when
its 	separate 	demands 	are met regardless 	of 	the 	accommodation
reached with the 	exclusive representative, 	the minority organiza-
tion has 	engaged 	in 	activity 	which 	is 	neither 	protected by 	the
EERA or 	sheltered by 	the 	constitutional 	guarantees 	of 	speech and
association.
Of course, 	an 	employer may be made aware 	that 	it 	is 	being pressed
into negotiations 	with 	a minority 	organization by words 	and actions
that 	fall 	short of an express 	invitation 	to negotiate. 	In The
Emporium the NLRB 	examined 	the 	activities 	of 	two 	employees 	who
sought 	to 	rectify what 	they perceived as 	racially 	discriminatory
working 	conditions. 	Abandoning 	the 	grievance 	procedure which
the 	exclusive representative had determined to utilize, 	the two
employees 	sought 	to 	"discuss what was 	happening 	among minority
employees" with the 	"top management" 	of the 	employer o 	The 	employees
attempted 	to 	secure 	these 	discussions 	by holding 	a 	press 	conference
on 	their 	allegations 	of 	the 	employer's 	racially 	discriminatory
policies 	and by picketing and 	leafletting 	in 	front 	of 	the 	employer's
establishment. 	Reviewing 	these activities 	the NLRB 	found 	that
something more 	than 	a presentation 	of 	grievances 	had 	taken 	place,
-9-

5
and 	that 	the 	employees 	had 	in fact 	demanded 	to negotiate with
the employer for 	the entire group of minority employees.5
In 	the 	instant 	case 	insufficient 	evidence has 	been presented
to 	sustain a 	finding 	that 	the Federation attempted 	to negotiate
with the District. 	The record reveals 	that 	on one occasion 	a
Federation 	representative 	addressed 	the 	school 	board urging 	the
board 	to 	consider 	the 	special 	demands 	and 	strains 	to which
teachers 	are 	subject. 	On two other 	occasions 	the President 	of
the 	Federation 	addressed 	school board meetings 	spelling 	out 	in
greater 	detail her 	desire 	that 	teacher's 	salaries 	be 	as 	high as
administration 	salaries, 	characterizing 	the prior 	year's 	raise
as 	inadequate, 	and predicting that unless 	salaries met 	cost-of-
living 	increases 	that 	the 	District's 	charity 	drive would 	falter.
What 	the record 	lacks 	is 	any 	indication 	that 	the views 	expressed
on 	these 	occasions 	by Federation 	speakers 	materially 	differed
from the views 	of the Association. 	In fact, 	the Association
argues 	that 	its negotiating position was 	undermined because 	the
Federation presented arguments 	at 	the January 18, 	1977 	school
board meeting 	that 	the Association was 	holding 	in reserve 	for
negotiations. 	The Association 	complains 	only that 	the Federation
spoke 	out 	of turn. 	We must 	conclude 	that 	the Association was
not 	troubled by the presentation of 	the views 	of 	the Federation.
Rather 	the Association 	sought 	only 	to 	remove 	Federation personnel
5 Based 	on 	this 	finding 	the 	Board 	dismissed 	an unfair 	practice
charge 	alleging 	the 	employees 	had 	been 	discriminatorily 	discharged
for 	engaging 	in protected 	concerted 	activity.
-10-

from the 	spotlight 	of public 	attention available 	at public
school board meetings. 	But 	the EERA is not 	designed to protect
exclusive 	representatives 	from political 	rivals 	who 	find 	their
way into 	the public eye. 	Without more, 	the mere allegation
that 	the 	Federation gained 	attention by appearing 	at 	the 	employer's
public meeting 	affords no basis 	for 	a charge 	against 	the 	employer
for permitting 	the 	appearances.
However, 	the presentations 	of 	the Federation did not 	take
place 	in isolation. 	The record reveals 	that at 	the April 	12, 	1977
meeting of 	the 	school 	board 	Federation members 	picketed 	outside
and brought 	their 	signs 	inside 	(but 	there 	is 	no 	evidence of what
the 	signs 	said or whether 	they 	identified a position as 	that 	of 	the
Federation), 	chanted "16 percent and not a penny less" before the
meeting, 	and walked out of the meeting at 	an unspecified point.
Again, 	there 	is no 	evidence 	in the record on 	the precise reference
of the chant, 	the occasion of the walk-out, 	or 	language on 	the
picket 	signs. 	Thus we 	cannot 	determine whether Federation members
were 	thereby presenting 	demands 	which 	differed 	from 	those 	of 	the
Association, 	While 	the picketing, 	chant and walk-out by some employees
of 	the District 	all 	could 	convey 	to 	the District 	that harmony 	in
the District's 	schools was 	dependent on meeting 	the 	demands 	of
those particular 	employees, 	no 	evidence 	indicates 	that their demands
differed 	from 	those 	of 	the 	exclusive representative.
In short, 	we are presented with a 	case 	in which the exclusive
representative appears 	to 	be 	complaining 	that 	a minority organiza-
tion echoed 	its 	demands 	but 	in a 	louder voice. 	In 	these 	circumstances
it 	cannot 	be 	held 	that 	the minority organization was 	attempting
to negotiate with 	the District,
-11-

6
• 	• 	•
The 	charging party has 	also 	argued 	that, 	whether 	or not 	the
Federation 	attempted 	to 	negotiate with 	the 	District, 	the Federation
represented 	the 	unit members 	in 	their 	employment 	relations 	within
the meaning of 	section 3543.1(a). 	If 	so, 	the Federation would be
subject 	to 	an unfair 	practice 	charge under 	section 	3543.6(a)6
And, 	if the District 	acquiesced 	in 	the representational 	activities
of 	the Federation, 	it would potentially be 	subject 	to 	an unfair
practice 	charge 	under 	section 	3543.5(b)7. But 	sections 	3543.1(a)
and 3543.5(b) and 3543.6(a) will, 	if possible, 	be 	interpreted 	so
as 	to be constitutional, 	that 	is, 	constitutionally protected
freedom of 	speech will 	not 	be 	treated 	as 	a 	representational 	activity
in violation of 	the EERA. 	And 	speech which does not 	effectively
6Sec. 	3543.6(a) 	provides:
3543.6. 	It 	shall be unlawful 	for 	an 	employee
organization 	to:
(a) 	Cause or attempt 	to 	cause a public 	school
employer 	to 	violate 	Section 	3543.5.
7 Sec. 	3543.5(b) 	provides:
3543.5. 	It 	shall be unlawful 	for a public
school 	employer 	to:
(b) 	Deny to 	employee organizations rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
See Mount 	Diablo 	Unified School 	District 	(12/30/77) 	EERB
Decision No. 	44 at p.6.
8 People v. 	Amor 	(1974) 	12 	Cal.3d 20.
-12-

undermine 	the 	exclusive 	status 	of 	the 	exclusive representative 	is
constitutionally 	protected.g
To 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	status 	of 	the 	exclusive representative
had been undermined by the 	activities 	of 	the Federation, 	the
Association presented 	the 	opinion 	of 	the Association's 	chief
negotiator 	that 	the 	impact 	of his 	presentations 	during negotia-
tions 	had been 	lessened 	because 	the 	Federation's 	representatives
used 	the 	same 	information 	in presentations 	before 	the 	governing
board. 	But, 	the bald opinion of 	the Association's negotiator
was not 	corroborated 	in any way. 	The Association 	also presented
evidence that 	"two 	or 	three" Association members 	threatened 	to
resign 	if the Federation was permitted 	to behave as 	it was. 	In
these 	circumstances 	it 	cannot be 	found 	that 	the 	status 	of 	the
charging 	party was 	demonstrably harmed.
Conduct 	of 	the 	District
The 	record 	indicates 	that 	the District 	acquiesced 	in 	the
presentations 	of 	the Federation on January 18, 	February 	15 	and
April 	12, 	1977 	on the advice of its 	counsel that 	failure 	to allow
the 	presentation 	could well violate 	the 	rights 	of 	the 	Federation
to 	freedom of 	speech. 	On the other hand, 	the 	school board
prudently refrained 	from engaging 	in probing 	questions 	fearing
that 	it would 	thereby provoke 	a charge 	that 	it had 	allowed 	the
Federation representative 	to 	represent 	the unit. 	Caught between
9 See Madison, 	supra. 	429 U.S. 	at 	174-75 	[93 LRRM at 	2973]
Abood, 	supra. 	431 U.S. 	at 22-23 	[95 LRRM at 2416].
-13-

the 	constitutional 	demand 	of 	freedom 	of 	speech 	and 	the 	statutory
commitment 	to 	allow only 	the Association 	to 	represent 	the 	unit,
the 	school 	board 	chose 	a 	narrow middle 	path which we 	cannot
fault .
As 	to 	the picketing, 	chanting, 	and walk-out 	on April 	12,
there 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	the 	school 	board 	acquiesced 	in 	the
behavior . 	We 	are 	told 	that 	chanting 	took 	place 	before 	the
meeting. 	By 	implication, 	it 	ended when 	the meeting began . 	In
these 	circumstances 	i mproper 	involve ment 	of 	the 	school 	board 	in
the 	events 	of April 	12th cannot 	be 	found .
In 	sum, 	the Association 	did not 	establish 	that 	either
the 	Federation 	or 	the 	District 	engaged 	in 	conduct 	forbidden 	by
the 	EERA .
~rilou 	Cossack Twohey, 	Member
-14-

)
)
,
EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
OF 	THE 	STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
CHULA 	VISTA ELEMENTARY 	EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, 	CTA/NEA,
Charging Party,
vs.
CHULA 	VISTA 	CITY 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Unfair 	Practice
Case 	No. 	LA-CE-73
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances; 	Charles R. 	Gustafson, 	Attorney 	for 	Chula Vista
Elementary Education Association; 	Arlene 	Prater, 	Attorney 	for 	Chula
Vista 	City 	School 	District.
Before 	Kenneth A. 	Perea, 	Hearing Officer.
INTRODUCTION
On February 	11, 	1977 	the Chula Vista Elementary Education
Association 	(Association) 	filed 	an 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	with 	the
Educational 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(EERB) 	alleging 	a 	violation
of 	Government 	Code 	Section 	3543.5(a).1 The 	Chula Vista 	City
Elementary School 	District 	(District) 	filed 	an 	answer 	on March 	4,
1977. 	An 	informal 	conference was 	held on March 	28, 	1977 	and 	a
formal 	hearing 	was 	held 	before 	an EERB 	hearing 	officer 	on April 	21,
1977 	at 	the EERB Regional Offices 	in 	Los Angeles. 	Opening 	and
closing 	briefs 	were 	filed 	by 	the 	parties 	and 	an 	amicus 	Curiae 	brief
was 	filed 	by 	the 	Chula Vista Federation 	of 	Teachers.
l All 	section 	references 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code 	unless
otherwise 	specified. 	Section 	3543.5(a) 	protects 	the 	rights 	of
employees 	under 	the 	Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA).
(continued)
-1-

. '
The 	charging 	party 	contends 	that 	presentations 	by 	the 	Chula
Vista 	Federation of 	Teachers 	(Federation) 	at public meetings 	of
respondent's 	Board 	of Education 	(Board) 	are 	disruptive 	to 	the meet
and 	negotiate 	process 	and 	to 	the 	exclusive 	negotiating 	representative
status 	of 	the Association. 	The 	respondent 	argues 	that 	public
expressions 	by 	a 	representative 	of 	a minority 	employee 	organization
(one 	not 	certified 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative) 	are 	protected 	by
the 	First Amendment 	according 	to 	the 	recent 	United 	States 	Supreme
Court 	decision 	in Madison 	School 	District 	v. 	Wisconsin 	Employment
Relation Commission, 	429 U.S. 	167, 	97 S. 	Ct. 	421 	(1976).
ISSUE
Did 	the 	respondent's 	Board 	of 	Education 	violate 	Section
3543.5(b) 	by 	allowing 	a 	representative 	of 	an 	employee 	organization,
which 	is 	not 	the 	exclusive 	representative, 	to make presentations
regarding 	wages, 	hours 	of 	employment 	and other 	terms 	and conditions 	of
employment 	at 	a public 	Board meeting?
(footnote 	1 	cont'd)
Section 	3543.5(b) 	protects 	the 	rights 	of 	employee 	organizations
under 	the 	EERA. 	The Association 	apparently 	intended 	to 	allege 	a
violation 	of Section 	3543.5(b) 	because 	it 	alleges 	interference 	with
the 	right 	to represent under 	Section 3543.1(a). 	This 	is 	technically
an 	improper 	statement of 	the charge. 	All parties, 	however, 	have
treated 	this 	case 	as 	if 	there were 	an 	allegation 	that 	the 	employer
violated 	Section 	3543.5(b) 	by: 	(1) 	meeting 	and 	negotiating 	with 	a
minority 	employee organization 	representative; 	and 	(2) 	not 	allowing
the 	charging 	party 	to 	be 	the 	sole 	party 	to 	represent 	the 	unit 	in
its 	employment 	relations 	with 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	pursuant
to Section 	3543.l(a). 	Because 	there 	was 	no objection 	to 	the manner
in 	which 	the 	charge 	was 	filed 	and 	because 	all parties 	have 	treated
it 	as 	cited 	above, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	will 	do 	the 	same.
-2-

FINDINGS 	OF 	FACT
The 	Chula Vista City Elementary 	School 	District 	is 	located 	in
San 	Diego County 	and 	has 	an 	average 	daily 	attendance 	of
approximately 	15,395 	students.2 The 	Association 	was 	recognized 	as
the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	a 	classroom 	teachers 	unit 	on 	July 	6,
1976 	after 	the 	Federation withdrew 	its 	intervening 	petition. 	There
are 	approximately 730 	certificated 	employees 	in 	the 	unit.
On 	December 	6, 	1976 	the Association 	and 	the 	District 	signed 	a
collective negotiations 	agreement. 	That 	contract 	contains 	a reopener
clause. 	Under 	that 	clause3 the 	Association 	could 	reopen
negotiations 	on 	salary 	and 	health 	by 	notifying 	the Board 	between
February 	15, 	1977 	and March 	15, 	1977. 	On February 	15, 	1977 	the
Association 	notified 	the 	Board 	of 	its 	desire 	to 	reopen 	negotiations
on 	salary 	and 	health 	provisions.
On January 18, 	1977 Mr. 	Doug Hill, 	spokesperson for 	the
Chula Vista 	Federation of Teachers, 	addressed 	the 	Board regarding
the wages, 	hours 	of 	employment 	and working 	conditions4 of 	the
2
1977 	California 	Public 	School 	Directory 	published 	by 	the
Superintendent 	of 	Public 	Instruction, 	State 	of 	California.
3 Section 42, 	Paragraph 2 	reads:
"The 	exclusive 	representative may give 	notice 	to 	the Board 	by
certified mail between February 	15, 	1977 	and March 	15, 	1977 	of
its 	desire 	to 	reopen 	negotiations 	on Salary 	and/or 	Health. 	...
Upon 	receipt of written notice, 	arrangements 	shall be made
pursuant 	to provisions 	of 	SB 	160, 	including 	the public 	notice
provision, 	for meeting 	and 	negotiating 	to commence."
4 These 	matters 	are 	included 	in 	the 	scope 	of 	representation
under 	Section 	3543.2.
-3-

District's 	certificated 	employees 	and 	concluded 	by 	encouraging 	good
faith 	negotiations 	by 	the 	District 	on 	February 	15.5
Mr. 	Hill's 	presentation 	received 	publicity 	in 	a 	community
newspaper 	and 	in 	the 	District's 	Staff Newsletter.6
The 	Association 	objected 	to 	the 	Federation's 	public
presentation 	on 	subjects within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation 	to
the Board on January 	18, 	1977. 	Representatives 	of 	the Federation
have 	subsequently 	addressed 	the 	Board 	at 	regular 	public 	meetings.
Members 	of 	the 	Association 	have 	threatened 	to 	resign 	because
they 	felt 	that 	the 	Federation 	presentations 	were 	not 	fairly
representing 	the 	collective 	negotiations 	unit. 	The Association's
chief 	negotiator 	claims 	that 	the 	impact 	of 	his 	presentations 	during
negotiations 	was 	lessened 	because 	the 	Federation's 	representatives
previously 	used 	the 	same 	information 	in 	their 	public 	presentations.
5 The 	final paragraph 	of 	Mr. 	Hill's 	presentation 	reads:
"In 	conclusion 	I'd 	like 	to 	say 	that 	if 	you 	honestly 	believe
we're 	a 	first-class 	district 	and 	you 	honestly 	believe 	that 	we're
working 	in 	first-class 	programs 	and 	you 	honestly 	believe 	that
we're 	a 	district 	of 	first-class 	teachers 	then 	show your 	support
of 	our 	efforts 	by 	sitting 	down 	at 	the 	negotiating 	table 	February
15 	and 	renegotiating 	a 	salary 	schedule 	that mirrors 	your 	good
faith 	and 	support 	and 	not 	empty 	rhetoric."
6 The 	Chula Vista 	City 	School 	District 	Staff 	Newsletter 	of
January 	19, 	1977 	contained 	the 	following 	under 	"Communications":
"Doug 	Hill, 	representing 	the 	Chula Vista 	Federation 	of
Teachers, 	shared 	some 	of 	CVFT's 	concerns 	regarding 	upcoming
budgetary 	considerations 	and 	negotiations with 	the 	teachers'
exclusive 	bargaining 	representative 	(CVEEA). 	He 	said 	teachers
have more 	responsibilities, 	more pressures, 	extra work 	and
should 	be 	justly 	compensated 	for 	these 	increases."
-4-

CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
Meeting 	and 	Negotiating
Section 	3543.3 	creates 	the 	duty 	of 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	to
meet 	and 	negotiate 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	its
employees. 	Section 	3540.1(h) 	defines 	meeting 	and 	negotiating 	under
the EERA 	as:
"Meeting 	and 	negotiating" 	means meeting, 	conferring,
negotiating, 	and 	discussing 	by 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	and
the 	public 	school 	employer 	in 	a good 	faith 	effort 	to 	reach
agreement 	on matters 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation 	and 	the
execution, 	if 	requested 	by either 	party, 	of 	a written document
incorporating 	any agreements 	reached, 	which 	document 	shall, 	when
accepted 	by 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	and 	the 	public 	school
employer, 	become binding 	upon both parties 	and, 	notwithstanding
Section 	3543.7, 	shall 	not 	be 	subject 	to 	subdivision 	2 	of Section
1667 	of 	the Civil Code. 	The 	agreement may be 	for 	a period of
not 	to 	exceed 	three 	years.
The 	presentation 	by Doug 	Hill 	on January 	18, 	1977 	was made 	at 	a
public 	Board 	meeting. 	The 	speaker 	discussed 	the 	increased 	workload
and 	stress 	of 	the 	District's 	teachers 	and 	he 	requested 	that 	the
District 	negotiate 	in good 	faith 	in 	the 	upcoming 	negotiations.
It 	would 	stretch 	the 	imagination 	to 	conclude 	that 	Hill's
presentation was more 	than 	an 	expression of 	his 	views. 	Hill 	did 	not
attempt 	to 	reach 	an 	agreement 	with 	the Board 	by making 	his
presentation. 	Hill's 	address on January 	18, 	1977 preceded the
Association's 	request on 	February 	15, 	1977 	to 	reopen 	negotiations.
Nothing 	in Hill's 	speech 	was 	privileged 	information. 	Any other
concerned 	citizen 	or 	non-Federation 	member 	teacher 	in 	the 	District
could 	have 	delivered 	the 	same message. 	The Association, 	as 	the
exclusive 	representative 	of 	that 	unit, 	was 	not 	committed 	to
- 5-

follow Hill's 	proposals. 	The 	speech made 	by Hill, 	together 	with 	the
subsequent 	brief 	questions 	and 	answers, 	did 	not 	constitute 	"meeting
and 	negotiating" 	by 	the Board 	and 	Hill. 	Madison School 	District 	v.
Wisconsin Employment Relation Commission, 	429 U.S. 	167, 	97. S. 	Ct.
421 	(1976), 	93 	LRRM 2970.
To 	find 	that 	this 	presentation 	constituted 	"meeting 	and
negotiating" 	by 	the 	parties 	would 	disrupt 	existing 	negotiating
relationships.
To 	conclude 	that Doug Hill 	and 	the 	District were 	"meeting 	and
negotiating," 	as defined 	in Section 3540.l(h), 	on January 	18, 	1977
would 	be 	contrary 	to National 	Labor 	Relations 	Board 	precedents
regarding 	bargaining 	in 	good 	faith. 	To 	hold 	that Doug Hill's 	general
presentation 	to 	the 	school 	board 	and 	the 	board's 	subsequent 	limited
questions 	met 	the 	test 	for 	meeting 	and 	negotiating 	in 	good 	faith
would 	make 	it 	extremely 	difficult 	for 	any 	employee 	organization 	to
sustain 	a 	bad 	faith 	negotiating 	charge 	since 	almost 	any 	discussion
between 	an 	employee 	organization 	and 	a 	school 	district, 	no matter
how 	vague 	or 	innocuous, 	would 	still 	be meeting 	and 	negotiating 	in
good 	faith. 	See Akron Novelty Mfg. 	Co., 	1224 NLRB 	998, 	93 	LRRM 1106
(1976) 	and Herman Sausage Co., 	122 NLRB 	168, 	43 LRRM 1090 	(1958),
e n f d 	275 F. 	2d 229 	(5th Cir., 	1960). 	Therefore, 	Doug Hill's
presentation 	did 	not 	constitute 	"meeting 	and 	negotiating" 	under 	the
EERA.
Right 	to 	Represent
The Association 	contends 	that 	the District, 	in allowing Doug Hill 	to
address 	it 	in 	a 	representative capacity, 	has denied 	it 	the 	right 	to
exclusive 	representation 	defined 	in 	3543.1(a) 	of 	the Act. 	That
section provides:
-6-

3543.1 	(a) 	Employee 	organizations 	shall 	have 	the 	right 	to
represent 	their 	members 	in 	their 	employment 	relations 	with
public 	school 	employers, 	except 	that 	once 	an 	employee
organization 	is 	recognized 	or 	certified 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	an 	appropriate 	unit 	pursuant 	to Section 	3544.1
or 	3544.7, 	respectively, 	only 	that 	employee 	organization may
represent 	that 	unit 	in 	their 	employment 	relations 	with 	the
public 	school 	employer. 	Employee 	organizations 	may 	establish
reasonable 	restrictions 	regarding 	who may 	join 	and 	may 	make
reasonable provisions 	for 	the 	dismissal 	of 	individuals 	from
membership.
Because 	the 	interpretation 	urged by the Association would interfere with
important 	liberties 	of 	Federation's members, 	guaranteed 	to 	them by 	the
First Amendment 	to 	the United States 	Constitution, 	as 	applied 	to 	the
State 	of 	California 	by 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 7 (Edwards 	v. 	S.
Carolina, 	372 U.S. 	229, 	83 S. Ct. 	68 	1963) 	the hearing officer
cannot 	adopt 	Association's 	interpretation. 	Rather, 	Section 	3543.1(a)
will, 	if possible, 	be 	interpreted 	to be consistent with 	the
Constitution. 	People v. 	Amor, 	12 Cal. 	3d 20 	(1974): 	National
Movement 	for 	Student Vote 	v. 	Regents of University of California, 	50
Cal. 	App. 	3d 	131 	(1975).
The 	briefs 	of 	the 	parties 	discussed 	the 	recent 	United 	States
Supreme 	Court 	decision City of Madison Joint School 	District No. 	8
v. 	Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 	supra, 	at 2. In that case,
the 	Supreme 	Court 	reversed 	an 	order 	by 	the Wisconsin 	Commission
which 	forbade 	the 	plaintiff 	school 	board 	to 	allow 	any 	employee 	other
than 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	to 	address 	the 	board 	on 	matters
subject 	to 	collective 	bargaining. 	The 	board 	had 	previously 	allowed
a 	member 	of 	an 	employee 	unit 	which 	was 	represented 	by 	an 	exclusive
7 Article 	I, 	Sec. 	2 	and 	3 of 	the California Constitution
insure 	the 	rights 	of 	free 	speech 	and 	assembly 	to Californians, 	as
does 	the 	First Amendment 	to 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution. 	The
hearing 	officer 	believes 	therefore, 	that 	the 	rights 	to 	be 	discussed
arise 	under 	both 	Constitutions.
- 7 -

representative 	to 	address 	the board on 	its 	adoption 	of 	a
"fair 	share" 	(compulsory payment 	in 	lieu of organizational 	dues)
provision 	in 	a proposed collective, bargaining agreement. 	Although
the 	employee 	had 	announced 	to 	the 	board 	that 	he 	represented 	"an
informal 	committee of 72 	teachers 	in 49 	schools," 	since 	the
Wisconsin 	Commission's 	order purported 	to 	ban 	all 	speeches 	before
the board by 	employees, 	the 	Court 	did not 	reach 	the 	issue 	of 	the
employee's 	representative 	capacity.
Thus, 	the 	Madison 	decision 	does 	not 	directly 	answer 	the 	question
posed 	by 	the 	instant 	case. 	However 	it 	does 	provide 	a 	useful
starting 	point. 	It 	establishes 	beyond 	question 	the 	right 	of 	a
public 	school 	employee 	to 	speak 	at 	public 	sessions 	of 	the 	governing
board 	of 	the 	employer.
Many decisions 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Supreme Court, 	in many
contexts, 	have 	recognized 	that 	the 	people 	often 	exercise 	their 	First
Amendment 	rights 	collectively 	through 	organizations. 	In NAACP 	V.
Alabama, 	357 U.S. 	449 	(1957) 	the Court wrote:
Effective 	advocacy 	of 	both 	public 	and 	private 	points 	of 	view,
particularly 	controversial 	ones, 	is 	undeniably 	enhanced 	by 	group
association, 	as 	this 	Court 	has 	more 	than once 	recognized 	by
remarking 	upon 	the 	close 	nexus 	between 	freedoms 	of 	speech 	and
assembly (citations omitted). 	It is beyond debate that freedom to
engage 	in 	association 	for 	the 	advancement 	of 	beliefs 	and 	ideas
is 	an 	inseparable 	aspect 	of 	the 	"liberty" 	assured 	by 	the 	Due
Process Clause of 	the Fourteenth Amendment, 	which 	embraces 	the
freedom of 	speech. 	357 	U.S. 	at 460.
In Sweezy v. 	New Hampshire, 	354 	U.S. 	234 	(1957) 	the Court found
that 	state's 	criminal 	prosecution of a defendant, 	a Progressive
Party 	activist, 	for 	failure 	to 	answer 	questions 	regarding 	political
activities, 	very probably 	interfered 	with 	the 	activities 	of 	the
-8-

Progressive 	Party. 	It 	then 	concluded 	that 	"any 	interference 	with
the 	freedom of 	a party 	is 	simultaneously 	an 	interference 	with 	the
freedom of 	its 	adherents." 	(at page 	250)
One 	extremely 	important 	aspect 	of 	constitutionally 	protected
group 	association 	is 	the 	ability 	of 	a 	group 	to project 	its 	views
outside of 	itself, 	as the Federation 	did 	in 	this 	case by 	appointing 	a
spokesperson 	to 	address 	the Board. 	No one 	would 	doubt, 	for
instance, 	the 	right of 	a political party 	to put 	forward 	a 	candidate
for 	office. 	In Kusper v. 	Pontikes 414 U.S. 51, 	for example, 	the
Court 	struck 	down 	an 	election 	statute 	which 	"virtually 	precluded"
candidates 	of 	small 	parties 	from obtaining 	a place 	on 	the 	ballot.
In a footnote 	to Madison, 	supra at 	2, 	Chief Justice Burger, 	although
in 	dictum, 	made 	a 	statement 	applying 	these 	principles 	to
employer-employee 	relations 	in 	the 	public 	schools:
Surely no 	one would 	question 	the 	absolute 	right 	of
the nonunion 	teachers 	to 	consult 	among 	themselves,
hold meetings, 	reduce 	their views 	to writing, 	and
communicate 	those 	views 	to 	the public 	generally 	in
pamphlets, 	letters 	or 	expressions 	carried by 	the news
media. 	It would 	strain First Amendment 	concepts
extraordinarily 	to 	hold 	that 	dissident 	teachers 	could
not 	communicate 	those 	views 	directly 	to 	the 	very
decisionmaking 	body 	charged 	by 	law with making 	the
choices 	raised by 	the 	contract 	renewal 	demands.8
8 429 U.S. 	167, 	176, 	97 S. 	Ct. 	421 	(1976)
-9-

To 	hold 	that 	members 	of 	the 	minority 	teacher 	organization 	could
not 	express 	themselves 	through 	a 	representative 	at 	a 	school 	board
meeting 	would 	strain 	First 	Amendment 	concepts 	just 	as
extraordinarily. 	It 	would 	impose 	upon 	each 	member 	of 	the 	Federation
the 	ponderous 	alternative 	of 	appearing 	in 	person 	before 	the 	board 	in
order 	to make 	known 	the 	same collective 	view. 	The hearing 	officer
does not 	believe 	that Section 	3543.1(a) 	requires, 	nor 	that 	the
Constitution 	allows, 	a 	result 	which would 	so 	limit 	the 	enhanced
advocacy 	recognized 	in NAACP v. Alabama, 	supra, 	p. 	8. 	It is 	therefore
concluded 	that 	in using 	the words 	"represent 	that 	unit 	in 	their
employment 	relations..." 	the 	Legislature 	did not 	preclude 	a
non-exclusive 	representative 	from making 	presentations 	at
public meetings 	of 	school boards.
Of 	course, 	Chief 	Justice Burger 	specifically 	stated 	in Madison
that 	the 	Court 	did 	not 	have 	to 	reach 	the 	issue 	of 	a 	State's 	ability
to 	exclude 	minority 	teachers 	from 	actual 	collective 	bargaining
sessions. 	Given 	the 	Supreme Court's 	recent 	deference 	to 	a
legislative 	determination 	of 	the 	value 	of 	exclusive 	representation
by 	a majority 	employee organization 	in 	a 	public 	employment 	setting
(Abood 	v. 	Detroit Board 	of 	Education 	U.S. 	, 	95 	LRRM 2411,
2415, 	May 23, 	1977), 	it seems quite 	likely that such an exclusion
would 	endure 	constitutional 	scrutiny. 	However, 	the 	hearing 	officer
need 	not, 	and does 	not decide 	that 	issue 	here.
-10-

Like 	the 	Court's 	holding 	in Madison, 	supra 	at 	2, 	the record 	in
this 	case 	shows 	no 	danger 	to 	the Association's 	status 	as 	exclusive
representative 	that 	would 	justify 	curtailing 	the 	speech 	of 	a
minority 	employee 	organization's 	representative.
The 	harm 	to 	the 	exclusive 	representative's 	status 	must 	be 	a
direct 	result of 	the Board's 	willingness 	to 	listen 	to minority
employee 	organization 	speakers. 	The Association's 	claims 	of 	a
threatened 	loss 	of 	membership 	and 	membership 	unhappiness 	were 	not
supported 	by 	evidence 	detailing 	their 	direct 	causation 	by 	the
Federation 	representative's 	public 	presentations.
There 	is 	no 	evidence 	in 	the 	record, 	that 	said 	demonstrations
were 	a 	result 	of 	Hill's 	presentation 	to 	the Board. 	The presentation
and 	the 	demonstration 	occurred 	at 	separate Board 	meetings. 	Nor 	is
there 	any 	evidence 	that 	the 	same 	principal parties 	were 	involved 	in
both. 	Without 	evidence 	showing 	a 	causal 	nexus 	between 	the 	speech 	in
question 	and member 	dissatisfaction 	it 	is 	impossible 	to 	find 	any
harm 	to 	the 	Association. 	The Association's 	negotiator 	claims 	that
mistimed 	factual 	revelations 	disrupted 	the 	negotiation 	process. 	He
claims 	that 	Hill's 	presentation 	contained 	facts 	that 	would 	be 	better
used 	during 	negotiations, 	not 	at 	a public meeting 	before 	those
negotiations 	commenced.
There 	is no evidence, 	however, 	that negotiations have been
lengthened 	to necessitate 	an 	impasse 	or 	that 	the parties' 	positions
have 	been 	irrevocably 	altered 	as 	a 	result 	of 	Hill's 	presentation.
Therefore, 	this 	claim 	is 	insufficient 	to preclude 	the First
Amendment 	rights 	of 	concerned 	minority 	employee 	organization
representatives.
-11-

ORDER
The 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	filed by 	the 	Chula Vista
Elementary Education Association 	is 	hereby DISMISSED.
Pursuant 	to Title 8, 	Cal . 	Adm . 	Code Section 35029, 	this
recommended decision 	sha l l 	become 	a 	final 	order on October 	17,
1 977, 	unless 	a 	party 	fi l es 	a 	timely 	statement 	of 	exceptions .
See Tit l e 	8, 	Cal . 	Adm . 	Code 	Section 35030 .
Dated October 3, 	1 977.
-12-
Kenneth A. 	Perea
Hearing Officer