Sweetwater Union High School District (PERB 0004E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT, Employer
and
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCI-
ATION, CHAPTER 471, Employee
Organization
and
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION, LOCAL 102, AFL-CIO, Employee
Organization
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) Case Nos. 	LA-R-27
LA-R-28
LA-R-696
EERB Decision No. 	4
November 23, 1976
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Appearances: 	Brown & Conradi by Gerald A. Conradi, Attorney, for
Sweetheart Union High School District; William D. Dobson,
Attorney, for California School Employees Association, Sweetwater
Chapter 471; Anthony Butka, Research Director, Los Angeles County
Employees Association, for Services Employees International
Union, Local 102, AFL-CIO.
Before: 	Alleyne, Chairman, Gonzales and Cossack, Members.
OPINION
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 1, 1976, Service Employees International Union,
Local 102 (SEIU), filed with Sweetwater Union High School
District a request for recogition as the exclusive representative
of two units it described as a custodial-gardening unit and a
transportation unit. 	Sequently, California School Employees
Association, Sweetwater Chapter 471 (CSEA), filed an intervention
seeking recognition as the exclusive representative of a unit it
described as including all classified employees except bus
drivers. 	SEIU next filed an intervention to the board unit
seeking recognition as the exclusive representative of two
additional units it described as an instructional aides unit and
an office-technical and business services unit. All petitions and
interventions excluded noon-duty supervisors and managerial,
supervisory and confidential employees from the requested
units.ss 	On July 26 and 27, 1976, a formal unit determination
hearing was held before an agent of the Educational Employment
Relations Board.

ISSUES
The first issue addressed at the hearing was whether any of
the units proposed by SEIU and CSEA constitutes an appropriate
unit for negotiating purposes under the Act.
The other two issues presented at the hearing were whether
head custodians and school secretaries are "supervisors" within
the meaning of the Act.
DISCUSSION
Appropriate Units
The sweetwater Union High School District has an average
daily attendanace of approximately 29,227 students in grades 7
through 12 and adult school. 	There are 11 sites on which are
distributed nine junior high schools, seven senior high schools,
three adult education schools and one continuation school.1 The
district employs approximately 672 classified employees. 	The
district's salary schedule for classified employees for
administrative purposes divides the classified employees into
nine job groups which are: 	accounting/purchasing/distribution,
secretarial-clerical, duplications, instructional assistance,
caferteria, custodial, gardening, transportation, and
maintenance. 	It is from aa rearrangement of these groups that
SEIU forms six suggested units. 	The unit proposed by CSEA
includes all of the nine salary schedule groups, excepting the
job positions of bus driver I and II which are in the
"transportation" group.
Government Code Section3545(a) provides:
3545. (a) In each case where the appropriateness of the
unit is an issue, the board shall decide the question on
the basis of the community of interest between and among
the employees and their established practices including,
among other things, the extent to which such employees
belong to the same employee organization, and the effect
of the size of the unit on the efficient operation of the
school district.
Relying principally upon past practices, CSEA takes the
position that "historically...the CSEA has made salary proposals
and handled the grievances for all classified employees..." SEIU
emphasizes what it views as the absence of a community of
interest among the employees in the comprehensive unit requested
by CSEA, and stresses the presence of a seperate community of
1While the record is silent with respect to these facts, we
take official notice of the information reported in the Annual
Approtionments Report California State Department of Education,
Form J-19 (July 1976).

interest among the employees within each of the four units it
seeks.
Applying the statutory criteria to the facts of this case, we
concluded tht appropriate bargaining units in this case are (1)
and instructional aides (paraprofessional) unit, (2) an office-
technical and business services unit, and (3) a unit, which for
ease of reference wh shall describe as an operations-support
services unit, consisting of all other classified employees.
None of these units shall include noon-duty supervisors, for
which neither party petitioned, nor managerial, supervisory or
confidential employees.
I
We find that the board unit excepting bus drivers requested
by CSEA is not an appropriate unit. 	The evidence does not
require a decision in favor of this unit on the basis of
established practices, community of interest or efficient
operation of the school district.
CSEA presented evidence that before the Act became effective,
it submitted wasge proposals to the employer's Board of Trustee
which covered all classified employees. 	CSEA also showed that it
had filed or was prepared to file grievances on behalf of any
classified employee. 	At the time of the hearing CSEA has
approximately 135 members among the classified employees. 	SEIU
indicated that it is an employee organization recognized by the
district, that it had filed a wage proposal with the district for
fiscal year 1976/77, and that "Local 102 [does not have] any
dues-paying members that are employees of the district."
The described activities of CSEA and SEIU are "established
practices" within the meaning the Act. 	The occurred before
passage of the Act and under the authority of the Winton Act.2
The Winton Act enabled employee organization as the district "may
designate" pursuant to "reasonable rules and regulations" to
"meet and confer" with the public school employer.3 It did not
set forth criteria or procedures for determining appropriate
units. 	On this record we do not know whether the rules and
regulations adopted by the employer required an employee
organization to represent all classified employees as a
precondition to becoming a designated representative. 	Because of
the unspecified and possibly unilateral nature of the unit
designation procedure which existed in this district under the
Winton Act, in determining appropriate negotiating units in this
case we give little weight to "established practices" as they
2The Winton Act, Education Code Sections 13080-13090,
governed employer-employee relations in public schools before
passage of Government Code Sections 3545 et. seq.
3Government Code Sections 13085 and 13087.

relate to the composition of the unit represented under the
authority of that Act.
The following discussions regarding the appropriateness of
separate insturctional aides and office-technical and business
services units will reveal the lace of a community of interest
among the employees of the proposed board unit.
No evidence presented in this case regarding the efficient
operation of the school district; however, this criterion will be
addressed after discussion of the community of interest criteria.
II
The petition of SEIU for a unit of instruction aides includes
in the unit the following job positions: 	instrumental music
specialist, graphic art technician, aide to assistant principal,
career center technician, community aide-adult school, cultural
awarenesss facilitator, school-community relations facilitator,
vocational workshop technician,m instructional aide, and
instructional aide clerical. 	These job positions are identical
to those listed in the employer's salary schedule in the job
position of public information specialist from its petition
apparently because the district has designated the position as
confidential. 	The unit would consist of approximately 124
employees.
We decide in this case, as we decided in Pittsburg Unified
School District,4 that the instructional aides excepting the
instructional aides-clerical, are a separate appropriate unit
based upon a seperate and district community of interest.
In the present case, the job specifiecation of instructional
aides show that, unlike other classified employees, their primary
duties involve directly assisting in the educational development
of students. 	Further, they are required to have at least a
twelfth-grade education, generally including or supplemented by
courses in thespeical area of education in which the aide is
involved. 	Instructional aides are compensated 90 to 95 percent
by categorical funding. 	With very few exceptions, the
instructional aides work regular hours from 7:30 a.m to 4:00 p.m.
They have a line of supervision distinct from other classified
employees in that an aide is directly supervised by a classroom
or resource teacher, next by the Principal and the coordinator of
the categorically funded program through which they are employed,
and ultimately by the District Superintendent and Board of
Trustees.
The unique characteristics of the instructional aide
employees relating to work function, educational requirements,
4EERB Decision No. 	3, October 14, 1976.

compensation, work hours and supervision combined to establish
that a separate instructional aides unit is appropriate.
As in Pittsburg, supra, we don not include the instructional
aide-clerical in the instructional aides unit. 	The district job
specification for the instructional aide-clerical states that
while such employees may occasionally perform paraprofessional
instructional activities, their major work function is to perform
clerical tasks. 	Because, unlike all other aide classifications,
the instructionnal aide-clerical is not generally required to
interact with or work effectively and cooperatively with students
and basically performs a clerical function, this job position is
not included in the instructional aides unit.
III
The petition of SEIU for an office-technical and business
services unit includes in the unit the following job positions:
assistant purchasing agent, accountant, payroll supervisor,
accounting technician, buyer, accountant clerk, financial clerk,
secretary IV, secretary III, school secretary, secretary II,
school clerk III/attendance, school clerk III/ library
technician, school clerk III/registrar, secretary I, typist clerk
III, school clerk II, typist clerk II, school clerk I, PABX
operator/receptionist, typist clerk I, duplicating equipment
operator II, duplications production technician and duplicating
equipment operator I. 	These job positions are identical to those
listed in the employer's salary schedule in the job grouping
titled "accounting/purchasing/distribution", "secretarial-
clerical" and "duplications", except the job positions of
warehouseman which are in the
"accounting/purchasing/distribution" group were not included in
the petition. 	The unit would consist of approximately 200
employees.
We find that the office-techincal and business services
employees constitute a separate appropriate unit based upon a
separate and district community of interest.
The functions of the office-technical and business services
are employees are generally to perform clerical and recordkeeping
work rather than physical labor. 	These employees are required to
type, operate business machines, maintain files and keep
records. 	They are required to have at least a twelfth-grade
education, sometimes supplemented by additionally courses in
business or financial recordkeeping. 	Approximately 	85 to 90
percent to these employees are compensated through the general
fund. 	The remainder are largely categorically funded. 	The
office-technical and business services employees work regular
hours from 7:30 a.m to 4:00 p.m. 	They work in offices at the
school sites or the district office. 	There are three lines of
supervision for office-technical and business services employees
which are distinct from the other clasified employees, each
culminating with the District Superintendent and the Board of

Trustees. 	Clerical workers at the school sites report to the
school Principal. 	Administrative clerks working at the district
office in categorically-funded programs report to the program
coordinator, the general director of the categorically-funded
programs and the Assistant Superintendent of Instructional
Services. 	Administrative clerks working at the district office
for various departments report to the particular department head
and the Business Manager.
The unique characteristics of the office-technical and
business services employees relating to work function,
educational requirements, compensation, work hours and
supervision combined to establish that a separate office-
technical and business services unit is appropriate.
In addition to the job positions listed in the petitioned
filed by SEIU, this unit shall contain employees in the job
position of instructional aide-clerical. 	As in Pittsburg, supra,
we find that the job function of these employees is more akin to
that of the employees in the office-technical and business
services unit than those in the instructional aides unit.
IV
The classified employees remaining after the establishment of
the instructional aides unit and the office-technical and
business services unit are also the subject of the petitions
filed by SEIU and CSEA. 	The petition filed by SEIU for a
transportation unit requests the representation of the following
job positions: 	maintenance mechanic II, foreman/heavy and light
duty trans., transportation foreman and driver training vehicle
operations, maintenance mechanic II/ heavy and light duty trans.,
bus driver II, and bus driver I. 	These job positions are
identical to those listed in the employer's salary schedule in
the job grouping titled "transportation." 	This proposed unit
would consist of approximately 30 employees. 	The petition filed
by SEIU for a custodial-gardening unit requests representation of
the following job positions: 	head custodian, lead custodian,
pool attendant, locker room attendant/custodian, custodian,
gardener, and gardener-groundsman. 	These job positions are
identical to those listed in the employer's salary schedule in
the job groups titled "custodial' and "gardening." 	This proposed
unit would consist of approximately 146 employees.
The other classified employees were the subject of the
petition filed by CSEA for the board unit. 	Their job positions
are those listed in the employer's salary schedule in the job
groupings of "cafeteria" and "maintenance." 	Also included are
the warehouseman and deliveryman listed on the salary schedule in
the "accounting/purchasing/distribution" job group. 	In addition
to the warehouseman and deliveryman, the job positions involved
are the following: 	caferteria warehouse/deliveryman, cafeteria
manager, baker, cook, cafeteria assistant, maintenance mechanic
II foreman/plumbing, maintenance mechanic I foreman/ carpentry,

maintenance mechanic I foreman/painting, maintenance mechanic II
leadman/audiovisual repair, maintenance mechanic II/audio-visual
repairman, maintenance mechanic II/ electrician, maintenance
mechanic II/ heating and air conditioning repairman, maintenance
mechanic II/machinist, maintenance mechanic II/ office machine
repairman, maintenance mechanic II/ plumber, maintenance mechaic
I/ carpentry, maintenance mechanic I/ heavy equipment operator,
maintenance mechanic I/locksmith maintenance mechanic I/metal
fabricator, maintenance mechanic I/painter, general maintenance
man, and utilityman. 	there are approximately 97 caferteria
employees and 38 maintenance employees.
We find that neither the transportation unitnor the
custodial-gardening unit suggested by SEIU is an appropriate
separate unit in that neither has a community of interest
separate and distinct from the other classified employees who
remain after the establishment of the instructional aides and
office-techical and buisness services unit.
The transportation employees have some characteristics which
distinguish them from the other remaining employees. 	The bus
drivers are required to possess a class II drivers license,
medical certificate, California Highway Patrol school bus driver
certificate, and a first aide certificate. 	They work a split
shift from 7:30 a.m to 9:30 a.m and 1:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. 	They
report to the transportation yard for work assignments. 	We find
that these several distinguishing characteristics are not
sufficient to establish a separate community of interest or
separate appropriate unit for the transportation employees
because, taken together, these characteristics do not
substantially distinguish the transportation employees from the
other remaining classified employees.
The custodial and gardening employees are different from the
other remaining employees in that most of the custodians work
evening shift from 2:30 p.m to 11:30 p.m. and they report to
their assigned school site for work assignments. 	We find that
these distinguishing characteristics are not sufficient to
establish a separate community of interest or separate
appropriate unit for the custodial-gardening employees because,
taken together, they do not substantially distinguish the
custodial and gardening employees from the other remaining
classified employees.
The employees who remain after the establishment of the
instructional aides and office-technical and business services
units are the transportation, custodial-gardening, cafeteria and
maintenance employees, and the warehouseman and deliveryman.
Together they have a community of interest. 	The primary work
functions of these employees all involve providing a proper
physical environment and support services for students. 	They
drive and repair buses, prepare meals for students, handle
instructional equipment and supplies, and perform janitorial,
gardening and general maintenance work. 	Generally they are not

required to have a twelfth-grade education. 	All except a
possible few of these employees work full-time. 	The custodial-
gardening and maintenance employees work a twelve-month year and
the great majority of the transportation and cafeteria employees
work a ten-month year. 	The maintenance employees work from
8:00 a.m to 4:30 p.m. and report to the maintenance yard for work
assignments. 	The cafeteria employees work from 9:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m. and report to work at their respective school sites.
The cafeteria employees and warehouseman are the only employees
who do not report to work at a location from which they are
disbursed to various other locations for the actual performance
of their job duties. 	While the cafeteria employees are
compensated through a separate cafeteria account, all other
employees are compensated wholly through the district's general
fund. 	The transportation and cafeteria employees are compensated
on an hourly bsis while the custodial-gardening and maintenance
employees are compensated on a monthly basis. 	All employees work
three or more hours per ay and therefore receive employer-paid
fringe benefits.
Additionally, the transportation, maintenance and caferteria
employees are supervised on a common scheme respectively by the
Supervisor of Transportation, Supervisor of Maintenance and
Supervisor of Food Service who each report directly to the
Business Manager who in turn reports to the District
Superintendent and Board of Trustees. 	The custodians and
gardeners are supervised by the School Principal as well as the
Supervisor of Maintenance, and again ultimately by the Business
Manager, District Superintendent and Board of Trustees.
The district job specification indicated that the job
function of the warehouseman is to be in charge of the district
warehouse including supervising the receipt, storage, issuance
and delivery of materials, stock and equipment. 	The district job
specification indicates that the job function of the deliveryman
is to receive, store and deliver school equipment and supplies,
and to load, unload and drive vehicles used in delivering
supplies and equipmet.
In this case, because neigher of the two units proposed by
SEIU is separately appropriate, and because the custodial-
gardening, transportation, cafeteria, maintenance worker,
warehouseman and deliveryman together have a substantial
community of interest, they are appropriately grouped in a single
negotiating unit which we shall refer to as an operations-support
services unit.
V
While no evidence was introduced at the hearing regarding the
efficient operation of the school district, we have been mindful
of the operation of this criterion with regard to the unit
determination in this case. 	It is a legitimate concern that
excessive fragmentation of negotiating units may burden an

employer with multiple negotiating processes and postures and
with a variety of negotiated agreements difficult to administer
because their provisions differ. 	Interorganization competition
may increase demand made upon the employer by an employee
organization. 	The employer may have to give the benefits of the
"best" settlement in each area of negotiations to all employees
to avoid employee unrest or the administrative inconvenience
caused by multiple agreements.5
On the other hand, while a single unit is theoretically the
most conducive to the efficient operation of the school district,
it is only one of three criteria for unit determination set forth
in Section 3545(a). 	Further, the purpose of the Act is stated in
Government Code Section 3540 as follows:
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the improvement
of personnel management and employer-employee relations with-
in the public school systems in teh State of California by
providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public
school employees to join organizations of their own choice,
to be represented by such organizations in their professional
and employment relationships with public school employers, to
select one employee organization as the exclusive representa-
tive of the employees in an appropriate unit...
This section recognizes to rights of public school employees
to join and be represented by the employee organization of their
choice. 	Implicit in this statement of legislative intention is
the notion that the employees will have the ability to choose an
organization which is an effective representative. 	An effective
representative will generally be one largely determined by the
community of interest andestablished practices of the employees
rather than the efficient operation of the school district.
In this case, we find that the criterion of efficient
operation of the employer should not preclude the establishment
of the three units suggested by the community of interest
criterion. 	This is especially so because no evidence was
presented regarding efficiency of operations. 	As we stated
previously, established practices have also been accorded little
weight. 	The appropriate classified employee bargaining units are
an instructional aides (paraprofessional) unit, an office-
technical and business service unit and an operations-support
services unit.
Supervisory Issues
5Two articles which discuss the problem of the fragmentation
of negotiating units are: 	Shaw & Clark. 	"Determination of
Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: 	Legal and
Practical Problems," 51 Orgon Law Review 152 at 173 (1971); Rock.
"The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: 	The
Problem of Proliferation," 67 Michigan Law Review 1001 (1969).

Government Code Section 3540.1(m) defines a supervisory
employee as follows:
"Supervisory employee" means any employee, regardless of job
description, having authority in the interest of the employer
to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
the responsibility to assign work to and direct them or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively recommend such
action, if, in connection with the foregoing functions, the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgement.
This section of the Actionis written in the disjunctive;
therefore, an employee need notpossess all of the enumerated
functions or duties to be a supervisor. 	The performance of any
one fo the enumerated actions or the effective power to recommend
such action is sufficient to make on a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act.6
In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo,7 the California
Supreme Court held that, in the interpretation of language in a
California statute, cognizance should be taken of the decision of
the National Labor Relations Board interpreting identical or
similar language in the Labor Management Relations Act.8 In
reaching our decision, we have considered the decisions of the
NLRB and other state public employment relations boards.
The definition of supervisor in Section 3540.1(m) of the Act
is virtually identical to the definition contained in Section
2(11) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 	However, other
provisions of the Act regarding supervisors are significantly
different from the LMRA. 	Specifically, Section 2(3) of the LMRA
excludes supervisors from the definition of "employee" and
therefore from the protection of the LMRA with regard to
collective bargaining rights. 	On the other hand, Section
3540.1(j) of the Act does not excluded supervisors from the
definition of "employee" and Section 3545(b)(2) allows
supervisors to be represented in a negotiating unit separate from
the rank and file employees they supervise.
This statutory scheme recognizes that public and private
sector supervisors differ in the nature of the authority they
6Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F. 2d 385, 23 LRRM 1242 (C.A.
6, 1949), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 899.
712 Cal. 3d 608 (1974).
829 U.S.C. 152 (11). 	The Labor Management Relations Act
amended the National Labor Relations Act in 1947.

possess. 	In the public school districts, decisions regarding
hiring, firing, discipline and salaries of employees are
generally ultimately reserved for decision-makers far removed
from the employee's immediate supervision. 	This type of
authority and the different California statutory scheme lend
themselves to a broader construction of the definition of
supervisor contained in the Act.
Head Custodians
The Board finds that the 18 head custodian in dispute are
supervisory employees within the meaning of the Act and should be
excluded from the operations-support services unit.
The record demonstrates that head custodians have the
authority to effectively recommend the hiring of custodians. The
Assistant Superintendent of Personnel Services testified that it
is generally the practice to have the head custodian become
involved in the selection of the custodial staff. 	A Principal
testified that the initial hiring interview is conducted by
himself and thereafter the applicant talks with the head
custodian who gives a recommendation to the Principal. 	When
asked if he placed a considerable amount of weight on the
recommendation of the head custodian, the Principal stated "At
this point he's never been wrong, so I would assume that he does
quite well with it." 	Another head custodian stated that he and
the Principal interview all applicants for custodial positions,
that he discusses his recommendation with the Principal and the
Principal follows his recommendation "99% of the time."
Since the head custodians' recommendations concerning hiring
are consistently solicited and adopted by higher authority, we
conclude that they have the authority to effectively recommend
the hiring of custodians.9
Head custodians also have the authority to assign and direct
the work of other employees, even though during the regular
school year head custodians work the day shift from 6;30 a.m. to
3:00 p.m. while most of the employees under their supervision
work the swing shift from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. 	At the
beginning of the shool year, each head custodian allocates
regular work assignments to the members of the custodial crew.
Although these assignments are forwarded through the Principal to
the district business office, they are rarely altered by higher
authority. 	A Principal testified tht he has changed the
assignments made by a head custodian only two or threes times in
17 years. 	During the summer all custodian work together during
the day and the head custodian personally oversees the work of
the custodial crew. 	The work assignments are varied during this
9Chambersburg Area School District, 6 PPER 144, 146 (1975);
Warren Rural Electrical Cooperative Co., Inc., 209 NLRB 325, 85
LRRM 1340 (1974).

period and are assigned on a daily basis by the head custodian.
When special events occur during the school year, the head
custodian alters the regular assignment and assign specific
additional tasks. 	Thes changes are usually made without
consulting the Principal. 	Early each morning, each head
custodian makes a round of inspection. 	If an evening crew member
has not properly performed a task, the head custodian directs the
evening crew chief or the crew member to correct the problem. 	It
is the initial responsibility of the head custodian to ensure
that improperly performed work is corrected; he consultes with
the principal in the rare circumstance when he is unable to
handle a problem himself.
The NLRB and other state public employee relations boards
have consistently held that the authority to regularly inspect
the work of other and to direct others to correct improperly
performed work constitutes responsible direction of other
employees in the performance of their work.10
In view of the authority of head custodians in the Sweetwater
Unified School District to assign the work of the custodial
crews, to inspect the work on a daily basis, and to direct
necessary corrective action, we concluded that this authority
constitutes responsible direction of other employees in the
performance of their work.
The record amply demonstrated that head custodians perform
several of the activities enumerated in Section 3540.1(m) of the
Act and are, therefore, supervisors within the meaning of the
Act.
School Secretaries
The Board finds that the 22 school secretaries in dispute are
not supervisors within the meaning of the Act and should be
included in the office-technical and business services unit.
School secretaries serve as secretaries to school Principals.
They prepare communications, make appointments, maintain files,
take dictation and do other tasks normally associated with
secretarial functions.
10Howard Johnson Company, 201 NLRB 376 (1973)
In Pennsylvania see: 	Bellefonte Area School District, 3
PPER 60 (1973); Northern Tioga School District, 3 PPER 107
(1973); Troy Area School District; 3 PPER 155 (1975); Forest Area
School District, 3 PPER 264 (1974); Huntingdon Area School
District, 5 PPER 33 (1974); Hatboro Horsham School District, 6
PPER 121 (1975); Chambersburg Area School District, 6 PPER 144
(1975); Claysburg-Kimmel School District, 6 PPER 309 (1975). 	In
Indiana see: 	Merrilville Community School Corp. 	IPER 60 (1976).

The district presented evidence that the duties of a
particular school secretary further involve in the occasional
assignment of work to approximately eight other clerical
employees. 	In these instances, the original assignment is made
by the Principal to the school secretary who then delegates all
or part of the assignment to whomever of the office clerical
staff has the lightest workload and is available to lend
assistanace. 	While she estimated that she devotes 10 percent of
her time to what she terms "coordinating," her Principal
testified that, "In general, however, day-to-day operation does
not requre the school secretary to make specific work
assignments." 	This school secretary also stated that she does
not generally inspect the completed work of the other clerical
employees. 	Finally, both she and her Principal agreed that she
has been only unofficially designated by him as his "office
manager" because he felt a need for his particular school
secretary to "coordinate the efforts of the office." 	A second
school secretary, who described her work as typical of that
performed by approximately ten other school secretaries she
knows, testified that she has never assigned work to other
employees nor prepared work schedules.
The assignments made by the secretary who was designated
"office manager" were made in a routine manner because she acted
simply as a conduit in the transfer of work from the Principal to
the most available clerical worker and because she did not
inspect the work product. 	Thus, the evidence shows that, at
best, some school secretaries only occassionally make rountine
assignments to other employees in a manner not requiring the
exercise of independent judgement.
The district also argues that school secretaries are
supervisors because of their role in the hiring, evaluation and
dismissal of other clerical employees. 	But the record shows that
school secretaries have only minimal if any participation in
these functions.
The Principal who testified stated that his school secretary
sits with him at job interviews for clerical employees and
assists himn in his decision to hire a particular person. 	It was
not established that any other school secretaries participate in
the hiring process in any manner.
While the same Principal testified that his school secretary
assists him in his evaluation of the office clerical staff, the
other school secretary testified that she has "never" been
involved in the evaluation process.
The only evidence regarding dismissal auathority is the
testimony of a Principal that on one occasion his school
secretary recommended the discharge of a clerical employee. 	He
did not follow the recommendation.

No evidence was presented regarding the other activities
referenced in Section 3540.1(m).
The evidence does not demonstrate that the school secretaries
perform any of the activities enumerated in Section 3540.1(m) of
teh Act and they are threfore not supervisors within the meaning
of the Act.
ORDER
The Educational Employment Relations Board directs that:
1. 	The following units are appropriate for the purpose of
meeting and negotiating, providing and employee organization
becomes the exclusive representative:
Instructional aides (paraprofessional) unit
Included: 	Instructional assistanace employees.
Excluded: 	Instructional aides-clerical, public information
specialist, and all other employees, including managerial,
supervisory and confidential employees.
Office-technical and business services unit
Included: 	Accounting/purchasing/distribution, secretarial-
clerical, and duplications employees, and instructional aides-
clerical.
Excluded: 	Warehouseman, deliveryman, and all other
employees, including managerial, supervisory and confidential
employees.
Operations-support unit
Included: 	Transportation, custodial, gardening,
maintenance,and caferteria employees,and warehouseman and
deliveryman.
Excluded: 	All other employees, including managerial,
supervisory and confidential employees.
2. 	The head custodians are "supervisors' within the meaning of
Section 3540.1(m) of the Act.
3. 	The school secretaries are not "supervisors" within the
meaning of Section 3540.1(m) of the Act.
4. 	The employee organizations have the 10 workday posting period
of the Notice of Decision in which to demonstrate to the Regional
Director at least 30 percent support in the above units. 	The
Regional Director shall conduct an electionat the end of the
posting period if (1) more than on employee organization

qualifies for the ballot, or (2) if only one employee
organization qualifies for the ballot and the employer does not
grant voluntary recognition.
Raymond J. Gonzales, Member
Member Jerilou H. Cossack,
Date: 	November 23, 1976
Alleyne, Chairman, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I agree with the conclusion of themajority that the three
units described in the Board Order are appropriate, and with most
of the factual analysis made in support of the finding. 	I do not
fully agree with the manner in which they apply the applicable
statutory-unit criteria. 	I dissent from the majority's
conclusion that the Head Custodians in the Sweetwater Union High
School District are supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
The Appropriate Units
I believe that this precedent-setting decision should contain
more than it does in the way of guidance for future parties
involved with issues like the appropriate-unit issue presented
here. 	That is the limited basis for this concurring opinion on
the appropriate-unit issue.
The standard set forth in Government Code Section 3545(a)
requires consideration of traditional community-of-interest
criteria plus consideration of the effect of unit size on the
efficiency of the employer's operations, and the extent to which
employees belong to the same employee organization. 	These are
broadly worded standards, purposely made so by the Legislataure
in order to cast upon this Board and the courts in California the
task of giving the unit criteria meaning in concrete cases. 	One
of the criteria, community of interest, has been the subject of
interpretation in private sector cses involving the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 	It has also been interpreted by
state appellate courts in California in cases arising under
various newly emerging public sector labor laws in this State.
The extent to which employees organize, as used as a criterion in
Government Code Section 3545(a), is more difficult to understand
since the NLRA and most public sector enactments contain the
contrary mandate that extent of organization not be considered as
a criterion in unit determination cases. 	Thus, it is not	-
possible to rely upon cases interpreting those statutes for
guidance in interpreting that aspect of Government Code Section
3545(a). 	The effect of unit size on the efficient operation of a
school district is clear in expressing the general intention of
the Legislature to avoid excessive unit fragmentation, but to

what extent and how this should be weighed as a factor in
conjunction with the other unit criteria, and how generally each
criterion should relate to the others cannot be known exept in
the context of real cases. 	With that, I reach the conclusion
reached by my colleagues through the following route.
Excessive unit fragmentation affects efficiency by burdening
employers with a multiplicity of bargaining postures, each of
which might arise at different times as different agreements are
negotiated and administered at different times, possibly with
different unions involved. 	On the other hand, a unit that is
excessively large and insufficiently divided may have employees
with conflicting employment interests which are adverse to their
interest in effective representation. 	These conflicts stem from
such matters as different methods of compensation, types of
working conditions, lines of supervision, job qualifications, and
differing degrees of integration or interchange with the work
functions of other employees.
In the context of our Act, I view community of interest among
groups of employees as an absence of conflicting employment
interests adverse to effective representation. 	That is how I
read the NLRB's decision in Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp.11, which I
regard as the most instructive case decided on the subject of
community of interest.
I think that in each case requiring application of the board
unit criteria contained in Government Code Section 35456, e must
attempt to fashion a proper balance between the harmful effects
on an employer of excessive unit fragmentation and the harmful
effects on employees and the organizations attempting to
represent them of a large and insufficiently divided negotiating
unit or units.
In this case, I view the proposed CSEA unit of all classified
employees, excluding bus drivers, as one that would produce
conflicting interests between and among certain classes of
classified employees. 	We decided in Pittsburg Unified School
District12, that paraprofessionals have a definable community of
interest, distinct from other classified employees, and I join
the majority opinion to the extent that it relies upon the
Pittsburg decision as a percedent on the matter of Instructional
Aides. 	Similar cases are appropriate decided in a similar
manner.
Another potential for conflicting interests can be seen in
this case by compaing the employment conditions of the office-
technical and the remaining classified employees. 	I agree that
the office-technical group is an appropriate separate unit. 	But
11136 NLRB 134, 49 LRRM 1715 (1962).
12EERB Decision No. 	3, Case No. SF-R-106.

rather nthan stop, as does the majority opinion, with a
recitation of the differences in employment conditions and a
conclusion that the separate unit is accordingly appropriate, I
would move from the noted differences in employment conditions to
a conclusion that those differences are such that the inclusion
of the office-technical group with other groups of employees
would produce conflicting bargaining interests and impede the
bargaining process.
I would similarly treat the remaining issue of whether of
food serivces, custodial-gardening, transportation and
maintenance groups should be combined in one unit or separated
into two or more units, in concluding as we all conclude here,
that those groups together are an appropriate unit.
I believe that once having considered the community-of-
interest standard, the kinds of conclusions reached on
application of that standard should be regarded as tentative and
contingent upon consideration of the efficiency-of-operation and
extent-of-organization criterion contained in Government Code
Section 3545(a). 	The statute does not expressly require or
expressly allow tht approach. 	But very few of the critical
issues before the Board are capable of being resolve on the basis
of a plain-meaning and literal reading of the Act. 	To consider
the efficiency-of-operation criterion firstwould require the
determination initially of the broadest of the statutory
criteria, and, accordingly, the one least capable of being
resolved by comparing facts in existing decisional law.13 That
being the case, the analysis ought to begin with the citerion
most capable of being resolved on the basis of comparatively
well-articulated general standards, such as those found in the
Kalamazoo14 decision. 	Further, I think the analysis should begin
with the standard most likely to be the subject of another case
with identical facts. 	When the standard more capable of being
subjected as well-reasoned analysis is applied first, it might
well be that community-of-interest findings dictate a number of
units so small that no one would seriously regard impairmant of
efficiency as a problem. 	It would then become unnecessary to
apply the broader and more difficult criterion. 	This does not
mean that community on interest ought to be given more weight
than efficiency-of-operations; rather, I view this approach as a
methodological one. 	It might well be that community-of-interest,
when viewed alone, could require a large number of units, a
number so large that it would not meet the efficiency test.15
13Unlike the NLRA, most public sector statutes contain the
efficiency-of-operations criterion. 	See e.g., affecting
educational personnel, Section 10 of the Indiana Educational
Employment Relations Act, GERR RF-104, 51:2315.
14Supra Note 1.
15The public sector statutes containing a criterion on
excessive fragmentation were no doubt enacted with such extreme

In this case, neither the District nor any other party has
asked us to consider the efficiency-of-operations criterion.
Thus we are wholly justified in finding that the result reached
on application of the community-of-interest criterion need not be
changed on the basis of the effeciency-of-operations standard.
In considering "past history" as required by the "established
practices" portion of Government Code Section 3545(a), I
conclude, as does the majority that history predating this Act
should be given little weight. 	In reaching that conclusion, I
would take my analysis further than the majority's. 	I agree with
my colleagues that the Winton Act contained no procedures for
determining an appropriate unit. 	But there are further reasons
why Winton Act history should be given little weight in our unit
determination cases.
In Grasko v. Los Angeles City Board of Education,16 the
California Court of Appeal, in holding invalid a negotiated
agreement between the Los Angeles City Board of Education and an
employee organization, held that under the Winton Act "The
Legislature has determined that binding written contracts or
agreements hav no place in the field of labor relations between a
public school employer and its employees."
Also, no exclusive-representative concept, as now recognized
under the present Act, existed for education personnel. 	On the
basis of all of these differences between the law before and
after passage of the Act, I would give little weight to
"established practices" predating this Act.
The extent to which employees belong to the same employee
organization was not argued and for that reason is not properly
before us as a criterion to be considered.
I would thus conclude on this reasoning that the finding
required by the community-of-interest criterion, that three units
are appropriate in this case, stands unrebutted following
application of the remaining criteria, and that accordingly the
three designated units are appropriate within the meaning of
Section 3545 of the Act.
The Head Custodians
examples in mind as New York City's 200 separate units, some with
two employees, in teh late fifties; seventy-eight units in
Detroit, a proportionately higher rate of proliferation than New
York City's; and fifty units in Los Angeles County. 	See Rock,
The Appropriate Unit Question In The Public Service, 67 Mich. L.
Rev. 1001.
1631 Cal. App. 3d 290, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334, LRRM 3098 (1973).

I respectfully dissent from the majority conclusion that
within the meaning of Government Code Section 3540.1(m), Head
Custodians are supervisors and hence ineligible for inclusion in
any of the units we find appropriate.
Government Code Section 3545 excludes "supervisory employees"
from units containing nonsupervisory employees and also prohibits
an employee organization from representing a unit of supervisors
who supervise employees also represented by the employee
organization. 	Government Code Section 3540.1(m) which is an
almost exact replica of Section 2(11) of the National Labor
Relations Act,17 defines a supervisory employee as follows:
"Supervisory employee" means any employee, regardless of job
description, having authority in the interest of the employer
to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
the responsibility to assign work to and direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively recommend such
action, if, in connection with the foregoing functions, the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely rountine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment. 	(Emphasis added.)
The statutory requirement that a supervisor exercise one of
the enumerated criteria in a manner that is not "rountine" or
"clerical" and in a manner requiring the use of independent
judgement is inescapably an essential part of the definition. 	I
think the majority decision gives it virtually no effect.
Generally, the eighteen Head Custodians employed at various
schools in the District work from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., while
the no more than five custodians each purportedly supervises work
from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. . 	Thus, for most of their shift,
the Head Custodians have no one to direct. 	For 6:30 a.m. until
2:30 p.m., the Head Custodians do maintenance and repair work, a
fact not mentioned in the majority opinion. 	Head Custodians
strip and wax floors, install pencil sharpeners, repair desks,
put in windows, unplug stopped sewers, and turn on air
conditioners. 	The Head Custodian at Castlepark High School
testified that with the exception of about one-and-a half hours a
day he spends inspecting the work of the kind just described, he
spends all his time doing maintenance and repair work. 	The Head
Custodian at Montgomery Junior High School testified tht he
spends the "bulk of his time" making repairs. 	The Principal at
Bonita Vista Junior High School described the Head Custodians's
limited inspection work as the inspection of "the kitchen area,
the cooking area in the caferteria, the dining area, all
lavatories and the [physical education] facilities for
cleanliness...at the beginning of every day." 	The Head Custodian
at Castlepark High School testified that if he saw that some of
1729 U.S.C Sec. 152 (11).

the night custodial work had not been done properly, and "if it
wasn't too big a job", that, "I'd go ahead and do it right and
then when the man came I'd let him know about it." 	The
Gardener's shift and the shift of the Head Custodian are almost
the same, but the Bonita Vista Junior High School Principal
testified that the Head Custodian does not supervise the Gardener
or inspect the Gardener's work.
The flaw that I see in the reasoning of the majority is the
failure to acknowledge the undisputably routine nature of the
work performed by custodians. 	This would not be relevant if the
Head Custodians had the power to hire, discharge, discipline or
reward custodians or adjust their grievances, or effectively make
recommendations in those areas. 	But the School District does not
seriously argue that the Head Custodians fit those portions of
the supervisory criteria. 	The principal argument of the School
District is that the Head Custodians meet the "assign" and
"direct" criteria in the supervisory definition, and to the
extent that the District relies on other supervisory criteria,
District's arguments fail.
I think that if assigned or directed work is routine, then
the assignment and direction of that work is rountine. 	It is
undisputed that Custodians sweep, mop, wash and seal floors: they
vacuum rugs and carpets, dust, wash and polish furniture and
woodwork; they empty and clean wastebaskets; they wash windows,
walls, sinks and fountains; they clean restrooms, sweep
sidewalks, pick up papers, wash caferteria and eating areas,
polich metal-work, fill towels and soap dispensers and replenish
supplies; they replace light bulbs and tubes, clean blackboards
and trays, turn lights on or off, lock doors, windows and gates
and assist in moving, arranging and setting up furniture and
equipment for special events; they stack and store furniture and
equipment and assist in vandalism prevention and reporting.
Their job description shows further that no experience is
required to qualify for a custodial position and that custodians
should have te ability to "work without immediate supervision."
I believe that this is routine work and that the direction of
this routine work could accordingly be nothing more than routine.
Thus, on the direction of work, the argument in favor of a
supervisory status for Head Custodians suffers from evidence of
the routine nature of the directed work as well as the brief
daily period during which the Head Custodians have any
opportunity to direct the custodians in any way. 	The same
reasoning applies to the argument that the Head Custodians assign
work in a manner that is not routine.
Once a year, at the beginning of each school year, custodial
assignments are made. 	According to one Principal, the
assignment, once set up by the Head Custodian on the basis of a
map and custodial needs outlined in a manual prepared by the
School District, are sent to the School District offices for
approval, which, not surprisingly, is routinely granted every

year.
At one school, a Head Custodian's participation in
evaluations is limited to a first-step written evaluation on a
form. 	The Principal also completes an evaluation form. 	On
completion of the two forms, the Head Custodian and the Principal
meet, discuss their respective evaluations, and prepare a final
evaluation which is signed by the Principal. 	The Head Custodian
at another school testified that he completed an evaluation form
and submitted it to the Principal, who did not discuss it with
him. 	At still another school in the District, the Bonita Vista
Junior High School, the Head Custodian, according to the
Principal's testimony, does not prepare a written evaluation of
employees. 	The Principal and the Head Custodian discuss the
custodians' strong and weak points, but it is clear that the
Principal decides what to place on the evaluation form whichhe
prepares in writing and signs.
In any event, the evaluation of employees is not, alone,
indicative of a supervisory status. 	In some cases it might
suggest the power to discipline employees, but this record is
lacking in evidence that Head Custodians discipline employees or
even effectively recommend that employees be disciplined. 	The
power to evaluation or to play a role with the Principal in the
evaluation process, may suggest the power to direct employees.
But the evidence recited established that the Head Custodians
have no effective power to direct.
A secondary argument of the School District is that Head
Custodians supervise by playing a role in the hiring process.
The School District brief states that the Head Custodians
"participates in the hiring process by interviewing prospective
employees and by informing the Principal of the most desirable
candidate." 	But the Bonita Vista Junior High School Principal
testified that that the Principal conducts the initial hiring
interview, following which the applicant is "invited" to visit
with the Head Custodian for an interview, which is followed by a
recommendation from the Head Custodian to the Principal, who in
turn akes a recommendation to the Board of Trustees of the School
District through the District Personnel Office.
It seems evident that in hiring, it is the Principal who
makes aneffective recommendationto the School District, and that
the Head Custodian is twice-removed from the final hiring
authority in the School District. 	That is why, in answer to the
single question of whether he hired employees, the Head Custodian
at Montgomery Junior High School testified: 	"No sir." The same
witness was asked whetyer he was ever involved in the dismissal
of an employee. 	He answer, "Yes, I have been." 	He then
described the one occasion of his involvement, as follows:
Well, this guy was not getting his job done and he told the
Principal one day that he should be the one sitting behind
the desk instead of polishing it. 	The Principal was very

unhappy so the next day this guy asked me, he said, "How many
weeks do I have to give you notice ... to quit?" 	I said,
"Give me two minutes is all you've got to give me." So he
said, "I'm giving you notice that I'm quitting." 	I said,
"Well lets go to the Principal's office", and it didn't take
the Principal along to get rid of him.
That is the sole evidence on the power of Head Custodians to
dismiss or effectively recommend dismissal.
I
In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo,18 the California
Supreme Court held that it is appropriate to use National Labor
Relations Act Precedents as a guide in interpreting analagous or
identical language in state labor legislation. 	In Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,19
the California Supreme Court said:
When legislation has been judically construed and a
subsequent statute on the same or an analagous subject is
framed in the identical language, it will ordinarily be
presumed that the Legislature intended that the language
as used in the later enactment would be given like a
interpretation. 	This rule is applicable to state statutes
which are patterned after federal statutes... (Emphasis
added.)
In Alameda County Assistant Public Defenders Association v.
County of Alameda,20 and Santa Clara County District Attorney
Investigators Association v. County of Santa Clara,21 the
California Court of Appeal relied on NLRB precedents in unit-
determination cases.
While Vallejo alone might well be read as suggested but not
requiring that NLRA precedents be followed in analagous-language
cases, it seems clear that the combination of (1) Vallejo, (2)
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, and (3) the just
cited Alameda County and Santa Clara County cases compels the
following conclusion: 	When California state labor legislation is
indentical to the National Labor Relations Act, federal
decisional law on the subject is an substance and effects the law
in California.
Indeed, none of the parties in this case regards this as a
1812 Cal. 3d 608, 617, 87 LRRM 2453 (1974).
1954 Cal. 2d 684, 46 LRRM 3065. 3066 (1960).
2033 C.A 3d 825, 109 Cal. Rptr. 392, 84 LRRM 2237 (1973)
2151 C.A. 3d 255, 124 Cal. Rptr. 115, 90 LRRM 3192 (1975).

matter in dispute. 	They all rely upon NLRA precedents, though
not suprisingly they interpret the precedents in a different
manner. 	Because the courts of our own state have chosen to
identify the federal law they will follow in analagous-language
unit determination cases, I regard the Pennsylvania and Indiana
Public Employment Relations Board cases relied upon by the
majority opinion (to the limited extent that they are not
distinguishable), as not relevant to the question at hand. 	Once
the federal decisional law is applied, it seems clear that we are
obligated to conclude that the Head Custodians in this case are
not supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
II
In NLRB v. Swift & Company,22 the plant clerks alleged to be
supervisors told employees where to place and when to move
certain products. 	It was held that those activities were of a
"merly routine or clerical nature" within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act.23 In Teamsters Local
626 (Quality Meat Packing Company), 24 the NLRB decided that an
employee who spends practically all of his time doing "rank-and-
file work" and whose directions to others employees involved no
more than "a more experience employee overseeing and facilitating
the work of less experienced employees", is not a supervisor
within the meaning of the NLRA. 	In that case, part of the
employees's duties as a Loading Foreman consisted of seeing that
other employees properly loaded beef into trucks for delivery.
In Laborers and Hod Carriers Local No. 341,25 the NLRB held that
a Labor Foreman wa not a supervisor because he had no authority
to hire or fire, played no part in grievance matters, and spent a
great portion of his day working and overseeing its performance
was held to be routine in nature and one not requiring any
significant exercise of independent judgement. 	In NLRB v.
Dunkirk Motor Inn,26 an Assistant Housekeeper in a motel spent
approximately one half of each working day reviewing the manner
in which the rooms on one of the motel's two floors had been
cleaned by the staff of eight to fourteen maids. 	The Unites
States Court of Appeals said:
The Limited discretion involved in this task is routine in
22240 F. 2d 65, 39 LRRM 2278 (C.A. 9, 1957). 	Accord, NLRB
v. Parma Water Lifter Co., 211 F. 2d 258, 261, 33 LRRM 2810 (C.A.
9, 1954), NLRB v. Osbrink, 218 F. 2d 341, 35 LRRM 2291 (C.A. 9,
1954).
23 29 U.S.C. Sec 152 (11).
24 224 NLRB No. 	40, 92 LRRM 1295 (1976).
25 223 NLRB No. 143, 92 LRRM 1112 (1976).
26 524 F. 2d 663, 90 LRRM 2961 (C.A. 2, 1975).

nature and insufficient, standing alone to convert an
employee into a supervisor... And while /the Assistant
- Housekeeper/ possessed the 'authority to order maids to take
corrective action,' that authority was sparingly exercised.	-
More frequently, Hancock would herself remedy any
deficiencies which she found... Furthermore, Hancock lacked
the power to discipline an individual maid whose performance
was unsatisfactory. Her sole remedy...was to relay the
information to the housekeeper... Such referral decision
hardly suggest a finding of supervisory status.
In that case, the Court of Appeals reversed a panel of the NLRB
on the supervisory status of the Assistant Housekeeper. In so
doing, I think the court also effectively overruled Howard
Johnson Company,27 a case relied upon by my colleagues in their
majority opinion.28
III
In addition to and supplementing the applicable case law,
there are compelling policy reasons why this record requires a
conclusion tht the Head Custodians in this case are not
supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 	By passing the Act,
the Legislature has afforded representation rights which did not
exist for education personnel before the Act's passage. 	In
implementing the Legislature's mandate, there should be a
presumption in favor of eligibility for inclusion in a unit found
to be appropriate. 	The presumption should stand unless rebutted
by a party marking an allegation of ineligibility for unit
inclusion. 	This is consistent with fairness and California law
on pleading and the allocation of the burden of proof.
It may be argued that the private and public sectors differ,
in that supervisors under our Act are eligible for representation
in supervisory units, while private sector supervisors under the
NLRA are not eligible for inclusion in units. 	But this ignores
the true status of supervisory units under our Act and our
statistics on supervisory units.
Government Code Section 3545(b) prohibits a union from
representing a supervisory unit of employees if supervisors in
the proposed supervisory unit supervise employees also
represented be the same employee organization. 	Given the limited
number of employee organizations operating in the education
sector,m it is not at all surprising to me that out of 1,824
requests for recognition and 370 interventions seeking
recognition or certification as exclusive representative, and
27 201 NLRB 376, 82 LRRM 1258 (1973).
28 The facts in Dunkirk and Howard Johnson are similar, the
NLRB panel members were the same in both cases, and both cases
arose in the same federal judicial circuit.

describing an assortment of proposed negotiating units, only five
supervisory units have been proposed and requested by employee
organizations. 	The reality of it all is that it is uncertain
that there will ever by very many supervisory units under the
Act, so long as teh Act, in this respect, remains in its present
form. 	Accordingly, I see little difference between the effect of
a private sector supervisory status and the effect of a
supervisory status under our Act. 	Accordingly, I believe that
the Board shoul not find a supervisory status unless the party
making that allegation is able to show bya preponderance of the
evidence that the test provided in the Act ha been satisfied.
Particularly, we ought to take care that employees who work with
their hands, performing relatively unskilled work, are not
effectively denied rights under the Act solely because their
Employer happens to have endowed them with the authority to give
routine directions to other employees doing the same or, as in
this case, less skilled work.
I agree with the majority conclusion that the secretaries are
not supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
Reginald Alleyne,
chairman