CJEO Formal Opinion No. 2017-010 — Extrajudicial Involvement in Marijuana Enterprises

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CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS OPINIONS
350 McAllister Street, Room 1144A
San Francisco, CA 94102
(855) 854-5366
www.JudicialEthicsOpinions.ca.gov
CJEO Formal Opinion 2017-010
[Issued April 19, 2017]
EXTRAJUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN MARIJUANA ENTERPRISES
I. Question Presented
The Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions has been asked to provide an opinion
on the following question:
“Is it ethical under the California Code of Judicial Ethics for a judicial officer to
have an interest in an enterprise that involves the sale or manufacture of medical
or recreational marijuana?”1
II. Summary of Conclusions
An interest in an enterprise involving the sale or manufacture of marijuana that is
in compliance with state and local law is still in violation of federal law pursuant to the
1 The relatively recent enactment of state medical and recreational marijuana laws,
and the conflict with federal law, presents a myriad of issues related to marijuana.
However, for purposes of this opinion, the committee addresses only the question
presented.

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Controlled Substances Act. (21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904.) A violation of federal law violates a
judge’s explicit obligation to comply with the law (canon 2A) and is an activity that
involves impropriety or the appearance of impropriety (canon 2). Moreover, such
extrajudicial conduct may cast doubt on a judge’s capacity to act impartially. (Canon
4A(1).) Therefore, the committee advises that a judicial officer should not have an
interest in an enterprise that involves the sale or manufacture medical or recreational
marijuana.
III. Authorities
A. Applicable Canons2
Terminology: “‘Impartial,’ ‘impartiality,’ and ‘impartially’ mean the
absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties,
as well as the maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a
judge. (¶) . . . (¶)
‘Impropriety’ includes conduct that violates the law, court rules, or provisions of
this code, as well as conduct that undermines a judge’s independence, integrity, or
impartiality. (¶) . . . (¶)
‘Law’ means constitutional provisions, statutes, court rules, and decisional law.”
Canon 2: “A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of the judge’s activities.”
Canon 2A: “A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary . . . .”
Advisory Committee Commentary following canon 2A: “. . . A judge must expect
to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on
the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by other members of the
community and should do so freely and willingly. (¶) . . . (¶) The test for . . . impropriety
2 All further references to canons and to Advisory Committee commentary are to
the California Code of Judicial Ethics unless otherwise indicated.

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is whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge
would be able to act with integrity, impartiality, and competence.”
Canon 4A(1): “A judge shall conduct all of the judge’s extrajudicial activities so
that they do not (¶) . . . cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially . .
. .”
Advisory Committee Commentary following canon 4D(1): “ Participation by a
judge in financial and business dealings is subject to the general prohibitions in Canon
4A against activities that tend to reflect adversely on impartiality, demean the judicial
office, or interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. Such participation is
also subject to the general prohibition in Canon 2 against activities involving impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety and the prohibition in Canon 2B against the misuse of
the prestige of judicial office. (¶) In addition, a judge must maintain high standards of
conduct in all of the judge’s activities, as set forth in Canon 1.”
B. Other Authorities
Title 18 United States Code sections 1956, 1957, 3282
Title 21 United States Code sections 801-904
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. L. No. 113-
235, § 538 (Dec. 16, 2014) 128 Stat. 2129, 2217)
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542 (Dec. 18,
2015) 129 Stat. 2242, 2332-2333)
California Constitution, article VI, section 18
California Business and Professions Code, sections 19300-19360
Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1
U.S. v. McIntosh (9th Cir. 2016) 833 F.3d 1163
U.S. v. Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana (N.D.Cal. 2015) 833 F.3d 1163
Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920
Inquiry Concerning Hall (2006) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 146
In re Conduct of Roth (Or. 1982) 645 P.2d 1064

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Rothman, California Judicial Conduct Handbook (3d ed. 2007) sections 7.36, 7.57
Colorado Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Board, Opinion 2014-01
Maryland Judicial Ethics Opinion Request Number 2016-09
Washington Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 15-02
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Feb. 14. 2014)
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013)
Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election (Nov. 8, 2016), Proposition,
analysis by the Legislative Analyst
III. Discussion
A. Introduction
Since 1996, more than half of the states have decriminalized and created
regulatory schemes for medical marijuana. Most states have made these changes in the
past 10 years. Even more recently, several states, including California, have gone further,
decriminalizing recreational marijuana use. In California, state and local taxes currently
collected on medical marijuana reach several tens of millions of dollars each year and
recreational marijuana could eventually generate tax revenues of $1 billion annually.
(Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016), Prop. 64, analysis by the
Legislative Analyst, pp. 92, 97.) The profits to be gained from the marijuana industry in
California are substantial and investors are flocking to this lucrative industry.
Despite the rapid decriminalization and new regulation of marijuana across the
states, it remains a schedule I drug pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. (21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-904.) Under federal law, the use, possession, distribution, or manufacture of
marijuana remains illegal, even if such conduct otherwise conforms to state law. Because
of the financial incentives to enter to the marijuana market, the rapid changes to

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marijuana law, and the continuing disparity between state and federal law, the committee
has been asked to provide guidance on whether a judicial officer may have an interest in
an enterprise that involves the sale or manufacture of medical or recreational marijuana.
For purposes of this opinion, an interest in an enterprise that involves the sale or
manufacture of medical or recreational marijuana includes, but is not limited to, a
personal financial investment in such an enterprise, private equity fund investments in
such an enterprise, maintaining shares in a corporation that invests in marijuana,
maintaining a real property interest in a property that is leased for marijuana growth or
distribution, or a spouse’s or registered domestic partner’s financial interest in such an
enterprise, shares, or real property.
B. State and Federal Regulation of Marijuana
In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 215 and enacted the
Compassionate Use Act, making California the first state to decriminalize limited
personal possession or cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes on a physician’s
recommendation, or possession or cultivation by his or her primary caregiver. (Health &
Saf. Code, §11362.5.) In 2004, the Legislature expanded these criminal immunities
through the Medical Marijuana Program for the cultivation and possession for sale to
specific groups of people. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.7 et seq.) In 2015, the Medical
Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act 3 was enacted to establish a statewide regulatory
system for medical marijuana businesses, governing, among other things, cultivation,
processing, transportation, testing and distribution of medical marijuana, and allowing for
medical marijuana businesses to operate for profit. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 19300-19360
[enactment of the Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act included additions to
other sections of Bus. &Prof. Code, Gov. Code, Health & Saf. Code, Lab. Code, Rev. &
Tax. Code, and Wat. Code not applicable to this opinion].) In 2016, California voters
3 The Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act was enacted through three bills,
Assembly Bill No. 266, Assembly Bill No. 243, and Senate Bill No. 643 in the 2015-
2016 legislative session. Each bill was conditioned on enactment of the other two.

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approved Proposition 64, allowing for recreational use of marijuana for those 21 years
old or older. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.1 et seq.)
California’s marijuana laws do not legalize medical or recreational marijuana.
(Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 926 [stating that
“[n]o state law could completely legalize marijuana for medical purposes because the
drug remains illegal under federal law”]; U.S. v. McIntosh (9th Cir. 2016) 833 F.3d 1163,
1179, fn. 5.) Instead, they decriminalize certain marijuana offenses under California law.
Under federal law, the knowing or intentional manufacture, possession, and distribution
of marijuana remains a federal crime. (21 U.S.C. §§ 812, subd. (c), 841, 844; see also
Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 [commerce clause gives Congress authority
to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary,
because local use affects the national marijuana market].) An attempt to violate or a
conspiracy to commit a violation of the Controlled Substances Act is subject to the same
penalties as the underlying offense. (21 U.S.C. § 846.) Moreover, it is unlawful to
knowingly lease, rent, or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance, or to manage or control any place as an
owner, lessee, mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or
make available for use the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance. (Id., § 856.) Any capital placed into a
marijuana business not only puts an individual at risk of criminal prosecution, but such
assets, investments, and profits are subject to forfeiture (id., §§ 853, 881) and any
investment of marijuana profits further violates federal law (id., § 854). Similarly,
financial transactions that involve proceeds generated by marijuana can form the basis for
federal prosecution under money laundering statutes, the unlicensed money transmitter
statute, and the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957.)
Based on the rapid decriminalization of medical marijuana by the states, on
August 29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice issued guidance applicable to all federal
enforcement activity, including civil enforcement and criminal investigations and
prosecutions concerning medical marijuana. (Memorandum from James M. Cole,

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Deputy Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement
(Aug. 29, 2013) (Marijuana Enforcement).) This federal policy concentrated and, to a
certain extent, limited medical marijuana enforcement efforts in accordance with eight
priorities. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) 4 On February 14, 2014, these policies were clarified and the
same priorities were made applicable to financial crimes that are predicated on medical
marijuana-related conduct. (Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Atty. Gen., U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14,
2014) (Financial Crimes).) More recently, federal appropriations bills have prohibited
the U.S. Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Agency from spending funds to
prevent states’ implementation of medical marijuana laws. 5 (Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, §538 (Dec. 16, 2014) 128
Stat. 2129, 2217; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542
(Dec. 18, 2015) 129 Stat. 2242, 2332-2333.)
4 These priorities include (1) preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; (2)
preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs,
and cartels; (3) preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under
state law in some form to other states; (4) preventing state-authorized marijuana activity
from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other
illegal activity; (5) preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and
distribution of marijuana; (6) preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; (7) preventing the
growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and (8) preventing marijuana
possession or use on federal property.
5 Based on these appropriations bills, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California has prohibited the U.S. Department of Justice from
enforcing a permanent injunction enjoining a medical marijuana dispensary from
distributing marijuana, to the extent the dispensary complied with California law. (U.S. v
Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana (N.D.Cal. 2015) 139 F.Supp.3d 1039, app. dism.
Apr. 12, 2016.) The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the U.S. Department of Justice may not
use federal funds to continue prosecutions for violations of the Controlled Substances Act
where the defendants’ conduct was authorized by state law. (U.S. v. McIntosh, supra,
833 F.3d 1163.)

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Although medical marijuana regulation is not currently an enforcement priority for
the federal government and the federal government is restricted from spending funds to
prosecute certain individuals, these priorities could change. “Congress could restore
funding tomorrow, a year from now, or four years from now, and the government could
then prosecute individuals who committed offenses while the government lacked
funding.” (U.S. v. McIntosh, supra, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179, fn. 5.) A change in executive
branch administration could shift federal attitudes and priorities, and these offenses can
be prosecuted for up to five years after the offenses occur. (See 18 U.S.C. § 3282.)
Moreover, both U.S. Department of Justice memoranda explicitly state that nothing
precludes investigation or prosecution, even in the absence of any of the priorities, “in
particular circumstances where investigation and prosecution otherwise serves an
important federal interest.” (Cole, Marijuana Enforcement, supra, at p. 4; Cole, Financial
Crimes, supra, at p. 3.) It is also important to note that these federal policies and
appropriations bills do not address enforcement priorities for recreational marijuana that
is decriminalized and regulated by state law. Therefore, an individual who maintains an
interest in a marijuana enterprise that complies with state and local law remains in
violation federal law and risks prosecution.
C. Activity Involving Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety
As the Code of Judicial Ethics observes, a judge is a highly visible member of
government (Preamble) and “must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny”
and “accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by
other members of the community and should do so freely and willingly” (Advisory Com.
com. foll. Canon 2A). These restrictions extend to a judge’s extrajudicial activities, such
as maintaining an ownership interest in a business. (Canon 4.)
1. Failure to Comply with the Law
Participation in extrajudicial activities is subject to the general prohibition in
canon 2 against activities involving impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.

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(Advisory Com. com. foll. canon 4D(1).) Impropriety includes conduct that violates the
law. (Terminology, “impropriety.”) Moreover, canon 2A explicitly states that a judge
must respect and comply with the law, which is defined to include statutes generally.
(Canon 2A; terminology, “law”; Advisory Com. com. foll. canons 1, 4A.) Nothing in
the code limits compliance to state law only. The California Constitution also obligates a
judge to comply with the law. A judge may be disqualified from acting as a judge when
subject to a pending indictment or an information charging him or her with a crime
punishable as a felony under California or federal law. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd.
(a).) If the judge is convicted, and if the conviction becomes final, the judge must be
removed from office. (Id., art. IV, § 18, subd. (c).)
Maintaining an ownership interest in an enterprise that involves the sale or
manufacture of marijuana is a crime under the Controlled Substances Act that potentially
subjects a judge to federal prosecution. Therefore, having an interest in a marijuana
business is an extrajudicial activity that fails to comply with the law and involves
impropriety, in violation of the code. Discipline can be imposed for a violation of the
canon 2A obligation to comply with the law, whether or not the judge is prosecuted or
convicted of a criminal offense. (Inquiry Concerning Hall (2006) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp.
146 [judge disciplined under canon 2A for violating several provisions of the Political
Reform Act during her reelection campaign, even though the criminal case was
dismissed]; In re Conduct of Roth (Or. 1982) 645 P.2d 1064, 1070 [proof of unlawful
conduct, not conviction, sufficient to support finding that a judge failed to comply with
the law].) Thus, involvement in a marijuana business that would violate federal law is
unethical regardless of the likelihood of prosecution. Further, it is the committee’s
opinion that, like the duty of a judge to be informed as to his or her personal and financial
interests in relation to disclosure and disqualification, a judge has a duty to make
reasonable efforts to inform himself or herself as to whether any financial or property
interest that the judge maintains is being used in an enterprise that involves the sale or
manufacture of marijuana. (See canon 3E(5)(d); Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd.
(a)(3)(C).) If the judge determines his or her financial or property interest is being so

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utilized, the judge has a duty to divest himself or herself of such investment or otherwise
take steps to ensure the termination of the enterprise.
The committee’s opinion that a judicial officer should not have an interest in an
enterprise that involves medical or recreational marijuana is consistent with judicial
ethics advisory opinions from states that have similarly decriminalized marijuana.
Maryland, which permits medical marijuana use, and Washington and Colorado, which
permit both medical and recreational marijuana use, prohibit judicial involvement with
marijuana.
In Maryland, the judicial ethics committee concluded that a judicial appointee may
not grow, process, or dispense medical cannabis. (Md. Jud. Ethics Com., Opinion
Request No. 2016-09 (Mar. 31, 2016).) The Maryland Code of Conduct for Judicial
Appointees requires a judicial appointee to comply with the law. (Md. Rules Judges, rule
18-201.1.) As in California’s canon 2A, nothing limits application of the Maryland rule
to compliance with Maryland law only. Therefore, the committee opined, “as long as
federal laws make the possession, use, manufacturing and/or distribution of marijuana
(cannabis) illegal, a judicial appointee may not participate in the growing, processing or
dispensing of the substance, regardless of the intended purpose.” (Md. Jud. Ethics Com.,
Opinion Request No. 2016-09, supra, pp. 1-2.) The committee went further, stating,
“Even if the Congress enacted federal legislation analogous to Health General §§ 13-33-6
et seq. [exempting growers, processors and dispensers licensed by the state of Maryland
from arrest, prosecution or administrative penalty], a proposal by a judicial appointee to
act as a medical cannabis grower, processor and dispenser might raise concerns with
other provisions of the Code, for example, Rule 1.2 ‘Promoting Confidence In The
Judiciary.’ We need not address these issues at this juncture, however.” (Id., fn. 2 [some
capitalization omitted].)
In Washington, the judicial ethics advisory committee concluded that it was a
violation of the state judicial ethics code for a judge to allow a court employee to
maintain an extracurricular medical marijuana business, which remains illegal under
federal controlled substances laws. (Wn. Jud. Ethics Advisory Com., Opinion 15-02.)

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After examining a judge’s duty to direct the conduct of court employees, the committee
concluded: “[E]ven if owning a medical marijuana business may comply with the state
statutory scheme, possessing, growing, and distributing marijuana remains illegal under
federal law for both recreational and medical use. See Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-904. Although the Code does not generally prohibit a court employee from
engaging in outside businesses or employment, operating a business in knowing violation
of law undermines the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary in violation of
CJC 1.2, and is contrary to acting with fidelity and in a diligent manner consistent with
the judge’s obligations under the Code.” (Id., at p. 2.)
In Colorado, the judicial ethics advisory board concluded that it is a violation of
the state judicial ethics code for a judge to engage in the personal recreational or medical
use of marijuana in private, and in a manner compliant with the Colorado Constitution
and related state and local laws. (Colo. Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Opinion 2014-01,
p. 1.) The board found that “because activities conducted in Colorado, including medical
marijuana use, are subject to both state and federal law . . . , for an activity to be ‘lawful’
in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.
Conversely, an activity that violates federal law but complies with state law cannot be
‘lawful’ under the ordinary meaning of that term.” (Id., at p. 2.)
Consistently with these opinions, and as the California canons state, to maintain an
interest in an enterprise that involves the sale or manufacture of medical or recreational
marijuana is not lawful under federal law and violates the obligations expressed in canon
2. Therefore, it is the committee’s opinion that a judge violates his or her ethical
obligations if the judge maintains an interest in an enterprise involving marijuana.
2. Judge’s Capacity to Act Impartially
An interest in a marijuana enterprise may also create an appearance of impropriety
and cast doubt on a judge’s ability to act impartially. (Canon 2 [requiring judges to avoid
impropriety and its appearance in all activities]; Advisory Com. com. foll. canon 2A [test
for impropriety is whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt

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that the judge would be able to act with independence, integrity, and impartiality];
Terminology, “impropriety” [includes conduct that undermines a judge’s impartiality].)
Canon 4A(1) also explicitly requires a judge to conduct all extrajudicial activities so that
they do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially.
A judge must disqualify himself or herself when a person aware of the facts might
reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. Judges “are
expected to honestly examine their lives, thoughts, experiences, relationships and biases
and not to sit on a case unless they have determined that none of these things will stand in
the way of rendering fair and impartial justice.” (Rothman, Cal. Judicial Conduct
Handbook (3d ed. 2007) § 7.36, p. 335.) Even if a judge determines that owning an
interest in a marijuana enterprise will have no bearing on his or her ability to be impartial,
if “a reasonable mind (not the mind of a particular lawyer or party) would conclude that
there is an objective doubt that the judge would be able to remain impartial regardless of
the judge’s professional efforts to put aside his or her bias,” then the judge should
disqualify himself or herself. (Id., § 7.57, p. 366.)
The decriminalization of certain marijuana activities in California has not
eliminated state criminal investigation and prosecution for numerous marijuana crimes,
such as driving under the influence or possession of large quantities of marijuana, as well
as the variety of civil matters that may arise from the marijuana industry, including civil
violations of state marijuana regulations, zoning, licensing, seizure or forfeiture of assets,
employment disputes, landlord-tenant disputes, and contract disputes. A reasonable
person could conclude that a judge who disregards applicable marijuana laws for his or
her own benefit is unable to act impartially anytime the judge rules on a marijuana-
related matter. For example, it may appear to a reasonable person that a judge who
owned an interest in a marijuana business would be unable to act impartially in
evaluating a forfeiture of assets that were earned through a marijuana business. This is
also true if a judge’s spouse holds a separate, noncommunity property investment in a
marijuana enterprise. The distinction between separate and community property may be
insufficient to eliminate an appearance of impropriety. A reasonable person could

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conclude that the judge supports his or her spouse’s decision to maintain a separate
interest in a marijuana enterprise, and that this spousal interest could impact the judge’s
ability to act impartially.
There will always be at least an appearance of impropriety and doubts regarding
impartiality when a judge decides to disregard a law to benefit his or her personal
interest. Therefore, it is the committee’s opinion that a judge cannot maintain an interest
in a marijuana enterprise and has an ongoing duty to make reasonable efforts to inform
himself or herself about any financial interest in a marijuana enterprise. If the judge
discovers such a financial interest, he or she should divest himself or herself of such
investment or otherwise take steps to ensure the termination of the enterprise. (See canon
3E(5)(d), Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(3)(C).). To maintain any such interest
would create an appearance of impropriety and cast doubt on a judge’s ability to act
impartially.
IV. Conclusion
It is the committee’s opinion that maintaining any interest in an enterprise that
involves the cultivation, production, manufacture, transportation or sale of medical or
recreational marijuana is incompatible with a judge’s obligations to follow the law under
canon 2. Such conduct is an activity involving impropriety that fails to comply with
federal law and puts a judge at risk for federal prosecution. Despite the limited
decriminalization of medical and recreational marijuana use, there will continue to be
numerous marijuana-related matters in the courts. Moreover, a reasonable person could
easily conclude that a judge’s disregard of federal law creates an appearance of
impropriety and casts doubt on the judge’s ability to act impartially, particularly in
marijuana-related cases. Therefore, the committee concludes that an interest in a
marijuana-related business creates an appearance of impropriety, casts doubt on a judge’s
ability to act impartially, and is incompatible with a judge’s obligations under canon 2
and canon 4A(1).

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
This opinion is advisory only (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.80(a), (e); Cal. Com.
Jud. Ethics Opns., Internal Operating Rules & Proc. (CJEO) rule 1(a), (b)). It is based
on facts and issues, or topics of interest, presented to the California Supreme Court
Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions in a request for an opinion (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 9.80(i)(3); CJEO rule 2(f), 6(c)), or on subjects deemed appropriate by the
committee (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.80(i)(1); CJEO rule 6(a)).