People v. Addleman CA2/4

CourtListener 9999878Calctapp11 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/11/24 P. v. Addleman CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B328467

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.KA111467)
v.

CLAYTON RUBEN ADDLEMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert M. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Thomas C. Hsieh and Melanie
Dorian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Clayton Addleman contends the trial court erred
in resentencing him because it did not apply the full resentencing
rule and did not properly consider his youth at the time of the
crime or his rehabilitative efforts since. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Conviction and Initial Sentence
In 2015, appellant, who was 24 years old, went on a three-
day spree during which he committed crimes against multiple
victims in several different locations. In 2017, a jury found
appellant guilty of all 13 charges resulting from the spree:
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)1; robbery (§ 211); three counts of
burglary (§ 459); grand theft auto (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)); grand theft
of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)); identity theft (§ 530.5,
subd. (a)); forgery relating to identity theft (§§ 473, subd. (a), 475,
subd. (b)); unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)); unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd.
(a)(1)); petty theft (§§ 484, subd. (a), 490.2); and assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true several
personal use firearm allegations. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c).) Appellant admitted suffering two prior
convictions.
At appellant’s original sentencing hearing in 2017, the
court vacated two of the three burglary convictions as duplicative.
The court then sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of
life for the attempted premeditated murder, plus a consecutive
term of 20 years for the firearm enhancement related to that
charge. The court rejected appellant’s argument that the crime

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
spree was a single course of conduct and imposed a consecutive
midterm sentence of four years for the robbery; a consecutive
aggregate sentence of one year for the grand theft auto and
related firearm enhancement (one-third the midterm plus one-
third the firearm enhancement); a consecutive aggregate
sentence of one year for the identity theft and related firearm
enhancement (same); and six months (time served) for the petty
theft. The court imposed and stayed under section 654 a four-
year midterm sentence for the burglary; an aggregate one-year
sentence for the grand theft of property and related firearm
enhancement (one-third the midterm plus one-third the firearm
enhancement); an aggregate one-year sentence for the forgery
and related firearm enhancement (same); a three-year high term
sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm; a three-year high
term sentence for unlawful possession of ammunition; and a
three-year midterm sentence for assault with a firearm.
Appellant’s total effective sentence thus consisted of a
determinate term of six years, plus the indeterminate term of life
plus 20 years. The court also imposed various fines and fees.
II. First Appeal
Addleman appealed. A different panel of this court
affirmed appellant’s convictions but remanded the matter to
enable the trial court to decide whether to exercise its then-new
discretion to strike the 20-year section 12022.53 firearm
enhancement related to the attempted murder conviction.
(People v. Addleman (Feb. 18, 2020, B285290) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court declined to strike the enhancement.
Addleman appealed.

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III. Second Appeal
In his second appeal, appellant argued that the court
abused its discretion by failing to consider his post-judgment
conduct. A different panel of this court rejected this argument
and affirmed. (People v. Addleman (Oct. 7, 2021, B307460)
[nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court granted
appellant’s petition for review and transferred the matter to the
court of appeal “with directions to vacate its decision and
reconsider the cause in light of Penal Code section 1170 as
amended by Assembly Bill No. 124 (Stats. 2021, ch. 695),
Assembly Bill No. 1540 (Stats. 2021, ch. 719), and Senate Bill No.
567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731).” (People v. Addleman (Dec. 22, 2021,
S271834).)
On transfer, a different panel of this court reconsidered the
matter and concluded that resentencing was required under
Assembly Bill No. 124 (AB 124), which amended section 1170
effective January 1, 2022 to make a low-term sentence
presumptively appropriate where any of certain specified
circumstances was a “contributing factor in the commission of the
offense,” including where the defendant was a “youth” at the time
of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (B); Stats. 2021, ch. 695,
§ 5.3.) Where the presumption applies, the court may impose a
higher sentence only if it finds that “aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6).) For purposes of this provision, a “youth” includes
any person who was under the age of 26 at the time of the
offense. (See §§ 1016.7 [defining youth as person under 26 at
time of offense], 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B) [incorporating § 1016.7’s
definition of “youth”]; Stats. 2021, ch. 695, §§ 4, 5.) Because

4
appellant was 24 when he committed his offenses, and the record
did not clearly indicate that remand would be futile, the court of
appeal vacated its previous decision, reversed appellant’s
sentence, and remanded the matter for “resentencing consistent
with the intervening ameliorative changes to sentencing law.”
(People v. Addleman (Apr. 18, 2022, B307460) [nonpub. opn.].)
IV. Most Recent Trial Court Proceedings
When the matter returned to the trial court, appellant,
through counsel, filed a one-page sentencing memorandum. He
requested that the court “sentence him to the lower term
pursuant to AB 124,” because his “extensive drug use,
homelessness, lack of maturity impulsive tendencies and
youthfulness [sic] all were contributing factors to his criminal
conduct.” Appellant also asserted that he had “made genuine and
significant strides towards rehabilitation” while incarcerated.
Appellant attached several documents in support of the latter
assertion. They included a piece dated November 2, 2022 in
which appellant wrote about witnessing his cellmate’s overdose
and experiencing his own father’s fatal overdose when he was six
years old; letters from two organizations recognizing appellant’s
rehabilitative efforts and offering supportive services upon his
release; a certificate documenting appellant’s receipt of a
scholarship award and a thank-you letter he wrote to the donor;
and a letter thanking him for his participation in the Prison
Letters 4 Our Struggling Youth program. Appellant also
attached two “laudatory chronos” from prison staff. One
recognized and praised his “hard work and superior work ethic,”
and the other commended his “considerable growth and
maturity,” “high levels of positive behavior,” and efforts to
“improve himself while providing a positive example to his fellow

5
inmates.” The People filed an updated probation report dated
December 15, 2022.
The trial court heard the matter on December 19, 2022;
appellant was present. The court noted at the outset that it was
“now required to impose the low term of any determinate
sentencing that has a sentencing range of three potential
sentences. . . . [u]nless certain factors are presented” and invited
counsel to argue the matter. Appellant’s counsel pointed to the
sentencing memorandum and argued that at the time of the
crimes, appellant was living in his vehicle and using drugs, which
“indicated a lack of maturity on his part and an impulsive
tendencies [sic] which are all indicative of his youthfulness.”
Counsel then highlighted several of the sentencing memorandum
attachments, and added that appellant recently devised a project
to help educate high school students about the dangers of drugs
and criminal life. Counsel concluded by asking the court to
sentence appellant to the low term “where legally permissible in
this case.”
Appellant then personally addressed the court. He spoke
about trauma he suffered during his childhood, including his
father’s “open casket legacy at age six and the drugs like
methamphetamine which found its way into my lungs by the age
of three.” Appellant stated that he “allowed my childhood trauma
to define me,” and his “best thinking led me from crime to crime
with no consideration for the well being of others, only my need to
get high and to escape my miserable reality.” Appellant stated
that receiving a “life sentence opened my eyes,” such that he
currently “live[d] a life of integrity” and “bountiful sobriety,” and
used his new insights to “connect with others” and “impact the
lives of those around me.” Appellant further stated that he

6
dedicated his efforts to the victims of his crimes, and thanked the
court for acknowledging his potential when it initially sentenced
him in 2017.
In response, the People asked the court “to not modify the
sentence the court previously imposed.” They asserted that they
“do not believe that the defendant’s conduct was due to his
youthfulness but due to the conduct that he was engaged in when
this particular crime occurred and in the years leading up to it.”
They pointed to the updated probation report, and the “long
history of police contact and . . . defendant’s repeated
involvement with crimes involving weapons” that “preceded our
particular matter here today.” They argued that appellant’s
criminal history and “increased violence which culminated with
our current case” justified the midterm sentence in this case.
They requested that the court “have these [sic] original sentence
maintained.”
The court began its oral ruling by discussing AB 124 and
its presumption in favor of a low term sentence when youth is a
factor in the crime. The court then stated that it had “reviewed
all the crimes” in the case and concluded that the only crime
affected by AB 124 was the robbery, which had a determinate
sentencing triad of two, four, or six years.2 It explained that

2 Appellant was convicted of other crimes punishable with
determinate sentencing triads. The court initially imposed
consecutive sentences of one-third the midterm for several of
those crimes in accordance with section 1170.1. The court also
initially stayed many of appellant’s sentences—including some of
the aforementioned sentences of one-third the midterm—
pursuant to section 654. Appellant’s opening (and only) brief
addresses this issue in a single sentence: “The court was also
required to state its reasons on the record for selecting each term

7
under AB 124, it “would be initially required to consider the low
term of two years,” “unless the aggravating circumstances are
such that they outweigh the mitigating factor of youth.” The
court stated that when it imposed the four-year midterm in 2017,
it “had to take into consideration the defendant’s background, his
criminal history, factors such as the fact that he was on felony
probation on two matters at the time these crimes were
committed,” and the offense’s classification as a violent felony. It
continued, “the court has to take into consideration the character
of the defendant. He did not have an easy life[;] he had a
criminal history which began when he was a juvenile and
involved weapons.” The court then summarized appellant’s prior
convictions: an incident involving a knife, an incident involving a
“collapsible baton,” felony possession of marijuana, “being under
the influence of PCP and another weapons charge,” unlawful
possession of a firearm, and possession of marijuana for sale.
The court then turned its attention to the circumstances of
the robbery, which occurred in a residence and “involved great
violence and threat of violence,” as well as “a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness and callousness.” The court noted although
no firearm enhancement had been alleged, appellant admitted
during trial that he had been armed with a firearm. The court
continued, “[t]he victim was vulnerable. The house was occupied

and impose sentence even if the sentence is ultimately stayed
under section 654.” As discussed below, the court appropriately
considered all counts. To the extent appellant seeks to challenge
any other aspects of the court’s application of section 654 in light
of recent statutory changes such as Assembly Bill No. 518 (Stats.
2021, ch. 441, § 1), such challenges are forfeited due to his failure
to appropriately raise them.

8
by her and her minor children. The residential robbery occurred
at 6:35 in the morning” and was part of “a very brief 48 hours
[that] also included the attempted murder of an individual that
was deliberated and premeditated.” The court added that the
jury found that appellant intended to kill the attempted murder
victim, and found him guilty of all the other charged crimes. The
court stated that it was “required to consider and to balance,
whether for the crime of first degree robbery a low term should be
imposed of two years rather than the four-year term the court did
impose.” Ultimately, the court concluded that under “the totality
of this case and the circumstances surrounding it, the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating
circumstances that would justify the imposition of the low term[,]
which would be contrary to the interest of justice.”
The court then addressed the remaining charges. It found
the attempted murder did “not fall within the new changes of the
law” because “there is no low term or high term that this court
can impose.” Instead, “attempted murder is punishable by a life
sentence.” The court noted that appellant “also received an
additional 20 years on the attempted murder” due to the firearm
enhancement. The court continued, “The court also imposed a
sentence on count 5, first degree burglary and selected the four-
year term but that was stayed. That means he will not have to
serve that sentence. In count 6, the defendant was charged with
auto theft. Since the court intended that count to run
consecutive, the court could only take one third of the middle
term and the court did so. And that one third of the midterm
amounted to eight months and one third of one year for principal
arm, so that term added one year.” The court addressed the
remaining counts in similar fashion, noting that it had imposed

9
the high term on the stayed firearm and ammunition possession
counts based on its consideration of the circumstances of the case
and appellant’s previous conviction for unlawful firearm
possession. After addressing all the counts, the court
pronounced, “[t]he total term imposed is 26 years followed by
life.”
The court then stated that it “has viewed and impressed
[sic] by the defendant’s apparent attempts to rehabilitate and
improve himself, but that alone isn’t enough to substantially
change the sentence. That being said, I believe that if he
continues with his positive behavior in state prison, he will
realize liberty down the road. The law permits the district
attorney and the Department of Corrections to petition the court
to modify a sentence typically for good behavior.”3 The court
further remarked, “It is so tragic that drugs found this young
man, not only drugs to use but also drugs to sell. The court in
exercising discretion has to consider the defendant but also has to
consider the protection of society. His past conduct has
demonstrated, for whatever reason, that he posed a significant
and substantial danger to society, committed serious crimes and
serious methods and choice of weaponry.” The court concluded
the hearing by telling appellant, “I hope that your journey will
continue to be positive, that the Department of Corrections will
keep an eye on your progress. I hope that if a petition is filed by

3 Effective January 1, 2024, the law also allows the court to
act “on its own motion” to recall a defendant’s sentence and
resentence him or her “at any time if the applicable sentencing
laws at the time of the original sentencing are subsequently
changed by new statutory authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd.
(a)(1).)

10
the Department of Corrections or the district attorney’s office,
that a judicial officer handle [sic] that petition in a fair and just
manner. But the motion to apply Assembly Bill 124 as codified
1170 [sic] of the Penal Code is denied. In preparation of the
hearing, the court has reviewed the most recent probation report
dated today’s date. I have reviewed the latest material filed by
[counsel] on your behalf and I wish you success in the future.”
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Full Resentencing Rule and Oral Pronouncement
Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed because
the court “did not properly conduct a sentencing hearing” by
applying the full resentencing rule and orally pronouncing
judgment on each count. We review these questions of law de
novo. (See People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894.)
The “full resentencing rule” provides that “when part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.’” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893
(Buycks).) Unless the remittitur expressly limits the scope of
remand or other circumstances such as a negotiated sentence or
ex post facto concerns are present (People v. Walker (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 198, 205-206 & fn. 4 (Walker)), “the resentencing
court may consider ‘any pertinent circumstances which have
arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.’” (Buycks, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 893.) Indeed, Walker held that the “when a trial
court corrects one part of a sentence on remand, it is obligated to
address the effect of subsequent events that render other parts of
that sentence legally incorrect. By correcting one part of the

11
sentence, the trial court is resentencing the defendant and, in so
doing, is not only permitted, but also obligated to look at the facts
and the law in effect at the time of that resentencing . . . and
whether they render a different part of the sentence legally
incorrect.” (Walker, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 205-206.) “The
trial court has a duty never to impose an unauthorized sentence,
and a corollary of this duty is to ensure that all components of
that sentence are authorized by the law and the facts at the time
any new sentence is imposed.” (Id. at p. 206.)
Appellant asserts that the court did not comply with the
full resentencing rule because it “merely considered if AB 124’s
changes to section 1170(B)(3) [sic] would apply to appellant’s
previous judgement [sic], which had been vacated by this Court”
and did not orally impose sentence on each count. The record
does not support these assertions.
Whether the full resentencing rule requires or, as the
Attorney General argues, merely permits the trial court to
reconsider the sentences it previously imposed, the court
complied with the rule here. As detailed above, the court
expressly stated that it had considered “the latest materials” filed
by both sides as well as the circumstances of the crimes and the
background and “character of the defendant,” all of which are
proper considerations under California Rule of Court 4.423 and
reflect the court’s reevaluation of its previous sentencing choices.
In any event, we presume the court considered the relevant
factors “unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.409), and the record here does not meet
that bar.
The court spent the most time during the resentencing
hearing addressing the most relevant conviction, the robbery

12
conviction, and explaining its reasoning for reimposing the initial
midterm sentence on that count. However, as appellant
recognizes, the court also addressed all of the other counts,
stating the sentences it previously imposed and why it believed
those sentences remained proper. Appellant has not pointed to
any authority holding that the court is required to resentence
from a completely blank slate, with no reference to the previous
sentence. The court cannot implicitly incorporate its original
reasons by failing to state any at the resentencing (see People v.
Thornton (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 72, 74), but here the court made
overarching comments demonstrating that it considered the
relevant factors and appreciated the scope of its discretion. We
are not persuaded otherwise by its errant remark that “the
motion to apply Assembly Bill 124 as codified 1170 [sic] of the
Penal Code is denied,” which was contrary to both the substance
of the hearing and its recognition that “[t]he matter is here on a
remittitur from the court of appeal.” Regardless of what it called
the hearing, the court explicitly stated what the sentence on each
count would be, and that the “total term imposed is 26 years
followed by life.” We accordingly conclude the court fulfilled its
obligations to orally impose sentence on each count (People v.
Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-388), and provide
evidence-supported reasons for its discretionary choices (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 349).
II. Consideration of Youth and Rehabilitative Efforts
Appellant contends the trial court “based its decision not to
change any sentence based on his past crime alone” and did not
“properly consider the relevant facts related to how appellant’s
youth had influenced his crime, and how appellant’s
improvement in character and demonstrated maturity at the

13
time of the sentencing reduced the need for further
incarceration.” He also asserts that the court failed to consider
new legislative findings about the purpose of incarceration that
took effect after the hearing. We review the court’s sentencing
decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Hicks (2017) 17
Cal.App.5th 496, 512.) We find none here.
As explained in the previous appellate opinion in this
matter, AB 124 amended section 1170 to provide that the court
“shall order imposition of the lower term sentence” if certain
enumerated factors, including the defendant’s youthful age at the
time the offense was committed, were “a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense,” “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).)
The lower term presumption also applies if the defendant
“experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” that
was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)4

4 Appellant also mentions that section 1170, subdivision
(b)(2) now provides that the court may impose a high term
sentence “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” We note that the court imposed and
stayed the high term on appellant’s convictions for unlawful
firearm and ammunition possession based on “the circumstances
of his case” and his previous similar convictions. Appellant
makes no substantive argument that these sentences were
improper or unauthorized.

14
Appellant’s counsel briefed and orally argued that
appellant’s youth, lack of maturity, and impulsive tendencies
contributed to the commission of his crimes. Appellant also
directly addressed the court, discussing events from his childhood
and their impact on his life. The People also argued about
appellant’s youth. The issue thus was squarely before the court,
and the court unambiguously acknowledged as much. It stated
that the “factor of youth” was the “category that applies here,”
and recognized that “the court is required to choose the low term
unless the court finds aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, that [sic] imposition of a lower term
would be contrary to the interest of justice.” The court then
discussed various factors it considered, notably including “the
character of the defendant” and that “he did not have an easy
life.” The court also addressed the cruel, vicious, and callous
nature of the robbery and attempted murder in particular, noting
the jury’s finding that the latter was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. Balancing these factors, it found that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed “any mitigating
circumstance that would justify the imposition of the low term.”
This conclusion was not so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it and therefore was not an
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 377.)
The “hallmark features” of youth include “immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”
(Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477.) Youth also “‘often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,’” and “‘are more
vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures’ than adults.”

15
(J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 272.) Even if the
court concluded that these factors contributed to appellant’s solo
crime spree generally or the robbery specifically (see § 1170,
subd. (b)(6)), the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
they were outweighed by the various aggravating factors present
in this case. “Sentencing courts have wide discretion in weighing
aggravating and mitigating factors” (People v. Lai (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 1227, 1258), and we cannot “reweigh valid factors
bearing on the decision below.” (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 355.) Appellant asks us to do just that, asserting that the
court should have given “great weight” to his youth and listing
various facts he finds particularly pertinent.
Appellant similarly contends the court failed to adequately
consider his rehabilitative efforts and instead “erroneously
implied that the facts of appellant’s rehabilitation would only be
considered if the District Attorney or Department of Corrections
petitioned for resentencing.” We disagree. The court stated that
it was “impressed by the defendant’s apparent attempts to
rehabilitate and improve himself,” clearly evincing its
consideration of those efforts. As previously noted, the court also
said it considered the materials filed on appellant’s behalf, all of
which pertained to his rehabilitative efforts. It further stated,
“that alone isn’t enough to substantially change the sentence,”
indicating not only its consideration of appellant’s efforts but also
its balancing of those efforts against other relevant factors.
Appellant suggests that the court should have mentioned and
considered “factors in mitigation other than [his] youth”; these
comments indicate it did. They do not indicate an abuse of
discretion.

16
Appellant also argues that the court abused its discretion
by failing to consider a recent amendment to section 1170,
subdivision (a)(1) that took effect on January 1, 2024. (See Stats
2023, ch. 50, § 2.5.) Section 1170, subdivision (a)(1) previously
provided, “The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of
sentencing is public safety achieved through punishment,
rehabilitation, and restorative justice. When a sentence includes
incarceration, this purpose is best served by terms that are
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for
uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same
offense under similar circumstances.” (Former § 1170, subd.
(a)(1).) It now provides, “The Legislature finds and declares that
the purpose of sentencing is public safety achieved through
punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative justice. When a
sentence includes incarceration, the deprivation of liberty
satisfies the punishment purpose of sentencing. The purpose of
incarceration is rehabilitation and successful community
reintegration achieved through education, treatment, and active
participation in rehabilitative and restorative justice programs.
This purpose is best served by terms that are proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense with provision for uniformity in the
sentences of people incarcerated for committing the same offense
under similar circumstances.” (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1).)
Appellant asserts that the court should have considered
this “newly stated purpose” at his December 19, 2022
resentencing hearing, because his “commitment to change”
demonstrated a reduced need for further incarceration. It would
have been factually impossible for the trial court to consider this
purpose, which had not yet been enacted at the time of
appellant’s resentencing. Even if we assume the amendment

17
retroactively applies to appellant’s resentencing—respondent
argues that it does not—the court would not have been required
to expressly reference it to properly exercise its discretion. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409.) The court considered appellant’s
significant positive strides as one of many factors relevant to its
sentencing decision, and we do not reweigh its careful balancing
here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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