O'Neill v. Cara CA4/3

CourtListener 9999244Calctapp10 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/10/24 O’Neill v. Cara CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JULIE O’NEILL,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062076

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01092091)

ANTHONY P. CARA et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Ronald L. Bauer, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Thaler Law and Jesse J. Thaler for Defendants and Appellants.
The Samini Firm, Bobby Samini, Ignacio J. Lazo for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendants Anthony P. Cara, Peter Nisson, and Consumer
Defense Law Group, P.C., a law firm and its two attorneys, appeal from a
judgment awarding $113,581.95 in damages to plaintiff Julie O’Neill, their
former client, for their malpractice. Plaintiff’s home was subject to two
encumbrances—a mortgage and a lien. The lienholder initiated foreclosure
proceedings, and plaintiff’s home was sold at a foreclosure sale.
After a bench trial, the trial court found defendants’ malpractice
caused the foreclosure sale because they could have taken actions to prevent
the foreclosure. The trial court initially awarded $437,000 in damages to
plaintiff, but it reduced the award to $113,581.95 after defendants filed a
motion for new trial noting certain errors in the court’s initial calculation.
Defendants filed a second motion for new trial, contending the court’s
damages calculation was still incorrect and arguing the $113,581.95 award
should be further reduced. The court denied the motion for new trial and
entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor.
On appeal, defendants contend the court’s award of $113,581.95
is not supported by the evidence. Relying on the court’s statements in a
minute order issued in response to defendants’ first motion for new trial,
defendants likewise argue the court made errors in its calculation. We
disagree and affirm the judgment.

FACTS
Foreclosure of Plaintiff’s Home
Plaintiff’s home in San Clemente was subject to a first deed of
trust owned by Wells Fargo, N.A., and a second deed of trust owned by
William Kevin O’Bryon. The first deed of trust had a principal balance of

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$482,653.93. The second deed of trust had a principal balance of $91,668. It
is undisputed plaintiff had the ability to cure any default regarding the
second deed of trust.
In February 2018, plaintiff retained defendants as her attorneys
in connection with a pending foreclosure sale of her home by O’Bryon.
Defendants’ efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, and plaintiff’s home was
sold at a foreclosure auction for $437,000 in July 2018. In addition to paying
$437,000, the purchaser was subject to liability for $482,653.93, the
remaining balance on the first deed of trust. The proceeds of the $437,000
sale’s price were distributed as follows: (1) $113,581.95 was paid to O’Bryon
in satisfaction of the second deed of trust and for costs of the foreclosure; and
(2) $323,418.05 of the surplus (i.e., overbid) proceeds was paid to plaintiff.

The Complaint
In August 2019, plaintiff filed the operative complaint alleging
claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against defendants
and another individual who is not a party to the instant appeal. According to
the complaint, plaintiff retained defendants as her counsel to prevent the
foreclosure sale of her home by O’Bryon, the holder of the second deed of
trust. Defendants allegedly told plaintiff they could enjoin the foreclosure
sale because of certain misconduct by the lender. But they gave false
information to plaintiff about the viability of her claims against her lender
and negligently delayed their litigation filings, resulting in the foreclosure of
her home. During their representation of plaintiff, defendants filed an

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At some point, it appears plaintiff and O’Bryon agreed to a
reduced lump sum payment of $75,000.

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unsuccessful motion to reopen plaintiff’s bankruptcy case, which had been
closed since 2014. After the foreclosure sale, defendants also filed an action
on plaintiff’s behalf against O’Bryon for declaratory relief, claiming plaintiff
had satisfied the lien. Plaintiff allegedly did not know defendants were going
to file the latter action.

The Court’s First Minute Order and Defendant’s First Motion for New Trial
After a bench trial, the court issued a minute order in August
2022 finding defendants liable for malpractice. The court held the foreclosure
sale’s price of $437,000 represented plaintiff’s lost equity and awarded that
amount in damages to plaintiff. The court did not rely on the parties’ other
proposed calculations because they were not reliable and were “heavily
dependent on guesswork.” The court also declined to award damages for
emotional distress or punitive damages.
In response, defendants filed a motion for new trial and argued
the court erred in calculating damages because plaintiff had already received
the equity in her home. They noted the court had found the fair market
value of the property was the $437,000 foreclosure sale’s price. According to
defendants, plaintiff already benefited from those proceeds because she
received $323,418.05 in surplus proceeds while the remainder was paid to
O’Bryon in satisfaction of the second deed of trust.

The Court’s Second Minute Order
After a hearing on defendants’ motion for new trial, the court
issued a minute order reducing the damages award to $113,581.95. The
court explained plaintiff’s damages were the value of the home she lost

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through the preventable foreclosure minus any value she received as a result
of the foreclosure.
Regarding the value of the home, the court appears to have
calculated this amount as $1,011,321.93 by adding the following numbers:
(1) $437,000 for the foreclosure sales price; (2) $482,653.93 for the remaining
balance on the first deed of trust, which the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
was committed to pay; and (3) $91,668 for the remaining balance on the
second deed of trust owed by O’Bryon. The court mistakenly stated the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale was committed to pay the $91,668 balance
on the second deed of trust. This statement is central to defendants’
arguments on appeal. The court also suggested the value of the home
alternatively could be calculated based on the price received by the
foreclosure purchaser when it later sold the home in 2019 “and then
factor[ing] in a number representing market appreciation and another
amount for the costs of refurbishing the house.” But the court did not rely on
the latter calculation because it entailed “guesswork” and “speculation.” The
court further noted plaintiff’s case was based on a theory that homes do not
sell at a foreclosure for their fair market value. But the court held plaintiff
presented “no evidence of what adjustment should be made to reflect this
theoretical foreclosure deficit.”
Regarding the value plaintiff received because of the foreclosure,
it appears the court calculated this amount as $897,793.98 by adding the
following numbers: (1) $323,418.05 for the surplus proceeds plaintiff
received; (2) $482,653.93 for the remaining balance on the first deed of trust;
and (3) $91,668 for the remaining balance on the second deed of trust. The
court acknowledged its prior order mistakenly overlooked the $323,418.05

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plaintiff had received. The court believed this “significant overage indicate[d]
[the] house did not sell for a large foreclosure discount—if any.”
Based on the above, the court calculated plaintiff’s net loss as
$113,581.95 ($1,011,321.93 minus $897,739.98). Although defendants’
counsel suggested the net proceeds of any sale should be reduced by a 6
percent brokerage fee, the court did not include this in its calculation because
it was speculative and “by no means certain.” The court directed plaintiff’s
counsel to prepare a judgment consistent with the court’s order.

Defendant’s Second Motion for New Trial and the Court’s Third Minute Order
A few days later, defendants filed another motion for new trial
and again argued the court erred in calculating damages. According to
defendants, plaintiff either had already received all of the equity in her home
or was damaged in the amount of $21,913.95 ($113,581.95 representing the
balance remaining after plaintiff received her surplus proceeds minus
$91,668 representing the remaining balance on the second deed of trust).
In opposition, plaintiff argued defendants misunderstood “the
distinction between a lending instrument that forecloses [versus] one that is
paid off.” At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel explained plaintiff did not benefit
by having a third party pay off the O’Bryon lien. Instead, plaintiff’s counsel
suggested plaintiff was damaged in the amount that was paid to O’Bryon.
Her counsel argued: “It seems wholly shocking to me that the defendants
now are here claiming that they should get the benefit from the foreclosure
for which they caused.”
After the hearing, the court issued a third minute order denying
defendants’ motion for new trial and objections to the proposed judgment.
The court indicated it would sign the proposed judgment. The minute order

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did not include any additional details about the court’s reasoning or
calculations.

Judgment
In November 2022, the court entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor
and awarded $113,581.95 in damages. Defendants filed a timely notice of
appeal.

DISCUSSION
Defendants contend the court’s calculation of damages is not
supported by the evidence. Relying on the court’s second minute order,
defendants argue there is no evidence to support the court’s finding that the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale was committed to pay $91,668 due on the
second deed of trust. Instead, they emphasize the second deed of trust was
paid off by the proceeds of the foreclosure, so it was a benefit plaintiff
received. They accordingly claim the court should have reduced the
$113,581.95 damages award by $91,668, resulting in an award of $21,913.45.
The court did not err.
At the outset, we address defendants’ assertion that the trial
court’s second minute order “was effectively a Statement of Decision.”
Defendants alternatively argue the court’s factual findings within the minute
order are part of the judgment because the judgment generally references the
minute order. Not so. The court did not issue a statement of decision.
A trial court typically issues a statement of decision “explaining
the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal
controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the
trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) Defendants do not dispute they failed to

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request a statement of decision or that the minute order was issued in
response to their motion for new trial. The trial court also appears to have
followed California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(a) by announcing its tentative
decision in the minutes and directing plaintiff to prepare a proposed
judgment. “The tentative decision does not constitute a judgment and is not
binding on the court.” (Ibid.; see Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 511, 551-552 [holding the trial court’s written opinion and ruling
was not a statement of decision “but merely a tentative decision [that could
not] be used to impeach the judgment”].) “[A] tentative statement of
decision . . . can be modified or changed as the judge sees fit before entry of
judgment.” (FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1270,
1284.) Indeed, this is exactly what the trial court did after it issued its first
minute order. It modified that tentative decision when it issued the second
minute order. There is no reason why the second minute order should be
treated differently.
In the absence of a statement of decision, we accordingly only
look to the judgment to determine error. “[T]he necessary findings of
ultimate facts will be implied and the only issue on appeal is whether the
implied findings are supported by substantial evidence.” (Shaw v. County of
Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 267.) We also note the amount of
damages awarded is generally “‘“a fact question . . . [and] an award of
damages will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence.”’”
(Madani v. Rabinowitz (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 602, 610.)
Here, the judgment noted there were trial proceedings and new
trial motions resulting in minute orders. The judgment then concluded
defendants were liable for $113,581.95 without specifying any reason or
calculation. The evidence supports the court’s implied finding that

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$113,581.95 ultimately was not a benefit plaintiff received and that O’Bryon
would not have received that amount if defendants had done their job
properly. Among other things, plaintiff’s expert witness testified defendants
may have been able to avoid the foreclosure sale by contacting the beneficiary
of the second deed of trust, which they never did. By contacting the
beneficiary, the expert explained defendants could have tried to negotiate a
reduction in the principal balance or try to arrange for mediation. According
to the expert, defendants’ filing of an adversary complaint in bankruptcy
court and a declaratory relief action after the foreclosure sale was valueless.
The court accordingly did not err by awarding damages to plaintiff in an
amount equal to the amount that would not have been pocketed by O’Bryon
absent defendants’ malpractice.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on appeal.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.

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