CourtListener 9998155•People v. Sedillo CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 7/8/24 P. v. Sedillo CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B329864
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA072460)
v.
JESUS SEDILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Charles Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Jesus Sedillo of two special circumstance
murders committed when he was 20 years old, crimes for which
he was sentenced to two terms of life without parole. Years later,
Sedillo moved for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63
Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), which held that a defendant may develop
a record for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under
Penal Code1 section 3051.2 The trial court denied Sedillo’s
request for a Franklin hearing because he was ineligible for a
youth offender parole hearing. Sedillo appeals, contending that
section 3051 violates equal protection because it excludes young
adult offenders sentenced to life without parole and that his
sentence is cruel or unusual punishment under our California
Constitution. We reject his contentions.
BACKGROUND
In 2009, a jury found Sedillo guilty of two counts of special
circumstance murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3)
[multiple murder special circumstance] & (21) [murder
committed by personally discharging firearm from vehicle at
person outside vehicle with intent to inflict death special
circumstance]; counts 1 & 2) and two counts of attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4). As to counts 1, 2, and 4, the
jury found that Sedillo personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd.
(d)). As relevant here, Sedillo’s sentence included two terms of
life without parole.
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
Such a hearing is sometimes referred to as a Franklin
hearing.
2
In May 2022, Sedillo filed a writ of habeas corpus in which
he requested a Franklin hearing. The trial court treated the writ
as a request for a Franklin hearing. On March 30, 2023, the trial
court issued an order finding that denying youth offender parole
hearings to 18-to-25 year olds sentenced to life without parole did
not violate the equal protection clause. The trial court therefore
denied Sedillo’s request for a Franklin hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Equal protection
Sedillo was 20 years old when he committed the murders
and was sentenced to life without parole; therefore, he was
ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051
and not entitled to a Franklin hearing. He nonetheless argues
that section 3051 violates equal protection by (1) treating young
adult offenders sentenced to life without parole for special
circumstance murder differently from young adult offenders
serving parole-eligible life sentences for other crimes, and
(2) excluding young adult offenders sentenced to life without
parole from eligibility while including juvenile offenders
sentenced to life without parole. As we now explain, our
California Supreme Court rejected his first argument in People v.
Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), and we follow other
Courts of Appeal rejecting the second argument.
Over the past two decades, courts have recognized that
juveniles (persons under 18) are constitutionally different from
adults for sentencing purposes because of juveniles’ diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform. (See generally
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.) Accordingly, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty on
juveniles (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551), life without
3
parole sentences on juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses
(Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48), mandatory life without
parole sentences on juveniles (Miller, at p. 489), de facto life
without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders
(People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262), and a sentence of 50
years to life for juvenile nonhomicide offenders (People v.
Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 356).
In light of the judicial recognition of juveniles’ lessened
culpability and greater prospects for reform, our Legislature
enacted section 3051. Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole
Hearings to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” at specified
times during the youth’s incarceration. Generally, persons who
were younger than 26 years old when they committed their
controlling offense are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
if they were sentenced to a determinate term or a life term with
the possibility of parole. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) Persons sentenced to
life without parole are entitled to a hearing if they were younger
than 18 years old when they committed the controlling offense.
(§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).) However, persons sentenced to life without
parole who committed their controlling offense when they were
18 or older are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.3
(§ 3051, subd. (h).) Further, persons who are eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing must have a sufficient opportunity to
make a record of information relevant to that eventual hearing.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
3
Similarly, persons sentenced under the Three Strikes or
One Strike laws and offenders who, after attaining 26 years of
age, commit an additional crime for which malice aforethought is
an element are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
(§ 3051, subd. (h).)
4
While this appeal was pending, our California Supreme
Court issued Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834, which considered
whether section 3051 violates equal protection. Hardin, at page
850, held that when “plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether
the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review,” which is rational basis review.
Under rational basis review, courts “consider whether the
challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4
Cal.5th 277, 289.)
Hardin then turned to whether there was a rational basis
to exclude persons sentenced to life without parole for a crime
committed when they were 18 or older from a youth offender
parole hearing. The court found that while the Legislature’s
primary purpose in extending section 30514 to young adult
offenders was to give them the opportunity to obtain release
based on growth and rehabilitation, the Legislature balanced this
purpose with other concerns about culpability and the
appropriate punishment for certain very serious crimes. (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 854.) In “designing section 3051, the
Legislature consciously drew lines that altered the parole
4
As originally enacted, only juveniles were eligible for youth
offender parole hearings, but, over the years, the age of eligibility
has been raised to 22 and then to 25. (See generally Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 845–846.)
5
component of offenders’ sentences based not only on the age of
the offender (and thus the offender’s amenability to
rehabilitation) but also on the offense and sentence imposed. The
lines the Legislature drew necessarily reflect a set of legislative
judgments about the nature of punishment that is appropriate for
the crime.” (Id. at p. 855.)
Hardin rejected the argument that there is no rational
basis to distinguish between youthful offenders sentenced to life
without parole for special circumstance murder and youthful
offenders sentenced either to functionally equivalent life without
parole sentences or to indeterminate life terms for first degree
murder. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 858.) The court
observed that “legions of decisions” hold that “special
circumstance murder is sufficiently serious and morally culpable
as to justify imposing the most severe sanctions available under
the law, up to and including death.” (Id. at p. 859.) While the
court did not “foreclose the possibility of other challenges to the
distinctions drawn by the special circumstances statute based on
a more robust record or a more focused as-applied inquiry,
Hardin has not carried his burden to demonstrate that legislative
reliance on the special circumstance murder statute in section
3051, subdivision (h) is categorically irrational.” (Id. at p. 862.)
The court concluded that Hardin had not shown that the
“Legislature’s decision to expand youth offender parole hearings
to most young adult offenders, while excluding Hardin and others
similarly situated, violates equal protection under a rational
basis standard.” (Id. at p. 866.)
Sedillo acknowledges that Hardin rejected his first
contention, that treating young adult offenders sentenced to life
without parole for special circumstance murder differently from
young adult offenders serving parole-eligible life sentences for
other crimes violates equal protection.
6
Sedillo therefore pursues only his second contention, that
excluding young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole
from eligibility while including juvenile offenders sentenced to
life without parole violates equal protection. Although Hardin
declined to address this issue, other appellate courts have
rejected it, finding that age provides a rational basis for the
Legislature to distinguish between offenders with the same life
without parole sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Hardin (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 273, 285–286, review granted Jan. 11, 2023,
S277487, reversed on other grounds by Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
834; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193; People v. Acosta
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 (Acosta).) Those cases recognize
that Roper and its progeny apply to juveniles, and not to young
adult offenders. Thus, a life without parole sentence may violate
the Eighth Amendment for juvenile offenders, but “the same
sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed
on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26.” (Sands, at
p. 204.) Our Legislature therefore could “rationally decide to
remedy unconstitutional sentences [of juveniles] but go no
further.” (Ibid.; accord, Acosta, at pp. 779–780 [Legislature
declined to include young adult offenders sentenced to life
without parole presumably because 8th Amend. jurisprudence
didn’t compel it].)
Although we join other appellate courts in questioning the
soundness of a policy that excludes young adult offenders
sentenced to life without parole from section 3051, “we cannot
assert our own policy concerns into the analysis” where there is a
rational basis—age—to treat them differently than juveniles.
(Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; accord, Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th 835, **1005 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [urging Legislature to
revisit issue] & **1012 (dis. opn. of Evans, J.) [“I urge the
Legislature to correct itself by ridding section 3051 of the [life
7
without parole] exclusion and extending youth offender parole
eligibility to all individuals who were convicted in their youth.”];
People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1041 (conc.
opn. of Segal, J.) [urging Legislature to rethink § 3051’s exclusion
of young adult offenders].) We therefore reject Sedillo’s claim
that excluding young adult offenders sentenced to life without
parole from eligibility while including juvenile offenders
sentenced to life without parole violates equal protection.
II. Cruel or unusual punishment
Sedillo alternatively argues that evolving standards of
decency, as exemplified by the expansion of section 3051 to
include persons who committed their controlling offense at the
age of 25 and younger, has made his life without parole sentence
cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution.5
But, as we have said, section 3051 has its genesis in cases
concerning juveniles. That is, Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S.
460 prohibited mandatory life without parole terms for juveniles.
It did not apply to young adults like Sedillo who were 18 or older
when they committed their crime. (Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th
at p. 782.) Our Supreme Court and numerous Courts of Appeal
have refused to extend Miller, as well as Graham and Roper, to
young adults 18 years of age or older. (See, e.g., People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429–430 [declining to extend Roper to 18-to-
20-year-olds]; People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 [death
5
Sedillo does not argue on appeal that his sentence violates
the federal constitution. Further, he did not argue below that his
sentence violates the state constitution, thereby forfeiting the
issue on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
711, 720.) Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to address the
merits. (See, e.g., People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134,
1145–1146, fn. 12.)
8
penalty for 18 year old with “intellectual shortcomings” does not
violate federal and state constitutions]; People v. Gamache (2010)
48 Cal.4th 347, 407 [“lengthy confinement under a death
sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment” or
violate federal and state constitutions]; In re Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 427, 437–438 [life without parole for 21-year old
offender not grossly disproportionate to his culpability]; see
People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.) Thus, as
Argeta observed, a line has been drawn about at what age it is
cruel or unusual punishment to impose a life without parole
sentence. That line currently stands at 17 years of age (i.e., those
persons who are 17 and younger are considered juveniles).
Sedillo was 20 years old and not a juvenile when he committed
the murders. Accordingly, his life without parole sentence does
not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
9
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
LAVIN, J.
BERSHON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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