CourtListener 9998140•People v. Smith CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 7/8/24 P. v. Smith CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082129
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN440036)
VANCE LAMONT SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David G. Brown, Judge. Affirmed as amended; remanded with directions.
Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury convicted Vance Lamont Smith of two counts of unlawfully
taking and driving a trailer (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); counts 1 and 3)
and two counts of buying, receiving, concealing, selling, or withholding a
stolen trailer (Pen. Code,1 § 496d; counts 2 and 4). Smith admitted to two
prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
The court sentenced Smith to prison for five years four months,
consisting of: four years (middle term of two years, doubled for prior strike)
on count 1 and a consecutive term of one year four months (one third of the
middle term of two years, doubled for the prior strike) on count 3. Under
section 654, the court stayed the sentence on counts 2 and 4.
Smith appeals, contending substantial evidence does not support his
conviction under count 2 and the trial court committed prejudicial error in
admitting a hearsay statement as to the value of the trailer. The People
concede and we agree that substantial evidence does not support Smith’s
conviction under count 2. However, we determine that Smith forfeited his
challenge to the subject hearsay evidence. Further, on the record before us,
we cannot say that Smith’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. Accordingly, we vacate Smith’s conviction under count 2 and
remand the matter to the superior court with instructions to amend the
abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
On the morning of December 27, 2022, R.Q., the owner of a U-Haul
truck and trailer rental in Vista, arrived for work and noticed that several
trailers had been moved and a few trailers were missing. R.Q. reviewed
video footage from the overnight surveillance of the parking lot and saw
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 The parties do not dispute the facts. We therefore paraphrase the more
concise facts from the People’s brief here, which accurately reflects the
record.
2
Smith pull up to the lot at 3:43 a.m. in a white Ford pick-up truck. Smith
attached a vehicle trailer, identified by decals as AT4441W to his pick-up
truck and drove off the lot. About an hour later, R.Q. saw Smith return to
the parking lot and take another vehicle trailer, this one identified by decals
as AT3280Y. R.Q. reported the incident and both trailers were placed in the
stolen vehicle system.
On the morning of December 29, 2022, C.S., the owner at Rocket
Storage in Vista, saw a Hispanic man spray painting an unhooked U-Haul
trailer with the identification number AT3280Y. C.S. told the Hispanic man
to leave the facility and the man left on a skateboard. C.S. called U-Haul
about the trailer, and he was advised that the trailer was stolen.
About an hour later, Smith arrived at Rocket Storage in a white Ford
pick-up truck with no license plates. C.S. asked Smith for identification and
Smith produced a California identification card. Smith initially told C.S. that
he had a rental agreement but then told C.S. that he was going to take the
trailer to the Department of Motor Vehicles to register it. C.S. reported the
incident to law enforcement. Two deputies from the San Diego County
Sheriff’s Department responded to investigate about 30 minutes later.
After arriving at Rocket Storage, the deputies examined the trailer,
confirmed that it was stolen and reviewed a report regarding the stolen
trailer, which included a description of the suspect matching Smith and
surveillance footage of the theft. The deputies also located a white pick-up
truck matching the description of the truck used in the U-Haul thefts parked
inside of the Rocket Storage facility. After confirming that the truck
belonged to Smith, they arrested him.
The next morning, the deputies responded to a report of a stolen
U-Haul trailer parked at a house in Vista, about one mile from Rocket
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Storage. They recognized the trailer’s identification number, AT4441W, from
the theft at the U-Haul lot on December 27, 2022. R.Q. came to retrieve the
stolen trailer.
DISCUSSION
I
COUNT 2
A. Smith’s Contentions
Smith asserts and the People concede that substantial evidence does
not support his conviction under count 2 for unlawfully receiving
trailer ATT441W. We agree that, under the facts of this case, Smith cannot
be convicted for unlawfully taking trailer AT4441W in violation of Vehicle
Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and receiving that same trailer in
violation of Penal Code section 496d.
B. Background
In count 1 of the amended information, Smith was charged with driving
and taking trailer AT4441W, with intent to either permanently or
temporarily deprive the owner of title and possession of the trailer in
violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). In count 2, Smith
was charged with unlawfully buying, receiving, concealing, selling, and
withholding or aiding in concealing, selling, and withholding
trailer AT4441W.
There is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that Smith took
trailer AT4441W from the U-Haul rental lot in the early morning hours of
December 27, 2022. That trailer was found parked at a house in Vista.
There was no evidence offered at trial that Smith drove trailer AT4441W to
the subject house, and Smith did not own and was not a resident of that
house.
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During closing arguments, the prosecutor maintained that Smith had
unlawfully taken trailer AT4441W. However, she did not contend that Smith
had unlawfully driven the trailer after taking it.
C. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Principles
When we assess the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard, “ ‘ “we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.) “ ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[a] reasonable inference may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guesswork; a finding of fact must be an inference drawn from
evidence rather than a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’
[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘By definition, “substantial evidence” requires evidence and not
mere speculation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)
A defendant can violate Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) by
either unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (People v. Garza (2005) 35
Cal.4th 866, 871, 876 (Garza).) A taking is complete when the defendant
reaches a place of safety, when the driving is no longer part of a
“ ‘ “continuous journey away from the locus of the theft” ’ ” (id. at p. 878.,
quoting People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 375 (Strong)), or when
the “driving is not part of the escape from the scene of the theft.” (People v.
Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 395.) When the driving is “ ‘part and
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parcel’ ” of the theft—such that there is one continuous Vehicle Code
section 10851, subdivision (a), violation—it is a theft conviction. Generally, a
defendant who takes a vehicle, thus committing a theft offense, cannot also
be convicted of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property under Penal
Code section 496d. (Calistro at pp. 403, 395.)
Dual convictions under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and
section 496d are allowed, however, ‘‘ ‘when there is evidence of complete
divorcement between the theft and subsequent receiving, such as when the
thief has disposed of the property and subsequently receives it back in a
transaction separate from the original theft.’ ” (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
pp. 874–875, quoting People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 8.)
Accordingly, the dispositive issue regarding dual convictions under Vehicle
Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 496d is whether a
defendant’s Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) conviction was
predicated on a theft or posttheft driving theory. (Garza, at p. 881.) When a
defendant is improperly convicted of both stealing and receiving the stolen
property, the theft conviction should be upheld and the receiving conviction
reversed. (People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Ceja).)
D. Analysis
Here, although the amended information charged Smith with taking
and driving the vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a) in count 1 , the prosecution proceeded solely on the taking
theory. Moreover, although the jury’s verdict form on count 1 reflected a
finding that Smith both took and drove the vehicle, this finding is
unsupported by the record. As adduced at trial, Smith hooked
trailer AT4441W to his truck and took it from the U-Haul rental lot.
Further, as Smith notes and the People do not challenge, there is no evidence
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as to what Smith did after taking the trailer or what might have happened to
the trailer between the time Smith took it from the U-Haul rental lot and
when it was discovered at the house in Vista. Although Smith did drive the
trailer away from the U-Haul lot, there is no evidence that he disposed of it
and then received it back at the residence in Vista. Rather, the evidence
supports the theory that Smith was on one “ ‘continuous journey away from
the locus of the theft.’ ” (Strong, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.) And the
prosecutor did not contend otherwise at trial with respect to count 1, focusing
solely on the theory that Smith took the trailer.
Against this backdrop, dual convictions on counts 1 and 2 are not
proper. The record clearly demonstrates that the offense for which Smith
was convicted in count 1 was the unlawful taking of trailer AT4441W, and
thus, Smith cannot be convicted of receiving that same trailer as stolen
property in count 2. (Strong, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 374.) Consequently,
the Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) conviction in count 1 should
be upheld and the Penal Code section 496d conviction in count 2 must be
reversed. (Ceja, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
II
EVIDENCE REGARDING VALUE OF THE TRAILER
A. Smith’s Contentions
Smith maintains that his two felony convictions under Vehicle Code
section 10851, subdivision (a) must be reduced to misdemeanors because the
trial court erred in admitting hearsay as to the value of the stolen trailers.
Specifically, he argues the admission of the testimony violated the expert
witness testimony and hearsay rules outlined in People v. Sanchez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). We are not persuaded.
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B. Background
One of the motions in limine Smith filed was to exclude any speculation
about the cost of the trailers. He based this motion on Evidence Code
section 702,3 arguing that no one has personal knowledge of the cost of the
U-Haul trailers because they are not available for sale and could not be
compared to other brands.
Although the court granted Smith’s motion in limine to exclude
speculation regarding the value of the U-Haul trailer, it made clear that a
witness would be permitted to testify about the value of the trailer if he or
she had the basis to do so. The court explained:
“Here’s what I’m going to rule, cutting the baby in half.
A witness can testify on his training or experience that he
saw these trailers being sold for, I’m assuming we’re not
looking at under a thousand. And this is subject to cross-
examination. I mean, is that—that goes to weight. So if
you can say, well, you don’t essentially say, politely of
course, you don’t know what you’re talking about. Then
you certainly have that opportunity. But to preclude
it, . . . , I’m not likely to do under any sort of sense that it
does go to the weight, not the admissibility. Just like any
opinion, at least in my way of thinking.”
The court further illuminated:
“I would say a witness of—I would say I would deny an
objection as to speculation if Mr. Rocket trailer guy gets up
there and says, I’ve seen trailers like this and they cost
$5,000 to build, subject to your cross-examination. I’m not
3 Evidence Code section 702 states:
“(a) Subject to Section 801, the testimony of a witness concerning a
particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of
the matter. Against the objection of a party, such personal knowledge
must be shown before the witness may testify concerning the matter.
“(b) A witness’ personal knowledge of a matter may be shown by any
otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.”
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saying that a U-Haul trailer has the value that can only be
established by a U-Haul executive. And I don’t want to
denigrate anyone’s argument, but it seems, and I think
jurors can infer this, that a U-Haul trailer has a value in
excess of $950, just by looking at the darn thing. Or has
a[n] asset value in excess of $950, so I could be wrong about
that.”
Defense counsel argued that a witness should not be permitted to state
that the trailers at issue in this case cost a certain amount because trailers
generally cost that amount. The trial court agreed, but explained that a
witness would be permitted to provide some sort of valuation and not simply
state that the trailer’s value was more than $950. However, defense counsel
did not raise the issue of hearsay.
At trial, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence as to the value of
the stolen trailers and offered the following testimony of R.Q.:
“Q: Now, these two trailers that are stolen from the lot on
December 27, what were the values of these trailers?
“A: The replacement value was $8,000 each.
“Q: How did you come to that conclusion? Or how did you
come up with a value?
“A: That is the value provided by U-Haul.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked R.Q. about the value of
the trailer:
“Q: You stated the value for the trailer was $8,000?
“A: Correct.
“Q: That’s a different value then you previously given to
law enforcement; right?
“A: Correct.
“Q: As you mentioned these trailers are not for sale; right?
9
“A: Correct.
“Q: There is a rental price but not a sales price?
“A: Correct.
“Q: U-Haul manufactures their own trailers?
“A: Yes.
“Q: And after the trailers have reached their life, they are
melted down and the metal is repurposed; right?
“A: That’s correct.
“Q: So, again, they are not put up for sale?
“A: Correct.
“Q: Do you have documentation showing the cost of the
trailers?
“A: I do have a text from U-Haul Corporate, yes.
“Q: Did you provide that to the prosecutor in this case?
“A: I have not.”
On redirect examination, the prosecutor clarified as follows:
“Q: So after the trailers were stolen, you were able to get a
better estimate of the value of the stolen trailer; is that
right?
“A: That’s correct.
“Q: And the information that you received, was that it cost
$8,000 to replace each trailer?
“A: That’s correct.”
C. Analysis
Here, Smith claims that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay
evidence regarding the value of the U-Haul trailer. However, defense counsel
10
did not object to R.Q.’s testimony regarding the value of the U-Haul trailer on
hearsay grounds. Therefore, Smith forfeited this issue on appeal. (See
People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 328 [“A ‘ “defendant’s failure to make
a timely and specific objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes that
ground not cognizable’ ”], quoting People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 302;
see Evidence Code section 353 [verdict or finding may not be set aside due to
the erroneous admission of evidence absent a specific and timely objection].)
Nonetheless, Smith essentially contends that the motion in limine he
filed pursuant to Evidence Code section 702 should be construed as a hearsay
objection. We are not persuaded. The subject motion was specifically aimed
at speculative testimony. Moreover, defendants who make in limine motions
to exclude evidence are generally “required to renew their objection at trial,
when the trial court would have the opportunity to evaluate their objections
in light of the actual evidence presented.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010)
50 Cal.4th 99, 159.) Additionally, Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (1),
requires an objection “so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the
objection.” “What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial
court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or
reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the
party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make
a fully informed ruling.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.)
Foundational facts, such as personal knowledge of a witness, are required
under several evidentiary rules, not only for claimed hearsay evidence. (See,
e.g., Evid. Code, §§ 400–405, 702, 720, 800–801.) Thus, a foundational issue
raised in a motion in limine pursuant to Evidence Code section 702 does not
give notice of a hearsay objection. We thus reject Smith’s assertion that his
motion in limine preserved his hearsay challenge on appeal.
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Additionally, we find Smith’s reliance on Sanchez, supra,
63 Cal.4th 665 misplaced. In Sanchez, our high court explained that “[w]hen
any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and treats
the content of those statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s
opinion, the statements are hearsay.” (Id. at p. 686.) The court defined
“[c]ase-specific facts” as “those relating to the particular events and
participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried.” (Id. at
p. 676.) It concluded that an expert’s recitation of case-specific facts is
prohibited if the facts are outside the expert’s personal knowledge, do not fall
under an exception to the hearsay rule, or have not been independently
established by competent evidence. (Id. at pp. 676–677, 686.)
Here, R.Q. testified as the owner of the rental lot from which Smith
stole the trailers. R.Q. was on duty the morning of the theft, and he was the
person who noticed the trailers were missing and then reviewed the
surveillance footage of Smith stealing the trailers. R.Q. was not offered, and
did not testify, as an expert on trailers or any issue regarding their value.
Therefore, Sanchez is not applicable, and the ordinary rules of evidence
apply.
So, what remains is Smith’s argument that R.Q.’s testimony about the
value of the U-Haul trailers was inadmissible hearsay. Nonetheless, he
forfeited that objection by failing to make it below. (See People v. Jackson,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 328.)
Anticipating forfeiture, Smith asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to the evidence of the
value of the U-Haul trailer. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must “demonstrate (1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that
it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
12
professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the
defendant, i.e., there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for counsel’s
failings, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result.” (People v.
Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 540–541; see Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687.)
Where a defendant argues on appeal that counsel’s failure to raise a
timely objection at trial amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel,
“a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there
is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Moreover, “ ‘[u]nless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume
that “counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a
matter of sound trial strategy.” [Citation.] If the record “sheds no light on
why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” an appellate
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected “unless counsel was
asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation.” ’ ” (People v. Bell (2019)
7 Cal.5th 70, 125; see People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1051 [“ ‘In the
usual case, where counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged
decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance
of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s
acts or omissions.’ ”].)
Here, Smith’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument rests on his
assertion that his trial counsel had no tactical reason for failing to object to
R.Q.’s testimony regarding the value of the U-Haul trailer. We are not
persuaded.
13
On the record before us, we cannot say that Smith’s trial counsel did
not have a tactical reason for failing to object. One of defense counsel’s
theories was mistaken identity as she argued that Smith could not be
positively identified from the surveillance footage, and there was no other
evidence connecting Smith to the trailer thefts. R.Q. was a prosecution
witness who observed the surveillance footage to identify Smith. Defense
counsel cross-examined R.Q. about his testimony as to the value of the
U-Haul trailer and got R.Q. to admit that the value he testified to at trial was
different than what he told law enforcement. Thus, there exists a plausible
strategic choice in allowing R.Q. to testify as to the value of the U-Haul
trailer. After doing so, defense counsel was able to attack R.Q.’s credibility to
undermine his testimony about what he observed on the surveillance video.
Such a tactic is further buttressed by the fact that the prosecution could have
called another individual to testify as to the value of the U-Haul trailer as
well as the possibility that there was no real dispute that the value of each
U-Haul trailer exceeded $950. Indeed, Smith’s counsel did not mention or
otherwise challenge the value of the trailers during closing argument.
Consequently, Smith’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument necessarily
fails.
14
DISPOSITION
Smith’s conviction under count 2 is vacated. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the superior court with
directions to amend the abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion and
forward the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
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