People v. Torrez CA2/1

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Filed 7/5/24 P. v. Torrez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B329943

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA090463)
v.

OSCAR TORREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Appellant Oscar Torrez was accused of breaking into the
home of Christian Alcaraz and Raquel Segovia while Christian’s
mother was alone in the home with the couple’s son and nephew.1
Torrez was arrested and his home—occupied by at least six
people—was searched; two assault weapons were found in his
home, in what appeared to be a garage. Torrez was charged with
two counts of robbery, one count of burglary, two counts of
possession of an assault weapon, two counts of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and one count of unlawful possession of
ammunition.
A month before the October 2022 trial, the People made a
disclosure to the court. The court shared the disclosure with
Torrez’s counsel in an in-camera hearing but admonished him not
to disclose the information to Torrez himself; the transcript from
the in-camera hearing was sealed. One month later, Torrez made
a motion to unseal that transcript. The court denied the motion
and the transcript of the hearing on the motion was itself sealed.
A jury convicted Torrez on all counts and found true that
he used a firearm in the burglary and robbery. The trial court
subsequently sentenced him to 22 years in prison; the sentence
included multiple firearm enhancements.
After trial, Torrez made a motion for “discovery of Brady
information in a police personnel file.”2 The court partially

1 Because some of the individuals discussed herein share a

surname, we refer to them by their first names.
2 (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.)Prosecutors
“have a duty under Brady v. Maryland to disclose all exculpatory
evidence to the defense.” (Levenson & Ricciardulli, Cal. Practice
Guide: Criminal Procedure (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 16:4.) As
discussed infra, the trial court expressly permitted the defense to
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

2
granted the motion, conducted an in-camera review of the
potentially responsive information, and disclosed the portions it
felt were responsive. It subsequently denied a supplemental
motion for further discovery.
On appeal, Torrez asks us to independently review the
court’s decisions on what was and was not disclosed in response
to the discovery motion. He also contends the court erred in
sealing the September and October 2022 hearing transcripts
regarding the People’s disclosure and Torrez’s subsequent
attempt to unseal that transcript, that one of the firearm
enhancements must be dismissed under Penal Code section 1385,
subdivision (c),3 and that there is insufficient evidence to support
his convictions for possession of an assault weapon or being a
felon in possession of a firearm.
We conclude that only Torrez’s final argument has merit.
As such, we reverse the convictions for possession of an assault
weapon and being a felon in possession of a firearm, affirm the
remainder of the judgment, and remand for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

A. Torrez Is Charged
In October 2019, Torrez was charged by information with
nine counts: three counts of first degree residential robbery

file such a motion after trial in lieu of granting a trial
continuance.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

4 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

3
(counts 1, 2, and 9),5 one count of first degree burglary with a
person present (count 3), two counts of possession of an assault
weapon (counts 4 and 5), two counts of being a felon in possession
of a firearm (counts 6 and 7), and one count of unlawful
possession of ammunition (count 8). It was further alleged that
in committing the robbery and burglary, Torrez personally used a
handgun. Torrez pled not guilty to all counts and denied any
allegations.6

B. Motion to Unseal Transcript
On September 8, 2022, after the People made a disclosure
to the court, the court held an in-camera hearing with both
counsel present, but with Torrez absent. The hearing was
transcribed but the transcript was sealed. On the record in open
court, the court related the fact that the conference had occurred
and declared that “the information disclosed by the People is not
relevant to the case” and the court “ordered counsel not to
disclose it” to his client.
In October 2022, Torrez moved to unseal the September
2022 transcript, arguing that the information contained therein
was pertinent to attacking a witness’s credibility. The court

5 In July 2020, count 9 was dismissed under section 995.

6 In October 2022, an amended information was filed with

the same charges but with additional circumstances in
aggravation alleged. Torrez again pled not guilty and denied all
allegations.

4
denied the motion. The court also sealed the transcript from the
hearing on the motion.7

C. Torrez Seeks to Continue Trial
After numerous continuances—Torrez had posted bail and
was not in custody and agreed to each continuance—trial was set
for October 11, 2022.
On October 4, 2022, Torrez was notified that “a number of
the officers named in the People’s Witness List may have
information in their personnel file that may be ‘potentially
exculpatory or used for impeachment.’ ” On October 11—i.e., the
first day of trial—Torrez filed a motion to continue trial because
he needed time to file a motion to request an in-camera review of
the officers’ personnel files. Because jurors were already present
and because of the age of the case, the court denied the motion to
continue, but stated that Torrez would be permitted to file his
discovery motion both during and after trial and, if discoverable
information was found, the court could declare a mistrial or
reverse a conviction if appropriate.

D. Trial
A jury was empaneled on October 12, 2022, and the court
issued preliminary instructions to the jury. Subsequently, the
jury heard from 16 witnesses for the prosecution over five days of
testimony. No witnesses testified on Torrez’s behalf.

7 In December 2023, Torrez’s appellate counsel requested

permission to view both the September and October 2022 sealed
transcripts. We granted the request.

5
1. Testimony
We briefly summarize the witness testimony relevant to
this appeal.

(a) Lilia Alcaraz
Lilia testified that she had a son named Christian, who was
married to Raquel. Christian and Raquel were parents to 18-
month-old Mateo. Raquel had a sister, Debbie, who was the
mother of four-year-old Jax.
On April 10, 2019, as she did every day, Lilia went to
Christian’s home to take care of Mateo and Jax. She arrived
between 7:00 a.m. and 7:15 a.m., and Christian left
approximately 10 minutes later. Jax was dropped off sometime
thereafter.
Around 12:40 p.m., two men entered the house. She
identified Torrez as one of the men and Amador Quintero as the
other. Quintero pointed a gun at her and told her to “get inside.”8
While Quintero was doing this, Lilia noticed Torrez with some
“papers.”
The men led her to a couch and Torrez told her to sit down;
he told Amador to “go and find things.” Amador handed Torrez
the gun and Torrez prevented Lilia from leaving the couch. After
Lilia informed him that there were children in the house, he
escorted Lilia to their room and then made all three sit on the
couch. They sat on the couch for approximately three hours. She

8 In attempting to get a description of the gun, the

prosecutor asked Detective Kohl, who was sitting at counsel table
with the prosecutor, to show his gun to the witness. Lilia
testified that Quintero’s gun was “like that[,] more or less, but it
was smaller.”

6
could hear Amador “destroying everything, moving things
around, looking all over the place.” At some point, Torrez asked
Lilia where the money was and Lilia replied that they did not
have money, only credit cards.
Torrez and Amador tied Lilia to a railing inside the house
using plastic zip-ties. About twenty to thirty minutes later,
Debbie arrived at the home to pick up her son. Torrez and
Amador pulled her into the house and zip-tied her hands behind
her back. The men left about ten minutes later.

(b) Debbie Segovia
Debbie testified that, in April 2019, she would leave Jax in
Lilia’s care at the house of Christian and Raquel from around
7:50 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. On April 10, 2019, when she went to pick
Jax up, she was on the phone with Raquel; Raquel had called
Debbie saying that Lilia was not answering the phone, so the
sisters stayed on the phone until Debbie arrived at the house.
When she arrived, she saw a white car that was not usually
there. As Debbie walked up to the front door, it opened, and
Debbie saw Torrez and another person. Debbie said, “What the
fuck are you guys doing here, there is kids here.” Torrez pointed
a gun at her and either he or the other person took her phone and
terminated the call with Raquel.9 Debbie saw Lilia zip-tied to the
railing. Torrez told Debbie to turn around and kneel, and then
her hands were zip-tied. Torrez and the other man left 10 to 20
minutes later.

9 Debbie testified that the gun was “a small gun,” similar to

the one Detective Kohl was carrying.

7
(c) Raquel Segovia
On April 10, 2019, Raquel left for work around 6:00 a.m.,
leaving Mateo in the care of her husband Christian, who would
hand him off to Lilia when she arrived. Debbie was also going to
drop Jax off.
Throughout the day, Raquel had called Lilia more than 20
times, but she had not been answering the phone, which was
unusual. Raquel called Debbie as Debbie was on the way to the
house and asked that Debbie stay on the phone with her. When
Debbie arrived at the home, Raquel asked her to go inside.
Raquel heard her say, “What the fuck are you doing here?” before
the call was terminated on Debbie’s end. Raquel unsuccessfully
tried to call Debbie back and then called 911. Raquel raced home
and when she went inside, saw Debbie with her hands zip-tied
behind her, and Lilia zip-tied to a railing. The house was in
disarray. Some money and an iWatch were missing.

(d) Alejandro Valencia
Valencia testified that he was a detective with the Los
Angeles Police Department and was asked to help investigate the
incident. As part of that investigation, he was provided with a
manilla envelope that had been left in the home by the suspects.
The envelope bore the name “Oscar Torres” [sic] and also had
Torrez’s address. Valencia researched both Oscar Torres and
Oscar Torrez, and matched Oscar Torrez to the address on the
envelope. Valencia also reviewed social media accounts for
Torrez and his wife.
Torrez’s counsel only asked Valencia whether he ran a
DMV check for Torrez and, if he did, whether Torrez spelled his
name with a “Z” on his license. Valencia replied that he did not
recall if he ran a DMV check but based on his common practice,

8
he probably did. He did not recall whether Torrez spelled his
name with a “Z” on his license.

(e) Carlos Moreno
Moreno testified that he was a police officer and was tasked
to serve a search warrant at Torrez’s home. He confirmed that
photographs taken of items seized at Torrez’s house included
pictures of rifles, magazines, and ammunition. Though unclear
from the testimony and the photographs, it appears that the
rifles were found in a garage. He also stated that there were six
occupants in the house.

(f) Forrest Yumori
Yumori testified that he was a criminalist working for the
Los Angeles Police Department, analyzing DNA samples.
Yumori was asked to analyze DNA on two rifles. One had five
DNA profiles on it, which was too many to analyze—he could
determine only that there were at least two male profiles
amongst the five. The other rifle—a Norinco—had three DNA
profiles on it, including at least one male. However, there was
“limited support” to conclude that Torrez’s DNA was not one of
those three DNA profiles; Yumori explained that “limited
support” meant they could not conclusively exclude his DNA, but
it was “slightly in favor” of concluding his DNA was absent from
the samples on the rifle. He also was able to determine that
there were three DNA profiles on a rifle magazine, including at
least two males, but he was able to exclude Torrez from those
DNA profiles.

9
(g) Matthew Saucedo
Saucedo testified he was a criminalist working for the Los
Angeles Police Department in the Firearm Analysis Unit. He
analyzed the two rifles relevant to the case: a GP WASR-10/63
and a Norinco. He testified they were both “assault rifles.”

2. Jury Instructions
Regarding counts 4 and 5 (possession of an assault
weapon), the court instructed the jury that the People were
required to prove that Torrez “possessed an assault weapon,”
specifically “as to count four, a brown Norinco AK-style rifle,” and
“as to count five, a black model GPW SAR [sic] AK-style rifle.”
Regarding counts 6 and 7 (being a felon in possession of a
firearm), the court instructed the jury that the People were
required to prove that Torrez “possessed a firearm,” specifically
“as to count six, a brown Norinco AK-style rifle,” and “as to count
seven, a black model GPW SAR [sic] AK-style rifle.”

3. Torrez is Convicted
The jury deliberated for less than two hours before finding
Torrez guilty on all counts. It also found that Torrez had used a
firearm in committing the robbery and burglary. As to counts 4
and 5, the jury specifically found Torrez guilty of “the crime of
possession of assault weapon, to wit, a brown Norinco AK rifle”
and “the crime of possession of an assault weapon, to wit, a black
model GPWSARAK [sic] rifle.” Similarly, as to counts six and
seven, the jury specifically found Torrez guilty of “the crime of
possession of a firearm, to wit, a brown Norinco AK rifle, by a
felon” and “the crime of possession of a firearm, to wit, a black
model GPWSARAK [sic] rifle, by a felon.”

10
4. Torrez Seeks Discovery
On November 21, 2022, Torrez filed a motion for “discovery
of Brady information in a police personnel file,” requesting all
“Brady . . . information” regarding thirteen police officers. On
December 5, 2022, the court granted the motion only as to
Alejandro Valencia, because he was the only officer of the
thirteen who had testified at trial. The court conducted an in-
camera inspection of the records relating to Valencia on
December 14, 2022, and ordered the disclosure of some of the
information.
In February 2023, Torrez filed a motion for “supplemental
Pitchess discovery,”10 asking for “copies of all statements made by
the following persons who either filed complaints about Officer
Alejandro Valencia (#36292) or who were interviewed during the
investigation of such complaints”; he listed four individuals.
In March 2023, the court denied the motion, “easily
find[ing] that there is no probability that the evidence requested
by the Defense in their supplemental motion would have affected
the result of the trial.” The court elaborated that “the requested
evidence of complaints against the officer would not have been
admissible at trial. They are all hearsay. Also, more
importantly, I think they were remote. All were between 2003
and 2008 and would not have been admitted under Evidence
Code Section 352.” The court also noted that “Officer Valencia’s
testimony [at trial] only related to the fact that he ran the
Defendant’s name to determine the Defendant’s address and
checked out the Defendant’s and his wife’s Facebook account. His

10 (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.)

11
testimony in the Court’s view was a minor administerial part of
the investigation. It was not even contested by the Defense.”

5. Circumstances in Aggravation and
Sentencing
Following the denial of Torrez’s supplemental motion for
discovery, the court held a trial on the circumstances in
aggravation.11 No new evidence was adduced, and counsel
presented arguments. The court found true the sentencing
factors noted at California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3),
(a)(8), (b)(1), and (c).
Sentencing occurred in April 2023. In discussing the
charges, the prosecutor argued that section 654 applied for some
of the counts in that “count 6 and count 7 essentially is the
alternative charge [sic] for counts 4 and 5.”12
The court sentenced Torrez to 22 years, consisting of: (1) 16
years for count 1 (the high term of six years plus ten years under
section 12022.53, subdivision (b)13); (2) four years and eight
months for count 2 (one-third of the mid-term of four years (or
sixteen months) plus one-third of ten years (or forty months)

11 Torrez had waived his right to a jury trial on the

circumstances in aggravation.
12 (§ 654, subd. (a) [“An act or omission that is punishable

in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision”].)
13 (§ 12022.53, subd. (b) [“Notwithstanding any other law, a

person who, in the commission of a felony specified in subdivision
(a), personally uses a firearm, shall be punished by an additional
and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 10
years”].)

12
under section 12022.53, subdivision (b)), to run consecutively; (3)
seven years and four months for count 3 (the mid-term of four
years plus one-third of ten years (or forty months) under section
12022.53, subdivision (b)), stayed under section 654, to run
concurrently;14 (4) eight months for count 4 (one-third of the mid-
term of two years) to run consecutively; (5) eight months for
count 5 (one-third of the mid-term of two years) to run
consecutively; (6) two years for counts 6 and 7 (one-third of the
mid-term of six years), both stayed under section 654 but
otherwise to run concurrently; and (7) two years for count 8 (the
mid-term), to run concurrently. Torrez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court Did Not Err in Its Review of the
Requested Information
Torrez filed two motions for discovery after the trial. One
was granted as to Alejandro Valencia only, and the second was
denied. The court’s in-camera review of complaints filed against
Valencia was transcribed, but the transcript was sealed.
On appeal, Torrez asks us to “conduct an independent
review of the Pitchess hearings and records produced, if any, to
determine whether error occurred.” “A motion for discovery of
peace officer personnel records is ‘addressed solely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.’ [Citation.] A review of the lower
court’s ruling is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.”

14 The court also stated that if it were found that the

sentence for count 3 should not be stayed, then its intention was
to impose the sentence for count 3 to run concurrently, and to
strike the firearm enhancement in the interests of justice.

13
(People v. Gill (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 743, 749.) We have
reviewed the sealed transcript of the in-camera hearing and
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions on
what was and was not responsive.15
We also agree with the trial court’s assessment that
Valencia played a minor role in the investigation—he
investigated Torrez’s address and the social media accounts of
him and his wife. Valencia’s testimony was unchallenged by
Torrez and there was no dispute that Torrez actually lived at the
address that Valencia found. As such, any potential error was
harmless.

B. Torrez Fails to Demonstrate the Court Erred in
Sealing the September and October 2022
Transcripts
The court sealed the September 8, 2022 transcript in which
it informed Torrez’s counsel about a disclosure made to the court
by the People, and then later sealed the October 6, 2022
transcript in which it denied the motion brought by Torrez’s

15 To the extent Torrez requests that we conduct an

independent review of the hearings themselves—the December
2022 hearing in which the court granted Torrez’s discovery
motion as to Valencia only, and the February 2023 hearing in
which the court denied Torrez’s supplemental motion for
discovery—we decline. The transcripts for these hearings were
not sealed and it is not our job to make arguments on Torrez’s
behalf. An appellate brief “ ‘should contain a legal argument
with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is
furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived,
and pass it without consideration.’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10
Cal.4th 764, 793.)

14
counsel to unseal the September 8, 2022 transcript. Torrez
contends the court erred in sealing these transcripts.
First, Torrez argues that he had the right to the disclosure
of exculpatory evidence, of information listed in section 1054.1,
and of evidence relevant to the credibility of witnesses. But he
does not explain how the evidence disclosed to his counsel at the
September 2022 in-camera hearing, or the discussions held in the
October 2022 hearing denying his motion to unseal, constitutes
any of those things. He has therefore forfeited this argument.
(People v. Clayburg (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86, 93 [issue forfeited
for failure to present “reasoned argument and analysis”]; People
v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 603 [issue forfeited for
“failure to present reasoned argument and legal authorities in
support”].)16
Next, Torrez asks that we review the sealed transcripts
“similar to the procedures followed for review of Pitchess

16 We reject the claim that Torrez’s “[c]ounsel cannot

discuss in this brief the contents of the September 8, 2022,
reporter’s transcript, or the contents of the motion to unseal that
hearing, because of the trial court’s sealing orders.” Torrez’s
counsel requested permission to view the sealed transcripts and
we granted that request. If he needed to reference the contents of
those transcripts to support his argument that the court erred in
sealing them, then the California Rules of Court provide
procedures for filing briefs referencing sealed records. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.46(g)(2) [“If it is necessary to disclose
material contained in a sealed record in a filing in the reviewing
court, two versions must be filed: [¶] (A) A public redacted
version. . . [and] [¶] (B) An unredacted version”].) Nothing
prevented Torrez’s counsel from explaining why the sealed
transcripts contained exculpatory or otherwise relevant
information.

15
hearings.” He has cited no authority permitting us to do this but
because the People have voiced no objection, and because the
transcripts were part of the record we reviewed in any case, we
state that, after reviewing the contents of the transcripts, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that
the information disclosed and discussed in the September 8, and
October 6, 2022 hearings was not pertinent to Torrez’s defense.
(See People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 110 [court may
independently review evidence to determine whether trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to disclose evidence].)
Finally, Torrez also asks that we “apply California Rule of
Court 2.550, subdivision (d), to determine whether the trial court
properly sealed the transcript of the September 8, 2022, hearing
and the October 6, 2022, motion,” arguing that the “prosecution
failed to show an overriding interest in sealing this hearing or
motion” and “[a]ny potential harm or threat from disclosure was
speculation.” Again, we find this argument forfeited for lack of
reasoned argument or citation to relevant authority. (People v.
Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 93; People v. Sorden,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.)

C. The Court Was Not Required to Strike the
Firearm Enhancement for Count 2
The court sentenced Torrez to 22 years in prison, including
four years and eight months for count 2 (one-third of the mid-
term of four years (or sixteen months) plus one-third of ten years
(or forty months) under section 12022.53, subdivision (b)). Torrez
argues this firearm enhancement must be vacated under section
1385, subdivisions (c)(2)(B) and (C), as these two subdivisions
stated that enhancements “shall” be dismissed if there are
multiple enhancements alleged in a single case or if the

16
application of an enhancement would result in a sentence of over
20 years.17
As Torrez acknowledges, several appellate courts have
rejected this argument. In People v. Anderson (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 233, review granted April 19, 2023, S278786
(Anderson), our colleagues in Division Seven stated:
“If we were to read section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) and
(C), in isolation, then [appellant]’s argument would appear
correct—use of the term ‘shall’ in a statute is generally
mandatory, not permissive. However, ‘we are not permitted to
pluck this phrase out of its placement in the statute and consider
it in isolation; instead, we are required to consider where it fits
into the “ ‘context of the statute as a whole.’ ” ’ ” (Anderson,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239, rev.gr.)
Anderson continued: “[T]he statement that a court ‘shall’
dismiss certain enhancements appears as a subpart to the
general provision that a ‘court shall dismiss an enhancement if it

17 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2) [“In exercising its discretion under

this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight
to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others. [¶] . . . [¶]
(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed. [¶] (C) The application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the
enhancement shall be dismissed”].)

17
is in the furtherance of justice to do so.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1),
italics added.) In other words, the dismissal of the enhancement
is conditioned on a court’s finding dismissal is in the interest of
justice. The nature of this condition is further explained by the
Legislature’s directive that the court, while ‘exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, . . . shall consider and afford
great weight’ to evidence of certain factors, and proof of one of the
factors ‘weighs greatly’ in favor of dismissal ‘unless’ the court
finds dismissal would endanger public safety. (Id., subd. (c)(2).)”
(Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239, rev.gr.)
Thus, the appellate court concluded that “[t]his language,
taken together, explicitly and unambiguously establishes: the
trial court has discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements;
certain circumstances weigh greatly in favor of dismissal; and a
finding of danger to public safety can overcome the circumstances
in favor of dismissal. [¶] It is within these boundaries that
section 1385 states the court ‘shall’ dismiss all but one
enhancement and/or enhancements resulting in a sentence of
more than 20 years. The dismissal shall occur but only if, in
exercising its discretion and giving great weight to certain
factors, the court finds dismissal is in the interests of justice or
would not endanger public safety.” (Anderson, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at pp. 239–240, rev.gr.)
Our colleagues in Division Two arrived at the same
conclusion in People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, review
granted March 22, 2023, S278309, noting “[i]f we were to read the
phrase appended to the multiple enhancements mitigating factor
as automatically mandating dismissal of all but one enhancement
whenever multiple enhancements exist, then the existence of

18
multiple enhancements would not ‘weigh greatly’ in favor of
dismissal—it would weigh dispositively.” (Id. at p. 397.)
We agree with our colleagues and conclude the trial court
had discretion—but was not required—to dismiss the firearm
enhancement for count 2. As Torrez argues only that the court
lacked discretion to not dismiss the enhancement—but not that
the court abused its discretion in not doing so—he has failed to
demonstrate the court erred in not dismissing the enhancement.

D. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the
Convictions for Counts 4 Through 7
To prove the crime of unlawfully possessing an assault
weapon, the prosecution must prove (among other elements) that
the defendant possessed an assault weapon and that “[t]he
defendant knew he possessed it.” (CALCRIM 2560.) Similarly, to
prove the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the
prosecution must prove (among other elements) that the
defendant possessed a firearm, and that “[t]he defendant knew
that he possessed the firearm.” (CALCRIM 2510.) Therefore, in
convicting Torrez of counts 4 through 7, the jury necessarily and
specifically found not only that Torrez was in possession of “a
brown Norinco AK rifle” and “a black model GPWSARAK [sic]
rifle,” but that he knew he possessed those weapons.
Torrez contends insufficient evidence supports these
convictions. When a conviction is challenged as lacking
evidentiary support, “the court must review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

19
We conclude that when viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment, a reasonable trier of fact could not have found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Torrez knew he possessed those two
weapons.
Two assault rifles were seized from what appeared to be
Torrez’s garage. Five DNA profiles were found on one of the
rifles, and three DNA profiles were found on the other. As for the
rifle with five DNA profiles, Yumori—the LAPD criminalist who
analyzed the DNA—could not identify any of the DNA profiles; he
could conclude only that at least two of those profiles were of
men. As for the rifle with three DNA profiles, Yumori testified
there was “limited support” to exclude Torrez as one of the three
DNA profiles.
The People contend that the jury was entitled to infer that
Torrez had “constructive possession of the guns” because he had
participated in the robbery and burglary the previous day, had
coordinated the crime with Quintero via text message, and the
weapons were found in his home the day after the robbery and
burglary. They cite to numerous cases standing for the
proposition that “possession may be imputed when the
contraband is found in a place which is immediately and
exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion
and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused
and another.” (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215.)18

18 (But see People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 285

[“proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are
found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful
possession” of narcotics]; People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d
334, 336 [“Opportunity of access to a place where contraband is
stored is not enough, by itself, to establish possession [citation].
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

20
But they cite to no authority that an accused’s knowledge of
possession may be imputed in such circumstances.
The People do not explain, and we do not see, why Torrez’s
participation in the robbery and burglary the previous day—in
which he used a handgun and not an assault rifle—would
logically permit an inference that he knowingly had possession of
the assault rifles found in what appeared to be his garage.
Similarly, there is no evidence showing that those who coordinate
crimes via text messages are more likely to knowingly own
assault rifles. Thus, the only link between Torrez and these
weapons was that they were stored in a garage to which he—and
at least five other occupants—had access. Regardless of whether
such evidence is sufficient to support a finding of constructive
possession of those weapons, it is insufficient to support a finding
that he knew he possessed those weapons. Therefore, substantial
evidence does not support his conviction on these four counts.

Dominion and control are essentials of possession, and they
cannot be inferred from mere presence or access. Something
more must be shown to support inferring of these elements”].)

21
DISPOSITION
The convictions on counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 are reversed. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial
court shall resentence the defendant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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