CourtListener 9997503•Jondo v. Micron Group CA4/3
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Filed 7/3/24 Jondo v. Micron Group CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JONDO, LTD.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G062929
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-01169529)
MICRON GROUP, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Deborah
C. Servino, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis and Roger N. Behle, Jr., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Jondo, Ltd. (Jondo) appeals from a default judgment awarding it damages
and costs. Jondo challenges portions of the trial court’s order which denied several of
Jondo’s requested damages. Jondo argues the trial court erred when it found Micron
Group, Inc.’s (Micron’s) grommet machines were not a substantial factor in causing
Jondo’s damages and that Jondo’s noncompliance with laws and regulations was the
cause. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment as to these damages and remand
with directions. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE COMPLAINT
In November 2020, Jondo filed a complaint against Micron for breach of
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, and equitable indemnity. The complaint alleged the following:
Jondo is a printing business headquartered in California. It sells, among
other things, banners that use grommets. A grommet is a ring or edge strip inserted into
the holes of a banner to protect it from tearing.
In June 2017, Jondo bought two PL-10 pneumatic plastic grommet
machines from Micron, a New Jersey manufacturer of grommet attaching machines, so
Jondo could attach grommets to the banners it produces. When the machines arrived,
Jondo visually inspected them and found they “did not appear to be defective or
nonconforming.” Neither Jondo nor any third party altered the machines in any way.
A year and a half later, “on or about January 16, 2019,” a Jondo employee
was seriously injured while using one of the machines. The Division of Occupational
Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) investigated the incident. It fined Jondo for serious
violations related to the machines. Unbeknownst to Jondo, the machines lacked certain
safeguards required under California regulations. Micron knew Jondo would be using the
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machines in California and therefore Micron was obligated to equip its machines with the
safeguards mandated by California regulations.
Jondo also alleged it incurred the following damages due to its employee’s
injury from operating Micron’s machines: (1) Cal/OSHA fines ($16,870); (2) the cost of
manual labor while Cal/OSHA prohibited using the machines ($3,200); (3) management
time to investigate the incident ($2,000); (4) the cost of replacement machines that
complied with California regulations ($15,000); (5) the cost of retraining employees to
use the replacement machines ($800); (6) the additional premiums for workers’
compensation insurance because of the employee’s injury ($63,000); and (7) the cost of a
safety consultant to deal with Cal/OSHA ($25,000). In total, it sought at least $125,870
in damages. The prayer of the complaint sought economic damages, incidental damages,
consequential damages, a judgment requiring Micron to indemnify Jondo, the costs of the
lawsuit, and any other relief the trial court deemed proper. Jondo attached two invoices
to its complaint showing the amount Jondo paid Micron for the two machines.
II.
ENTRY OF DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Micron did not file a responsive pleading to the complaint. In April 2021,
upon Jondo’s request, the trial court clerk entered Micron’s default.
In April 2023, Jondo requested a default judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 585, subdivision (b) (all undesignated statutory references are to this
code). It claimed $125,870 in damages, $53,624.07 in prejudgment interest at the annual
rate of 10 percent, $3,605 in attorney fees, and $734.10 in costs. Jondo sought to proceed
by way of declarations under section 585, subdivision (d), in lieu of live testimony and
evidence. Accordingly, Jondo supplied a declaration of John S. Doe, who was then the
chief financial officer of Jondo.
The trial court declined to proceed by way of declarations, and a prove-up
hearing was eventually held in June 2023. At the hearing, Jondo provided the testimony
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of Doe, who had become president and chief executive officer of Jondo, and four
exhibits, including: (1) Cal/OSHA’s March 2019 Citation and Notification of Penalty
(Cal/OSHA Citation); (2) invoices for the replacement machines Jondo had to purchase;
(3) Jondo’s workers’ compensation insurance; and (4) safety training invoices.
Of relevance here, the Cal/OSHA Citation identified at least two violations
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related to the machines. First, Cal/OSHA concluded Jondo violated California Code of
Regulations, title 8, section 4185. This regulation provides, “All foot-operated devices
(i.e., treadles, pedals, levers, bars, valves, and switches) shall be protected from
unintended operation, if such operation creates a hazard.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §
4185.) Cal/OSHA found, “Prior to and during the course of the inspection, including, but
not limited to, on January 22, 2019, [Jondo] failed to protect the foot-operated device
(foot pedal) of a pneumatic grommet machine, exposing employees to hazards created
from unintended operation of the machine.” (Boldface omitted.)
Second, Cal/OSHA determined Jondo violated California Code of
Regulations, title 8, section 4186, subdivision (b). This regulation provides, “All point of
operation guards shall be properly set up, adjusted and maintained in safe and efficient
working condition in conformance with Figure G-8 and Table G-3 or other guard
configurations which will prevent the operator’s hand from entering the point of
operation.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 4186, subd. (b).) Cal/OSHA concluded, “Prior to
and during the course of the inspection including, but not limited to, January 22, 2018,
[Jondo] failed to ensure all point of operation guards (pneumatic grommet machine) were
properly set up, adjusted and maintained in safe and efficient working condition in
conformance with Figure G-8 and Table G-3 or other guard configurations which would
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Our record contains two out of nine pages of the Cal/OSHA Citation:
pages six (“Citation 2 Item 1”) and seven (“Citation 3 Item 1”). From the footer on each
page, we can infer pages one to four include “information on employer and employee
rights and responsibilities.” It is unclear what is on pages five, eight, and nine.
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have prevented the operator’s hand from entering the point of operation.” (Boldface
omitted.)
After the default prove-up hearing, the trial court ruled by minute order and
issued its judgment. The trial court concluded: “[T]he failure of the two machines to
have the expected quality or to be suitable to attach grommets were not a substantial
factor in causing [the requested] damages. (See CACI [N]os. 1231[–]1232.) Rather, it
appears that it was [Jondo’s] failure to comply with the applicable provisions of the Labor
Code and General Industry Safety Orders in the California Code of Regulations that
caused these damages. (See Lab. Code, §§ 6400, subd. (a) [employer has duty to furnish
place of employment that is safe and healthful for the employees][,] 6403, subd. (a)
[employer must provide and use safety devices and safeguards reasonably adequate to
render the employment and place of employment safe][,] 6407 [employer shall comply
with applicable occupational safety and health standards, all rules, regulations, and
orders]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, [§§] 4185[–]4186 [applicable occupational safety
regulations for foot-operated devices and points of operations and other hazardous parts
of machinery].) For instance, one of the fines imposed by [Cal/OSHA] was for conduct
in January 2018, even before the accident in which one of [Jondo’s employees] injured
his hand. [Citation.] Much of the safety consultant’s charges for training were unrelated
to the two machines. [Citation.] At best, [Jondo] has proven that it suffered damages of
$2,169.58 (the costs of the two machines). [¶] . . . [¶] Accordingly, [Jondo] is awarded a
total of $2,903.68 against [Micron], consisting of $2,169.58 in damages and $734.10 in
costs.”
Jondo timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Jondo argues the de novo standard of review applies here, because the
issues on appeal involve mixed questions of law and fact or present predominately legal
questions. We disagree.
We employ the substantial evidence standard of review when considering a
trial court’s damages findings following default. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 267, 288 (Kim).) “Although some cases have recited a ‘general rule that
sufficiency of the evidence [tendered in a default proceeding] cannot be reviewed on an
appeal from a default judgment’ [citation], that rule applies only ‘as to matters for which
no proof is required by virtue of the admission by default of the allegations of the
complaint.’ [Citation.] ‘However, as to damages which, despite default, require proof the
general rule does not apply.’” (Ibid.)
“Under the substantial evidence standard of review, ‘we must consider all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of
every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings].
[Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is
the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to
whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. Even in cases where the evidence is
undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be
drawn from the evidence this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or
deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in
the absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. . . . [Citations.]’
[Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance,
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citations.] However, substantial
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evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] ‘The ultimate test is
whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the
whole record.’” (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257,
1266.)
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT’S DAMAGES FINDINGS
A default “confesses [the] properly pleaded facts [in a complaint],”
relieving a plaintiff of the responsibility “to provide the court with sufficient evidence to
prove them.” (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) Thus, the properly pleaded facts
“are treated as true for purposes of obtaining a default judgment.” (Ibid.) No evidence is
therefore required to establish liability and “[t]he only additional proof required for a
default judgment is that needed to establish damages.” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 879, 883–884 (Carlsen).) “That the plaintiff lacks evidence to prove the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint is of no consequence.” (Id. at p. 884.) The
only relevant evidentiary facts at a prove-up hearing are those pertaining to the damages
alleged in the complaint. (Id. at pp. 899–900.)
When a plaintiff requests entry of a default judgment by the court pursuant
to section 585, subdivision (b), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing “entitlement
to the specific judgment requested. ‘The court shall hear the evidence offered by the
plaintiff, and shall render judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that relief, not exceeding
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the amount stated in the complaint, . . . as appears by the evidence to be just.’” (Kim,
supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 287, quoting section 585, subdivision (b).) A prima facie
showing the plaintiff was damaged by a defendant’s actions is required. (Johnson v.
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As the trial court awarded Jondo some damages, it impliedly found Jondo
stated proper causes of action in its complaint. Whether Jondo stated proper causes of
action is not an issue on appeal.
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Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 365; Carlsen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 883–
884.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party
in question.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851.)
Jondo argues it presented sufficient evidence at the prove-up hearing to
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establish a prima facie showing of damages. Jondo contends the trial court’s
misinterpretation of its exhibits resulted in the trial court’s finding that Micron’s
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machines were not a substantial factor in causing most of Jondo’s damages. From our
review of the exhibits and the trial court’s citations to them in its ruling, this appears to be
so.
In its ruling, the trial court found the “failure of the two [Micron] machines
to have the expected quality or to be suitable to attach grommets [was] not a substantial
factor in causing these damages.” The trial court explained, “[I]t appears that it was
[Jondo’s] failure to comply with the applicable provisions of the Labor Code and General
Industry Safety Orders in the California Code of Regulations that caused these damages.
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These damages included: (1) Cal/OSHA fines; (2) the cost of manual
labor while Cal/OSHA prohibited using the machines; (3) management time to
investigate the incident; (4) the cost of replacement machines that complied with
California regulations; (5) the cost of retraining employees to use the replacement
machines; (6) the additional premiums for workers’ compensation insurance because of
the employee’s injury; and (7) the cost of a safety consultant to deal with Cal/OSHA.
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Jondo sought damages for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and equitable
indemnity. An entitlement of damages for the implied warranty of merchantability
required a showing the “failure of the [product] to have the expected quality was a
substantial factor in causing [Jondo]’s harm.” (CACI No. 1231, italics omitted.) The
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose mandated a showing “the failure of
the [product] to be suitable was a substantial factor in causing [Jondo]’s harm.” (CACI
No. 1232, italics omitted; Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169
Cal.App.4th 116, 145–146.) Additionally, in order to recover damages under equitable
indemnity, Jondo must have shown the resulting damages to Jondo are those for which
Micron was equitably responsible. (C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 688, 700.)
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[Citations.] For instance, one of the fines imposed by [Cal/OSHA] was for conduct in
January 2018, even before the accident in which one of [Jondo’s employees] injured his
hand.” (Italics added.) This explanation drew from “Citation 3 Item 1” in the Cal/OSHA
Citation. “Citation 3 Item 1” stated in relevant part, “Prior to and during the course of the
inspection including, but not limited to, January 22, 2018, [Jondo] failed to ensure all
point of operation guards (pneumatic grommet machine) were properly set up . . . .”
(Boldface omitted, italics added.)
In support of its finding, the trial court relied on what is, in reading the
record as a whole, a typographical error in “Citation 3 Item 1” in the Cal/OSHA Citation:
the date should be January 22, 2019, rather than January 22, 2018. The Cal/OSHA
Citation specified the inspection dates as “01/22/2019 - 03/29/2019.” A separate fine in
the Cal/OSHA Citation, “Citation 2 Item 1,” provided in pertinent part, “Prior to and
during the course of the inspection, including, but not limited to, on January 22, 2019,
[Jondo] failed to protect the foot-operated device (foot pedal) of a pneumatic grommet
machine . . . .” (Boldface omitted, italics added.) Considering the start date of the
inspection, the date provided in “Citation 2 Item 1,” and the reference to the machines in
each fine, the date in “Citation 3 Item 1”—January 22, 2018—is plainly a typographical
error. The date should be January 22, 2019, the start date of the inspection.
Accordingly, “Citation 3 Item 1” did not involve a different incident, as the
trial court found. It concerned the January 2019 injury, caused by the machines’ failure to
have the expected quality or to be suitable.
On the record before us, we cannot say substantial evidence supported the
trial court’s finding that the machines’ failure to have the expected quality or to be
suitable was not a substantial factor in causing the requested damages and that Jondo’s
noncompliance with laws and regulations was the cause. As discussed ante, the
Cal/OSHA Citation was incurred after the Jondo employee’s injury. One of the citations
stated “all point of operation guards,” if set up on the machines, “would have prevented
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the operator’s hand from entering the point of operation.” (Boldface omitted.) That is,
the machines’ failure to have the expected quality or to be suitable was a substantial
factor in causing the Jondo employee’s injury and thus any damages arising from that
injury. While the Cal/OSHA Citation also indicated Jondo failed to comply with the
applicable regulations, the reason for this noncompliance was the machines lacked the
expected quality or were unsuitable.
Therefore, we will reverse and remand for the trial court to rehear and
reconsider the damages issue. We express no opinion on the ultimate merits.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment denying the requested damages is reversed.
We remand to the trial court to rehear and reconsider whether Appellant is entitled to its
requested damages. The trial court shall permit Appellant to present additional relevant
evidence and argument at the hearing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Appellant is to recover its costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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