In re I.G. CA2/3

CourtListener 9997474Calctapp3 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/3/24 In re I.G. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B331605
In re I.G., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00691A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Appellant E.G. (father) appeals from juvenile court
jurisdictional and dispositional orders asserting dependency
jurisdiction over minor I.G. and ordering father to test for drugs.
We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
indicating S.G. (mother) tested positive for marijuana and PCP
when she gave birth to I.G. Mother also admitted she had used
methamphetamine two weeks earlier. I.G. spent several days in
the neonatal intensive care unit because he had “no active cry” at
birth.
On January 3, a DCFS social worker interviewed mother at
the hospital. Mother reported she was enrolled in a drug
rehabilitation program and had arranged for I.G. to live with her
at the rehabilitation facility. The social worker discussed a safety
plan with mother, which required her to engage in rehabilitation
services and check in with the social worker weekly. The social
worker told mother I.G. could remain in her care as long as she
remained in treatment. Mother and I.G. were discharged from
the hospital in mid-January 2023 and began living at the
rehabilitation facility.
Mother said she had a nine-year “ ‘on-again, off-again’ ”
relationship with I.G.’s father. She denied having any plans to

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return to a romantic relationship with him. A hospital social
worker later reported father had visited mother and I.G. in the
hospital “almost daily.” Mother had told the hospital social
worker that she and father had “an extensive domestic violence
relationship.”
During his initial interview, father told the social worker
he smoked marijuana every two days, and he later tested positive
for marijuana. Father stated he would stop smoking marijuana if
necessary.
Both parents admitted past involvement with DCFS and
the three other children they had together. Mother indicated
past domestic violence with father had led to the children being
removed from her custody. She said the last violent incident with
father happened three years earlier. She admitted smoking
marijuana and methamphetamine during her pregnancy with
I.G. She had not obtained prenatal care because she did not want
DCFS to remove the baby from her custody and her older
children had already been removed.
Father indicated the DCFS cases concerning his older
children with mother resulted from the parents’ domestic violence
and mother’s drug use. Father admitted he had been in “multiple
domestic violence relationships” and that he and mother had an
extensive history of domestic violence. He reported the last
violent incident was a year and a half earlier, in 2021. Father
attributed the domestic violence to mother’s continued use of
methamphetamine. Although during prior dependency cases
father had reunified with the other children he shared with
mother, the children were removed again because of mother’s
continued drug use. Father reported that he was “tired of trying
to fight for his children” and did not reunify. He did not feel

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DCFS gave him a fair opportunity to raise the children, who were
later adopted by a maternal family member. He indicated he did
not intend to continue a romantic relationship with mother.
In early February 2023, mother told the social worker she
was willing to participate in voluntary family maintenance
services if she could move to an outpatient program. Mother
reported there was “drama” between her and other residents at
the rehabilitation facility, and she did not want I.G. to be exposed
to any “negativity.” The social worker reminded mother that the
current safety plan allowed I.G. to remain in mother’s care only
so long as she remained at the rehabilitation facility.
The next day, mother was expelled from the drug
rehabilitation program because she refused to engage in services
and had “issue[s] with other residents.” Father picked up I.G.
from the facility and returned to his home, where he lived with a
paternal cousin. The social worker observed the home was
furnished and had appropriate food and clothing for I.G., and
father had a plan to care for I.G. Around this time, father
enrolled in a 12-step program to address his marijuana use.
Mother told the social worker she was entering a women’s
center to complete drug rehabilitation services. Around a week
and a half later, a counselor from the center informed the social
worker that mother had left the program almost immediately.
In late February, the social worker attempted to contact
mother several times, but the calls went straight to voicemail and
mother did not respond to the social worker’s messages. Father
reported that mother called him around this time and asked him
to pick her up to visit I.G. When he refused, mother threatened
him. Mother told father she was living “under a bridge off of
Whittier Blvd.” According to maternal aunt, mother went to stay

4
at maternal grandfather’s home, but soon left, and was “most
likely living in the riverbed in Pico Rivera.”
On February 24, 2023, DCFS filed a petition alleging I.G.
was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), due to the parents’
history of engaging in domestic violence which resulted in I.G.’s
siblings receiving permanent placement services; subdivisions (b)
and (j), due to mother’s substance abuse and father’s failure to
protect I.G. and his siblings from mother’s substance abuse; and
subdivision (b), due to father’s substance abuse and mother’s
history of mental and emotional problems.1
At the initial hearing on March 10, 2023, the court ordered
I.G. detained from mother and released to father. Father was to
submit to weekly random drug testing as a condition of the
release to him.
In April 2023, mother agreed to participate in random drug
and alcohol testing. Mother missed all eight tests reflected in the
record.
At the June 7, 2023 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court
sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).
The court found true the allegations related to mother’s
substance abuse, father’s failure to protect I.G. and his past
failure to protect I.G.’s siblings from mother’s substance abuse,
and mother’s mental and emotional problems. Under section 300,
subdivision (j), the court also found true allegations based on the
parents’ domestic violence, which led to I.G.’s siblings receiving
permanent placement services and created a continuing risk of
harm to I.G.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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At the August 22, 2023 disposition hearing, the court
declared I.G. a dependent of the court. Father did not object to
this decision or ask the court to consider an alternative
disposition. The court ordered I.G. removed from mother and
released to father under DCFS supervision. Father requested
that the drug testing order be changed from weekly to “random or
on suspicion.” Father also asked that he be permitted to
complete a 26-week domestic violence program or to address
domestic violence in his individual counseling.
The court ordered father to submit to random drug testing
for 90 days. If all test results were negative, the testing
requirement would end, except for any on demand testing based
on a suspicion that he was under the influence. As father had
requested, the court also ordered him to complete a 26-week
domestic violence program. Father’s case plan additionally
included individual counseling and parenting counseling. Father
had started individual counseling in July and was scheduled to
begin a Fundamentals of Fatherhood Program shortly after the
disposition hearing.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Father’s Challenge to the Juvenile Court’s
Jurisdictional Findings is Nonjusticiable
Father contends substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s findings that I.G. was placed at risk of harm due
to father’s failure to protect I.G. and his siblings from mother’s
substance abuse. Father does not otherwise challenge the court’s
jurisdictional order. We conclude father has not raised a
justiciable issue.

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“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an
appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable
issue.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 (I.A.).) “An
important requirement for justiciability is the availability of
‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.”
(Id. at p. 1490.)
It is further well established that “ ‘[w]hen a dependency
petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor
comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing
court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over
the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that
are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial
evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider
whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for
jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Here, in addition to the failure to protect findings father
challenges on appeal, the juvenile court also found father’s
history of domestic violence against mother placed I.G. at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. The court
additionally concluded mother’s drug use and her mental and
emotional problems put I.G. at risk of suffering serious physical
harm. Father does not challenge these findings. Thus, even if he
were to prevail on his arguments on appeal, we would not disturb
the court’s jurisdictional order. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
283–284 (D.P.); I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491–1492.)
While father asserts this court may grant him effective
relief in ongoing proceedings, he fails to identify any tangible
impact his successful appeal could achieve. Father identifies no

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specific dispositional order that would be undermined by a
reversal of the failure to protect allegations. He asserts he is
currently seeking to terminate dependency jurisdiction under
section 364, but, as he recognizes, the result of that effort will
depend on the court’s assessment of current conditions. (§ 364,
subd. (c).) Striking jurisdictional allegations sustained as to
father in June 2023 “would have neither legal nor practical
consequence” in the ongoing proceedings, and therefore would not
provide father any effective relief. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1493.)
Father alternatively asks us to exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of his arguments. Although “no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal,” appellate courts often
reach the merits when a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286, 285), or when a challenged
finding “is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285–286.)
Father contends the challenged allegations are likely to
impact him in future proceedings because jurisdictional findings
are “consistently examined by social workers and judges to
determine current risk based on past events,” citing In re
Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134. However, a
reversal of the order sustaining the challenged allegations in this
case would not erase the prior sustained findings that father
failed to protect I.G.’s siblings from mother’s drug use. And, as
father acknowledges, the ultimate inquiry in any dependency
matter focuses on current circumstances. (I.A., supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [findings in dependency matters “require

8
evidence of present detriment, based on the then prevailing
circumstances of parent and child”].) Even if a court in a future
proceeding considered the challenged findings as true, the court
would still be obligated to independently assess then existing
circumstances to evaluate the risk of harm to the minor. We
further cannot conclude that the failure to protect allegations
were particularly pernicious or stigmatizing, particularly in view
of the domestic violence allegations father does not challenge,
which indicate he repeatedly perpetrated violence on mother.
Father has not suggested a specific practical, tangible
impact the challenged language in the petition could have on him
or his legal status. We therefore decline to exercise our discretion
to reach the merits of his arguments regarding the court’s
jurisdictional findings. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493;
see D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278 [speculative harm
insufficient].)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declaring I.G. a Dependent of The Court and
Ordering Father to Drug Test
Father also contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion by declaring I.G. a dependent of the court and
requiring father to test for drugs. We disagree.
As an initial matter, “a parent’s failure to object or raise
certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from
presenting the issue to the appellate court.” (In re Lorenzo C.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338.) Father did not object to the
juvenile court order declaring I.G. a dependent of the court. He
also did not object to the March 10, 2023 order requiring him to
submit to weekly random drug testing, or the August 22 order
requiring 90 days of random drug testing. Indeed, father

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affirmatively requested the random drug testing required by the
latter order, and therefore forfeited his argument by inviting any
error. (In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1196.) Father
notes forfeiture is not automatic but fails to articulate any reason
why the doctrine should not apply here.
Even if these contentions were not forfeited, we would
reject father’s arguments. “After a juvenile court exercises
jurisdiction over a child pursuant to section 300, it must
determine the appropriate disposition for that child. [Citations.]
The court has broad discretion in selecting a disposition that
serves the child’s best interests.” (In re M.D. (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 836, 856.) The court may declare the child a
dependent of the court. (§§ 300, 360, subd. (d).) Alternatively,
the court may order services to keep the family together under
informal DCFS supervision. (§ 360, subd. (b).) After ordering
informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b), “ ‘the
court “has no authority to take any further role in overseeing the
services or the family unless the matter is brought back before
the court” pursuant to [section 360, subdivision (c)].’ ” (In re
Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259.)
We will not disturb the juvenile court’s dispositional
decision unless the court “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination [citations].” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 (Stephanie M.).)
Father contends the court should have exercised its
discretion to order informal supervision under section 360,
subdivision (b), instead of declaring I.G. a dependent of the court.
He argues informal supervision was appropriate because the
social worker observed father was motivated and had the

10
capacity to protect I.G. and meet his needs. The social worker did
not identify any significant safety concerns with I.G. remaining
in father’s care.
Yet, other factors indicate continued court oversight was
appropriate. Father and mother had an extensive history of
domestic violence that endangered I.G. and his siblings. Mother
used drugs, and there was no evidence her drug use had ceased.
Prior to the disposition hearing, mother left two drug
rehabilitation programs and failed to complete a single drug test.
Father indicated the past domestic violence between the parents
was related to mother’s drug use. Father and mother share three
other children and a nine-year off-and-on romantic history. After
the prior dependency case, which ended with the termination of
parental rights, father and mother apparently maintained
enough of a relationship that they conceived another child
together, I.G. Given the not unlikely possibility of a future
reconciliation, or, at a minimum, interaction between the
parents, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that a
period of formal court supervision was necessary to protect I.G.
from any recurring parental violence or further exposure to
mother’s drug use. In addition, father was only beginning to
engage in three categories of services to comply with his court-
ordered case plan. Declaring the child a dependent of the court
allowed the court to ensure father completed those services.
Considering all of these circumstances, the court was well within
its discretion to declare I.G. a dependent of the court. (Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
The court also did not abuse its discretion by requiring
father to test for drugs. Father contends this aspect of the
disposition order was not tailored to the family’s needs. He

11
observes that the court dismissed the jurisdictional allegation
based on his drug use. Yet, the juvenile court may “formulate
disposition orders to address parental deficiencies when
necessary to protect and promote the child’s welfare, even when
that parental conduct did not give rise to the dependency
proceedings.” (In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25.) Father
admitted to using marijuana every two days before I.G.’s birth.
He tested positive for marijuana shortly after I.G.’s birth. I.G.,
an infant, was placed in father’s care alone. Although father
committed to stop using marijuana, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the court to ensure father adhered to that
commitment by requiring him to periodically test for drugs. (In
re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [juvenile
court may reasonably conclude substance abuse is an obstacle
that must be addressed in reunification plan through drug and
alcohol testing].) Further, the order was time limited, requiring a
three-month period of testing, followed by testing only on
suspicion of drug use. The court’s order was not arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.

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