People v. Stringer CA2/1

CourtListener 9987282Calctapp1 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/1/24 P. v. Stringer CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B328976

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA331910)
v.

JONZEL STRINGER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________
In 2010, a jury convicted Jonzel Stringer of two counts
of second degree murder and 46 counts of attempted murder.
The jury further found that a principal in the commission of
the crime was armed with a firearm. The court sentenced him
to 198 years to life in prison. After we reversed the attempted
murder convictions on his direct appeal in 2012, the court
resentenced Stringer to 15 years to life on the murder convictions
plus three years on the principal armed enhancements.
In 2019, Stringer petitioned the court to be resentenced
under the predecessor to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 After an
evidentiary hearing, the court found Stringer guilty of two counts
of second degree murder on alternative grounds: (1) that he was
a direct perpetrator of the two murders; and (2) that he acted
with implied malice in directly aiding and abetting his
accomplice, Izac McCloud.
Stringer contends: (1) The court failed to consider
the element of causation in determining that he was a direct
perpetrator of the murders; (2) The evidence is insufficient to
support the court’s findings on certain elements of the crimes;
and (3) The court failed to consider his youth in determining
whether he acted with the requisite mental state.
We conclude that the court’s finding that Stringer is
liable for murder as a direct aider and abettor of the murders
committed by McCloud is supported by substantial evidence.
We also conclude that Stringer forfeited the argument that the
court failed to consider his youth and, if not forfeited, we reject
it as inadequately developed or supported. We therefore affirm
the judgment.

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On the afternoon of January 19, 2008, Stringer, McCloud,
and K.L. were at L.L.’s house. McCloud and Stringer talked
about going to a party that evening. L.L. told them they should
not go because “bad things happen when you go where you
ain’t supposed to be.” McCloud said they “should . . . bring a 22
or a bigger gun” to the party. A friend of McCloud and Stringer,
who L.L. knew as “Black-T,” arrived at the house. Black-T
showed the others a semiautomatic handgun he had brought
with him. According to L.L., it was a “9, similar to a Glock.”
Upon seeing the gun, Stringer said to McCloud and K.L., “We
can use that” for “protection” at the party and told McCloud to
get the gun from Black-T. Black-T agreed to let them have it.
That evening, Stringer drove McCloud to a birthday
party for teenage twins R.H. and C.H. (the twins) at the
Masonic Lodge in Long Beach. The twins’ father anticipated
that 80 to 100 people would attend. Instead, “hundreds” of
people showed up. Witnesses described the lodge as being
“packed” “[e]lbow-to-elbow,” and “[w]all-to-wall people.” Many
more—including Stringer and McCloud—were in the parking
lot or waiting in a long line of people to get inside.
At some point, a scuffle or fight broke out inside the
lodge. The twins’ father believed the situation had become
uncontrollable and decided to shut the party down. Before
he could do so, however, gunshots were fired and a window
to the lodge shattered. Different bullets hit Dennis Moses and
Breon Taylor, who were inside the lodge. They died as a result
of bullet wounds to the head. A third bullet hit R.G. in the leg.
R.G., who was also inside the lodge when he was hit, survived.

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Later that night, Stringer returned to L.L.’s house.
According to L.L.’s trial testimony, Stringer seemed “nervous”
and “scared” and kept walking in circles and saying, “I didn’t
do it.” Once Stringer calmed down, he told L.L. that he and
McCloud drove to the party, Stringer “walked up to the door
to go in, and they socked him in the face.” Stringer said he ran
back to the car and told McCloud, “ ‘[G]et ’em, get ’em, get ’em.’ ”
Stringer told L.L. he got the gun from McCloud, fired two shots
“aiming towards the party” or “[a]t the party,” and then handed
the gun back to McCloud, who fired six more shots. Stringer
then drove them away from the scene.2
When L.L. was asked at trial what Stringer was referring
to when he initially said he “didn’t do it,” L.L. said that Stringer
was not the one who shot the victims; McCloud shot them.
Investigating police officers found 10 nine-millimeter
shell casings in the parking lot outside the lodge. They found no
evidence that shots were fired inside the lodge. After examining
the casings, a police criminalist determined that the bullet
casings were all fired from the same weapon.
The criminalist concluded that the bullets recovered
from victims Moses, Taylor, and R.G. were all fired from a nine-
millimeter semiautomatic firearm, and that the bullets recovered
from Moses and Taylor were fired from the same firearm. The
bullet recovered from R.G. was “more likely than not” fired from

2 On cross-examination, Stringer’s counsel introduced
evidence of L.L.’s prior statements to detectives that did not
identify Stringer as a shooter. At one point, a detective asked
L.L.: “Did he [Stringer] say who was shooting?” to which L.L.
answered: “No, but I think he was trying to say it was Izac
[McCloud].”

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the same firearm as the bullets recovered from Moses and Taylor.
The gun was never found.
The criminalist observed “pitting marks” and a “glistening
powdery substance” on the surface of the bullets recovered from
R.G.’s leg and the bodies of Moses and Taylor. According to the
criminalist, these marks and substance indicated that the bullets
had passed through glass before hitting the victims.
In addition to the three bullets that hit the victims,
investigating officers identified five bullet strike marks on the
exterior wall of the lodge near the shattered window and two
bullet holes in a car in the parking lot near the entrance to
the lodge. Ten hits equal the maximum number of bullets that
can be held in the kind of magazine that “the public is allowed
to buy” for a nine-millimeter handgun.
Two days after the shooting, P.A.—a student at the same
high school McCloud attended—talked to Marcus Egland, a gang
intervention specialist at the school. P.A. told Egland that he
“was there when everything happened,” that he saw “the actual
shooting,” and “knows who did the shooting.” In talking to
Egland, P.A. referred to Stringer as “JP.” Egland testified that
P.A. told him that McCloud and Stringer became upset when
they were not allowed into the party, and that Stringer told
McCloud “to go to the car and get the gun out and end it,” i.e.,
“[e]nd the party.” P.A. told Egland that Stringer “instructed”
McCloud to “shoot it up in the air. Just scare ’em.” McCloud
then started shooting into the party.
In an audiotaped interview on February 4, 2008, P.A. told
police a version of events that was generally consistent with
Egland’s testimony: There was some sort of fight at the party;
McCloud went to a beige car and got a gun from inside the car;

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a companion of McCloud’s told McCloud to “[e]nd the party”
and “ ‘shoot it in the air’ ”; McCloud then “shot at the window,”
paused, and fired two shots in the air.3 McCloud and the
companion then left in the beige car.
Detectives showed P.A. a picture of a beige Buick Regal
that was registered to Stringer’s mother. P.A. told the detectives
that it looked like the car in which McCloud and the driver left
the scene after the shooting.
About a week after the shooting, Stringer talked to his
cousin about the incident. Stringer told his cousin that he was
at a party and “his homeboy got into it with somebody, and the
homeboy shot him and they just left.” Stringer’s cousin asked
about the gun, and Stringer told him that “the guy got rid of
that.”
Other accounts of the incident varied widely. Although
many witnesses testified that the shots were fired from outside
the lodge, some said they saw or believed someone fired a gun
from inside the lodge and others described gunfire without
saying from where it had come. Witnesses also gave different
descriptions of the clothes and hair color of the shooter.
Testimony as to the number of shots witnesses heard
ranged from three to twenty. Some witnesses described a single

3 P.A.’s statements in police interviews and his testimony
before a grand jury were not all consistent, and he admitted
having given incorrect information to the police at various times.
During trial, P.A. answered, “I don’t remember” to nearly every
question asked, and he specifically denied having told the police
the identity of the shooter. The recording of the February 4, 2008
interview was then played for the jury.

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series of gunshots; and others described two or three series of
gunshots separated by a pause or pauses.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2010, a grand jury charged Stringer and McCloud
with the murders of Moses and Taylor (§ 187), the attempted
murder of R.G. (§§ 187, 664), and the attempted murder of
59 others. The indictment further alleged certain firearm
enhancements as to each crime (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1),
12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)), and the multiple murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). Pursuant to section 1385,
the trial court dismissed 12 of the attempted murder counts
prior to trial and, later, pursuant to section 1118.1, dismissed
two attempted murder counts.
Stringer and McCloud were tried together before different
juries. Stringer’s jury was instructed, among other theories, on
felony murder and aiding and abetting liability under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
Stringer’s jury convicted him of two counts of second degree
murder and all 46 remaining counts of attempted murder. The
jury also found the firearm enhancement allegations true. The
court sentenced Stringer to prison for 198 years to life.
In 2012, we affirmed Stringer’s murder convictions
and reversed the attempted murder convictions in a partially
published opinion. (People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
788.) After remand, the prosecution elected not to retry the
attempted murder charges. The court resentenced Stringer
to 15 years to life plus three years for the firearm enhancement
on each of the murder convictions.
In 2019, Stringer petitioned the superior court to be
resentenced under section 1172.6. The court found that Stringer

7
had made a prima facie showing for relief and, on December 21,
2022, held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to subdivision (d)(3)
of section 1172.6. The hearing was held before the same judge
that presided over Stringer’s 2010 trial. The prosecution
introduced the reporter’s transcripts from Stringer’s trial, the
clerk’s transcript and supplemental clerk’s transcript from
McCloud’s direct appeal, and the procedural summary portion
of our opinion in McCloud.4 No other evidence was offered by
either side. After argument from counsel, the court took the
matter under submission.
On February 2, 2023, the court issued its ruling denying
Stringer’s petition. The court found Stringer guilty of two counts
of second degree murder under alternative theories: (1) Stringer
was a direct perpetrator in the murders; and (2) Stringer acted
with implied malice in aiding and abetting McCloud’s acts of
shooting into the party.
In finding that Stringer was liable as a direct perpetrator,
the court relied on L.L.’s testimony that Stringer told him that
he had fired the gun twice before handing it to McCloud. The
court stated that it is “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as
to the credibility of [L.L.]” The court further explained that L.L.’s
testimony was consistent with the testimony of witnesses who
described two separate series of gunshots.
Regarding the alternative theory that Stringer is liable as
an aider and abettor of McCloud’s criminal acts, the court found:
(1) McCloud, by shooting into the crowded party, committed the
crime of implied malice murder; (2) Stringer intended to aid and

4 We granted Stringer’s request to take judicial notice of
the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts that the court considered
in connection with the evidentiary hearing.

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abet, and did in fact aid and abet, McCloud’s commission of the
crime; and (3) In aiding and abetting McCloud, Stringer knew
that his conduct endangered the life of another and he acted
with conscious disregard for life.
Stringer appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Aiding and
Abetting Implied Malice Murder
When, as here, the trial court holds an evidentiary hearing
on a section 1172.6 petition, it acts as an independent factfinder
to determine whether the defendant is guilty of murder beyond
a reasonable doubt under current law. (People v. Guiffreda
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123; People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745.) We review the court’s factual findings
for substantial evidence. (People v. Underwood (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) Under this standard, we “ ‘examine
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment
to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that
would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant
guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. San Nicolas
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657–658; accord, People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express
or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “The primary difference between
express malice and implied malice is that the former requires
an intent to kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto (2018)
4 Cal.5th 968, 976.)

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“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) “[I]mplied
malice [thus] requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in
conduct that endangers the life of another.” (People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) “To suffice for implied malice
murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to
life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a
high degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) A high degree of probability does not
mean, as Stringer suggests, that the act is more probable than
not to result in death. Rather, the court or jury needs to find only
that “the natural consequences of the act entail[s] a significant
risk of death.” (People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 485, 501; see People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 513 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [for proof of implied malice, “the
probability of death from the act must be more than remote or
merely possible”]; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377,
389 [same].)
Implied malice aider and abettor liability remains a valid
theory of murder liability under current law. (People v. Silva
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639; People v. Vargas (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 943, 953.) “[U]nder direct aiding and abetting
principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by
another if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense
with ‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and
[with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.’ ”

10
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.) Thus, “an aider
and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can
still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows
that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts
with conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at p. 850.)
“ ‘In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required
of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act.
For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever
acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of
the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea,
which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit
the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 991.)
Here, the testimony of Egland—the high school gang
intervention specialist—that P.A. said he saw McCloud retrieve
a gun from a car and intentionally fire numerous gunshots into
the crowded party, and the evidence of P.A.’s corroborating
police interview, constitute substantial evidence that McCloud
committed a life-endangering act.
The court’s finding that Stringer aided and abetted
McCloud’s firing a gun at the party is also supported by
substantial evidence. According to L.L.—whose testimony the
court found credible—Black-T showed Stringer a nine-millimeter
firearm and Stringer told McCloud they “can use that” “for
protection” at the party. Stringer and McCloud asked Black-T

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for the gun, and he agreed to let them have it. According to L.L.,
after the shooting, Stringer told him that he attempted to enter
the lodge when someone “socked him in the face.” Stringer
then ran back to the car and told McCloud, “ ‘[G]et ’em, get ’em,
get ’em.’ ” Stringer took the gun, fired two shots “[a]t the party,”
and handed the gun to McCloud, who fired six more shots.
The inference that Stringer and McCloud shot “at the
party”—and not in the air as P.A. suggested—is strengthened by
the evidence of bullet strikes. Police investigators found evidence
that 10 bullets were fired at the lodge: three that passed through
glass and hit victims; five that hit the lodge near the window;
and two that hit a parked car near the lodge. If, as a detective
testified, publicly available magazines for a nine-millimeter gun
can hold no more than 10 bullets and all 10 bullets were shot in
the direction of the party, then none of the bullets—including the
shots Stringer fired—were shot into the air.
There is evidence that Stringer, after being hit in the face
and denied entry to the party, told McCloud to “[e]nd the party”
and “get ‘em, get ‘em, get ‘em”; Stringer took the gun from
McCloud and fired two shots “[a]t the party”; Stringer handed
the gun back to McCloud; and McCloud, following Stringer’s lead,
proceeded to commit the life-endangering act of firing additional
shots at the party. The court reasonably inferred from the
combination of these acts that Stringer intended to aid and
abet—and did aid and abet—McCloud’s life-endangering act, and
that he did so with the knowledge that the shooting is dangerous
to human life and that McCloud intended to commit the act of
shooting, and that Stringer thus acted in conscious disregard for
human life. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)

12
Stringer suggests that we should give little or no weight
to L.L.’s trial testimony because it is arguably inconsistent
with his earlier statements and not corroborated by other
testimony. As the People point out, however, in reviewing a
ruling for substantial evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence
or reevaluate a witness’s credibility. (People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1118; People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951,
970.) Here, in its ruling on Stringer’s petition, the court stated
that “[d]espite some inconsistencies, this court believes witness
[L.L.’s] testimony at trial was credible.” Although he had been
threatened by gang members prior to trial and was “scared to
testify, [L.L.] testified that he was trying to do the right thing by
testifying honestly at trial.” The court was “convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt as to the credibility of this witness.” We thus
reject Stringer’s suggestion that we reevaluate L.L.’s credibility.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court finding that Stringer intended to aid
and abet, and did aid and abet, McCloud’s act of shooting into the
crowded party—a life-endangering act—and did so with conscious
disregard for human life and with the knowledge that McCloud
intended to commit that act. Because the court’s finding of
liability for implied malice second degree murder is supported
by substantial evidence, we do not address Stringer’s arguments
concerning the court’s alternative ground that Stringer was a
direct perpetrator of the murders.

B. Consideration of Stringer’s Youth
Stringer contends that he was 19 years old at the time
of the shooting—without citation to the record—and the court
erroneously failed to consider his youth in determining that he
possessed the requisite mental state for implied malice murder.

13
Stringer cites to People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400
(Pittman), which held that a court should consider whether
and how a defendant’s “youth impacted his ability to form the
requisite mental state for second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 418.)
In Pittman, the Court of Appeal discussed the defendant’s
age and the particular “circumstances of the offense” that
“suggest that some of [the] ‘ “hallmark features of youth” ’ may
have been at play.” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.)
The court concluded that “remand is appropriate for the court
to consider how, if at all, [the defendant’s] youth impacted his
ability to form the requisite mental state for second degree
murder.” (Ibid.)
Stringer asserts that we should “follow Pittman and
remand here, as well.”
Stringer did not raise this issue below or assert that
the court should consider his youth at the time of the shootings.
Indeed, it does not appear from our record that anyone brought
the defendant’s age to the court’s attention. He has therefore
forfeited the argument on appeal. (See In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950,
988, fn. 13.)
In Pittman, the defendant had also not raised the issue
of his youth in the trial court. The appellate court concluded,
however, that he had not forfeited the issue on appeal because
the defendant’s petition was denied in 2020, and “[t]he relevant
appellate cases [deciding that youth is a relevant factor bearing
on mental state in section 1172.6 petitions] were not decided
until 2021 or later.” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)
The court listed eight relevant cases decided in 2021 and 2022.
(Ibid.)

14
Pittman is distinguishable because seven of the eight
relevant cases cited in Pittman were decided before Stringer’s
December 21, 2022 evidentiary hearing. (See People v.
Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960; In re Moore (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 434, 452–455; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 987; In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450,
470; People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091–1093;
People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 562–563; People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595.) Thus, unlike the
defendant in Pittman, Stringer had ample notice of the issue
prior to his hearing and the reasons the Pittman court gave for
finding that the petitioner had not forfeited the issue are absent
here.
Even if not forfeited, Stringer makes only an undeveloped
perfunctory argument that we “should follow Pittman and
remand.” The Pittman court’s decision to remand, however, was
based upon the circumstances of the defendant’s crime. (Pittman,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.) Here, by contrast, Stringer
fails to refer us to any pertinent facts or provide citations to
the record. Because he has failed to establish prejudicial error
on this point, we reject the contention. (See People v. Picazo
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 778, 802 [judgment challenged on
appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden
to affirmatively demonstrate error].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.

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