In re X.F. CA2/4

CourtListener 9986882Calctapp28 giu 2024

Testo completo

Filed 6/28/24 In re X.F. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

In re X.F., A Person Coming B329079
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 20CCJP03927A
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

J.V. (mother) appeals from orders issued at the conclusion
of juvenile dependency proceedings regarding her child X.F. (born
2017). In April 2023, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
after a combined hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
sections 364 and 388.1 The court ordered that A.F. (father) have
legal and physical custody over X.F. and mother have monitored
visitation. The court also issued a permanent restraining order
protecting father, X.F., and G.N. (father’s companion) from
mother. The record shows mother did not complete her court
ordered programs; violated the court’s visitation orders;
communicated with father and G.N. in a threatening and hostile
manner; and acted inappropriately in front of X.F., resulting in
X.F. experiencing emotional distress.
On appeal, mother raises the following arguments: (1) the
court’s order granting father sole legal and physical custody was
an abuse of discretion because it was unsupported by substantial
evidence; (2) the court’s order requiring mother’s visits to be
monitored was an abuse of discretion; and (3) the permanent
restraining order must be reversed because it is unsupported by
substantial evidence. We affirm.
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) The parties are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of the case, so we do not fully restate those

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services had filed a section 388 petition requesting the
juvenile court revert mother’s visitation from unmonitored to
monitored.

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details here. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851
[unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of juvenile
court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal
statement”].) Instead, in the Discussion, post, we discuss the facts
and procedural background as needed to provide context for and
resolve the issues presented in this appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. The order granting father sole legal and physical
custody of X.F. was not an abuse of discretion

A. Legal Principles
Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make “exit orders” regarding custody and visitation upon
terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child. (See § 362.4,
subd. (a); In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 202-203; In re
Kenneth S., Jr. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1358.) These exit
orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by a
subsequent order of the superior court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700.)
“[I]n making exit orders, the juvenile court must look at the
best interests of the child.” (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th
961, 973.) The court must be guided by the totality of the
circumstances in issuing orders that are in the child’s best
interests. (In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 201; In re
Roger S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30-31.) Because juvenile
dependency proceedings arise when children are subject to or at
risk of abuse or neglect, “‘[t]he presumption of parental fitness
that underlies custody law in the family court just does not
apply. Rather the juvenile court, which has been intimately

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involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make
custody determinations based on the best interests of the child
without any preferences or presumptions.’” (In re Chantal S.,
supra, at p. 206, italics omitted.)
“[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
[and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case (§ 362.4).” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4.) We review the juvenile court’s exit
orders for abuse of that discretion. (See, e.g., In re Maya L. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s
decision “‘“unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.”’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

B. Analysis
We are unpersuaded by mother’s argument that the
juvenile court’s order granting father sole physical and legal
custody of X.F. was an abuse of discretion. Contrary to mother’s
assertion, the custody order is supported by substantial evidence.
The record reflects the following. Mother did not complete her
case plan. She also did not follow the visitation schedule set by
the court, sent hostile, threatening text messages to father, and
was verbally aggressive in X.F.’s presence. X.F. stated he felt
upset hearing his mother call his father “stupid” repeatedly.
Mother denied sending the threatening texts and did not take
responsibility for her other harmful behavior. During this period,
mother was kicked out of her domestic violence support group for
not following the program rules. Mother also made comments
indicating she did not understand why she needed to participate
in any domestic violence classes.

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In issuing the custody order, the juvenile court noted its
view that mother’s behavior was “completely inappropriate,”
“continue[d] to be problematic,” and took an “emotional toll” on
X.F. Given the facts presented, we conclude the court was
reasonably acting in X.F.’s best interest in granting father sole
physical and legal custody, and accordingly, we conclude the
custody order was not an abuse of discretion.

II. The order requiring that mother’s visits with X.F. be
monitored was not an abuse of discretion

Nor are we persuaded by mother’s argument that the exit
order requiring her visits to be monitored was an abuse of
discretion. For the same reasons discussed above in regards to
the court’s custody order, it was not arbitrary nor irrational for
the juvenile court to conclude requiring mother’s visits to be
monitored was in X.F.’s best interest.

III. Mother’s other argument that the visitation
order was improper

Mother also argues the visitation order was improper
because it did not specify the minimum frequency and duration of
the visits, instead impermissibly delegating all visitation
authority to father. Respondent counters that the visitation order
did specify the frequency and duration of visits. Respondent is
correct. We granted Respondent’s request for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s orders not originally contained in the record.
Having granted Respondent’s motion, the record now contains
visitation order form JV-205, which specifies mother will have
monitored visits with X.F. “in a neutral setting, 3 times a week
for 4 hours per visit.” We therefore reject mother’s argument that

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the visitation order improperly failed to specify the frequency and
duration of her monitored visits with X.F.2

IV. Mother’s challenge to the restraining order

Mother lastly argues the restraining order the juvenile
court imposed is unsupported by substantial evidence.
Respondent does not take a position on whether the restraining
order is supported by substantial evidence. We therefore conduct
our own review to determine whether mother has met her burden
of showing error. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110, fn. 1.) Having reviewed the record, we
conclude the restraining order is supported by substantial
evidence, and thus was not improper.
Under section 213.5, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may
issue an order “enjoining any person from . . . contacting[ ] . . . or
disturbing the peace of the child . . . . [or] contacting[ ] . . . or
disturbing the peace of any parent, legal guardian, or current
caretaker of the child[.]” “Monitored visitation of a child is not
incompatible with a restraining order.” (In re N.L. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466.) Courts have applied both substantial
evidence and abuse of discretion standards of review when
deciding whether the issuance of a restraining order was an
abuse of discretion, though the practical differences between the
two standards within this context are not significant. (Id. at pp.
1465-1466.) In other words, a restraining order unsupported by
substantial evidence inherently constitutes an abuse of

2 Mother did not file a reply brief and therefore does not
dispute Respondent’s contentions that the specifications of the
monitored visitation order contained in form JV-205 were proper.

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discretion, as an order not reasonably supported by any evidence
is by definition arbitrary and irrational.
Using form JV-255, the juvenile court issued a restraining
order protecting father, father’s companion, and X.F. from
mother. The restraining order will expire on April 27, 2026, three
years after its issuance. The order prohibits mother from abusing
father, his companion, and X.F., and defines the prohibited
abusive behavior in various ways, including harassment,
annoying by phone or electronic means, and disturbing the peace
of the protected individuals. It notes the juvenile court has
ordered monitored visitation between mother and X.F. The order
also prohibits mother from having contact with the protected
individuals, with the exception that mother may have brief and
peaceful contact with father only to communicate about X.F. for
court-ordered visits. It additionally requires mother to stay away
from X.F. and his school, as well as father, father’s home, his
workplace, and his car. And it states: “If an officer has probable
cause to believe that the restrained person had notice of the order
and has disobeyed the order, the officer must arrest the
restrained person.”
As mentioned above, mother sent father and G.N. hostile,
threatening, harassing text messages. Although we need not
repeat the content of all these texts, we note that they included
death threats. Mother denied sending the threatening texts and
did not take responsibility for her actions. Additionally, as noted
above, X.F. stated he felt upset because he heard his mother
repeatedly call his father “stupid,” indicating mother’s
interactions with X.F. were causing him emotional distress.
Based on these facts, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to
conclude the restraining order was in X.F.’s best interest, and to

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issue the order to protect father, G.N., and X.F. in a manner that
prevented mother from harassing them or contacting them
outside the context of court-ordered monitored visitation.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s exit orders, restraining order, and
order terminating jurisdiction are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

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