CourtListener 9986756•People v. Sturgis CA3
Testo completo
Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Sturgis CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098617
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21FE010736)
v.
LARENCE LEONARD STURGIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
After his motion to suppress was denied, defendant Larence Leonard Sturgis pled
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to two
years eight months in prison. On appeal, Sturgis argues the gun and ammunition found in
his pocket should be suppressed because both the traffic stop and subsequent frisk were
not supported by reasonable suspicion. We conclude the record does not contain
sufficient articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and will
reverse.
1
BACKGROUND
The information alleged Sturgis was a felon in possession of a firearm and
ammunition. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1).) It also alleged
Sturgis had a prior strike conviction. (Id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
Pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, Sturgis moved to suppress the gun and
ammunition officers found in his pocket. At the suppression hearing held in conjunction
with the preliminary hearing, Officer Conner Mills testified he had worked for the
Sacramento Police Department for five and a half years and was assigned to the north
gang enforcement team. Officer Mills reported he encountered many firearms in his job
and there had been a recent trend of people carrying firearms in cross-body style satchels.
On the date of this arrest, Officer Mills, Officer Derek Goetting, and Sergeant
Zach Eaton were on a routine patrol in the north area of Sacramento at about 1:30 p.m.
Officer Mills noticed three people (a woman, Sturgis, and a man (H.B.)) standing in front
of a tire shop that was next to a nearby liquor store. H.B. was wearing a cross-body style
satchel. Officer Mills testified, “As we drove past, it appeared they became fixated on
our presence and kind of started walking in different directions.”
The man wearing the cross-body style satchel (H.B.) went into the liquor store.
Officer Mills was not sure if the satchel was zipped up when H.B. went in, but when he
came out it was unzipped. Sergeant Eaton went into the liquor store to look around but
there is no evidence in the record that anything was found.
The three people got into a car. The woman was in the driver seat. Sturgis was in
the front passenger seat, and H.B. was in the back passenger seat.
As Officers Mills and Goetting walked up to the car, the car drove off. Because
the officers were not sure that the three people in the car saw them approach, the officers
could not tell if they were just trying to drive away or drive away from them.
The officers got into their patrol car, followed the car, and made an enforcement
stop. Officer Mills testified he effected a traffic stop on the car because it “had window
2
tint affixed to the front driver window and passenger window.” When asked, “And
what’s wrong with having window tint affixed to those two windows that you
mentioned,” Officer Mills responded, “It makes it difficult to see inside the vehicle, not
only for other people, but also for the driver. It obscures their vision looking out the
windows, especially at certain times — at night.” On cross-examination the officer
testified it was his opinion that having tint on your front windows is illegal under state
law.
Officer Mills contacted the female driver. While he did so, he saw a beer can in
the back seat. When it was handed to him, he noted it was about one-third full and
smelled like alcohol. Officer Goetting conducted a records check and determined the
driver had a suspended license and Sturgis had a history of firearm-related charges.
Officer Mills decided to have the driver step out of the car to conduct a probable cause
search of the car based on the open container of alcohol. Officer Goetting searched
H.B.’s satchel and found no firearms inside of it. Officer Goetting also asked Sturgis to
step out of the car and during a brief patdown search discovered a loaded handgun that
had three bullets in the magazine. Sturgis said he found the handgun somewhere in the
North Sacramento area.
A brief 24-second body camera video of the patdown was submitted into evidence.
Despite that the video shows there were three officers involved, each with a body camera,
this was the only footage the People introduced at the hearing. During the colloquy with
counsel, the trial court said it had reviewed the video of the stop that showed the front
passenger window rolled down with only “1 to 2 inches, or so, protruding from the door.”
The trial court described that window as tinted and later described the windows as
appearing “to be somewhat darker than clear but they’re not black.” We have viewed the
video as well. It shows the front passenger window almost all the way down with only a
little over an inch showing above the doorsill. We can see through the window.
3
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court summarized the issue as follows:
“The officers testified they observed the vehicle traveling with dark film attached or
tinting to the front driver and passenger side windows in violation of Vehicle Code
Section 26708. The prosecution claimed that for this reason the officers lawfully
effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle and detained the occupants within while the
officers investigated the violation. [¶] The defense contends the stop was unlawful
because there was insufficient evidence of window tinting or the nature of the tinting to
justify [the] stop.” The trial court stated it did not appear any Court of Appeal has
published an opinion under the current statutes as to whether an officer can stop a vehicle
that has a front driver and passenger window that is not clear, not colorless, or not
transparent. The trial court found the fact that this window was not clear, not colorless,
and not transparent was a legal basis for the officers to stop the car and denied the motion
to suppress.1
On January 26, 2022, Sturgis filed a motion to dismiss the information under
Penal Code sections 995 and 1538.5, subdivision (i). On June 16, 2022, the trial court
denied that motion. Sturgis then pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a
firearm and admitted his prior strike conviction. On May 17, 2023, the trial court
sentenced him to two years eight months in prison. Sturgis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Sturgis argues the traffic stop based on tinted windows was not supported by
reasonable suspicion and as a result the evidence of the gun must be suppressed. We
agree.
1 The trial court also discussed the legality of the patdown search, but as this case turns
on the propriety of the stop, we will not discuss that finding.
4
A. Standard of Review
“In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts,
select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts to determine whether the law as applied has
been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under
the deferential substantial evidence standard.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494,
505.) “ ‘We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts
presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ”
(People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.)
B. Analysis
“A traffic stop is a seizure subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.” (People v. Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937.) The
police may conduct a traffic stop if the circumstances show “ ‘at least reasonable
suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law.’ ” (People v.
Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 734-735.) Reasonable suspicion exists “when the
detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the
totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person
detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224,
231.) At the trial court level, it is the People’s burden to demonstrate the legality of the
stop. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128.) “Although an officer’s
reliance on a mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop, [citation], the likelihood of
criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” (United
States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.)
If the stop does not meet this test, any resulting search or seizure violates the
detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights and a motion to suppress any evidence obtained
pursuant thereto must be granted. (People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 434
5
[“As a general rule, evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure is
inadmissible against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution”].)
Sturgis argues that the windows appearing darkened was by itself insufficient to
amount to reasonable suspicion of illegal tinting. The People counter arguing the
window tint was not clear, colorless, and transparent thus, the affixed tint described by
the officer is a violation of the Vehicle Code. We conclude Sturgis is correct.
The People argue that “the affixed tint is the issue at bar, and not the tint of the
‘windows themselves.’ ” However, the blanket assertion that having any tint “affixed” to
a car window is a violation of the Vehicle Code is inaccurate. To the contrary, the
statutory scheme is centered, in large part, on the actual degree of tint because not all tints
are illegal, as windows tinted with certain light transmittance are permitted. Vehicle
Code2 section 26708, subdivision (d)(1) and (2) appear to provide that having tinted
material applied or affixed is only impermissible if the visible light transmission is less
than 88 or 70 percent, respectively. (See Sen. Com. on Transportation, Rep. on Assem.
Bill No. 2320 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 1998.) Officer Mills did not
provide any articulable facts indicating that the tint affixed was darker than permitted by
statute.
Contrary to the trial court’s description, Officer Mills did not testify the car had a
dark film or tinting on the window; he did not testify at all about the coloring or shading.
Instead, the officer testified he stopped the car Sturgis was a passenger in because “[i]t
had window tint affixed to the front driver window and passenger window.” When asked
why having window tinting was a problem, the officer responded broadly: “It makes it
difficult to see inside the vehicle, not only for other people, but also for the driver. It
obscures their vision looking out the windows, especially at certain times -- at night.”
The nature of the question, the fact that the windows were mostly rolled down, and
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
6
Officer Mills’s response make it ambiguous at best as to whether the officer was talking
about car windows with tinting in general or this particular car’s windows. Because the
window visible in this record was almost all the way down, it is not possible any tinting
made seeing into this car difficult. There were no specific articulable facts testified to as
to whether Officer Mills’s ability to see into the car was obscured in any way, nor any
facts provided about the degree of tint on the windows.
With no specificity about the degree of tint, it is inaccurate to blanketly assert that
window tint that is not clear, colorless, and transparent, violates the Vehicle Code and the
officer was incorrect that having tinted windows is a per se violation of the Vehicle Code.
Section 26708, subdivision (a)(1) states: “A person shall not drive any motor vehicle
with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied upon the
windshield or side or rear windows.” Additionally, section 26708, subdivision (a)(2)
prohibits driving “any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed,
installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s
clear view through the windshield or side windows.” But the Vehicle Code provides for
exceptions generally, as noted above, allowing “clear, colorless, and transparent material”
designed “to block the sun’s harmful ultraviolet A rays” may be affixed to the front side
windows if the “material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent” and
the “window glazing with the material applied meets [the federal] . . . specified minimum
light transmittance of 70 percent . . . .” (§ 26708, subd. (d)(1)-(3); People v. Niebauer
(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1291-1292.) Thus, having tint on windows is not per se
illegal, and does not by itself support a traffic stop. Relying on the fact of tint alone to
provide reasonable suspicion, without testimony about the degree of tint, would
improperly shift the burden to the defendant to prove the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion. Instead, the officer must provide something more to demonstrate the tint is of
the type prohibited by the Vehicle Code and the officer here did no such thing.
7
Appellate courts have held that an officer’s testimony that window tint is illegal,
without more, is insufficient to support a stop. For example, in People v. Butler (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 602, 604, the officer who conducted a traffic stop saw that the “side and
rear windows [of the defendant’s vehicle] were darkened.” The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress based on the testimony regarding the window tint. (Id. at
pp. 605, 607.) On appeal, the appellate court “disagree[d] with the People’s suggestion
that seeing someone lawfully driving with tinted glass raises a reasonable suspicion of
illegality such that a reasonable inquiry is justified. Without additional articulable facts
suggesting that the tinted glass is illegal, the detention rests upon the type of speculation
which may not properly support an investigative stop.” (Id. at p. 607.) The simple fact
the car’s windows were darkened did not suggest that the officer “had a reasonable
suspicion that the windows in the [vehicle] were made of illegally tinted, rather than
legally tinted, safety glass.” (Id. at p. 606.)
In People v. Niebauer, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, an officer testified that he
initiated the traffic stop because “the windows were darker than normal and he could only
see [the defendant’s] outline through the window.” (Id. at p. 1292.) The officer further
testified that “he had stopped other drivers with the same type of tinting material on their
vehicle windows and those drivers had to roll down their windows at night in order to see
where they were turning.” (Id. at p. 1293.) On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted in dicta
that “the facts presented would also justify . . . a stop in this case. [The officer] testified
to additional facts giving him reasonable suspicion [the defendant] was driving with
illegally tinted windows other than merely the bare statement [the defendant’s] truck had
tinted windows.” (Ibid., fn. 10.)
More recently, in People v. Roberts (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1149, the appellate
court upheld the constitutionality of a stop based on tinted windows where the officer
testified he “could not see through the driver’s tinted side window from the open
passenger side window,” and “believed the view from the windows was obstructed by the
8
tint in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708.5, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 1190.) In so
holding, the court found that “the underlying facts for the stop were specific and
reliable.” (Id. at p. 1191.)
Likewise, in People v. Hanes (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6, 8, the arresting
officer, who had conducted 400 traffic stops based on suspicion of illegal window tinting,
testified that the front right window of the defendant’s black car was “ ‘so black that it
kind of matched the color of the car.’ He also testified that he was unable to see the
occupants of the vehicle.” On that basis, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
(Ibid.) On appeal, the appellate department of the superior court concluded that the
arresting officer’s testimony provided the kind of additional articulable facts required by
the court in Butler. (Id. at pp. 9-10.)
Here, the People presented no additional articulable facts suggesting the tinted
glass was illegal here. The solitary observation presented to the trial court of the vehicle
Sturgis was in prior to initiation of the traffic stop was that the windows were tinted.
Officer Mills did not testify as to any specific articulable facts suggesting that the tint was
illegal, such as that he had difficulty seeing through the window, or that the window was
demonstrably dark. This is all the more true here given that at the time he stopped the
car, the front passenger window was rolled down almost completely. Officer Mills’s
generalized comment that tints make looking inside a car difficult could not have
referenced this car as the only window shown in the record was rolled down almost all
the way, such that it would not have affected any view into the car. Accordingly, the
record does not support the trial court’s finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion
to stop Sturgis.
We acknowledge that in People v. Carter (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, the Second
District held that “[w]hen a police officer sees a vehicle with tinted front and side
windows, the officer may stop the car and cite the driver for a violation of Vehicle Code
section 26708, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 529.) That court included no analysis to
9
support this holding, but merely cited Niebauer, even though Carter contradicts the
holding in Butler. As we have already noted, Niebauer’s analysis relied on the existence
of additional facts beyond the windows merely having been tinted. Accordingly, we
decline to follow Carter and instead follow Butler and Niebauer.
Because the record contains no specific articulable facts suggesting that the tinted
glass was illegal, this stop violated Sturgis’s Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, all
evidence obtained pursuant to the stop must be suppressed.3
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded. On remand, the trial court
shall vacate its June 16, 2022 order denying Sturgis’s motion to suppress and enter a new
order granting that motion, and shall conduct further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
I concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
3 Given our conclusion the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we
decline to address Sturgis’s arguments concerning the propriety of the officer’s protective
frisk of Sturgis.
10
RENNER, J., Dissenting.
The majority suggests having tint affixed to a front driver and passenger window
may not violate the Vehicle Code because “section 26708, subdivision (d)(1) and (2)
appear to provide that having tinted material applied or affixed is only impermissible if
the visible light transmission is less than 88 or 70 percent, respectively.” (Maj. Opn.
ante, at p. 6.) This is a misstatement of the law. Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision
(d) allows only a “clear, colorless, and transparent material” to be affixed to the windows
at issue and only if the material also meets each the following additional conditions:
“(1) The material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent.
“(2) The window glazing with the material applied meets all requirements of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (49 C.F.R. 571.205), including the
specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent and the abrasion resistance of AS-14
glazing, as specified in that federal standard.
“(3) The material is designed and manufactured to enhance the ability of the
existing window glass to block the sun’s harmful ultraviolet A rays.” (Veh. Code,
§ 26708, subd. (d).)
It has long been settled that tint that is affixed to a window cannot satisfy these
requirements. (People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1292.) At a minimum,
a tint that is affixed to the window as opposed to a safety glass and/or glaze cannot meet
the applicable federal standards. (Id. at p. 1291 & fn. 8.) The majority has failed to
acknowledge their departure from settled law on this point. (See id. at p. 1292 [“If an
officer forms an opinion in a commonsense examination of a vehicle that there is a film
placed upon the vehicle’s windows in an unauthorized place . . . such evidence will be
sufficient to support conviction under [Vehicle Code] section 26708[, subdivision ](a) if
the trial court believes the officer; no further evidence or scientific testimony need be
presented”].)
1
The majority relies on People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602, which noted
that tinted windows are not necessarily unlawful if the windows are “made of the type of
tinted glass meeting the requirements of subdivision (b) of Vehicle Code section
26708.5.” (Id. at p. 606.) (Maj. Opn. ante, at p. 8.) There, the court found no facts in the
record to suggest that the officer “had a reasonable suspicion that the windows in the
Cadillac were made of illegally tinted, rather than legally tinted, safety glass.” (Butler,
supra, at p. 606.) Butler is distinguishable because here it is undisputed the tint was
affixed, which would preclude the possibility that what the officer saw was tinted safety
glass in compliance with Vehicle Code section 26708.5, subdivision (b). The majority’s
analysis misses the distinction between tinted safety glass and affixed tint. (E.g., Maj.
Opn. ante, at p. 9 [“Here, the People presented no additional articulable facts suggesting
the tinted glass was illegal here”].) For this reason, I dissent.
/s/
RENNER, J.
2
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