CourtListener 9968907•People v. Smith CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Smith CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B324922
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A979634)
v.
WILLIE DEAN SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ray Jurado, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Paul Kleven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Willie Dean Smith (defendant) of the first
degree murder and second degree robbery of Willie Gossom, Jr.
(Gossom). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in
prison. More recently, after intervening changes in California
law defining murder, defendant petitioned for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former Penal Code section 1170.95).1
We consider whether the trial court erred when it summarily
denied defendant’s petition for resentencing without appointing
him counsel and relying solely on this court’s opinion resolving
defendant’s direct appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
At approximately 2:30 p.m. on November 17, 1988, Gossom
was shot in the parking lot of a supper club in Los Angeles. Two
weeks later, defendant was arrested and charged with the
murder (§ 187) and robbery (§ 211) of Gossom. In connection
with each offense, defendant was alleged to have personally used
a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
A. Defendant’s Trial and Direct Appeal2
According to the evidence at trial, on the afternoon of the
shooting, sometime between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., Gossom
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
At the Attorney General’s unopposed request, we take
judicial notice of the following documents from defendant’s trial:
excerpts from the trial transcript, the instructions given to the
jury, instructions proposed by the prosecution but rejected by the
trial court, and the verdict forms.
2
drove to the City of San Fernando and sold his Nissan 200 SX
automobile to the owner of a brake shop for $1,500 in cash. Both
before and after the sale of the automobile, the shop’s owner saw
Gossom chatting with defendant. The last time the owner saw
the two men, they were standing near a brown station wagon.
Minutes later, Gossom, defendant, and the brown station wagon
were gone from the brake shop.
Approximately a half an hour after the brake shop owner
last saw defendant and Gossom, Ricky Smith (Ricky), an eleven-
year-old boy, was passing near the supper club’s parking lot and
heard a gunshot. Ricky turned and saw a man pointing a gun at
Gossom, who staggered backwards before falling to the
pavement. After Gossom collapsed, Ricky saw the man with the
gun flee the scene in a brown station wagon. Other witnesses
stated they saw two men leave the scene in a brown station
wagon. Ricky identified defendant as the man with the gun from
a photo lineup, and then later at defendant’s preliminary hearing
and trial.
Although Ricky and two other witnesses who were near the
supper club at the time of the shooting testified they heard one
gunshot, and although only one spent shell casing was found in
the parking lot, an autopsy revealed Gossom had been shot three
times. One bullet entered Gossom’s neck from the front and
exited through the top of his head. The two other bullets entered
Gossom’s back in close proximity to each other and each traveled
downward before lodging inside Gossom’s body. In the opinion of
the chief forensic examiner for the County of Los Angeles, each
gunshot wound was potentially fatal. The autopsy also revealed
an abrasion in Gossom’s lower back surrounded by bruising.
3
1. Contending theories at trial
According to the prosecutor, the forensic medical evidence
showed that defendant, after learning Gossom had just received
$1,500 from the sale of his automobile, jabbed a gun into
Gossom’s back at the brake shop and forced him at gunpoint into
the front passenger seat of the brown station wagon. The
prosecutor argued defendant shot Gossom twice in the back from
the station wagon’s rear seat and robbed Gossom of the $1,500 as
a “third unknown person” drove the station wagon. Once they
arrived at the supper club’s parking lot where defendant and his
accomplice planned to dump Gossom, defendant delivered the
third, “coup de grace” shot heard by Ricky and the other
witnesses. Based on the evidence, the prosecutor advised the
jury they could find defendant guilty of “standard murder” (i.e.,
“premeditated,” “willful,” “deliberate” murder with “malice
aforethought”), or “felony murder,” or both. In connection with
the felony murder theory, the prosecutor told the jurors that to
convict defendant they need only find that a robbery occurred and
that during the robbery an unlawful killing by defendant also
occurred.
Defense counsel argued defendant was not guilty of the
charged offenses for two main reasons. First, the defense
contended Ricky’s identification of defendant as the parking lot
shooter was unreliable due to inconsistencies between his
statement to police, his testimony at the preliminary hearing,
and his trial testimony concerning where he was when the
shooting occurred and the shooter’s clothing, hair style, and
complexion. Second, relying on the testimony of defendant’s
mother and niece, defense counsel asserted his client could not
4
have been the shooter Ricky saw because defendant was at home
at the time of the shooting.
2. Jury instructions
Following closing argument, the trial court instructed the
jury on two theories of first degree murder: deliberate,
premediated, malice murder and felony murder during the course
of a robbery.
The court gave CALJIC No. 8.10 to define murder: “Every
person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought or during the commission or attempted commission
of robbery is guilty of the crime of murder. . . . [¶] In order to
prove such a crime, each of the following elements must be
proved: [¶] 1. A human being was killed. [¶] 2. The killing was
unlawful, and [¶] 3. The killing was done with malice
aforethought or occurred during the commission or attempted
commission of robbery. [¶] A killing is unlawful if it was neither
justifiable nor excusable.”
The court gave CALJIC No. 8.21 to explain first degree
felony murder: “The unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the
commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is
murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific
intent to commit such crime. [¶] The specific intent to commit
robbery and the commission or attempted commission of such
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The trial court also instructed the jury on “unjoined
perpetrators” using CALJIC No. 2.11.5: “There has been
evidence in this case indicating that a person other than
defendant was or may have been involved in the crime for which
5
defendant is on trial. [¶] Do not discuss or give any
consideration to why the other person is not being prosecuted in
this trial or whether [he or she] has been or will be prosecuted.”
The trial court did not instruct the jury on any theory of
accomplice or aider and abettor liability.
3. Verdict
After just three hours of deliberation, the jury found
defendant guilty of first degree murder and second degree
robbery.3 For both crimes, the jury also found true defendant
personally used a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant to
13 years on the robbery conviction and a consecutive term of 25
years to life on the murder conviction.
4. Direct appeal
On appeal, a different division of this court modified
defendant’s sentence but otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Smith (Oct. 31, 1991, B047260) [nonpub. opn.] (Smith
I).) In summarizing the evidence at trial, the Smith I opinion
states: “Ricky Smith, a sixth grader, was walking towards the
parking lot of [the supper club] when he heard a shot. Ricky
looked up to see where the sound came from and saw [defendant]
shoot Gossom.” Although Smith I discussed defendant’s claim
that the trial court erred by not sua sponte giving a jury
instruction that he argued should have been given, it did not
otherwise discuss the trial court’s charge to the jury.
3
The verdict form on the murder charge did not reveal
whether the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder
based on premeditation and deliberation or on felony murder.
6
B. Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
In July 2022, defendant filed a form petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. Defendant also asked
the trial court to appoint counsel to represent him. Attached to
defendant’s petition was a copy of Smith I.
The following month—without appointing counsel for
defendant, considering briefing from any party, or holding a
hearing—the trial court summarily denied the petition. The
court’s minute order states: “In the [Smith I] opinion, the Court
of Appeal summarized the facts at trial. Defendant was
identified as the actual shooter of the victim and the jury
convicted him of first degree murder. As the actual shooter,
defendant is not entitled to resentencing.”
II. DISCUSSION
The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred when it
summarily denied defendant’s petition without first appointing
counsel and in sole reliance on Smith I’s summary of the trial
evidence. The Attorney General argues the errors were
harmless, however, because record of conviction materials other
than the opinion in Smith I establish defendant was Gossom’s
actual killer.
In the procedural posture in which the case now reaches us,
we cannot say the errors, particularly the failure to appoint
counsel, were harmless. We believe there exists a reasonable
possibility appointed counsel for defendant could establish he is
not ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law—for instance,
by emphasizing features of the jury instructions or argument at
trial that indicate defendant was likely convicted on a felony
7
murder theory or even by proffering new evidence casting doubt
on whether defendant was indeed the victim’s actual killer.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [“The prosecutor and the petitioner may
also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens”].)
A. Section 1172.6 Procedure
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
Because section 1172.6 “‘requires legal and factual inquiry
into complex legal theories (felony murder, and natural and
probable consequences) not easily understood by an
unrepresented litigant’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 967), our
Supreme Court in Lewis held a petitioner is “statutorily entitled
to counsel, if requested, upon the filing of a facially sufficient
petition.” (Id. at 957; see also id. at 970 [same].) In Lewis’s
wake, the Legislature amended the statute to codify this holding.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1; see also § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) [“Upon
receiving a petition in which the information required by this
subdivision is set forth or a petition where any missing
information can readily be ascertained by the court, if the
petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel
to represent the petitioner”].)
8
In addition to appointing counsel upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition under section 1172.6, the trial court
must also allow briefing from both sides and hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) In deciding whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing for relief under section
1172.6, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved.”’ [Citations.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at 971.) “[T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly
set very low.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 972)
While appellate opinions are “generally considered to be
part of the record of conviction” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 972),
their usefulness may be limited; as our Supreme Court has
cautioned, “‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might
not supply all answers” (ibid.). At the time of the trial court’s
ruling on defendant’s petition, the Legislature had already
limited a lower court’s consideration of a prior appellate opinion
to “the procedural history of the case cited.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551; People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“If [the factual summary in an appellate
opinion] may not be considered at an evidentiary hearing to
determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we
fail to see how such evidence could establish, as a matter of law, a
petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing at the prima facie
stage”]; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292
[holding that by allowing consideration of “‘the procedural
history”’ in a prior appellate opinion, the Legislature intended to
9
prohibit consideration of “the factual summar[y]” in a prior
appellate opinion].)
If the trial court, after briefing, determines the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) At this
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as
amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) And, as already
mentioned, a defendant (or the prosecution) is entitled to come
forward with new evidence at a hearing held pursuant to an
order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see also People v.
Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85, 96 [“[T]he Legislature provided
that a petitioner may meet his or her burden by offering new or
additional evidence. Therefore, we cannot say at this stage of the
proceedings that failure to appoint counsel was harmless ‘given
the trial evidence’; by the express terms of section 117[2.6],
subdivision (d)(3), counsel is not limited to the trial evidence”].)
B. The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred When It Did Not
Appoint Counsel for Defendant and Relied Solely on
Facts Recited in Smith I to Summarily Deny the
Petition
Defendant filed a facially sufficient petition. He alleged all
the requirements under section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to be
eligible for relief: the prosecution at his trial proceeded under a
theory of felony murder (or other now-invalid theory), he was
convicted of murder, and he could not now be convicted of murder
10
because of the changes the Legislature made to sections 188 and
189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Under Lewis and section 1172.6
as amended, the trial court should have appointed counsel for
defendant. In addition, the trial court erred when it summarily
denied the petition without briefing or a hearing based solely on
Smith I’s summary of the evidence at trial. (People v. Langi
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979 [“In this case, the trial court
treated this court’s opinion in Langi I as conclusively establishing
that the jury found appellant guilty as the actual killer.
Although understandable in view of explicit statements in this
court’s prior opinion, the trial court erred in treating those
statements as conclusive”].)
The trial court’s errors were prejudicial because there is a
reasonable probability appointment of counsel would have made
a difference, i.e., that his petition would not have been denied
without issuance of an order to show cause. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at 973-974 [error in deciding not to appoint counsel is
reviewed for prejudice under the harmless error standard of
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) Defendant’s jury
was instructed on felony murder and the prosecution argued that
theory to the jury. Even looking only to the evidence at
defendant’s trial, there is evidence (multiple gunshots and
testimony from witnesses who saw two men leave the scene of the
murder) from which a factfinder could infer defendant was not
the victim’s actual killer.4 Appointed counsel for defendant would
4
Indeed, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.11.5
because there was evidence of an uncharged perpetrator. Though
we highlight for present purposes the inferences that the trial
evidence might additionally permit, that does not of course cast
doubt on the factual recitation included in Smith I. “[I]t is
11
not be limited to the trial evidence, though; if given a chance to
brief the matter, counsel could proffer additional evidence that
might be introduced at a hearing after issuance of an order to
show cause or attempt to highlight features of the instructions
given to defendant’s jury and explain why they do not foreclose
relief as a matter of law. In short, as this court explained in
Smith, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at page 96, “we cannot say at this
stage of the proceedings that failure to appoint counsel was
harmless ‘given the trial evidence.’”
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to appoint
counsel for defendant and to thereafter proceed consistent with
section 1172.6, subdivisions (c) and (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J. LEE, J.*
axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not
considered.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176.)
*
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
12
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