CourtListener 9968824•People v. Singh
Testo completo
Filed 6/27/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F084642
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF177999A)
v.
JAGJIT SINGH, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua,
Judge.
Linnéa M. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and Kelly E. LeBel,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified
for publication with the exception of part II. of the Discussion.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jagjit Singh was charged and convicted of first degree murder after he
shot his daughter-in-law to death. During defendant’s interview with the police after the
crime, one officer translated the detective’s questions into Punjabi and defendant’s
answers into English. Defendant discussed the details of the shooting and events leading
up to it with the police. At one point, the questioning detective asked defendant if the
shooting was an “honor kill.” The defense at trial was defendant was provoked and he
shot the victim in the heat of passion.
On appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in admitting his statement to police
because it was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)
because a critical component of the warning was lost in the translation process.
Relatedly, he asserts the court should not have concluded he impliedly waived his
Miranda rights because the warnings were legally insufficient. He also contends the
court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury inaccurately regarding provocation, and
his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a pinpoint instruction that explained, to
negate the mental state required for first degree murder, the provocation must be
determined based upon the defendant’s subjective perception of the acts of provocation.
He also contends his interview with police, as translated, infused the trial with implicit
bias in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Pen. Code, § 745 (Racial
Justice Act or RJA)); undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) and
defendant’s due process and fair trial rights. He argues, if the issue was forfeited based
upon a failure to object to the admission of defendant’s interrogation DVD on these
grounds, his counsel was ineffective on this basis.
We affirm.
2.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CHARGES
Defendant was charged with committing first degree murder on August 26, 2019
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1). It was further alleged the murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated (§ 189, subd. (a)) and defendant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury or death to another person, not an
accomplice, during the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
Defendant’s 911 Call and Law Enforcement Response
On August 26, 2019, at 11:27 a.m., defendant called 911 and stated there was an
emergency at his home. The People introduced the audio recording of the call at trial.
The fire department initially responded to the call. They arrived at defendant’s residence
at around 11:35 a.m. Defendant answered the door. He did not appear to be in distress.
Defendant directed them to the back of the house. Fire department captain Michael
Taylor spoke with defendant as another firefighter and engineer went to the back of the
house. The other two individuals returned and told Taylor they found a body. Taylor
went in the room. There was a firearm—a .38-caliber revolver—on top of a table. The
cylinder was open and it had been loaded with five bullets; three out of the five had been
fired as evidenced by spent casings inside. There were seven live rounds of ammunition
next to the gun on the table. Defendant’s daughter-in-law, Sumandeep Kooner (Simi),
was on the couch and she had gunshot wounds to her mouth, neck, and shoulder. It was
later determined she was missing two teeth and the teeth were found on the scene. A
cellular phone was located on her left arm. After the body was removed, police found a
hole in the couch where they located a copper projectile.
Defendant said, “‘I shoot,’” and he put his hand in his pocket and pulled out a
handful of bullets, which he gave to Taylor. Taylor patted down defendant. Then,
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defendant sat down and watched television; he was calm. They waited for the police
department to arrive.
Multiple officers arrived at the scene. Officer Gilbert Rodriguez detained
defendant in the entryway of the home. He eventually accompanied defendant outside
and defendant was transported to Kern Medical Center by ambulance for high blood
sugar. As defendant was getting into the ambulance, Rodriguez noticed “very small, red
drops on the front of his shirt.” A photograph of defendant’s shirt was introduced at trial.
Defendant’s wife, B.K., was found in the backyard of the house.
Defendant’s Arrest and Statements to Police
Sergeant Rob Robles interviewed defendant at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the day
of the shooting. Officer Charanjit Singh was asked to translate during Detective Robles’s
interview of defendant. The interview was audio- and video-recorded and the
prosecution played it for the jury.
During the interview, when asked to slowly explain what happened, defendant
began by giving a “little history.” He stated his daughter-in-law, Simi, “had made some
relations” with, and was talking on the phone to, a boy from India who had moved to
England. Simi kept calling the boy and had made plans to leave her husband and their
children. Simi stated her suitcases were ready and she was getting an apartment.
Defendant learned of her plans because he heard her talking on the phone when they
returned home from temple the day before. Simi was talking loudly, assuming no one
was home. Defendant also found out the man Simi was talking to was not of good
character. Defendant tried to explain to Simi that she had a beautiful family, two kids, a
job, a husband that worked, defendant and his wife, and she should not ruin her home;
“[e]verything is good.”
Simi got mad at defendant and told him not to give her advice. She told him she
would pull off his beard and “shove it up [his] ass.” Defendant got mad and begged her
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to stop; he touched her feet, which meant asking for forgiveness. She did not
acknowledge him touching her feet. Defendant then got a gun from his room and put it in
the pocket of his pants. When he returned, Simi told defendant she was going to rip off
her clothes, call the police, and tell them he tried to sexually assault her. She began to rip
her clothes and picked up her phone. Defendant got angry that Simi was about to expose
her chest, explaining “a father will never see his daughter naked.” He then shot and
killed her. He fired the first shot when he was standing behind Simi and she was sitting
on the sofa; he aimed at her neck. He walked around the sofa and then shot her twice
from the front. Then, he put the gun on the table and called law enforcement. He stated
he knew he had done something wrong and would accept whatever the court decides.
During the interview, Detective Robles asked defendant if Simi “dishonor[ed]
him.” Defendant responded that she disrespected him about his beard and, when she
started pulling off her shirt, it is like a daughter doing that in front of her father, which is
“a shame” and “the father will either shoot himself or her.” At that point, Detective
Robles asked defendant if it was “an honor kill.” The following exchange, including
Officer Singh’s translations, then took place:
“OFC. SINGH: Honor, or you can for your honor … for your
dignity…
“[DEFENDANT]: Honor is also in danger.
“OFC. SINGH: Yes.
“[DEFENDANT]: Because I was also…
“OFC. SINGH: I did it for my honor.”
At the end of the interview, when asked by the officers how he was treated during
the interview, defendant responded that they did “very well.”
5.
Other Trial Evidence
At trial, defendant’s wife B.K. testified, in the morning of August 26, 2019, she
went outside to cook on the outdoor stove; defendant was watching television in the
house when she left. At some point, B.K. fainted. When she awoke, the police had taken
her inside. She denied hearing anything while she was outside, but later admitted, on the
day of the shooting, she reported to police she had heard a loud popping sound that
sounded like a firecracker.
B.K. testified she and defendant have three daughters and one son. Defendant and
B.K. lived with their son, G.K., and his family. G.K. was married to the victim, Simi.
G.K and Simi had a daughter, D., who was 13 years old at the time of the trial, and a son,
V., who was 10 years old at the time of the trial.
B.K. testified she viewed defendant as the leader of the house even though it was
G.K.’s and Simi’s home. B.K. had a good relationship with G.K. and they did not fight.
B.K. met Simi in 2008 and, initially, they had a good relationship, too. B.K. denied
seeing G.K. and Simi argue, but eventually testified they started arguing about a year
before Simi’s death and it slowly increased. Simi started using profanity toward
defendant, B.K., G.K., and her children, and she “used to beat up the children.” B.K.
testified, starting about three months prior to her death, Simi used to pull B.K.’s hair out.
Simi was on the phone more in the month leading up to her death talking to a man who
was not her husband. Simi’s demeanor also changed in the year leading up to her death.
She changed the way she and the children dressed and she cut her own hair and the
children’s hair, though as Sikhs they did not believe in cutting hair. It was hard for
defendant and B.K. to take the children to the temple after Simi cut their hair. Eventually,
Simi would not allow the children to go to the temple and would take them away when
B.K. was praying. She would blow out a religious candle defendant and B.K. would light
in their prayer room each morning and turn off their religious hymns. Simi would also
lock the door to her room so G.K. would have to sleep on the sofa.
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B.K. testified they had a pistol lying around the house, but when the “problems”
started, defendant told her they should not keep it there because “she would use it on us.”
B.K. also stated she “used to hide the gun” because she was worried defendant, G.K., or
Simi would get angry and use it. During an interview with Detective Robles after the
shooting, B.K. reported that defendant had threatened to slap Simi during the four to five
months before the shooting if she did not “stay quiet.” B.K. never mentioned Simi had
been physically abusive to anyone in the family in the past.
At trial, G.K. testified his relationship with Simi also changed approximately five
to six months before her death. It got worse approximately one month before her death;
Simi would not speak to G.K. or let him into their room to sleep. Simi would fight “too
much” about “small, little things in the house.” She would “always be on the phone,”
and she told G.K. in front of their children that “she was talking to her boyfriend.” She
would talk on the phone about leaving and she personally told G.K. that she was going to
leave because she had a boyfriend. In the five or six months leading up to the shooting,
Simi started insulting B.K. and defendant. She told G.K. to kick them out of the house.
G.K. denied being in the house when Simi was killed and he denied killing her.
He testified he took the children to school that morning, returned home to finish his tea,
and then he left again. Simi was sleeping still when he left for the second time.
The coroner who evaluated Simi’s body observed three through-and-through
gunshot wounds. The first traveled through the neck bone and part of the spinal cord.
There was no evidence the tip of the barrel of the gun was closer than about 18 inches
based upon the lack of soot and stippling. Simi’s upper central jaw was severely
fractured as a result of an exiting projectile. The second gunshot wound went through the
neck, throat, and spinal cord. There was a muzzle stamp on the surface of the skin but
there was no stippling present, which suggested the tip of the barrel of the gun was
against the skin surface, so the projectile, hot gunpowder, and soot all went into the
wound. The third gunshot entered just below the second and it also traveled through the
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throat and the spine in the neck and exited out of the upper back; it had a “bit [of a ]
downward” trajectory. Based on the soot around the muzzle stamp, the tip of the barrel
of the gun did not appear to have been “as tightly pressed into the skin for [gunshot
wound] number three.” All the gunshot wounds were lethal and would have resulted in
death within seconds. The “manner of death” was determined to be homicide and the
“cause of death” was listed as “multiple gunshot wounds.”
The trigger of the firearm was found to have DNA from a single female source,
and the grip was found to have a mixture of DNA from at least three people. Simi could
not be excluded as a potential contributor to the DNA profile obtained from the firearm’s
trigger; B.K., G.K., and defendant were all excluded as potential contributors. The
trigger is not usually an area where a lot of DNA is found because it is a small area and it
is smooth, so there is less friction. Defendant, G.K., and Simi could not be excluded as
potential contributors to the DNA profile obtained from the firearm’s grip and Simi could
not be excluded from the major portion of the DNA profile obtained from the firearm’s
grip. Simi could also not be excluded as a contributor to DNA obtained from the shirt
with blood droplets on it.
DEFENSE EVIDENCE
Harvinder Singh Bhullar testified regarding defendant’s character, stating
defendant is peaceful and helpful. They had known each other since 1993 when they met
at temple and they interacted both socially and religiously. Bhullar testified defendant is
Amritdhari, which refers to a particular group among Sikhs.
Before trial, the court held retained defense witness Dr. Laljit Sidhu qualified as an
expert on Punjabi culture and the Sikh religion and that his testimony was relevant “for
the jurors to have a better understanding of the overall circumstances in which the
defendant found himself.” At trial, Dr. Sidhu testified he has a doctorate in psychology
and a background in clinical psychology. He was born in India and identifies as Sikh.
He testified he grew up in a relatively traditional Indian family, was immersed in the
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culture, went to temple, and is fluent in the language. Additionally, as a professional
psychologist he is required to understand “cross-cultural issues,” and he has focused on
how Indian populations engage in offending.
Dr. Sidhu testified Punjab is a rural agrarian area in India similar to California’s
Central Valley. As a result, it “tends to be a very collectivist culture,” unlike Western
societies in which individuality is paramount. In collectivist cultures, the notion of
reputation and status is extremely important. Punjabi culture is a “culture of honor in the
sense that when a person is engaging with other people, … their reputation is what
defines how that relationship is going to go.” “So it becomes extremely important in
these types of cultures for a person to maintain that reputation, to maintain that status, to
avoid anything that would reduce their reputation, that would be dishonorable to them or
would somehow reduce their status.” And the behaviors of an individual person within a
family inherently reflect on the family more broadly. Punjabi culture also tends to be
very patriarchal and hierarchical; males tend to be dominant, in a position of
decisionmaking and power. Gender norms are fairly well established and elders are given
more power and respect. Households are typically multigenerational. When older sons
marry, their wives move into the household with the son and parents.
Dr. Sidhu explained the five symbols or K’s of Sikhism—a special cotton
undergarment, a comb to maintain your hair and beard, a steel bracelet, a ceremonial
sword, and the rejection of cutting hair. Dr. Sidhu testified, when a person cuts his or her
hair, it is an act of sacrilege because the beard and the hair are deeply intertwined with the
faith itself. He explained, a threat to cut off a Sikh person’s beard is significant and
offensive. Amritdhari is a specific group of Sikhs who are more devout in following the
tenets, morals, and strictures of the faith.
D., the daughter of Simi and G.K., also testified on behalf of the defense. She was
10 years old when her mother died. D. testified she noticed a change in her mother at
some point in the year before her death. She also noticed her parents were fighting more
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frequently; her mother would yell at her father “[a] lot,” “probably every single day.” D.
overheard a conversation between her mother and someone on the phone and learned her
mother was having a relationship. Simi would “talk to him a lot.” Simi would lock
herself in a room and not let G.K. in. D. testified she did not get along well with her
mother. Shortly before her death, Simi would speak “really bad about” D. and hit her. D.
observed Simi yelling at her grandparents—defendant and B.K. Simi did not want D. to
practice religion and she asked D. to cut her hair.
VERDICT
Following the presentation of evidence, the jury convicted defendant of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that the crime was done with
premeditation and deliberation within the meaning of section 189 and defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in violation of section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) and he personally used a firearm withing the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found true the following aggravating
factors: defendant committed a crime that involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
or callousness, within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court; he
was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the crime, within the meaning of
rule 4.421(a)(2); and the victim was particularly vulnerable within the meaning of
rule 4.421(a)(3). The jury could not reach a unanimous decision as to the allegation that
defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense
within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(11), so a mistrial was declared as to that allegation.
The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life enhanced by 10 years pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
10.
DISCUSSION
Defendant now raises multiple challenges to his convictions. For the reasons that
follow, we reject each contention in turn.
I. Alleged Miranda Violation
Defendant first contends the trial court erred in admitting his statements to police
which he alleges were taken in violation of Miranda. We disagree.
A. Relevant Procedural History
As discussed, police conducted a recorded interview with defendant on August 26,
2019, during which Detective Robles questioned defendant and Officer Singh served as a
translator. At the outset of the interview, Officer Singh told defendant in Punjabi (as
translated in the stipulated transcript), “we will tell you a little bit about your rights,
whenever we have to question anybody, it is important for us to tell this, if we have to do
question answers then we have to tell this. It is important from the government side to do
this. Do you understand?” Defendant can be seen in the video recording nodding and
making an audible sound in response. The following exchange then took place as
detailed in the stipulated transcript:
“DET. ROBLES: So I would talk to you a little bit about what’s going
on but before we do so, I do need you to specify his rights.
“OFC. SINGH: We want to ask you about what happened but before
that it is important for us to tell you this. OK?
“DET. ROBLES: You have the right to remain silent. Do you
understand?
“OFC. SINGH: If you want to remain silent then you do not have to
speak. Do you understand what I have just told you? Did you understand
it?
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
“DET. ROBLES: Anything you say may be used against you in court;
you understand?
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“OFC SINGH: Whatever statement you give us, it is your statement
and we can use it in court whenever there is the court date. Do you
understand?
“DET. ROBLES: You have a right to have a presence of an attorney
before answering the questions. Do you understand?
“OFC SINGH: Whenever we have questions and answers from you,
you can bring an attorney if you want. Do you understand?
“DET. ROBLES: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you, free of charge, for any questioning if you want. Do you
understand?
“OFC. SINGH: If you cannot hire an attorney, if you do not have the
money to do it then the government will provide you with an attorney if
you like, for this question-and-answer session. Do you understand?
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes, it is alright.”
Defendant can be seen in the video nodding in response to Officer Singh’s
statements.
Detective Robles then proceeded to interview defendant regarding the shooting.
As detailed, defendant admitted to shooting Simi during the interview and he explained
the circumstances surrounding the shooting. Before trial, defense counsel requested an
evidentiary hearing regarding statements defendant made in the interview with police, to
firefighters, and/or in the 911 call. Defense counsel also moved in limine to suppress
defendant’s statements to detectives on the grounds defendant did not sufficiently waive
his Miranda rights.
The court conducted an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Before the hearing,
the parties stipulated “that in terms of the Miranda portion of the interview that the
translation is indeed correct.” Officer Singh affirmed he was the translator/interpreter
during Detective Robles’s interview with defendant. To Officer Singh’s knowledge,
defendant was not under arrest at that time; they were still investigating and had not told
defendant he may be charged with murder.
12.
During the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Officer Singh testified he was born
in India and could read, write, and speak in Punjabi. He was certified through the
Bakersfield Police Department to translate Punjabi interviews. He was not aware of there
being a Miranda card in Punjabi. Singh testified, in the Punjabi language “[e]ach
individual has to be advised of Miranda in a different way. As [defendant], he’s an older
individual, I would have to explain it to him in a different way as I would if someone was
25 to 30 years old.” He explained this is because, from his experience, the majority of
the older Indian community members “have not gone to any school so you have to
explain it to them a certain way than versus … an individual who is 25 to 35 years old
now, they would understand … what I mean when I say ‘court,’ instead of a person that’s
never been to school, it would be kind of hard to explain it to them ….” He also
explained that some things cannot be translated verbatim but must be explained “in
context.” Officer Singh testified, he had small talk with defendant before reading him his
Miranda rights and asked him if he wanted water. It appeared to Officer Singh that
defendant understood the questions being asked and his explanation of the Miranda
rights. Defendant “acknowledged the first question and gave … nods on the follow-up
two questions, and on the third one he actually said he understood.” Officer Singh
testified that nodding is a common way of saying “‘yes’” in the Punjabi language. After
being read his rights, defendant told the police about the incident and responded to their
questions. He never stopped the 48-minute interview, asked for an attorney, or said he
did not want to talk anymore.
When defense counsel asked Officer Singh why his translation “le[ft] out the
portion that his statements can be used against him,” Officer Singh responded that “[i]f
you translate it properly, just saying ‘Your statement can be used against you,’ … [i]it
doesn’t make any sense.” Rather, he put the phrase “in a context that [defendant] would
understand.” Defense counsel asked Officer Singh why he did not use particular
language stated in Punjabi to convey the statement. Officer Singh responded that he
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understood the Punjabi statement made by defense counsel to mean, “your statement can
be overturned,” “your statement can be manipulated,” “basically saying we can use your
statement, manipulate it, and turn it against you,” and it would not make sense.
In arguing for the admissibility of defendant’s statement, the prosecutor asserted
“there are no magic words for Miranda advisal. All that is required is that it was a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.” She argued defendant nodded his head,
which Officer Singh testified is a common way to say “‘yes’” in Punjabi culture, or
defendant verbally said he understood when Officer Singh was translating each of the
Miranda rights. Then, defendant’s willingness to talk and to keep talking about the
incident for 44 minutes implied “he waived those rights and wanted to speak to the
officers about the incident that occurred.”
Defendant’s counsel asserted two arguments:
“First is the inadequacy of the Miranda, and, second, that the Miranda
waiver was not done intelligently and knowingly.
“The primary issue … is that Detective Robles states any statement
may be used against him in a court of law, and … Officer Singh translates
that portion of the Miranda statement by saying ‘Whatever statement you
give us, it is your statement, and we can use it in court whenever there is
the court date.’
“I understand that there are no magic words, … but the question is in
what manner is it going to be used? Is it going to be used against
[defendant]? Is it going to be used for him? Is it going to be used to reduce
his bail?
“[Defendant] gave up his rights, but was unaware of the extent of
what his statements were going to be used for, and it’s the defense’s opinion
that when Detective Robles says anything you say can and will be used
against you, the primary purpose of that statement is to apprise the
defendant that it will be used against him. That wasn’t done here.
“Moving on to the second argument, that it was done knowingly and
intelligently, … if you look at the totality of the circumstances, … he was
unaware of the extent to which the statements were going to be used.
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“As Officer Singh had stated …, he has to … provide more context
for elderly people because they have some lack of education. They
immigrated to this country later. [¶] In this instance, [defendant] did
immigrate to the country later. He has very little … understanding of the
legal system …. And taking all of those things into account, … [defendant]
… did not give up his rights knowingly and intelligently ….” (Italics
added.)
The court held defendant’s statement was not taken in violation of Miranda and
was admissible during the trial. It found:
“[W]hile the defendant participated in the interview, he was in
custody, and, on that basis, before participating in an interview or an
interrogation, he has the right to be informed of the Miranda advisal, as
they are, as stated previously, prophylactic rights. [¶] It does appear to the
Court early on in the interview, and certainly before anything substantive in
nature was obtained, that the Miranda advisal was provided to the
defendant.
“It appears further that Sergeant Robles read all of the rights that we
are accustomed to in English, and based on Officer Singh’s testimony, they
were translated—at least the meaning of those rights were translated so that
the defendant can appreciate the rights that were provided. [¶] When
considering the translations, the Court does accept the representations in the
transcript consistent with the stipulation entered into by both parties. [¶]
The Court also considers the totality of the circumstances, including Officer
Singh’s reasons for why he did not utilize a technical translation, because,
in his mind, as testified to, they would not have made sense to the
defendant. So he used his best efforts, arguably, to explain the rights that
were afforded to him in a manner in which the defendant would understand.
“During the course of the interview, it appears to the Court, based on
the colloquy established between the defendant, Officer Singh, and
Sergeant Robles, that there did not appear to be any struggling or confusion
as to what was being asked or what was being translated. [¶] The
communication during the course of the interview did appear to the Court,
as an objective observer, that Officer Singh and the defendant were able to
communicate effectively with one another.
“To a certain extent, the statements attributable to the defendant as a
declarant, throughout this interview, does satisfy Evidence Code
Section 1220, and, on that basis, those statements are admissible for the
truth of the matter asserted therein. [¶] The statements attributable to
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Officer Singh and to Sergeant Robles, however, are not admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted, but are only relevant in establishing meaning
and understanding to the defendant’s statements themselves. That is
important when coming back to the Miranda advisal, which was provided
early on in the exchange.
“Officer Singh translated ‘You have the right to remain silent’ as ‘If
you want to remain silent, then you do not have to speak.’ That, in this
Court’s view, is a sufficient translation to explain to the defendant that he
has a right to remain silent; that he does not have to speak if he chooses not
to.
“Sergeant Robles then stated, ‘Anything you say may be used
against you in court.’ Officer Singh’s translation, again to enable the
defendant to fully understand and appreciate this right, translates ‘Whatever
statement you give to us, it is your statement, and we can use it in court
whenever there is the court date.’
“The purpose for the statement attributable to Sergeant Robles about
‘Anything you say may be used against you in court’ is important because it
allows the suspect to understand that whatever he tells law enforcement
officers very well may be introduced in a formal setting, such as a
courtroom, in later proceedings. [¶] The statement as translated by Officer
Singh certainly does make the same exact point as what is required under
Miranda vs. Arizona, ‘Whatever statement you give us, it is your statement,
and we can use it in court whenever there is the court date.’
“In this Court’s view, while it is not a direct or technical translation
of what Sergeant Robles stated, it certainly does capture the same meaning
and importance as incapsulated [sic] in that particular right, and for
purposes of an advisal, the Court finds that Officer Singh’s translation, as it
relates to the meaning necessary to be conveyed, was sufficient to enable
the defendant to understand that whatever statements the defendant makes
to law enforcement at that time could be used in court whenever there is a
court date. [¶] … [¶]
“Miranda vs. Arizona does not contain a script, so to speak, that
requires law enforcement to stick to a particular script involving language
that has been approved to use and work as a proper advisal. [¶] Miranda
vs. Arizona does articulate those rights that are afforded individuals, such as
the right to remain silent, as well as the right to have the presence of an
attorney during any questioning, and affords law enforcement agencies
enough latitude to be able to individually determine what language is best
to use for those particular communities and their particular jurisdictions.
16.
“In this particular case, it is no different. While the Bakersfield
Police Department does have a Miranda card—that is, a card that
articulates for their law enforcement officers particular questions to ask
suspects before interrogations begin if the suspect is in custody—it
certainly is not one that is mandatory; that is, the language contained within
the Bakersfield Police Department Miranda-issued card, while approved in
some level and certainly does qualify for what is mandated and required by
Miranda vs. Arizona, is not the only way and manner in which the advisal
can be provided.
“For that reason, the Court recognizes that Officer Singh, being in a
position to translate English into Punjabi, as well as the experience that
Officer Singh has in the Punjabi language, could afford some latitude to
make sure that the suspect—in this case, the defendant, in particular—
would be in a position to understand those rights that are afforded to him,
just as they are afforded to all others.
“On that basis, it does appear to the Court that Officer Singh’s
translation, wherein he testified that he was translating the meaning of what
was being asked to the defendant so that the defendant could understand his
rights, does satisfy the Miranda vs. Arizona obligation, and, for that reason,
the Court will find that the Miranda advisal was appropriately provided to
the defendant during the course of this interview.
“In determining whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
thereafter voluntarily waived his rights, the Court does look at the totality
of the circumstances. [¶] It does appear that the defendant at times nodded
his head in reference to questions ‘Do you understand?’ It further appears
at times that the defendant audibly answered affirmatively, ‘Yes, it is all
right,’ and so forth. [¶] To that, the Court does find that whenever the right
was provided to the defendant in the manner in which Officer Singh elected
to explain the meaning of the right, it does appear, based on the totality of
the circumstances, that the defendant understood his rights. There were no
questions involving ambiguity, at least in the translation, and the Court,
based on the totality of the circumstances, will find that the defendant
understood the rights that were provided to him through Officer Singh.
“In determining whether the defendant waived his rights, while it
might be easiest if there was a written waiver, which would act as an
express waiver, courts have found that dependent upon the continued
participation of the suspect during the course of the interview, one can find
that the suspect impliedly waived his rights. [¶] … [¶]
17.
“[B]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the Court will find that
the defendant impliedly waived his rights by continuing to participate in the
interrogation with Sergeant Robles and Officer Singh. [¶] For those
reasons, the Court will find that the defendant did knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive his rights and thereafter participated in an interview
with law enforcement.
“As the proponent of this information, [Prosecutor], the Court will
find that the defendant’s interview, as played in this courtroom, is
admissible during your case-in-chief.” (Italics added.)
B. Standard of Review
In Miranda, the Supreme Court formulated a warning that must be given to
suspects before they can be subjected to custodial interrogation. Accordingly, a suspect
in custody must be advised as follows: “He must be warned prior to any questioning that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479.)
When reviewing a ruling admitting a confession, we accept the trial court’s
resolution of any factual dispute to the extent the record supports it, but otherwise we
determine independently whether the confession was taken in violation of the rules of
Miranda or was involuntary. (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551.) On both
questions, the People bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Ibid.) Similarly, we review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress a
statement under Miranda. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730.)
C. Applicable Law
1. Adequacy of Miranda Warnings
“The four warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but [the United States
Supreme] Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be
conveyed.” (Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50, 60; accord, California v. Prysock
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(1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359 (per curiam) (Prysock) [“This Court has never indicated that
the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a
criminal defendant.”]; accord, People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 159 [“The high
court has ‘never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in
that decision.’”].) “In determining whether police officers adequately conveyed the four
warnings, … reviewing courts are not required to examine the words employed ‘as if
construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the
warnings reasonably “conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.”’”
(Florida v. Powell, supra, at p. 60; accord, Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 203
(Duckworth); Prysock, supra, at p. 361; People v. Suarez, supra, at p. 159; People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 830.)
In People v. Bradford (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 843 (Bradford), the appellate court
reversed the defendant’s convictions of second degree murder and other offenses after
concluding his statement to police should have been suppressed because he received
inadequate Miranda warnings and he was harmed by the statement’s admission. (Id. at
pp. 845–846.) Specifically, it was undisputed in Bradford that the detectives failed to
advise the defendant that his statement could be used against him in court before the
defendant confessed to his involvement in the crimes. (Id. at p. 850.) The Bradford court
rejected the People’s assertion that defendant’s comments during the interrogation,
including his reference to incriminating himself, showed he was aware his statements
could be used later, despite the failure of the detectives to so advise him. (Id. at pp. 850–
851.) The Bradford court reasoned, Miranda “repeatedly characterizes informing a
suspect of each of the four warnings as an ‘absolute prerequisite’ to the admission in
court of the suspect’s statements to police. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 471,
476, italics added.)” (Bradford, supra, at p. 851.) Bradford quoted Miranda’s
explanation that, because “‘[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our
system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the
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availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases
whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his
age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than
speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.’ (Miranda, at pp. 468–469, fn. omitted.)”
(Bradford, supra, at p. 851.)
The Bradford court discussed Miranda’s explanation of the purpose of the
required omitted warning that “anything said during the interrogation can and will be
used against the suspect in court.” (Bradford, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.)
“‘[T]his warning is needed in order to make [the suspect] aware not only of the privilege,
but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these
consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent
exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more
acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system—that he is not in the
presence of persons acting solely in his interest.’ (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 469.)”
(Ibid.)
The Bradford court concluded, “Because the detectives failed to give [the]
defendant one of the four required Miranda warnings, his confession was inadmissible in
the prosecution’s case-in-chief.” (Bradford, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 854, fn.
omitted.) In so holding, it distinguished cases in which all four Miranda warnings were
given, albeit imperfectly, in which courts permitted some latitude in the administering of
the warnings and, at times, examined the record to determine whether the defendant
understood the Miranda advisements after finding some form of each warning was given.
(Bradford, supra, at pp. 852–853 [discussing Duckworth, supra, 492 U.S. 195, People v.
Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th 795, and People v. Nitschmann (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 677].)
The Bradford court explained “[t]he evidence of understanding was therefore used not as
20.
a substitute for one of the four warnings, but rather to demonstrate that the defendant
properly understood an arguably imperfect warning.” (Bradford, supra, at p. 853.)
The Bradford court could not conclude the admission of the defendant’s statement
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reasoning it was “beyond doubt that [the]
defendant was the killer,” but “evidence of his mental state at the time of the shooting
[was] less clear cut.” (Bradford, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.) And the defendant’s
confession was used by the prosecution for the specific purpose of removing doubts
about his mental state, namely, he did not act in imperfect self-defense or in the heat of
passion, and “[a] confession is uniquely powerful evidence.” (Id. at p. 855.)
Accordingly, its admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and mandated
reversal of the defendant’s convictions. (Ibid.)
In Duckworth, the defendant was advised: “‘Before we ask you any questions,
you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
can be used against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before
we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this
right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We
have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and
when you to go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present,
you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to
stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a lawyer.’” (Duckworth, supra, 492
U.S. at p. 198.) The Duckworth court held the defendant’s statement about the crime
given after these warnings was admissible because the warnings given “touched all of the
bases required by Miranda” (id. at p. 203) and, “in their totality, satisfied Miranda” (id.
at p. 205). In so holding, the Duckworth court rejected the argument the given warnings
were insufficient in light of the statement, “We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but
one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you to go to court.” (Id. at p. 198,
italics omitted.) The court reasoned the referenced statement was accurate in that, under
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Indiana law, counsel is appointed at the defendant’s initial appearance in court and
Miranda does not require attorneys producible on call. (Id. at p. 204.) Rather, the
suspect must only be informed, as the defendant was, that he had the right to an attorney
before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he
could not afford one. (Ibid.)
2. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
“Miranda makes clear that in order for [the] defendant’s statements to be
admissible against him, he must have knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights to remain silent, and to the presence and assistance of counsel.
[Citation.] [¶] It is further settled, however, that a suspect who desires to
waive his Miranda rights and submit to interrogation by law enforcement
authorities need not do so with any particular words or phrases. A valid
waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the
suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in
the Miranda decision. [Citation.] We have recognized that a valid waiver
of Miranda rights may be express or implied.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44
Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).)
“[U]ltimately the question becomes whether the Miranda waiver was knowing and
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” (Cruz,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 668.) This means relinquishment of the right must have been
voluntary—it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception—and it must have been made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.
(People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 247; accord, Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475
U.S. 412, 421.) “‘Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights
was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and
that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the
analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.’” (People v. Whitson,
supra, at p. 247, quoting Moran v. Burbine, supra, at pp. 422–423, fn. omitted.)
22.
Important to the present case, “[a] suspect’s expressed willingness to answer
questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself
been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights.” (Cruz, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 667; accord, People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 752; People v. Sully
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1233.) This principle has been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court, which explained: “Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning
was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement
establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” (Berghuis v. Thompkins
(2010) 560 U.S. 370, 384–385 [finding implied waiver of Miranda rights].)
D. Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional
privileges against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15)
when it denied his motion to suppress the recording of his confession to police.
1. The Given Advisements Reasonably Conveyed the Rights Under
Miranda
First, he asserts the Miranda warnings as translated in Punjabi did not reasonably
convey the meaning of Miranda. He contends Officer Singh’s translation did not convey
to defendant that his statements could be used “against him” at trial. So it failed to
capture the meaning of the consequence of defendant’s failure to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, making the warnings “legally insufficient.”
Here, Officer Singh translated all of the Miranda warnings, including the
statement, “[a]nything you say may be used against you in court,” to “Whatever
statement you give us, it is your statement and we can use it in court whenever there is
the court date.” Thus, the given advisements did not “‘entirely omi[t]’ … any
information Miranda required [the detectives] to impart,” as was the case in Bradford.
(Florida v. Powell, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 62; see Bradford, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at
p. 854.) Rather, the “essential inquiry” here is “whether the warnings reasonably
23.
‘“[c]onvey[ed] to [defendant] his rights as required by Miranda.”’” (People v. Wash
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 236–237; accord, Duckworth, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 203.)
Based upon our independent review of the record, we conclude the given
advisements adequately conveyed to defendant his rights as required by Miranda. Said
differently, though Officer Singh’s translation did not include the term “against,” the
given warning sufficiently captured the meaning of the warning.
Initially, the trial court considered Officer Singh’s “reasons for why he did not
utilize a technical translation, because, in his mind, as testified to, they would not have
made sense to the defendant.” Accordingly, the court concluded Officer Singh “used his
best efforts, arguably, to explain the rights that were afforded to him in a manner in which
the defendant would understand,” and it appeared “Officer Singh and the defendant were
able to communicate effectively with one another.” The record supports the trial court’s
finding. That is, Officer Singh is a certified Punjabi translator and he testified he tailored
his translation to most effectively communicate with defendant. He also testified a literal
translation of the challenged warning would not have made sense in context; rather, he
translated the phrase using language that would convey the meaning. When posed with
an alternate suggested translation by defense counsel, Officer Singh explained that he
interpreted the proposed language as inaccurate in that it meant any statement given by
defendant could be “manipulated.” Significantly, the defense did not present any
evidence to contradict Officer Singh’s testimony or to establish there was a more
technically accurate translation that could have been utilized in Punjabi.
And the given advisement sufficiently conveyed to defendant the consequence of
forgoing the right to remain silent and speaking to the police by stating that law
enforcement could use defendant’s statements in court when there is a court date. (See
United States v. Pacheco (D.Utah 2011) 819 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1241, 1245 [concluding
advisement to the defendant, “Anything you tell me, I am going to put in the police
report. That police report can be used in a court of law at a later date and time if need
24.
be,” sufficiently warned the defendant of his rights and potential consequences of
speaking]; State v. Messino (2005) 378 N.J. Super.Ct. 559, 577 [finding Miranda
advisement adequate where the “defendant was told that his statements could be used in a
court of law, which in substance informed [the] defendant that his statements could be
used against him”]; see also United States v. Crumpton (6th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 593, 606
[“[U]se of the term ‘in court’ certainly helps to ensure a suspect’s awareness of both the
‘consequences of forgoing’ the privilege against self-incrimination and the fact ‘that he is
faced with a phase of the adversary system,’ [citation], but it is not the only way to do
so.”].) Nothing in Officer Singh’s translated statement suggested defendant’s statement
could only be used for a limited purpose, such as only on defendant’s behalf or in a
particular proceeding. Rather, on its face, the statement provided for broad use of
defendant’s statement in court by law enforcement, which included against defendant.
(See generally Prysock, supra, 453 U.S. at pp. 360–361 [concluding given warnings that
the defendant was entitled to speak to lawyer before being questioned and during
questioning and that the defendant had right to appointed counsel at no cost adequately
conveyed his right to appointed lawyer if he could not afford one prior to and during
interrogation, noting “nothing in the warnings given [the] respondent suggested any
limitation on the right to the presence of appointed counsel”]; see generally People v.
Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 236–237 [concluding advisement, “‘you have the right to
have an attorney present before any questioning if you wish one,’” reasonably conveyed
defendant’s right to have attorney present during questioning though it deviated from
standard form by failing to expressly state defendant had right to counsel both before and
during questioning; rejecting argument language was so ambiguous or confusing as to
lead defendant to believe counsel would be provided before questioning and removed
once questioning began].) Accordingly, we conclude the warning as translated
reasonably conveyed to defendant that anything he said could be used against him in a
court of law.
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The record further supports a conclusion defendant understood the consequences
of speaking. During the interview, after explaining the circumstances of the shooting,
defendant stated he knew he was going to go to jail. When asked during the interview
what he believed should happen to him legally, defendant answered that whatever the
court decided would be acceptable to him. Thus, defendant was aware at the time of the
interview that he would be involved in adversarial court proceedings during which his
punishment would be assessed. And such evidence supports our conclusion “that the
defendant properly understood an arguably imperfect warning,” that his statement could
be used by law enforcement in court. (See Bradford, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.)
2. Defendant Voluntarily and Knowingly Waived His Rights
Defendant also contends the totality of the circumstances does not establish he
impliedly waived his Miranda rights. He argues the trial court found an “‘implied
waiver’” based upon defendant’s nodding of his head “to a legally insufficient
explanation of the consequence of failing to remain silent.” Defendant asserts the
prosecution failed to show his education level, whether he had experience with the
California legal system, or that he was knowledgeable of the California and United States
Constitutions. He contends, “Officer Singh gave no testimony about [defendant’s]
educational background, other than what he inferred from [defendant’s] age.” He asserts
his nod coupled with the “insufficiency of the warning translated into Punjabi” based on
the lack of advisement that his statement could be used against him, rendered the
Miranda warnings legally inadequate. He also contends, as in Bradford, we should
conclude the interrogation violated Miranda and it should have been inadmissible.
After conducting an independent review of the record, we conclude the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals defendant made an uncoerced
choice to voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights when he continued to
speak with detectives after he was informed of his Miranda rights and acknowledged his
understanding. Initially, as discussed ante, we conclude defendant was adequately
26.
advised of his rights under Miranda. Furthermore, “‘[o]n review of a trial court’s
decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if
supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged
statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.’” (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1234, 1269.) And here, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant appeared to understand those rights and that he impliedly waived them. As
defendant acknowledges, the audio- and videotaped recording of the interview reflects he
verbally confirmed he understood he had the right to remain silent and that an attorney
could be appointed to him if he could not afford one. And he nodded affirmatively in
response to the advisements that he had the right to an attorney and that law enforcement
could use his statement in court, when these rights were explained to him. Additionally,
Officer Singh expressly testified nodding is a common way of saying “‘yes’” in Punjabi.
After the advisements were given, defendant discussed the shooting at length. His
answers were responsive to the questions, evidencing his understanding and that the
parties were effectively communicating with each other. Defendant never asked for an
attorney, stated he did not want to speak to the police, or otherwise expressed a desire to
end the interview. Defendant did not present any evidence of mental or other
impairments at the suppression hearing nor does he point to anything else in the record,
other than the advisements we have already held to be adequate, that would have raised
questions about his ability to understand his rights as they were explained to him.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant’s willingness to
answer questions after acknowledging his understanding of his Miranda rights
constituted an implied waiver of such rights and the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
(See People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 932; accord, Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
pp. 667–669.)
Accordingly, the People met their burden of proving defendant understood his
rights, and he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights when he provided an
27.
uncoerced statement to police. (See Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 668–669 [“[The]
defendant’s responses to [the detective’s] inquiries reciting his Miranda rights reflect a
knowing and intelligent understanding of those rights, and [the] defendant’s willingness
to answer questions after expressly affirming on the record his understanding of … those
rights constituted a valid implied waiver of them.”]; Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560
U.S. at p. 385 [“The record in this case shows that [the defendant] waived his right to
remain silent. There is no basis in this case to conclude that he did not understand his
rights; and on these facts it follows that he chose not to invoke or rely on those rights
when he did speak.”].) Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting defendant’s statement
to police, and its admission did not violate defendant’s due process rights or his right to a
fair trial.
We reject defendant’s first contention.
II. Provocation Instruction
Defendant next argues the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury
that the test for determining whether provocation negates the specific intent required for
first degree murder is subjective.
A. Relevant Factual Background
During the jury instruction conference, the parties discussed the defense’s request
for a voluntary manslaughter instruction based upon heat of passion as a lesser included
offense. The court stated its tentative was to grant the request. The defense explained the
instruction is aligned with the defense in this case. The prosecutor objected to the
instruction asserting the defense had not “met their burden in asking for the heat of
passion provocation [instruction] given that in this case the only conduct we have by the
victim are words.” The court explained, “In this particular case, the issue for the Court
legally and the issue for the jurors factually is to determine whether provocation exists in
See footnote, ante, page 1.
28.
this case. [¶] [B]oth sides recognize[] that provocation has to be demonstrated both
subjectively and objectively.”
Over the People’s objection, the court allowed the inclusion of jury instructions on
the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, heat of passion, or sudden quarrel.
It found “quite a bit of evidence has been presented to the jurors to consider a situation
where provocation can occur. It ostensibly comes from the interview that the defendant
participated in where he was able to express the conversation between he and the alleged
victim, specifically what the alleged victim was saying that was disrespectful or
dishonoring and so forth. [¶] Additionally, and just as significantly, at least shown in the
video recording the defendant also indicated through the video recording that there was
some conduct attributable to the alleged victim in this case when threatening to allege
him of sexual assault, false sexual assault. She was threatening to take off her shirt or rip
her shirt or something to the effect that would substantiate the false allegations. That is
certainly conduct that the jurors can consider, coupled with the words that the alleged
victim used in this case, with some specificity, as stated by the defendant, to determine if
provocation existed.”
The jury was instructed on first and second degree murder (CALCRIM Nos. 520
& 521) and on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion
(CALCRIM No. 570). Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 521, the court instructed the jury that
the People must prove defendant “acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation”
for defendant to be guilty of first degree murder. It explained, in part, that “[a] decision
to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and
premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached
quickly.”
The court instructed the jury on provocation with CALCRIM No. 522
(Provocation: Effect on Murder) as follows:
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“Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second
degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter. The weight and
significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide.
“If you conclude that the defendant committed murder, but was
provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first-
or second-degree murder. Also, consider the provocation in deciding
whether the defendant committed murder or manslaughter.”
The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 570 on “Voluntary
Manslaughter: Heat of Passion–Lesser Included Offense” as follows:
“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel
or in the heat of passion.
“The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion if:
“One, the defendant was provoked;
“Two, as a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and
under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or
judgment;
“And, three, the provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation; that is, from passion
rather than from judgment.
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes the person to
act without due deliberation and reflection. In order for heat of passion to
reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted
under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined
it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote
provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short
or long period of time.
“It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation
was sufficient.
30.
“In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider
whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing
the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from judgment.
“If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a
person of average disposition to cool off and regain his or her clear
reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary
manslaughter on this basis.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not kill as a result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder.”
Defendant did not request a pinpoint instruction on provocation, or any additional
instructions amplifying or clarifying the provocation necessary to negate premeditation
and deliberation such that it would reduce first degree murder to second degree murder.
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued defendant acted with
premeditation and deliberation and, thus, committed first degree murder. She asserted
defendant heard Simi talking about her plans to leave the day before the murder, but
defendant waited until the next day, when no one was around, to confront her. She
further noted there was no evidence Simi had packed her suitcases. The prosecutor
stated, defendant reported Simi’s comment about cutting off his beard and shoving it up
his ass was disrespectful and made him mad, but he “tolerated” it. However, at that
point, defendant “made the decision to go down the hallway and inside his room” and to
“grab his gun.” The prosecutor asserted that Detective Robles showed the jury how the
revolver is loaded: “[w]ith a revolver you have to make the conscious decision. You load
each round one by one by one by one.” She argued the fact that a Ziploc bag with
ammunition inside was found on defendant’s bed supported a conclusion the firearm was
not initially fully loaded and, instead, that defendant went to his room, opened the bag,
loaded the gun, and then walked back to the living room with the gun concealed in his
pocket. The prosecutor asserted Simi was sitting on the sofa “in a vulnerable position”
when defendant returned. She argued, contrary to defendant’s statement that Simi was
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“pulling her shirt up and talking about how she’s going to call the police to report him for
sexually assaulting her,” Simi’s shirt was not disheveled but instead “way below her
waistline.” Defendant shot Simi for the first time in the back of her neck and then,
“[e]ven though … shooting her in the neck, can be a deadly shot, that’s not enough for
him. He then goes around and shoots her again two more times in the front of the neck.”
She emphasized that Simi was unarmed and defendant consciously and physically moved
to the front of the couch to shoot her again as Simi was “bleeding from her mouth” and
“her teeth are all over the room.” She argued all three shots were “at lethal areas,” which
is “extremely significant.” And defendant “was within a few inches of [Simi] when he
stood over her and shot her for the second time,” as evidenced by the muzzle stamp. He
had “to be within inches” of her “to get all that blood on not only himself, but the
firearm.” She asserted that defendant showed “no remorse” and he never sounded
distressed after the shooting. And, during his interview with police, “[h]e tells them that
he had a choice and he killed her, and that is exactly what deliberation is. You weigh[]
the consequences of your decision and you decide[] to do it.”
She argued defendant was not guilty of voluntary manslaughter, asserting
“[p]rovocation does not allow you to set up your own standard of conduct. What the
defendant has done in this case is set up his own standard of conduct and saying that he
should only be measured against himself and not against others. There’s insufficient
provocation in this case…. You can’t start a fight or an argument and then expect to be
able to take advantage and say that you were provoked.”
In closing argument, the defense asserted defendant shot Simi in a “rash and
impulsive moment.” Defense counsel argued, defendant tried to talk sense into Simi.
“And [Simi] responded to his request for harmony with vile, offensive, disrespectful, and
sacrilegious remarks that were designed to personally anger, hurt, and provoke
[defendant]. There are certain words and phrases or comments and actions that may
cause or trigger anybody here to have a reaction, a negative response, to anyone. But
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[Simi] barraged a provocation that was personally brutal, scathing, and painful to
[defendant] as much as a ten-pound pot of hot, scalding water falling all over his body.”
“Without thinking, his mind full of rage and anger, [defendant] made a rash and
impulsive decision to kill [Simi] and he shot her three times.” Counsel asserted it is clear
in defendant’s statement “something … triggers [defendant’s] anger, and anger was the
constant guide that basically caused him to do what he did in the end.” The defense
asserted defendant “had no plan” and instead acted on “impulse” and “there was one
continuous act, one stream of consciousness” and he never calmed down or had the
opportunity to cool off. Additionally, the provocation defendant faced “would have
caused an individual of average disposition to have acted rashly and without due
deliberation.”
During the course of deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking for the
definitions of “‘provocation’” and “‘deliberate’” in more detail. After discussing with
counsel, the court responded the jury should refer to CALCRIM Nos. 200, 570, and 521.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“Provocation may … reduce murder from first to second degree.” (People v.
Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 328; accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 384.)
It has been held, “a subjective test applies to provocation as a basis to reduce malice
murder from the first to the second degree: it inquires whether the defendant in fact
committed the act because he was provoked. The rationale is that provocation may
negate the elements of premeditation, deliberateness and willfulness that are required for
that degree of the crime. [Citation.] But more is required to reduce malice murder to
voluntary manslaughter. For that, an objective test also applies: the provocation must be
so great that, in the words of CALCRIM No. 570, it ‘would have caused a person of
average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather
than from judgment.’” (People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000–1001; see
People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332.)
33.
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Parker (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1, 66.) “A trial court ‘is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of
law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a
formal request.’” (Ibid.) “A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to
erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the
jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the defendant.” (People v. Cross
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67–68; see People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 475
[“relevant inquiry … is whether, ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial
record, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled to [the] defendant’s
prejudice’”].) “‘“‘[W]e must assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of
understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’ [Citation.]”’”
(Sattiewhite, supra, at p. 475.)
Notably, “an instruction that provocation may be sufficient to raise reasonable
doubt about premeditation or deliberation … is a pinpoint instruction to which a
defendant is entitled only upon request where evidence supports the theory. [Citation.]
The trial court is not required to give such an instruction sua sponte.” (People v. Rivera,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 328; accord, People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 384.)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues CALCRIM Nos. 520 (first or second degree murder), 521 (first
degree murder), 522 (provocation: effect on murder), and 570 (voluntary manslaughter)
did not fully, fairly, and correctly instruct the jury on the law of provocation/heat of
passion related to first degree murder. He asserts these instructions did not inform the
jury that when provocation is the basis for negating the premeditation and deliberation
element of first degree murder, the provocation is considered based upon defendant’s
subjective intent. He asserts the jury likely applied the objective test of provocation
discussed in the voluntary manslaughter instruction in considering whether intent was
negated with regard to the first degree murder charge. In support, he asserts the jury
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struggled with the meaning of provocation and deliberation based on their request for
more detailed definitions of these terms and then continued deliberating for three hours
after the court’s response. He contends, if the issue is deemed forfeited, his counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the provocation instructions or
proposing a pinpoint instruction. The People respond, this issue was forfeited for failure
to object and any alleged error was harmless. They also deny that defense counsel’s
failure to request a pinpoint instruction constituted ineffective assistance. We agree with
the People and reject defendant’s contentions.
Initially, courts have held CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 522—both given here—are
correct and “[t]hey accurately inform the jury what is required for first degree murder,
and that if the defendant’s action was in fact the result of provocation, that level of crime
was not committed.” (People v. Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001; see People v.
Hernandez, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1333–1334.) That is, “CALCRIM Nos. 521
and 522, taken together, inform[] jurors that ‘provocation (the arousal of emotions) can
give rise to a rash, impulsive decision, and this in turn shows no premeditation and
deliberation.” (Jones, supra, at p. 1001; see Hernandez, supra, at p. 1334.) “Provocation
in this context is not a ‘defense’ but merely a theory of reasonable doubt as to required
elements of first degree murder. [Citation.] Because an instruction on provocation
relates to the legal elements of premeditation and deliberation, it is a ‘“pinpoint
instruction”’ that a court need not give on its own motion.” (People v. Ocegueda (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 548, 557.)
Accordingly, we cannot conclude the court erred in instructing the jury with the
cited instructions. We also cannot conclude it was reasonably probable, as defendant
contends, the instructions on murder, manslaughter, and provocation misled the jury to
believe that, to reduce murder from first to second degree, provocation must meet the
same objective reasonable person test that leads to a reduction to voluntary manslaughter.
As discussed, the jury was instructed on first degree murder with CALCRIM No. 521,
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which provides in part that for a murder to be first degree, it must be deliberate and
premeditated and a “decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful
consideration is not deliberate and premeditated.” It was also instructed that provocation
could reduce the degree of murder, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 522. We cannot conclude
the jury would have understood the instructions as saying the test for determining
whether a murder is first or second degree is the same as that for determining whether a
defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Rather, the jury was also instructed that
for a defendant to be guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the provocation must be of such a
kind that a person of average disposition would have been provoked and defendant was
subjectively provoked. And we “see no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
construed this language in a voluntary manslaughter instruction to alter the
requirement—plainly stated in CALCRIM No. 521—that first degree murder must be
deliberate and premedi[t]ated.” (People v. Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 559;
see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880 [“In the absence of instructional errors
such as were present in [People v. ]Valentine [(1946) 28 Cal.2d 121], the standard
manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and
deliberation is the factor distinguishing first and second degree murder.”].)
And we cannot conclude the prosecutor’s closing argument when considered in
conjunction with the instructions likely confused the jury. Defendant argues the
prosecutor “misstated the law” and “conflated the standard pertaining to provocation that
reduces a murder to second degree with the provocation that reduces a murder to
voluntary manslaughter” by arguing:
“Voluntary manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective
element; so the conduct by the victim must be sufficiently provocative that
it would cause a person of average disposition to act rashly or without due
deliberation or reflection.
“This is the part I’m talking about where [defendant] cannot set up
his own standard of conduct. It is a person of an average disposition. For
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the subjective portion, he must have killed while under the actual influence
of strong passion, and it can be any intense or violent emotion. It doesn’t
have to be anger. But if you are allowing him to say I killed her for X, Y,
and Z reasons, you are allowing him to set up his own standard of conduct.”
We disagree with defendant’s contention. Rather, the referenced argument
occurred in the prosecutor’s rebuttal, after defense counsel asked the jury to find
defendant “not guilty of first-degree or second-degree murder” and, instead, to find him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. On its face and in context, the referenced argument is
clearly discussing the standard for assessing adequate provocation for defendant to be
guilty of voluntary manslaughter and not murder. Indeed, the prosecutor never asserted
the objective test for considering provocation applied when considering whether there
was sufficient provocation to negate premeditation and deliberation such that defendant
was guilty of second as opposed to first degree murder or otherwise urged the jury to
misapply the law.
To the extent defendant argues a more specific instruction, namely a pinpoint
instruction, should have been given informing the jury that the objective test did not
apply to reduction of the degree of murder, defense counsel’s failure to request such an
instruction forfeited this claim on appeal. (See People v. Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1001; see People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 879 [CALJIC No. 8.73, which
relates evidence of provocation to specific legal issue of premeditation and deliberation is
a “pinpoint instruction” that need not be given on court’s own motion].) And we cannot
conclude defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request such a
pinpoint instruction.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel “must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” measured against
“prevailing professional norms.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688
(Strickland).) In evaluating trial counsel’s actions, “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
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assistance .…” (Id. at p. 689; accord, People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 541.)
Thus, a defendant must overcome the presumption the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy under the circumstances. (Strickland, supra, at p. 689;
Dennis, supra, at p. 541.) “Reasonableness must be assessed through the likely
perspective of counsel at the time.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 445.)
Additionally, the defendant must also establish prejudice: “that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” (Strickland, supra, at p. 694.) “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Ibid.) On direct appeal,
when no explanation for counsel’s conduct can be found in the record, “we must reject
the claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel] on appeal unless counsel was asked for
and failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory
explanation.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212; see People v. Hernandez
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1053.)
Here, “counsel could reasonably have concluded the instructions given adequately
advised the jury, as we have, and that no further instruction was necessary.” (People v.
Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 561.) And, as discussed, we cannot conclude
there is a reasonable probability the jury was misled by the given instructions, which
accurately conveyed the applicable law. For the same reasons, we cannot conclude
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction that the
test for determining whether provocation as sufficient to reduce first degree murder to
second degree murder is subjective. Rather, the given instructions, namely CALCRIM
Nos. 521, 522, and 570, advised the jury of the elements of the crimes and no further
instructions were necessary. Said differently, we cannot conclude it is reasonably
probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable verdict had the referenced
pinpoint instruction been requested and given. Thus, defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim also fails.
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We reject defendant’s second contention.
III. Racial Justice Act and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that his conviction should be
reversed because his police interview reflects law enforcement was implicitly biased and
the introduction of the entirety of his police interview was inflammatory and prejudicial
in violation of the Racial Justice Act (§ 745, subd. (a)(1) & (2)), and it rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He further contends, if
the issue is deemed forfeited, his counsel was ineffective in failing to object on these
grounds. We conclude the issue was forfeited and defendant has not established he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reject his contentions.
A. Relevant Factual Background
In his statement to police after the shooting, defendant detailed the events leading
up to the shooting: he learned Simi had been speaking to another man and was going to
leave his son and their children to be with that man; on the day of the shooting, he told
Simi not to do this and she told him she was going to pull off his beard and “shove it up
[his] ass”; she threatened to tell the police defendant sexually assaulted her and “[w]hen
she began to rip her clothes,” defendant “said if you have done this then I’m dead, then
my son is dead,” and he shot her. Then, the following exchange took place with
Detective Robles questioning, Officer Singh translating, and defendant responding:
“DET. ROBLES: Was [defendant] angrier about the disrespect she
was showing or was he worried about the … the {unintelligible} of his
reputation?
“OFC. SINGH: Were you angry because of the way she was talking to
you or the things that she was doing like ripping off her clothes and trying
to frame you? Were you angrier with the way she was speaking with you?
“[DEFENDANT]: First it was about my beard {unintelligible}…
“OFC. SINGH: One thing it was about my beard…
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“[DEFENDANT]: I tolerated that {unintelligible} you would also do
that[.]
“DET. ROBLES: Did she dishonor him?
“OFC. SINGH: In a way she was {unintelligible}
“[DEFENDANT]: She did a big thing about my beard. The beard is
our greatest honor.
“OFC. SINGH: {unintelligible} one thing…. And then she
disrespected my beard…
“[DEFENDANT]: Then when she started to pull off her shirt like
this…
“OFC. SINGH: When she grabbed her shirt…
“[DEFENDANT]: Now, a daughter is doing this in front of her father
… she was like a daughter, right?
“OFC. SINGH: She is like my daughter, right[?]
“[DEFENDANT]: So, if a daughter behaves like this in front of the
father then that’s a shame, then the father will either shoot himself or her.
“OFC. SINGH: And if your daughter is trying to rip off her clothes in
front of you either you kill yourself or you kill her, so.
“DET. ROBLES: So, was it an honor kill?
“OFC. SINGH: Honor, or you can for your honor … for your
dignity…
“[DEFENDANT]: Honor is also in danger.
“OFC. SINGH: Yes.
“[DEFENDANT]: Because I was also…
“OFC. SINGH: I did it for my honor.
“[DEFENDANT]: In America {unintelligible} for 27–28 years, I have
respect here. She is the daughter in law of the family and I am begging
you.”
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Later, the following exchange took place:
“DET. ROBLES: OK. Again, we were not there but is there a reason
why she would … start saying that my father-in-law is going to rape me,
wanted [to] tear my clothes off, why did he not call the police to intervene
if he was worried about stopping this from happening or did he decide she
dishonored the family too much at that point?
“OFC. SINGH: When she was saying that she was going to rip off her
clothes why did you not call the police to tell them that she was doing like
this and she is telling me this? Why did you try to kill her? Did you feel at
that time that she had dishonored you and your family?
“[DEFENDANT]: Stained my reputation, yes, yes.
“OFC. SINGH: According to what reason, that she was ready to go
with another man, was it because of this reason that it was a stain to your
reputation?
“[DEFENDANT]: She was already going with that man but then she
was going to stain my reputation but I touched her feet and begged her…
“OFC. SINGH: At that point it was for me … it was for my honor… I
begged her[.]”
After defendant stated he would have gone to jail if she had reported he sexually
assaulted her, the police asked him whether he thought he would go to jail for shooting
her and the following exchange took place:
“[DEFENDANT]: If you are talking about someone going to jail…
“OFC. SINGH: The thing about jail {Unintelligible}…
“[DEFENDANT]: Then we consider it to be the most dishonorable
thing that some daughter or sister one tries to entrap someone by false
accusations.
“OFC. SINGH: And if somebody and if she would have done that and
called the police and I would have got in for sexual arrest and what kind of
{Unintelligible}…
“[DEFENDANT]: Then it would be a living death for me.
“OFC. SINGH: What kind of honor is that…
41.
“[DEFENDANT]: I would have gone to jail in either case. Because
for ordinary people I am {unintelligible}.
“OFC. SINGH: I could never show my face to anybody and
{unintelligible}…
“DET. ROBLES: Does he feel that he overreacted in the situation or
does he think he did what he needed to do based on his personal beliefs?
“OFC. SINGH: Do you feel that you have done something wrong or
you did what was right? That you could have done something else? What
do you think?
“[DEFENDANT]: Now I do feel that I have done something wrong
but that {unintelligible}
“OFC. SINGH: I feel that now, that I did wrong but…
“[DEFENDANT]: Only I know the situation that I was in at that time
and what I have been through.”
Before the recording was played for the jury, the court noted, defense counsel
expressed during a sidebar that they “have decided not to object to the recording or to the
translations in the recording and so forth.” The court then permitted defense counsel to
explain on the record. Defense counsel believed it was “inappropriate” that defendant
was asked during the interview “about the actions …, … how he felt about them, the
legality of the action, whether or not he thought it was fair.” However, “looking at it
from the totality of the circumstances with respect to the statement,” counsel believed it
would be in their “best interest not to object to this portion and, for that reason, … did not
make such a request.”
The prosecution did not rely on “honor killing” as a theory of first degree murder
at trial or discuss the concept in opening or closing argument, but the prosecutor showed
the entirety of the audio and video recording of the interrogation in the case-in-chief.
As discussed ante, at trial the defense called Dr. Sidhu, an expert on Punjabi
culture, who testified at length about the concept of “honor killing,” and defense counsel
asserted in closing that this was not an honor killing. In response to questioning by
42.
defense counsel, Dr. Sidhu testified “honor culture” is a notion within Punjabi culture.
However, Westerners “tend to misinterpret the notion of what an honor killing is. There
is this term that’s used in the academic literature to orientalize things, to make an ‘other’
of things, to see other cultures in these monolithic terms. There’s a tendency to believe
that if a brown man kills a brown woman, it must have been an honor killing.” However,
“[h]onor killing is a very specific thing with[in] the academic literature. It’s a very
specific concept that has [a] very specific meaning. Even in cultures of honor, people
engage in violence for all sorts of reasons. Domestic violence occurs. Family violence
occurs. People get into fights. Not every single aspect of violence, even in an honor
culture, … is necessarily honor violence.”
He explained that honor killings do exist in Indian culture, but there are two forms
of honor violence or killing: “One of them is killing or engaging in violence for revenge,
because your honor has been impugned. You’ve been insulted…. This is where you’ve
been insulted or your family’s been insulted; so you engage in violence to regain that
honor. [¶] The second form of honor killing, which is more likely to occur in Indian
culture or cultures of honor, is what’s called purification acts. In a collectivist society,
honor is not solely of the individual as it is in Western societies. Honor is a reflection of
the entire family. So if a woman—and it’s almost invariably a woman—does something
that’s believed to have stained the honor of the family, that stain has to be cleansed, and
so violence can be used—or violence will be used against that woman as a way of
cleansing that stain. [¶] In those situations what defines the honor killing, again, is the
particular characteristics. [¶] First, honor killings are planned. An honor killing isn’t
something that’s done impulsively or without giving forethought, because an honor
killing is a form of signaling. You are essentially telling the rest of society, the other
people in your community, that, look, we understand that this person stained our
reputation, but we’re going to do something about it. We[, the group or family,] are going
to punish this person. So please recognize that we are not really as shamed as that
43.
behavior may have done.” He explained that “honor killing is a very specific thing.” It
“isn’t just violence toward women; otherwise, almost any incident of domestic violence
would be considered an honor killing because usually, even in situations of domestic
violence, the man generally feels somehow insulted, emasculated, dishonored.”
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Sidhu whether killing of a
daughter-in-law or a daughter is common in the Punjabi community. Dr. Sidhu
responded, “I would say honor killings unto themselves are extremely rare. It’s one of
the reasons why it’s kind of a different difficult concept for people to understand. This is
not a common practice.” The prosecutor also asked Dr. Sidhu if it is common for a
father-in-law to talk directly to his daughter-in-law regarding her cheating on his son.
Dr. Sidhu responded, “I think the initial step is—again, this is looking at how other honor
killings have occurred or other incidents like this have occurred, and generally it’s the
mother-in-law that will first talk to the daughter to try to explain, because cheating is
infidelity, it has to do with sexual assault, it has to do with taboos, and it’s going to be
more comfortable. [¶] But if the behavior continues, if it escalates, then the
disciplinarian of the household is still going to end up being the elder male; so they may,
after consultation, after talking to the mother-in-law, the son, approach the daughter-in-
law as well.”
B. California’s Racial Justice Act
In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 3.5), which went into effect on January 1, 2021. Its declared intent is “to
eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because racism in any form
or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice
system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI of the California Constitution, and
violates the laws and Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although often
unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar
to intentional bias.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).). The Legislature expressed its
44.
intent not to punish implicit bias, “but rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case
and to the integrity of the judicial system,” “to ensure that race plays no role at all in
seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing,” and “to reject the conclusion that
racial disparities within our criminal justice [system] are inevitable, and to actively work
to eradicate them.” (Ibid.)
To that end, the Racial Justice Act provides, in relevant part, “The state shall not
seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of
race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a
preponderance of evidence, any of the following: [¶] (1) The judge, an attorney in the
case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited
bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or
national origin. [¶] (2) During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings,
the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an
expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race,
ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not
purposeful….’” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) The statute defines the phrase “‘[r]acially
discriminatory language” as “language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or
implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially
coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that
references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.
Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in
cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to
determining whether language is discriminatory.” (Id., subd. (h)(4).)
Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act, “A defendant may file a motion … or a petition
for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). For claims based on the trial record, a
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defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from
the conviction or sentence. The defendant may also move to stay the appeal and request
remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this section.…” (§ 745,
subd. (b).) Section 745, subdivision (c) provides a procedural structure for RJA motions
filed in the trial court: “If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a
prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing.
A motion at trial shall be made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of the
alleged violation. A motion that is not timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of
the court.” 1
If, after a judgment has been entered, the court finds that a conviction was sought
or obtained in violation of section 745, subdivision (a), “the court shall vacate the
conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings
consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).) The provision permitting such
a claim to be raised on direct appeal and authorizing a defendant to move to stay the
appeal and request remand to the superior court to file a motion was added by the
1 In Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, the First Appellate District,
Division Four, discussed the prima facie standard under the Racial Justice Act, drawing from the
prima facie case concept as articulated in other contexts. (Finley, supra, at pp. 20–24.) The
Finley court held, “a defendant seeking relief under the Racial Justice Act must state fully and
with particularity the facts on which relief is sought and include copies of reasonably available
documentary evidence supporting the claim. The court should accept the truth of the defendant’s
allegations, including expert evidence and statistics, unless the allegations are conclusory,
unsupported by the evidence presented in support of the claim, or demonstrably contradicted by
the court’s own records.” (Id. at p. 23, fn. omitted.) “At the prima facie stage …, the trial court
must consider whether the motion and its supporting evidence state facts that, ‘if true, establish
that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation’ occurred (§ 745, subd. (h)(2), italics added),
and should not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, except in the rare case
where the record ‘irrefutably establishes’ that a defendant’s allegations are false.” (Id. at pp. 23–
24.) If the trial court determines the defendant had made a prima facie showing, it must conduct
an evidentiary hearing where it may consider evidence and arguments submitted by the People,
make credibility determinations, and weigh the evidence. (See id. at p. 25.)
46.
Legislature through Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill
1118), which became effective on January 1, 2024. (Stats. 2023, ch. 464, § 1.)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues Detective Robles “initiated the questioning about honor killing,
and it was the prosecutor [who] played the unredacted DVD of the interrogation for the
jury at trial.” He asserts Detective Robles’s “investigation of this homicide as an honor
killing” reflected implicit bias and violated the Racial Justice Act, specifically
section 745, subdivision (a)(1), and the Fourteenth Amendment. In support, he asserts
“[a]t the time the interrogation … began, Detective Robles knew nothing that would have
indicated that this was an ‘honor killing,’ as opposed to an act of domestic violence, other
than a brown man wearing a turban killed a brown woman” and “Dr. Sidhu’s testimony
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was based on a misconception
resulting from implicit bias: that when a brown man kills a brown woman, it must be an
honor killing.” He contends honor killing “was not the prosecutor’s theory of the case,”
thus, the references to it were irrelevant, inflammatory, and prejudicial. He argues the
defense expert, Dr. Sidhu, testified honor killings are not impulsive, but are planned and
the product of a decision made by the family or the elders of the village, and this
testimony “combined with law enforcement’s focus on honor killing, made playing the
DVD of the interrogation at trial an invitation to the jury to follow the most direct route
to a first degree murder verdict: honor killing.” Defendant also asserts, “[i]n playing the
DVD of this interrogation in her case in chief, the prosecutor violated [section 745,]
subdivision (a)(2) because, even though she did not explicitly rely on the honor killing
characterization in the DVD, the jury saw and heard the DVD as well as Dr. Sidhu’s
testimony that honor killings are not impulsive, but are carefully planned and
deliberated.” He asserts “[t]his shows prejudice as it is ‘reasonably probable the trial
outcome was affected’ which is the standard applied to Racial Justice Act violations.” He
further contends the record on honor killing as a form of discrimination based on race
47.
and/or national origin was adequately developed at trial to permit review of his Racial
Justice Act and Fourteenth Amendment claims on appeal. He urges us to conclude both
alleged violations of the Racial Justice Act “were shown by a preponderance of the
evidence, requiring this Court to vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally
invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with section 745, subdivision (a)” and/or
that “the Fourteenth Amendment violations were not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt” and require reversal of defendant’s conviction. Finally, he argues his counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to exclude or redact the recording of
the interrogation on Racial Justice Act or Fourteenth Amendment grounds when he
moved to exclude the record based on the alleged Miranda violations. He argues there
was no tactical reason for counsel’s actions and the failure to move to exclude the DVD
of the interrogation was prejudicial under Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at page 687,
because it deprived him of a fair trial.
The People assert “Assembly Bill 1118 does not help defendant[] …, who was
convicted after the RJA took effect, but who failed to make an RJA claim at trial.” They
contend Assembly Bill 1118 left intact language in subdivision (c) of section 745 that
requires an RJA motion to be made in the trial court “‘as soon as practicable upon the
defendant learning of the alleged violation,’” with untimely motions subject to waiver.
And that provision would serve no practical purpose if an RJA claim waived in the trial
court could nonetheless be raised on appeal. They further contend Assembly Bill 1118
did not expressly preclude application of the forfeiture doctrine, and its legislative history
“buttresses the conclusion that a defendant who could have brought a timely RJA claim at
trial will remain subject to forfeiture on appeal.” Accordingly, they contend defendant’s
claim was forfeited based on his counsel’s failure to raise it at trial. Alternatively, they
assert defendant’s claim fails on its merits because the record shows Detective Robles’s
question about whether it was an honor kill “was not racially biased” in context. Rather,
“[h]e chose the word ‘honor’ based on [defendant]’s preceding statements about status,
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respect, and his reputation.” They argue that defendant “raised his cultural and religious
background with the police” and “this was not a situation where the detective conjured up
the notion of an honor killing upon seeing a ‘brown man killing a brown woman.’”
Additionally, defendant raised the issue before the jury and called an expert on Punjabi
culture, Dr. Sidhu, who testified “one’s sense of self is defined within one’s position
within the broader society in that culture, and highlighted the importance of reputation
and status.”
1. Defendant’s Claim is Forfeited
Defendant contends his Racial Justice Act claim may be raised on direct appeal for
the first time if supported by the trial record, and he urges us to exercise our discretion to
conclude the issue is not forfeited and, instead, to consider the merits of his argument,
citing In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–888, footnote 7 (Sheena K.), for the
proposition that we may consider a forfeited issue that presents a pure question of law.
We agree with the People that the issue is forfeited based upon defendant’s failure to
object at trial on this basis.
Here, defendant was charged by information on December 11, 2019. On April 11,
2022, the defense filed its pretrial motions in limine in which, in part, it requested an
evidentiary hearing related to defendant’s statement to police. The court subsequently
held an Evidence Code section 402 evidentiary hearing on April 15, 2022, with regard to
the police statement, during which the defense never argued for exclusion of the
statement or redaction of the reference to an “honor kill” under the Racial Justice Act.
Thereafter, the trial in this matter took place from April to May 2022—a year and nearly
five months after the Racial Justice Act became effective. Defense counsel never raised
an objection based upon the Racial Justice Act either during trial or posttrial in a motion
for new trial.
As a result, on this record, we must conclude defendant forfeited his claim by
failing to timely object below. Initially, it is true section 745, subdivision (b) was
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amended by Assembly Bill 1118, effective January 1, 2024 to permit a defendant to “raise
a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or
sentence.” But section 745, subdivision (c) expressly provides, “A motion made at trial
shall be made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of the alleged
violation. A motion that is not timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the
court.” (Italics added.) And at least one court has held that where, as here, the defendant
could have but failed to raise his Racial Justice Act claim below, he forfeited the claim
and could not raise it for the first time on direct appeal despite Assembly Bill 1118’s
amendment to section 745 permitting such claims to be raised on direct appeal. (See
People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 805, 811–813 (Lashon).)
The Lashon court reasoned, “By the Assembly Bill 1118 amendment, the
Legislature did not include any language indicating a section 745 claim could be
presented on direct appeal for the first time. (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 812.)
It held, in the absence of such language, “review of a section 745 claim, like any other
appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of
claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court.” (Ibid.) It reasoned,
“[i]t makes little sense for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive procedure for
making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including a specific
waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow defendants who could have but did
not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass that
procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time on appeal.” (Id. at p. 813.)
The Lashon court further concluded the legislative history of the statute “indicates
the Legislature did not intend to allow a defendant to pursue such a claim for the first
time on direct appeal where it could have been but was not raised in the trial court.”
(Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813.) It reasoned, “[a]t the time the Legislature
enacted Assembly Bill 1118, it was made aware of general appellate rules of preservation
and forfeiture of issues on direct appeal, and exceptions to those rules as judicially
50.
applied in analogous contexts.” (Ibid.) In support, the Lashon court referenced the
explanation of Assembly Bill 1118’s proposed amendments to the Racial Justice Act,
including the clarification that a Racial Justice Act claim based on the trial record may be
raised on direct appeal and that a defendant can request a stay and remand of the appeal:
“‘This may be necessary to permit the trial court to rule on the claim in the
first instance, and to allow the parties to fully litigate the issue. (See Gray1
CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 897 [“[I]t
is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims
made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not
presented to the trial court. Thus, we ignore arguments, authority and facts
not presented and litigated in the trial court”] (citation and quotations
omitted); see also People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 [“Reviewing
courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial
where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by
substantive law then in existence”].) …’ (Assem. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Mar. 15, 2023, pp. 5–6.)” (Lashon, supra, at p. 814.)
The Lashon court found “it significant that the Legislature did not include any
language to the effect that a section 745 claim may be raised on direct appeal ‘for the first
time,’ which it could have easily done just as it did when amending the habeas corpus
proceedings [in section 1473].” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 814 [referencing a
footnote in which it discussed the changes to the habeas corpus procedures].) Lashon
held, “Accordingly, taking into account the purpose of section 745—to swiftly and
effectively address racial bias as soon as practical upon a defendant learning of an alleged
violation—and ‘the substantial state interest in protecting the integrity of the process
from improper “sandbagging” by a defendant’ [citation] along with the language of the
statute and its legislative history, we conclude a defendant may be found to have forfeited
a section 745 claim of racial bias made for the first time on direct appeal in the absence of
a showing that an exception to the forfeiture doctrine applies.” (Id. at p. 815.)
We agree with the Lashon court’s reasoning and conclude where, as here,
defendant could have but failed to raise his Racial Justice Act claim below, it is forfeited.
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The Legislature could have, but did not, expressly declare that a defendant in such
instances could raise such a claim on appeal for the first time. And, as the Lashon court
explained, “[i]t makes little sense for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive
procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including a
specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow defendants who could
have but did not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass
that procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal.”
(Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813.) Furthermore, in enacting Assembly Bill
1118’s provision permitting a defendant to raise a Racial Justice Act claim on direct
appeal, the Legislature left intact the language in section 745, subdivision (c) that “A
motion made at trial shall be made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of
the alleged violation.” To permit a defendant to raise a claim on direct appeal where, as
here, he could have but failed to timely raise it at trial would render the timeliness
requirement set forth in section 745, subdivision (c) meaningless because, even if such a
claim was not timely raised below, it could be raised for the first time on appeal. It is a
“fundamental principal that a court should interpret a statute … so as to harmonize and
give effect to all its provisions if such an interpretation is consistent with the language
and purpose of the act.” (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 10.) And finding
forfeiture in a situation such as here harmonizes the statutory provisions (namely, § 745,
subds. (b) and (c)) and gives each provision full effect. (See In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th
94, 103 [“We harmonize statutory provisions, if possible, giving each provision full
effect.”].)
This conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of Assembly Bill
1118, which reflects the Legislature’s intent to permit consideration of claims on direct
appeal based on the trial record, as opposed to by way of habeas corpus proceedings, to
promote efficiency and conserve judicial resources. Permitting a claim to be raised on
direct appeal for the first time when it could have been timely raised and remedied below
52.
would be directly contrary to the goal of promoting judicial efficiency. For all these
reasons, we agree with the Lashon court that “review of a section 745 claim, like any
other appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate rules of preservation and
forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court.”2 (Lashon,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 812.)
We also cannot conclude an exception to the forfeiture doctrine should apply. In
Sheena K., cited by defendant in support of his argument, the California Supreme Court
held a constitutional challenge to a probation condition that presents “a pure question of
law” and is “easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition,” may be
raised for the first time on appeal. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 888.) In so
holding, the Sheena K. court distinguished claims of erroneously admitted evidence or
prosecutorial misconduct where forfeiture is necessary for the sake of procedural
efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, and held the Sheena K. defendant’s
failure to assert her constitutional claim in juvenile court did not have an impact on the
same proceedings “‘downstream.’” (Ibid.) The Sheena K. court cautioned that it was not
concluding “‘all constitutional defects in conditions of probation may be raised for the
first time on appeal, since there may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions
2 During oral argument, defense counsel argued for the first time that the use of the term
“waived” as opposed to “forfeited” in section 745, subdivision (c), puts an obligation on the trial
court to inquire whether the relinquishment of a Racial Justice Act claim is knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. We reject this contention. Rather, the plain language of the statute states: “A
motion that is not timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court.” (§ 745,
subd. (c), italics added.) It does not require the court to conduct such an inquiry before deeming
a claim waived. Furthermore, as our Supreme Court has acknowledged, “Knowing and
intelligent waivers are generally required when a criminal defendant gives up ‘any significant
right’ [citation], such as the constitutional rights relinquished by a plea of guilty [citation], the
right to counsel [citations], and the right to appeal [citation].” (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60
Cal.4th 850, 859.) Here, defendant has not argued a comparably significant right is at stake such
as a core autonomy interest or a constitutional right. (See ibid.) Rather, for the reasons
discussed, we conclude the general rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have
been but were not made in the trial court apply.
53.
of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record
developed in the trial court.” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection
and waiver principles encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of
discretion in the trial court.”’” (Id. at p. 889.)
Here, defendant’s Racial Justice Act claim that Detective Robles exhibited bias or
that “racially discriminatory language” was used during the trial proceedings is not a
constitutional challenge that presents a pure question of law as was the case in Sheena K.
Rather, it necessarily requires reference to and consideration of the circumstances of the
case and record below. (See Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 811.) And, as
discussed, it would not be procedurally efficient, nor would it conserve judicial resources,
to find an exception to the forfeiture doctrine in this context—where, as here, the trial
court could have easily remedied the introduction of the allegedly objectionable evidence
before trial. (See People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1035–1036 [rejecting the
defendant’s argument forfeiture of prosecutorial claim was irrelevant because issue was
“‘“pure question of law”’” presented by undisputed facts, noting “[The d]efendant’s
interpretation of that exception to the forfeiture rule would seem to imply that any issue
reviewable de novo may be raised for the first time on appeal.… Such an exception
would allow a defendant to invalidate an entire trial based on a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct that could have been easily remedied by a timely objection and an
admonition.”].) Rather, given the circumstances of this case, we conclude general
forfeiture rules apply and defendant’s claim must be deemed forfeited.
2. Defense Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance
Nevertheless, defendant asserts, should we conclude his claim is forfeited, his
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object or seek exclusion of his police
interview based upon the Racial Justice Act. First, defendant argues his counsel “must
have determined that it would benefit [the] defense to have his interrogation excluded for
Miranda violations.” Accordingly, “[t]here could be no tactical reason that exclusion on
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Miranda grounds would benefit [defendant], but exclusion or redaction on RJA and/or
Fourteenth Amendment grounds would not; accordingly, defense counsel was deficient in
failing to move to exclude the DVD of the interrogation on all legally viable grounds.”
“[W]hether or not to object to evidence at trial is largely a tactical question for
counsel, and a case in which the mere failure to object would rise to such a level as to
implicate one’s state and federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel
would be an unusual one.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1312.) “An
attorney may well have a reasonable tactical reason for declining to object, and ‘“[i]f the
record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be
no satisfactory explanation.”’” (Id. at pp. 1312–1313.)
We can discern multiple reasonable tactical reasons why defense counsel may not
have objected to defendant’s statement to police and to the particular exchange related to
Detective Robles’s question regarding whether it was an “honor kill” based upon the
Racial Justice Act. First, defense counsel could reasonably have concluded the statement,
specifically the question about whether the shooting was an “honor kill,” did not violate
the Racial Justice Act. Rather, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded
Detective Robles’s question regarding whether the shooting was an “honor kill,” in
context, was a legitimate investigative inquiry into defendant’s motive for the shooting or
his state of mind, rather than evidence of Detective Robles’s bias or animus and/or
“racially discriminatory language,” as defined by the statute. Accordingly, defense
counsel could have concluded an objection on this basis would have been futile,
particularly in light of defendant’s preceding comments during the interview in which he
stated, once the victim was going to expose herself he had no choice but to kill her or
himself, and his discussion of the events leading up to the shooting in the context of his
culture. (See People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 804 [“[D]efense counsel’s
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decision not to file a motion he believes will be futile does not ‘“‘substantially impair’ …
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.”’”].) Defense counsel could have
also concluded an objection or redaction was not necessary in light of the anticipated
testimony by the defense expert on Punjabi culture, Dr. Sidhu, who discussed the concept
of “honor killing” and opined that the shooting in this matter was not an “honor killing.”
Additionally, the referenced exchange provided a further basis for the admissibility and
relevance of the defense expert testimony, which defense counsel could have determined
was critical to the defense theory that defendant was provoked. Defense counsel could
also have reasonably decided to not seek a redaction of the statement because the defense
did not want the jury to think the defense was hiding anything from them. Accordingly,
we cannot conclude “this is one of those ‘rare’ cases in which counsel’s failure to object
amounts to constitutionally deficient performance.” (People v. Bona (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 511, 522.)
Irrespective, defendant has not established he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
failure to object to the reference to an “honor kill” in defendant’s statement to police
under the Racial Justice Act and to seek redaction or exclusion on that basis. Said
differently, even if defense counsel had objected to defendant’s statement to police on the
grounds the reference to an “honor kill” and/or to his statement to police pursuant to the
Racial Justice Act, we cannot conclude defendant has established but for counsel’s error,
“the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 694.)
Initially, the record is far from clear the trial court would have found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Detective Robles’s question during the interview, in
the context of defendant’s statements, established Detective Robles “exhibited bias or
animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national
origin,” or was a use of “racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race,
ethnicity, or national origin” such that it amounted to a violation of section 745,
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subdivision (a). (See People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 876 [“[a] claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on a trial attorney’s failure to make a motion or
objection must demonstrate not only the absence of a tactical reason for the omission
[citation], but also that the motion or objection would have been meritorious”]; People v.
Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 576 [rejecting argument that failing to bring motion
established ineffectiveness; holding in order to prove prejudice under Strickland, the
defendant must establish motion would have been granted]; see also Kimmelman v.
Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375 [under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate a
motion to exclude would have been “meritorious and that there is a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in
order to demonstrate actual prejudice”]; People v. Gonzalez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 432,
438 [“To establish prejudice [as a result of counsel’s deficient representation,] … the
defendant must do more than show the motion [to suppress] would have been
meritorious…. [T]he defendant must show … the motion would have been
successful.”].)
Section 745 does not define the terms “bias” or “animus,” but specifies that the
moving party is not required to prove “intentional discrimination.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).)
The legislative findings to the Racial Justice Act include a nonexhaustive list of
potentially violative statements or conduct, including “racially incendiary or racially
coded language, images, and racial stereotypes,” and suggestion that people of a certain
race are “predisposed” to criminal conduct. (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subds. (d), (e).)
The term “bias” is defined as “an inclination of temperament or outlook” or an instance
of “personal and sometimes unreasoned judgment.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online
(2024) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bias> [as of June 27, 2024],
archived at <https://perma.cc/7ZG5-RUCU>.) And the phrase “implicit bias” is defined
57.
as “a bias or prejudice that is present but not consciously held or recognized.”3
(Merriam-Webster, supra <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implicit
%20bias> [as of June 27, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/949E-V64T>; see Bonds v.
Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821, 829 [“implicit bias can manifest itself in
other ways based on unstated or even unconscious assumptions”].)
Here, there was evidence Detective Robles used the phrase “honor killing” during
defendant’s interrogation. Dr. Sidhu testified Westerners misconceive the notion of honor
killing applying whenever a brown man kills a brown woman evidences implicit bias.
But the trial court could have reasonably concluded Detective Robles’s question related
to “honor killing,” in context, was a valid investigative inquiry related to understanding
defendant’s motive and state of mind given defendant’s immediately preceding statement
that he had to kill himself or the victim at the point she was going to expose herself and
defendant’s statements that repeatedly put the events leading up to the shooting in context
based upon his culture. That is, defendant himself explained the victim’s actions and
statements, in the context of his culture, were particularly egregious and he had to
respond, suggesting there was an expectation, which could be interpreted as a cultural
expectation in context, that he kill her or himself. Notably, the prosecution did not
discuss honor killing during trial or urge the jury to convict defendant on that basis.
Thus, this is not a situation in which we can conclude, if defense counsel objected on the
basis of the Racial Justice Act, the trial court necessarily would have concluded the state
sought or obtained a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin. (See § 745, subd. (a).)
Nevertheless, even assuming the court would have found a violation of the Racial
Justice Act on this basis, we cannot conclude defendant has established a reasonable
3 Notably, the uncodified declarations of Assembly Bill 2542 state that implicit bias “may”
inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar to intentional bias, suggesting there may be
circumstances where implicit bias does not have this effect. (Stats. 2020 , ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)
58.
probability the result of the proceeding would have been different in light of the violation.
Initially, it bears worth noting that section 745, subdivision (e) provides, “[I]f the court
finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the court shall
impose a remedy specific to the violation from the following list:
“(1) Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose
any of the following remedies:
“(A) Declare a mistrial, if requested by the defendant.
“(B) Discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury.
“(C) If the court determines that it would be in the interest of
justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations,
or reduce one or more charges. [¶] … [¶]
“(4) The remedies available under this section do not foreclose
any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the
California Constitution, or any other law.” (§ 745, subd. (e)(1)(A)–(C), (4),
italics added.)
And, in the uncodified findings and declarations accompanying the Racial Justice
Act, the Legislature declared its intent “not to punish [implicit] bias, but rather to remedy
the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system” and “to ensure
that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” (Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)
Here, since the alleged violation occurred pretrial, before a jury was empaneled
and/or evidence presented, and it was apparent on the face of the pretrial record, as
defendant concedes, it could have been remedied by redaction of the objectionable
statements. (See § 745, subd. (c) [“A motion made at trial shall be made as soon as
practicable upon the defendant learning of the alleged violation. A motion that is not
timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court”].) Though defendant
asserts his counsel should have moved to exclude his entire statement to police on the
basis of the alleged violation of the Racial Justice Act, he cites no authority in support of
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such a remedy, and we cannot conclude it is reasonably probable such a remedy would
have been granted or is appropriate under the Racial Justice Act. Rather, if the trial court
had found a violation of the Racial Justice Act based upon Detective Robles’s use of the
phrase “honor killing” and, potentially the use of the word “honor” generally, during
defendant’s police interview, the court could have redacted the challenged statements
while permitting admission of the remainder of the interview, which was relevant to the
disputed issues at trial.4 (See Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(2) [“[e]xcept as provided
by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the
Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding”]; see
generally People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 653 [drastic remedy of wholesale
suppression of evidence is only warranted in extreme circumstances of flagrant
government misconduct]; see also People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 707
[tailoring remedy “‘to the injury suffered from the … violation [without] unnecessarily
infring[ing] on competing interests’”].) Such a remedy would be “specific to the
violation,” as required under the Racial Justice Act. (§ 745, subd. (e).)
Furthermore, defendant contends his counsel’s failure to object permitted the
introduction of the exchange regarding “honor killing,” “and the prosecutor’s exploitation
of implicit bias by playing the DVD of the interrogation at trial[] was proof enough of the
elements of premeditation and deliberation required for first degree murder because, as
Dr. Sidhu explained, a true honor killing is not impulsive, but is planned and the product
of a group decision.” But we cannot conclude defendant has established he was
prejudiced by the introduction of the reference to “honor killing” and/or the references to
“honor” in the interview. As defendant acknowledges, the prosecution did not assert the
shooting was an “honor killing” or otherwise encourage the jury to rely on the concept of
4 We note defendant does not argue, nor can we conclude the other specific enumerated
remedies detailed in section 745, subdivision (e)(1) would have been appropriate here given that
the alleged violation was discoverable pretrial and could be remedied.
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“honor killing” to find the shooting was deliberate and premeditated. To the contrary, the
prosecution did not reference “honor killing” at all during argument or in its questioning
of witnesses. And the defense presented Dr. Sidhu to testify as an expert witness on
Punjabi culture. Dr. Sidhu explained the concept of “honor killing” and distinguished the
circumstances of the current case. Moreover, without even considering defendant’s
interview with police, the other evidence established, when firefighters arrived after
defendant called 911, defendant told one of them, “‘I shoot’” and he handed them bullets;
Simi’s blood was discovered on defendant’s shirt; defendant and the Simi were the only
people in the house at the time of the shooting; defendant’s gun was stored in his room,
so he would have had to go to his room to retrieve it before shooting; Simi was sitting
down on the couch and unarmed when she was shot; and defendant shot her three
times—once from the back, then he walked around and shot her twice from the front—
and all the shots were lethal. On this record, we cannot conclude it is reasonably
probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable result even if his counsel had
successfully moved to redact the reference to “honor killing” and/or “honor” during the
interview.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
As an alternative argument to his Racial Justice Act claim, defendant generally
asserts his interrogation, as translated, infused the trial with implicit bias in violation of
his due process, equal protection, and fair trial rights. He does not develop this argument
further but contends “[f]or constitutional purposes, the prosecution must show that the
implicit bias infusing the trial with the irrelevant but inflammatory honor killing theme
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Relying on Bains v. Cambra (9th Cir. 2000)
204 F.3d 964, 974 (Bains) and United States v. Cabrera (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 590,
596–597 (Cabrera), he contends the People cannot make that showing. To the extent the
issue was waived, he argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to object on this basis.
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We agree with the People that defendant forfeited this argument by failing to raise
it below. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 437.) But even if the issue was
adequately preserved for our review, we disagree with defendant’s contention that the
admission of his police interrogation in its entirety, including the exchange regarding
whether the shooting was an honor killing, violated his constitutional rights to due
process, equal protection, and a fair trial.
“‘[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due
process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.’” (People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1209, quoting People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
“‘“‘[I]rrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention from
its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.’”
[Citation.]’” (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 118.) “‘Such evidence violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause when it is so unduly prejudicial that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair.’” (Ibid.) And a “prosecutor’s conduct violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’” (People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 110–111.)
Here, we cannot conclude the challenged evidence was so prejudicial or
inflammatory that it rendered defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. During defendant’s
interview with police, Detective Robles asked one question regarding whether the
shooting was an “honor killing.” There was no other discussion of the concept of honor
killing in the interview and the prosecution did not introduce any other evidence or
argument related to honor killing at trial, nor did it urge the jury to consider a theory of
honor killing when deciding defendant’s guilt. The defense also presented an expert who
explained the concept of honor killing and that it did not apply to the circumstances of
this case. On this record, we cannot conclude the challenged evidence in this case was so
prejudicial or inflammatory that it had the effect of rendering the trial fundamentally
62.
unfair. Rather, we reject defendant’s contention his constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection, and to a fair trial were violated.
The authorities defendant relies upon are distinguishable. Bains involved a
Punjabi defendant who was charged and convicted of the murder of his sister’s ex-
husband. (Bains, supra, 204 F.3d at p. 967.) At trial, numerous witnesses for the
prosecution testified about the beliefs and customs of the Sikh community with regard to
marriage and divorce, including that, “if a husband leaves his wife, his wife is considered
to be ‘damaged goods’ and an ‘unmarketable commodity,’ thereby causing the families of
both spouses great hardship.” (Id. at p. 970.) An officer for the prosecution, who was
qualified as an expert in the Sikh religion and its practices, testified, “in the Sikh
community, when a husband in an arranged marriage unilaterally decides to divorce his
wife, the family of his wife, especially its male members, would attempt to bring the pair
back together, and if the attempt at reconciliation failed, would attempt to exact ‘violent
revenge or retribution’ in order to save face.” (Ibid.) But the officer also testified “‘such
escalation was not predictable or inevitable’” and, essentially, that “‘Sikhs are no more
violent than anyone else [citation].’” (Ibid.) Then, in closing arguments, “the prosecutor
emphasized these generalizations about followers of the Sikh faith and stated, among
other things, ‘If you do certain conduct with respect to a Sikh person’s female family
member, look out. You can expect violence,’ and ‘What you don’t understand, what [the
defendant] did understand and wanted [the victim] to understand, was the laws in the
United States is [sic] not what we’re talking about. We’re playing this game by Sikh
rules.’” (Ibid.) The prosecutor also emphasized the defendant’s statements to police
regarding the strength of his belief in the Sikh faith and the “wrongness” of the victim’s
actions towards his sister. (Ibid.) The Bains court acknowledged that, while most of the
testimony and arguments made by the prosecutor involving the Sikh religion related to
explaining Sikh beliefs concerning marriage and divorce were offered as a potential
motive and to show defendant’s intent, “[a] not insignificant portion of the prosecutor’s
63.
closing arguments … highlighted the relevant testimony in a way that went beyond
merely providing evidence of motive and intent (i.e., without limiting his generalizations
about Sikh persons as [the officer] did at the end of his own testimony) and that invited
the jury to give in to their prejudices and to buy into the various stereotypes that the
prosecutor was promoting.” (Id. at p. 974.) Accordingly, “the prosecutor relied upon
clearly and concededly objectionable arguments for the stated purpose of showing that all
Sikh persons (and thus [the] defendant by extension) are irresistibly predisposed to
violence when a family member has been dishonored … and also are completely unable
to assimilate to and to abide by the laws of the United States ….” (Id. at p. 975.) The
Bains court held, “It is evident under clearly established federal law that this very kind of
conduct by a prosecutor (to the extent that it involves either race or ethnicity) violates a
criminal defendant’s due process and equal protection rights.” (Id. at p. 974.) The court
explained the prosecutorial arguments “were actually more of a statement about the
stereotypical ‘nature’ of a particular group rather than an explanation of the beliefs
followed (to different degrees and in different ways) by some members of that group.”
(Id. at p. 975.)
In Cabrera, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed two defendants’
convictions of crack cocaine offenses based on its conclusion that “at their joint trial the
lead detective injected extraneous, prejudicial material, including impermissible
references to [the defendants’] national origin” of Cuba. (Cabrera, supra, 222 F.3d at
p. 591, fn. omitted.) During trial, the lead investigator repeatedly referred to drug activity
among “Cubans” in Cabrera’s neighborhood and he testified “that the round, flat wafers
of cocaine that he purchased from Cabrera were typical of members of the Cuban
community,” and he had only seen that form of cocaine “in Cuban cases.” (Id. at pp. 592,
593.) The detective also suggested Cubans tended to be a flight risk. (Id. at p. 593.) The
Cabrera court noted most of the detective’s references to Cubans were not relevant and
reversal of the defendants’ convictions was required under plain error review because the
64.
detective’s “repeated references to their Cuban origin and his generalizations about the
Cuban community prejudiced [the defendants] in the eyes of the jury.” (Id. at pp. 596–
597.) Specifically, the detective’s “repeated references to Cuban drug dealers had the
cumulative effect of putting the city[’s] …Cuban community on trial, rather than sticking
to the facts of [the defendants’] drug offenses.” (Id. at p. 596.) The Cabrera court held
appeals to racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice during the course of a trial violates a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial, due process rights, and equal protection
rights. (Cabrera, supra, at p. 594.)
We cannot conclude the conduct at issue here—Detective Robles’s question to
defendant in the context of the police interview regarding whether it was an honor kill—
is comparable to the improper and irrelevant evidence introduced in Bains and Cabrera
and the “clearly inflammatory” prosecutorial arguments in Bains. (Bains, supra, 204
F.3d at p. 975.) As defendant acknowledges, here, the prosecution did not pursue a
theory of honor killing at trial, introduce any other evidence or testimony related to the
term, or argue to the jury it should consider the concept of honor killing in determining
defendant’s guilt. Detective Robles’s singular question to defendant during his police
interview regarding whether the shooting was an honor killing is markedly different from
the repeated improper comments and ethnic generalizations that were introduced through
testimony and argument in Bains and Cabrera. Here, the challenged evidence was not
used as a basis to convict the defendant nor can we conclude it amounted to an appeal to
ethnic prejudice as was the case in Cabrera.
Rather, defendant has failed to establish a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
65.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
SMITH, Acting P. J.
DeSANTOS, J.
66.
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