CourtListener 9883684•People v. Banks CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 6/26/24 P. v. Banks CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081736
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE411886)
KEVIN TYRONE BANKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Steven E. Stone, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kevin Tyrone Banks appeals his assault with a deadly weapon
conviction, contending insufficient evidence supported the charge and that
the court incorrectly instructed the jury on self-defense during mutual
combat. Finding substantial evidence of deadly weapon use and no error in
the instructions, we affirm the conviction.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2021, Banks and Halbert Braley got into a fight, during
which Braley sustained various serious lacerations to his left arm and leg.
Responding officers applied tourniquets to those limbs and identified his
injuries as consistent with knife wounds. In surveillance footage capturing
the incident, Braley is heard three times saying, “[w]hy’d you stab me, Kev?”
Braley’s girlfriend, Cynthia Ellis, is also heard in the footage multiple times
asking, “[w]hy did you stab him?” When she called 911, Ms. Ellis reported
the event as a stabbing.
An ambulance transported Braley to the hospital, where staff described
his injuries as “stab wounds” caused by a “machete-type knife.” Braley’s left
arm suffered a brachial artery laceration, transections of his radial and ulnar
nerves and biceps and triceps muscles, as well as damage to the flexor
tendons in his forearm. These injuries required surgical repair. Braley’s left
leg required an operation to repair severe damage to his Achilles tendon,
posterior tibial tendon, plantaris tendon, tibial nerve, and posterior tibial
artery. Braley remained in the hospital for seven days before recovering
sufficiently for discharge.
On June 28, 2022, the case went to trial. At its conclusion, Banks’s
attorney asked the court to give the self-defense and mutual combat
instructions. Over the People’s objection the court agreed to read the
self-defense instruction; defense withdrew its mutual combat instruction
request. During deliberations the jury sent a note to the court asking, “If
both people instigate a fight, do either have a right to claim self-defense?”
2
With the agreement of both parties, the court responded by sending into the
jury room the standard mutual combat instruction:1
A person who engages in mutual combat has a right
to self-defense only if, one, he actually in good faith tried to
stop fighting; two, he indicated by word or by conduct to his
opponent in a way that a reasonable person would
understand that he wanted to stop fighting and that he had
stopped fighting; and three, he . . . [¶] gave his opponent a
chance to stop fighting.
If the defendant meets these requirements, he then
has a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to
fight.
A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued
by mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be
expressly stated or implied and must occur before the claim
to self-defense arose.
The jury convicted Banks of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,2
§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), finding that he personally used a knife and inflicted great
bodily injury (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 12022.7, subd. (a)). Banks admitted
two strike priors and two serious felony priors, with the court later
dismissing one of each before imposing judgment. The court then sentenced
Banks to 14 years in state prison.3 Banks timely appealed the conviction.
1 CALCRIM No. 3471.
2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 The court imposed the three-year middle term for felony assault,
doubled to six years for the prior strike, plus five years for the serious felony
prior conviction, and an additional three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement.
3
III. DISCUSSION
Banks presents us with two arguments. First, he challenges the
evidence in support of his assault with a deadly weapon conviction, claiming
it was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Second, he contends
CALCRIM No. 3471 did not properly instruct the jury regarding self-defense
in the context of mutual combat.4
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Banks claims there was insufficient evidence that he used a deadly
weapon because none of the witnesses testified that they saw a weapon, and
the surveillance footage did not depict a weapon or movement consistent with
a stabbing.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) We presume “ ‘ “in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a “deadly weapon” is “any
object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be
4 Without elaborating or citing authority, Banks also briefly asserts,
“The fact that appellant may also have been injured suggests the evidence
was insufficient to show that his conduct was assaultive as opposed to simply
reckless.” We disregard this argument as unsupported. (Holden v. City of
San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418 (“ ‘[W]here a point is merely
asserted by [appellant] without any [substantive] argument of or authority
for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no
discussion.’ ”].)
4
capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.” ’ ”
(People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) “Great bodily injury” means
“significant or substantial injury,” but “[p]ermanent or protracted
impairment, disfigurement, or loss of function . . . is not required.” (People v.
Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087.)
If the assault causes injuries, “the nature of such injuries and their
location are relevant facts for consideration in determining whether an object
was used in a manner capable of producing and likely to produce great bodily
injury.” (People v. Brown, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) Indeed, the use of
a deadly weapon can be inferred from the victim’s injuries. (People v. Burton
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 457.)
Braley suffered three deep lacerations to his arm and leg, requiring two
tourniquets to stop the bleeding and a week-long hospital stay with multiple
surgeries to repair the damaged muscles, tendons, nerves, and arteries.
These injuries were substantial and not the type that would result in the
absence of a sharp object. After reviewing both Braley’s medical records, and
photographs from the crime scene depicting his injuries, the jury could
reasonably conclude that Banks used a deadly weapon on Braley.
Additionally, the responding officers and medical staff that treated Braley
described his injuries as being consistent with knife wounds. Further, both
Braley and Ellis referred to Banks’s actions as a stabbing. We therefore find
sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Banks used a deadly
weapon during the assault on Braley.
B. Jury Instructions
Banks asserts CALCRIM No. 3471 did not adequately explain “mutual
combat” under the circumstances of this case. He further contends that the
instruction imposed a burden on him “to prove that he tried to stop fighting,
5
he did stop fighting, and he gave Braley a chance to stop fighting,” thereby
relieving “the prosecution of its duty to prove that appellant did not act in
self-defense.”5
“ ‘If a supplemental instruction is given, . . . its correctness presents
a question of law that we review de novo.’ ” (People v. Doane (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 965, 980.) We determine “ ‘whether there is a “reasonable
likelihood” that the jury understood the charge as the defendant asserts.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3471, the trial court instructed the jury
that “A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual consent
or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must
occur before the claim to self-defense arose.” Banks does not describe how
this explanation was inadequate, nor can we find any impropriety. The
instruction addressed the scenario posed by the jury, which was the
application of self-defense “[i]f both people instigate a fight.” It also complied
with the legal definition of mutual combat. (People v. Ross (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1046–1047 [“ ‘mutual combat’ consists of fighting by
mutual intention or consent, as most clearly reflected in an express or
implied agreement to fight. . . . there must be evidence from which the jury
could reasonably find that both combatants actually consented or intended to
fight before the claimed occasion for self-defense arose” (italics omitted)].) We
therefore find no error in the trial court’s mutual combat explanation.
5 The People argue that Banks forfeited his challenge to CALCRIM
No. 3471 by failing to object in the trial court. We agree with Banks that an
objection was not required to preserve the issue for appeal because, if Banks
were correct, such an error would have affected his substantial rights.
(§ 1259; People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579–580.)
6
Turning to the alleged improper burden shifting, Banks claims that by
stating the agreement to fight “must occur before the claim to self-defense
arose,” the instruction imposed a burden on him to prove that he withdrew
from the fight. This phrase merely addresses the requisite sequence of events
for self-defense to apply in a mutual combat scenario.
On the other hand, several other instructions given to the jury clearly
placed the burden of proof on the People, both generally and in the context of
self-defense. (See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 3470 [“Right to Self-Defense [¶] . . . [¶]
The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in lawful self-defense.”]; CALCRIM No. 875 [“Assault
With Deadly Weapon [¶] . . . [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this
crime, the People must prove that: [¶] . . . [¶] 5. The defendant did not act in
self-defense.”]; CALCRIM No. 220 [“Reasonable Doubt [¶] . . . [¶] A defendant
in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires
that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; and
CALCRIM No. 355 [“Defendant’s Right Not to Testify [¶] . . . [¶] [a defendant]
may rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the People have failed to
prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.”].) Under these circumstances,
it is not reasonably likely that the jury interpreted CALCRIM No. 3471 as
shifting any burden of proof to Banks.
Given our discussion above, we find no error in the court’s use of
CALCRIM No. 3471.
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
8
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