Stephenson-Cocke v. Cocke CA2/6

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Filed 6/24/24 Stephenson-Cocke v. Cocke CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THERESA STEPHENSON-COCKE, 2d Crim. No. B328830
(Super. Ct. No. 17PR-0378)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

HUGH J. COCKE, as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Hugh J. Cocke appeals a judgment nullifying the First
Amendment (First Amendment) to the Hugh D. Cocke 2005
Revocable Trust (Trust) and surcharging him for his actions as
trustee. We affirm.
This appeal concerns the Trust that divided Hugh D.’s
property equally among his seven children, including his son
Hugh J. and his daughter Theresa.1 The Trust assets included a
140-acre parcel of real property in Paso Robles, two unimproved

1 We refer to the settlor and beneficiaries by their first

names not from disrespect, but to ease the reader’s task.
parcels in Cambria, and various bank accounts. Shortly before
Hugh D.’s death in 2006, Hugh J. suggested that his father
amend the Trust to alter the shares that Theresa and other
beneficiaries would receive. Hugh D. then amended the Trust by
the First Amendment. The amended terms required Theresa to
perform certain acts to receive a 5 percent share of the 140-acre
Paso Robles real property in addition to the Cambria real
property. Theresa was unaware of the First Amendment and did
not perform its conditions. Hugh J. later sold the Paso Robles
and Cambria properties and distributed Trust assets contrary to
the terms of the Trust or the First Amendment. Theresa brought
this lawsuit in 2017, alleging Hugh J.’s breaches of the Trust.
She sought an accounting, damages, and other remedies.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2005, Hugh D. created the Trust which left his estate in
equal shares to his children Hugh J., John, Mark, Paul, Theresa,
Catherine, and Mary. The main assets of the Trust were a 140-
acre parcel at 1980 Niderer Road in Paso Robles, two unimproved
parcels in Cambria, and various bank accounts. One year later,
Hugh D. created the First Amendment to the Trust at Hugh J.’s
suggestion. This amendment altered Theresa’s share of the Trust
estate from one-seventh to 5 percent of the Niderer Road parcel.
Before Theresa could receive the 5 percent share, however, the
First Amendment required her to split the southern 20 acres of
her own real property with her sisters Mary and Catherine. In
return for this split, Theresa would receive the unimproved real
property in Cambria.
The Niderer Road property was purchased many years
prior by Theresa and her parents as a 181-acre parcel. They later
split the 181 acres unevenly despite their respective
contributions to the purchase price, with Theresa and her
husband taking 41 acres and her parents taking 140 acres. Hugh
D.’s estate plan contemplated each of his seven children receiving
20 acres of the Niderer Road property, hence the 140 acres.
The Trust appointed Hugh J. as trustee following his
father’s death. Hugh J. did not provide Theresa a copy of the
Trust or First Amendment and did not consult with her
regarding a split of her own 41-acre property with Mary and
Catherine. In 2012, Hugh J. sold the Cambria parcels and gave
the $15,000 proceeds only to Catherine. In 2016, he sold the 140-
acre parcel and distributed the proceeds (albeit unequally) to
each beneficiary except Theresa. Hugh J. also did not distribute
any bank account proceeds to Theresa. Prior to the sale of the
140-acre parcel, Hugh J. lived there; he did not pay any rent and
used Trust funds to pay the property taxes and insurance.
Hugh J. also did not provide accountings to any Trust
beneficiary and he failed to keep receipts or evidence of every
Trust expenditure. In 2009, he bought real property in
Sacramento with Trust funds and permitted his daughter to live
there. She paid a low rent until 2016, and has not paid any rent
since then.
Construction of Shop Building and Water Well
Purchase of Grader
At her parents’ request, Theresa acquiesced to the
construction of a shop building on her property. She agreed on
the condition that the building would be assessed separately and
that her parents would pay the property taxes therefor.
Theresa’s parents constructed the shop building without
obtaining required permits. After the parents’ deaths, the county
required that the building be brought to code standards or torn
down. Hugh J. brought the building to code standards using
Trust assets so that he could continue to use the shop. Theresa
again acquiesced. The trial court found that the value of the shop
building was $65,000.
During his time as trustee, Hugh J. used Trust funds to
construct a water well on Theresa’s property. It was built
without Theresa’s knowledge or request and she has never used
it. The trial court found that $9,418 in Trust funds were spent
constructing the well.
Hugh J. also used $5,000 in Trust funds to purchase a
grader to grade the common road that leads to the 140-acre
parcel and Theresa’s real property. Hugh J. abandoned the
grader when he moved from the larger parcel.
On October 19, 2017, Theresa filed a petition seeking
removal of Hugh J. as trustee, an accounting, damages,
surcharges, and nullification of portions of the First Amendment.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Hugh J.
breached his duties as trustee and engaged in willful misconduct
and gross negligence. The court removed Hugh J. as trustee,
surcharged him for his breaches, and nullified the First
Amendment because his actions made it impossible for its
conditions to be satisfied.
Hugh J. appeals and contends that the trial court 1)
exceeded its authority in nullifying the First Amendment, and 2)
erred by surcharging him as trustee without accounting for
benefits Theresa received.
DISCUSSION
I.
Hugh J. points out that Theresa did not present evidence
that the First Amendment was invalid and that at trial she
requested only the 5 percent interest in the 140-acre parcel. He
adds that modification of a trust is only permitted when
necessary to accomplish the settlor’s purpose and intent. Hugh J.
asserts that de novo review of the Trust and the First
Amendment applies.
Probate Code section 15409, subdivision (a)2 provides: “On
petition by a trustee or beneficiary, the court may modify the
administrative or dispositive provisions of the trust or terminate
the trust if, owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and
not anticipated by the settlor, the continuation of the trust under
its terms would defeat or substantially impair the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust. . . .” Unusual or
emergent circumstances afford the basis for the court to deviate
from the terms of a trust. (Estate of Gilliland (1974) 44
Cal.App.3d 32, 37, 40.)
The trial court’s ruling nullifying the First Amendment was
reasonable because the conditions imposed on Theresa were
impossible to carry out. Hugh J. did not provide Theresa with a
copy of the Trust or First Amendment and she was initially
unaware of the conditions. Hugh J. then sold the 140-acre parcel
as well as the Cambria parcels and distributed the proceeds to
other beneficiaries. His breaches made it impossible for the
conditions of the amendment to be satisfied.
Circumstances often arise not contemplated by the trustor.
“ ‘[H]ad they been anticipated, [they] would undoubtedly have
been provided for, where the aid of the court . . . must be invoked
to grant relief . . . ; and in such cases the court must, as far as
may be, occupy the place of the party creating the trust, and do

2 All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless

stated otherwise.
with the fund what he would have dictated had he anticipated
the emergency.’ ” (Adams v. Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 352, 360-361
[modification of trust to prevent loss or destruction of trust
property].)
Moreover, the trial court was empowered “[to] grant the
plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the
complaint and embraced within the issue.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 580, subd. (a).) “[W]hen an answer is filed, the case becomes
one in which the court is authorized regardless of the prayer to
grant any relief consistent with the plaintiff’s averments.”
(Wright v. Rogers (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 349, 367.) The court was
not limited to granting Theresa a 5 percent interest in the 140-
acre parcel free of the conditions imposed by the First
Amendment. There is no abuse of discretion by nullifying the
First Amendment.
II.
Hugh J. asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to find benefits to Theresa from the $65,000 shop building
and $9,418 water well. He points out that section 16421 provides
that the remedies against a trustee are exclusively in equity and
the beneficiary must account for benefits received. (Ibid. [“The
remedies of a beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively in
equity”].) Hugh J. relies upon Orange Catholic Foundation v.
Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283 to contend that the benefits
received by Theresa from the shop building and water well
should be offset from her share of the Trust estate. (Id. at pp.
285-286 [the court has discretion to excuse a trustee for breach of
trust if it is equitable to do so].)
We review the surcharge orders to a trustee pursuant to an
abuse of discretion standard. (Estate of Moore (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 1101, 1105.) “A ruling that constitutes an abuse of
discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’”
(Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) The facts underlying a surcharge
order are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Estate of Fain
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 987.)
The trial court considered this argument and ruled that the
shop building and water well costs would be charged against
Hugh J.’s interests in the Trust because they were not built at
Theresa’s request, and she has never used them. (The court
declined to charge the road grader against any one beneficiary
and ordered that, if sold, the proceeds should be shared equally
among all beneficiaries.)
A party is not entitled to reimbursement for improvements
voluntarily made to another’s land in the absence of an express or
implied agreement to pay. (Kershman v. Kershman (1961) 192
Cal.App.2d 18, 22.) The shop building and water well are
permanent improvements affixed to Theresa’s property not at her
request or for her benefit. (Civ. Code, § 1013 [“When a person
affixes his property to the land of another, without an agreement
permitting him to remove it, the thing affixed . . . belongs to the
owner of the land, unless he chooses to require the former to
remove it or the former elects to exercise the right of removal”].)
Section 16440, subdivision (b) provides that if a “trustee
has acted reasonably and in good faith under the circumstances
as known to the trustee,” a court has discretion to excuse the
trustee from liability for a breach of trust if it would be equitable
to do so. Here the trial court specifically ruled that Hugh J.
engaged in willful misconduct and/or gross negligence. Thus,
Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th
283, 285-286, is not helpful to him. The court’s ruling regarding
the shop building and water well is reasonable and not an abuse
of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Theresa shall
recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J.

CODY, J.
Tana L. Coates, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Christian E. Iversen for Defendant and Appellant.
The Law Office of Clay A. Schroeder and Clay A. Schroeder
for Plaintiff and Respondent

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