CourtListener 9567898•People v. Rogers CA1/5
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Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Rogers CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A168539
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. 22CR02037)
HARVEY LEE ROGERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Harvey Lee Rogers (appellant) appeals from the judgment following his
plea of no contest to driving a vehicle under the influence of a drug (DUI) and
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (f)). We remand for a new
sentencing hearing.
BACKGROUND
According to the probation report, appellant was driving a car and
collided with a motorcycle, severely injuring the motorcycle driver and
passenger. Appellant told the responding officer that he had not used
methamphetamine that day, but a blood test revealed the presence of
methamphetamine.
1
Appellant pled no contest to driving under the influence and admitted
two enhancements: personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1
§ 12022.7, subd. (b)), and causing injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code,
§ 23558). The trial court sentenced appellant to the low term of 16 months
for the DUI, plus consecutive terms of five years on the great bodily injury
enhancement and one year on the multiple victim enhancement.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the trial court prejudicially failed to recognize the
scope of its discretion to strike one of the enhancements pursuant to a recent
statutory amendment.
“Section 1385, subdivision (a) (§ 1385(a)), authorizes a trial court to
dismiss an action ‘in furtherance of justice’ on its own motion.” (People v.
Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 409, review granted May 29, 2024,
S283924.) “Prior to 2022, section 1385 ‘did not provide direction as to how
courts should exercise [their] discretion’ to dismiss or strike enhancements.
[Citation.] But, effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81) amended section 1385 to specify mitigating
circumstances courts must consider when deciding whether to strike
enhancements in furtherance of justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; [citation].)”
(Dain, at pp. 409–410.) These amendments were in effect at the time of
appellant’s July 2023 sentencing hearing.
Section 1385, subdivision (c) (§ 1385(c)), added by Senate Bill 81 (Dain,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 410), provides: “(1) Notwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” As relevant here, one of the mitigating circumstances is:
“Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(§ 1385(c)(2)(B).)2
Appellant argues the trial court was unaware of this new direction as
to how to exercise its discretion.3 “ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing
2 Appellant disavows any argument that dismissal is mandatory when
a mitigating circumstance is found. (See People v. Mazur (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444 [“California courts have consistently rejected this
mandatory dismissal argument in construing the ‘shall be dismissed’
language of subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C).”], review granted February 14,
2024, S283229.) Appellant also disclaims any argument that section 1385(c)
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal when mitigating
circumstances are present, an issue currently pending before the Supreme
Court. (People v. Walker, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.)
3 The People do not contend appellant forfeited the claim by failing to
raise it below. (See People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840 (Panozo)
[where the appellant “does not challenge the manner in which the trial court
exercised its sentencing discretion but rather its apparent misapprehension of
statutory sentencing obligations[,] . . . forfeiture . . . is inappropriate”].) We
therefore need not and do not address appellant’s alternative contention that
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise
the challenge below. Appellant has also asserted his ineffective assistance of
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decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing
court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose
sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material
aspect of a defendant’s record.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
424 (Salazar).) “ ‘If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous
understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope
of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the
law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of
improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed
discretion and is subject to reversal.’ ” (Wade v. Superior Court (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 694, 709 (Wade).)
While “sentencing courts are generally presumed to have acted in
accordance with legitimate sentencing objectives,” “where the record is not
silent, but rather is ‘at the very least ambiguous as to whether the court
understood its [statutory] obligation,” the presumption cannot be relied on.
(Panozo, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 839.) Thus, where the defense counsel,
prosecutor, and probation report all failed to reference the court’s statutory
obligation to consider the defendant’s military service-related post-traumatic
stress disorder in considering his suitability for probation and as a mitigating
factor in selecting a term of imprisonment; and where the court’s
identification of the factors it considered in making these determinations did
not include the defendant’s military service-related post-traumatic stress
disorder, the record was ambiguous and remand was required. (Id. at
pp. 837–839; see also Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 716, fn. 9
counsel claim in a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus, case No.
A169172. We have denied that petition by separate order filed this date.
4
[presumption of correctness does not apply to exercise of discretion where
“the court stated its considerations on the record, and none pertained to” the
appropriate legal principle]; People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 852–
854.)
Neither the probation report, the prosecutor, nor defense counsel made
any reference to section 1385(c). In its pronouncement of the sentence, the
trial court did not discuss the enhancements other than to impose sentence.
Most significantly, the court subsequently stated its reasons for denying
defense counsel’s request to run the sentence on either enhancement
concurrently instead of consecutively: “I think as a matter of law the only
thing the court could do is strike the punishment under the enhancement, I
can’t [run] them concurrently. And based on the fact that there were two
victims in this case that suffered horrific injuries that are life lasting, the
court is not inclined to strike the punishment for either enhancement. [¶] The
court would note he ple[]d to one 12022.7(b) allegation, though there were
two victims in this case.” In discussing its discretion to strike an
enhancement, the court did not mention the mitigating circumstance of two
enhancements or whether dismissal of one enhancement would endanger
public safety. Instead, the court’s sole focus was on the impact of the crime.
While the physical harm caused by the crime may impact whether dismissal
would endanger public safety, it is not the only consideration in this
intrinsically forward-looking determination. Accordingly, the record is
ambiguous as to whether the trial court was aware of the scope of its
discretion pursuant to the amended statute.
Where a court was unaware of the scope of its discretion, “ ‘the
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly
indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even
5
if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (Salazar, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 424.) The record does not so indicate. The trial court found
the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances in
sentencing appellant to the low term on the DUI, indicating the court was
open to some leniency in sentencing. Moreover, the record indicates
appellant is in his 70s with multiple health issues, and the trial court noted,
based on the letters submitted on appellant’s behalf, “[i]t sounds like you had
people that have supported you in the most recent timeframe after this
incident.” These factors could support a finding that dismissal of an
enhancement would not endanger public safety.4 The court’s decision not to
strike one of the enhancements, apparently based on its understanding of the
prior version of section 1385, does not constitute a clear indication of how the
court would exercise its discretion under the amended statute.
Accordingly, we will remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion
under section 1385(c).
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the trial
court shall exercise its discretion under section 1385(c). In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.
4 We express no opinion as to whether the trial court should so find or
how the trial court should exercise its discretion under section 1385(c) on
remand.
6
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
(A168539)
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