CourtListener 9567897•Soltero v. Precise Distribution
Testo completo
Filed 6/18/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
NELIDA SOLTERO, D083308
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2203669)
PRECISE DISTRIBUTION, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, David Cohn, Judge. Affirmed.
OZ Law Group, Greg Ozhekim, and Susan K. Laffer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Gonzalez Weerasuriya and Suren N. Weerasuriya for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Precise Distribution, Inc. (Precise) appeals from an order denying its
motion to compel arbitration of an employment action brought against it by
Nelida Soltero, who previously worked in a Precise distribution warehouse.
Precise argues the trial court should have compelled arbitration under the
terms of an arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time Staffing
Services, LLC (Real Time), a temporary staffing agency that placed Soltero
with Precise as a temporary worker. Real Time itself is not a party to the
lawsuit. We conclude that the trial court correctly denied Precise’s motion
because it was not a party to the arbitration agreement between Soltero and
Real Time, and it cannot compel arbitration based on theories of equitable
estoppel, third-party beneficiary, or agency. We therefore affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Real Time is a temporary staffing agency that hires and places
temporary workers at businesses in California, including Precise. Real Time
is a subsidiary of EmployBridge, LLC (EmployBridge).1
Soltero applied for employment with Real Time in December 2016. As
part of the onboarding process, she electronically signed the Spanish
language version of a Mutual Agreement Regarding Arbitration and Class
Claims (Agreement). The appellate record includes a purported translation
of the document into English.
The Agreement defined “the [C]ompany” to include EmployBridge,
multiple other named companies, “and all related entities,” but not their
clients.2 The Agreement stated that in the event of “any dispute between
[Soltero] and the [C]ompany relating to or arising out of the employment or
the termination of” her employment, “[Soltero] and the Company agree to
1 Real Time does business in California as Select Staffing, Inc. For
clarity, we refer to it as Real Time throughout this opinion.
2 The accuracy of the English translation is questionable as it contains
some garbled language. Because neither party disputes the translation, we
construe it as best we can. According to the translation, the Agreement
defined “Company” as “EmployBridge, StaffingSolutions, ProLogistix,
ResourceMFG, resource accounting, a staff, also employment,
MedicalSolutions, selecting staff, SelectRemedy, RemX specialty staffing,
personal intelligent remedy and Westaff and all related entities [sic] . . . .”
2
submit all such claims or disputes to be resolved by final and binding
arbitration, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Federal
Arbitration Act.” The Agreement stated that such disputes included, but
were not limited to, grievances for breach of contract, wages, compensation,
reimbursement, the Federal Labor Standards Act “and status of comparable
or local the laws [sic].”
Real Time placed Soltero on a temporary work assignment with Precise
from October 2017 through January 2021. A Real Time manager worked
onsite at Precise, serving as the main point of contact for Real Time
employees assigned to work there.
In February 2022, Soltero filed a class action complaint against Precise
for its alleged failure to provide required meal periods and rest breaks to
employees, failure to pay premiums for meal and rest break violations, and
related claims for inaccurate wage statements and failure to immediately pay
all wages due upon separation of employment, including meal and rest break
premiums. Soltero asserted these claims under identified provisions of the
Labor Code, the Industrial Welfare Commission’s wage orders, and the unfair
competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). Soltero did not name
Real Time as a defendant. The complaint mentioned Real Time only in the
venue paragraph, which alleged that Soltero “was staffed by [Real Time],
located in San Bernardino, to work at Precise’s distribution warehouse.” The
complaint did not mention any of the terms of Soltero’s employment
agreement with Real Time.
Precise filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Agreement
between Soltero and Real Time. Precise argued that even as a nonsignatory
to the Agreement, it was entitled to compel arbitration based on theories of
equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, and agency. Soltero opposed the
3
motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied Precise’s motion to compel
arbitration.
DISCUSSION
By its terms, the Agreement only requires arbitration of employment
disputes “between [Soltero] and the [C]ompany.” Although Precise is not a
party to the Agreement and does not claim that it falls within its definition of
“the Company,” Precise argues that it is nevertheless entitled to compel
arbitration under the Agreement based on theories of equitable estoppel,
third-party beneficiary, and agency. We address each theory in turn.
I
Standard of Review
Because the material facts are undisputed, we review de novo whether
the trial court correctly denied Precise’s motion to compel arbitration.
(Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 541, 547 (Fuentes);
Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 226, fn. 9 (Goldman).)
II
Equitable Estoppel
Although there is a strong public policy in favor of contractual
arbitration, there is no policy compelling anyone to accept arbitration of
controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. (Victoria v. Superior
Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 744.) Because arbitration is a matter of contract,
the basic rule is that one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be
bound by it or invoke it—with limited exceptions. (DMS Services, LLC v.
Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352.)
One such exception is the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Equitable
estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights they otherwise would have
had against another when their own conduct renders assertion of those rights
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inequitable. (Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.) As applied in the
arbitration context, “if a plaintiff relies on the terms of an agreement to
assert his or her claims against a nonsignatory defendant, the plaintiff may
be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause of that very
agreement. In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration
clause cannot ‘have it both ways’; the signatory ‘cannot, on the one hand, seek
to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the
agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand,
deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.’ ”
(Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.)
“[T]he sine qua non for application of equitable estoppel as the basis for
allowing a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration clause is that the claims
[the] plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory must be dependent upon, or
founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the underlying contractual
obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.” (Goldman,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 217–218.) “ ‘The plaintiff’s actual dependence
on the underlying contract in making out the claim against the
nonsignatory . . . is . . . always the sine qua non of an appropriate situation for
applying equitable estoppel.’ ” (Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 552,
internal quotation marks omitted.) “This requirement comports with, and
indeed derives from, the very purposes of the doctrine: to prevent a party
from using the terms or obligations of an agreement as the basis for his
claims against a nonsignatory, while at the same time refusing to arbitrate
with the nonsignatory under another clause of that same agreement.”
(Goldman, at p. 221.)
Applying these principles, we conclude that the trial court correctly
declined to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
5
Soltero is suing Precise for its alleged violations of Labor Code provisions
governing meal and rest breaks, premium payments for missed meal and rest
breaks, wage statements, and immediate payment of final wages upon
separation of employment. Her complaint does not mention or rely on any
provision of her employment agreement with Real Time as a basis for
imposing liability on Precise. Accordingly, Soltero’s complaint against
Precise is not “founded in and inextricably bound up with the obligations
imposed by the agreement containing the arbitration clause.” (Goldman,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.) She is not trying to have it both ways
because she is not seeking to impose liability on Precise based on the terms of
her employment agreement with Real Time while simultaneously seeking to
avoid the arbitration clause of that same agreement.
Precise relies on the holding of Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 782 (Garcia), which also involved the Real Time staffing agency.
In that case, the plaintiff Garcia signed an arbitration agreement with Real
Time as part of its hiring process. Real Time assigned him to work as a
temporary employee for Pexco, which was not a party to the arbitration
agreement. After Garcia was terminated, he filed a class action suit against
both Real Time and Pexco for violations of the Labor Code and unfair
business practices pertaining to payment of wages. Real Time and Pexco
moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion, relying
on theories of equitable estoppel and agency as to Pexco. Garcia appealed the
order only as to Pexco—not disputing that the trial court had properly
ordered arbitration as to Real Time. (Id. at pp. 784–785.)
In affirming the trial court’s equitable estoppel ruling as to Pexco, the
Court of Appeal first noted that “[e]ven though Garcia’s claims are styled as
Labor Code violations, the arbitration agreement applies” because “Labor
6
Code violations are clearly, and indeed expressly, included as one of the types
of disputes covered by the arbitration agreement.” (Garcia, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 786.) The court noted that even Garcia had conceded that
the signatory “Real Time may compel arbitration of his statutory claims
under the agreement.” (Ibid.)
The court went on to reject Garcia’s argument that the nonsignatory
Pexco could not compel arbitration because he was only asserting statutory
claims under the Labor Code and was not seeking to enforce the contractual
terms of his employment agreement with Real Time. (Garcia, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at pp. 786–787.) Relying on Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262 (Boucher), the Garcia court noted: “There, like
here, the claims presumed the existence of the employment agreement with
the signatory defendant.” (Garcia, at p. 787.)
The court also found it significant that Garcia was suing both Real
Time and Pexco for the same Labor Code violations on a theory that they
were his joint employers. The Court of Appeal explained: “[I]t is inequitable
for the arbitration about Garcia’s assignment with Pexco to proceed with Real
Time, while preventing Pexco from participating. This is because Garcia’s
claims against Pexco are rooted in his employment relationship with Real
Time, and the governing arbitration agreement expressly includes statutory
wage and hour claims.” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 787–788.)
Since the Garcia decision, several federal district courts have
questioned whether it correctly applied California’s equitable estoppel
doctrine. (See, e.g., Soto v. O.C. Communications, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Nov. 21,
2018, No. 17-cv-00251-VC) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199011, at *2 & fn. 1
[“Garcia’s interpretation of the equitable estoppel exception may be
inconsistent with traditional notions of equitable estoppel and other
7
California Court of Appeal cases”]; Shoals v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc.
(E.D. Cal., Oct. 31, 2018, NO. 2:18-cv-2355 WBS EFB) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186729, at *21–*23 [characterizing Garcia as “an outlier decision” on
equitable estoppel that “appears to be contrary to established law and has not
been adopted by the California Supreme Court” and “is inconsistent with the
purpose of the doctrine”].)3
For several reasons, we agree that Garcia misapplied California law on
this issue. First, the court relied heavily on the fact that the arbitration
clause applied to claims of Labor Code violations. (Garcia, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 786.) Under the equitable estoppel doctrine, however, a
nonsignatory defendant cannot compel arbitration merely because the scope
of the arbitration agreement extends to the types of claims asserted by the
plaintiff. (See Franklin, supra, 998 F.3d at p. 872 [the “scope-of-arbitration
analysis of a claim between two signatories provides no guidance for whether
claims against a nonsignatory are ‘intertwined with’ the employment
contract”].) Rather, the critical question is whether the plaintiff’s claims
against the nonsignatory defendant actually rely on the terms of the contract
containing the arbitration clause. (Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 552;
Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 231.) If so, the plaintiff cannot avoid
the arbitration clause. If not, the nonsignatory defendant cannot compel
arbitration under the equitable estoppel doctrine—even if the plaintiff is
3 In Franklin v. Community Regional Medical Center (9th Cir. 2021) 998
F.3d 867 (Franklin), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “some federal
district courts have disagreed with Garcia’s result” (id. at p. 874, fn. 9), but
concluded that absent any indication the California Supreme Court would
reject Garcia, it would follow Garcia’s interpretation of California law as a
matter of comity and federalism (id. at pp. 871–874).
8
asserting claims of a type that would otherwise fall within the scope of the
arbitration agreement if asserted against a signatory defendant.
Second, Garcia erred by relying on the fact that the Labor Code claims
against the nonsignatory defendant “presumed the existence of the
employment agreement with the signatory defendant.” (Garcia, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 787.) As the Goldman court explained, it is not enough that
the plaintiff’s complaint presumes the existence of a contract that contains an
arbitration clause. (Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 231.) In this
context, “ ‘presum[ing] the existence of’ an agreement is not a stand-alone
principle, but merely an elaboration of the underlying principle, stated in all
the cases: actual reliance on the terms of the agreement to impose liability on
the nonsignatory.” (Ibid.; see also Mattson Technology, Inc. v. Applied
Materials, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1156 [“Nor is it sufficient
that . . . the controversy would not have occurred but for the existence of the
contract, provided the contract is not the basis for the claims against the
nonsignatory.”].) For example, in the Boucher case cited by Garcia, the
plaintiff’s claims against his employer’s successor did not just presume the
existence of his employment contract containing the arbitration agreement.
Rather, the plaintiff actually relied on the terms of his employment contract
in suing the nonsignatory successor employer, including by asserting claims
for breach of and interference with the employment contract.4 (Boucher,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266, 272–273.)
4 In Boucher, the plaintiff’s original employer transferred all of its
operations and assets to another subsidiary of the same parent company,
which tried to give the plaintiff a less generous compensation package. The
plaintiff refused to accept the offer, was terminated, and then sued the
successor employer for claims including breach of his contract with the
original employer. (Boucher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266.)
9
Finally, the Garcia court did not explain how Garcia’s Labor Code
claims against Pexco actually relied on the substantive terms of his
employment agreement with Real Time. The court observed that “Garcia’s
claims against Pexco are rooted in his employment relationship with Real
Time” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 787, italics added), but that is not
a legally sufficient basis for equitable estoppel absent actual reliance on the
terms of the contract containing the arbitration agreement to establish
liability. (Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 231.) The court generally
described Garcia’s claims as being “for violations of the Labor Code and
unfair business practices pertaining to payment of wages during his
assignment with Pexco.” (Garcia, at p. 785.) Although these statutory claims
may have been rooted in Garcia’s employment relationship with Real Time,
that does not explain how they relied on the terms of his employment
contract with Real Time as a basis for imposing liability against Pexco.5 (See
Elijahjuan v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 15, 23 [“petitioners’
rights under the Labor Code are distinct from their contractual rights . . . .”].)
For all these reasons, we decline to follow Garcia’s equitable estoppel
holding. We further note that this portion of the Garcia decision was not
5 Many Labor Code claims are rooted in the employment relationship but
arise independently of the terms of the plaintiff’s employment contract. For
example, Labor Code claims for failure to pay the legal minimum wage or
overtime compensation do not depend on the employment contract. (See Lab.
Code, § 1194, subd. (a) [authorizing such claims “[n]otwithstanding any
agreement to work for a lesser wage”].) The statutory duty to provide
accurate wage statements also is not derived from any contractual obligation.
(Id., § 226, subd. (a).) The same is true of the employer’s duties to provide
meal and rest breaks (id., § 226.7, subd. (b)), pay meal and rest break
premiums, (id., subd. (c)), and pay final wages within 72 hours of separation
of employment or face additional waiting time penalties (Lab. Code, §§ 201,
202, 203).
10
necessary to the result because the court also concluded that the
nonsignatory Pexco could compel arbitration under a separate agency
exception. (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 788.) On that issue, the court
again relied on the plaintiff’s own allegations that Pexco and Real Time were
joint employers acting as agents for one another. (Ibid.) Nothing we say here
is intended to cast doubt on the court’s application of the agency exception.
(See Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418 [where complaint
alleges that nonsignatory defendants acted as agents for signatory defendant,
the nonsignatory defendants are entitled to benefit of arbitration
agreement].)
Finally, even assuming that Garcia correctly applied the equitable
estoppel doctrine, it is distinguishable because Soltero is not suing both
Precise and Real Time on a joint employer theory. Instead, she is only suing
the nonsignatory Precise. In Hernandez v. Meridian Management Services,
LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1214 (Hernandez), the court declined to apply
equitable estoppel to compel arbitration in analogous circumstances. There,
the plaintiff Hernandez signed an arbitration contract with an employer
called Intelex, but she also worked for a variety of other related and jointly
owned and operated companies referred to in the court’s opinion as “Other
Firms.” The Other Firms did not contract for arbitration with Hernandez.
After Hernandez was terminated, she brought employment claims against
the Other Firms, but not Intelex. The Other Firms moved to compel
arbitration under the arbitration agreement with Intelex based on theories of
equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, and agency. The trial court
denied the motion. (Id. at pp. 1217–1218.)
In affirming, the Court of Appeal quoted and approved the trial court’s
discussion of equitable estoppel as follows: “ ‘[T]ypically the doctrine of
11
equitable estoppel is applied where a signatory has sued both another
signatory and certain non-signatories on identical claims.’ ” (Hernandez,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1219.) “ ‘[The Other Firms] complain[] that it is
unfair for [Hernandez] to tailor her complaint in such a way as to avoid
arbitration. But it isn’t, really. There is nothing wrong with either party
wanting to appear in court, or in arbitration. And it isn’t as though
[Hernandez] is trying to have it both ways–to appear in court, she has
completely given up her claims against Intelex. Parties make tactical
“bargains” like this all the time.’ ” (Ibid.)
Likewise, Soltero is not trying to have it both ways because she has
foregone any claims against Real Time and opted to litigate her claims in
court only against Precise, which is not a party to the arbitration agreement.
She is entitled to make this choice. In these circumstances, there is nothing
unfair about applying to Precise “the usual requirement that you must be a
party to a contract to enforce it.” (Hernandez, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1220.) We therefore reject the equitable estoppel theory.
III
Third-Party Beneficiary
Third-party beneficiary theory is another exception to the usual rule
that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it. (Fuentes,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 551.) Precise argues that it is a third-party
beneficiary of the employment agreement between Soltero and Real Time
because the essential purpose of the employment agreement was to provide
labor to Real Time’s clients, such as Precise. As a third-party beneficiary of
the employment agreement, Precise contends that it has standing to enforce
the arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time that is part of their
employment agreement.
12
In this context, however, the question is not whether the party seeking
to compel arbitration is a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing
the arbitration clause, but whether it is a third-party beneficiary of the
arbitration clause itself. (Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551–552.) To
invoke the third-party beneficiary exception, the nonsignatory “ ‘ha[s] to show
that the arbitration clause . . . was made expressly for [its] benefit.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Ronay Family Limited Partnership v. Tweed (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
830, 838.)
In Fuentes, for example, the seller of a motorcycle (Riverside) sought to
compel arbitration under the arbitration clause of a finance agreement
between the buyer and another party (Eaglemark). (Fuentes, supra, 26
Cal.App.5th at pp. 545–546.) The Court of Appeal assumed that Riverside
was a third-party beneficiary of the finance agreement because it required
that Eaglemark pay the loan proceeds to Riverside. (Id. at p. 552 [“We
accept, for the sake of argument, that Riverside was the third party
beneficiary of Eaglemark’s promise to pay the loan proceeds to it.”].) Yet the
court concluded that Riverside was not a third-party beneficiary of the
arbitration clause in the finance agreement. The court explained: “The
arbitration clause . . . had its own list of intended third party beneficiaries; as
we have already discussed, Riverside was not among them. Thus, the
contract affirmatively disproves any intent that the arbitration clause should
benefit Riverside.” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. The arbitration agreement had its own list of
intended third-party beneficiaries. Although the English language
translation leaves much to be desired, it required arbitration of any
employment disputes between Soltero and “the Company,” which it defined
as EmployBridge, other named entities, and all “related entities,” such as
13
Real Time, but not their clients, such as Precise. Precise makes no argument
that it is included in this list as an intended beneficiary of the arbitration
clause. Thus, even assuming that Precise could be considered a third-party
beneficiary of the employment agreement between Soltero and Real Time, it
has failed to demonstrate that it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the
arbitration agreement.
IV
Agency
“The agency exception is another exception to the general rule that only
a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.” (Garcia, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 788.) “The exception applies, and a defendant may enforce
the arbitration agreement, ‘when a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an
agent of a party to an arbitration agreement. . . .’ ” (Ibid., quoting Thomas v.
Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614.)
Soltero’s complaint does not allege that Precise acted as an agent of
Real Time or vice versa. Nor did Precise submit any evidence of such an
agency relationship. The record includes no allegation or evidence that either
entity had control over or a right to control the other or authority to act on
the other’s behalf. Absent any such allegation or evidence of an agency
relationship, there is no basis to apply the agency exception. (Hernandez,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1220–1221 [refusing to apply agency exception
to compel arbitration in absence of any allegation or evidence that plaintiff’s
employers had authority to act on behalf of each other].)
Precise contends that Soltero “effectively” alleged that Precise and Real
Time were her joint employers (and therefore agents of one another) by
alleging in the venue paragraph of her complaint that she “was staffed by
[Real Time], located in San Bernardino, to work at Precise’s distribution
14
warehouse.” But Precise cites no authority holding that a principal-agent
relationship arises as a matter of law whenever a staffing agency provides a
client with a temporary worker.6 The law is to the contrary. (Grande v.
Eisenhower Medical Center (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1166–1167 [finding
no principal-agent relationship in absence of evidence that staffing agency
and client exercised control over each other].) Thus, the agency theory fails
as well.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Precise’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Respondent is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
I CONCUR:
DO, J.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
IRION, Acting P. J.
6 Contrary to Precise’s suggestion, Labor Code section 2810.3,
subdivision (b) does not create a principal-agent relationship between a
staffing agency and its client employers. It merely states that “[a] client
employer shall share with a labor contractor all civil legal responsibility and
civil liability for all workers supplied by that labor contractor for both of the
following: [¶] (1) The payment of wages. [¶] (2) Failure to secure valid
workers’ compensation coverage as required by Section 3700.” (Lab. Code,
§ 2810.3, subd. (b).)
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