People v. Meza CA2/2

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Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Meza CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B329872

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA054914)
v.

BRAYAN MARTIN MEZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
The trial court denied the third petition filed by Brayan
Martin Meza (defendant) for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.61 without an evidentiary hearing. Because, under
recent Supreme Court precedent, the standard CALCRIM No.
401 instruction for direct aiding and abetting is effectively
deemed to permit conviction on the basis of imputed malice, we
must reverse the decision below and remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Underlying crime2
Defendant belonged to the “Westside Playboys” street gang,
and Carlos Sotello (Sotello) belonged to the “Down As Fuck”
street gang. The two gangs were allies. Sotello decided to pick
two fist fights with David Hendricks (Hendricks), and lost both of

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For simplicity’s sake,
we will refer to the section by its new numbering.

2 These facts are drawn from the prior two appellate
decisions in this case—namely, the 2015 opinion affirming
defendant’s conviction (People v. Meza (Mar. 5, 2015, B250365)
[nonpub. opn.]), and the 2021 opinion affirming the denial of one
of defendant’s prior petitions for resentencing under section
1172.6 (People v. Meza (Aug. 12, 2021, B307736) [nonpub. opn.]).

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them. After losing the first time, Sotello walked away; after
losing the second, he got a gun from defendant and shot
Hendricks dead.
B. Prosecution, conviction, sentence, and appeal
The People charged defendant with Hendricks’s murder (§
187). The People further alleged that the murder was committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)), and that a principal
in the crime personally discharged a firearm causing death (§
12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).
At trial, and as pertinent here, the jury was instructed on
the elements of (1) murder, including murder committed by
implied malice; and (2) direct aiding and abetting. The jury
convicted defendant of second degree murder and found both the
gang and firearms allegations to be true.
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 40 years,
comprised of 15 years to life for the murder and 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement. The court stayed the gang
enhancement.
Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction
and sentence. (People v. Meza (Mar. 5, 2015, B250365) [nonpub.
opn.].)
C. Prior section 1172.6 petitions
Defendant filed two prior petitions for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied
each petition without appointing counsel. Defendant appealed
one of them, and we affirmed. The Supreme Court granted
review, and remanded for further consideration in light of its
decision in Lewis v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).
On remand from the Supreme Court, we reaffirmed the summary

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denial after finding that the failure to appoint counsel was
harmless because defendant’s petition lacked merit as a matter of
law, as his jury had never been instructed on the now-potentially
invalid theory of felony murder or the now-invalid theory of
natural and probable consequences. (People v. Meza (Aug. 12,
2021, B307736) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Procedural Background
On January 3, 2022, defendant filed a third petition
seeking relief under section 1172.6. The trial court appointed
counsel for defendant. After a full round of briefing and a
hearing, the trial court denied the petition without an
evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned that defendant was not
entitled to relief as a matter of law because the jury was never
instructed on the theory of felony murder, the natural and
probable consequences theory, or “any other theory of culpability
that impute[s] malice.”
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
section 1172.6 petition without an evidentiary hearing because
the jury instructions did not foreclose the possibility that the jury
convicted him on the basis of imputed malice.
As pertinent here, section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle
through which defendants convicted of murder can seek to vacate
their convictions if they rest on a theory that imputes malice to
the defendant (rather than requiring a showing that the
defendant personally harbored the requisite malice). Initially,
our Legislature invalidated only those convictions that rested on
a felony murder theory or on the theory of natural and probable
consequences—unless the defendant was shown to have been the

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actual killer or personally acted with express or implied malice.
(Former § 1170.95, subd. (a).) In 2022, our Legislature expanded
the reach of section 1172.6 to invalidate murder convictions that
rest on “any theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . .” (Sen.
Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
In assessing whether a defendant seeking relief under
section 1172.6 is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a trial court
must take the petition’s factual allegations as true and ask
“‘“whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if [those]
allegations were proven.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
“‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents
[from the record of conviction, including the jury instructions,]
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner”’” and denying the petition without an
evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) Where, as here, we are reviewing
the jury instructions in the record of conviction, our review is de
novo. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
Because it is undisputed that defendant’s jury was never
instructed on the theories of felony murder or natural and
probable consequences, the sole question before us is whether the
standard CALCRIM jury instructions for murder and direct
aiding and abetting given in this case foreclose the possibility
that defendant’s murder conviction rests on imputed malice.
At least one court has concluded that these very same
standard CALCRIM jury instructions make it possible for a jury
to convict a defendant of implied malice murder based on
imputed malice. (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713
(Powell).) Although the standard CALCRIM instruction for direct

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aiding and abetting turns on whether the aider and abettor knew
the actual perpetrator intended to commit “the crime,” and
whether they intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing “the crime” (CALCRIM No. 401), Powell construed
that language as requiring only proof that the aider and abettor
knew that the actual perpetrator intended to commit a “life
endangering act” that gives rise to liability for implied malice
murder as well as proof that the aider and abettor intended to aid
and abet that “act.” (Powell, at p. 713.) This seems inconsistent
with a plain reading of the jury instructions which hinge aider
and abettor liability on the aider and abettor’s knowledge and
intent to aid “the crime”—not “the act.” It also seems
inconsistent with multiple, longstanding pronouncements from
our Supreme Court that a direct aider and abettor “‘share[s] the
specific intent of the [actual] perpetrator’”—and thus that a
conviction does not rest on imputed malice—as long as the aider
and abettor “‘knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal
purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or
purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’”
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118, italics added;
People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 518; People v. Beeman
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.)
However, our Supreme Court in Reyes adopted Powell’s
reading of the standard CALCRIM jury instructions. (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 991-992.) In so doing, the court either
implicitly found no conflict with its prior precedent or implicitly
overturned it. Either way, Powell’s reading of the standard
CALCRIM instructions is binding and obligates us to conclude
that those instructions do not foreclose the possibility that
defendant’s murder conviction rests on imputed malice. Because

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the instructions given at his trial do not foreclose that possibility
as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
where the People bear the burden of proving that he is guilty of
directly aiding and abetting the implied malice murder as a
matter of fact.
The People argue that defendant is procedurally foreclosed
from filing his third section 1172.6 petition because he already
filed two prior petitions asserting the same claim. But he did not.
The prior petitions were brought before the January 1, 2022
amendments that expanded the scope of section 1172.6.
Defendant was not barred from pursuing relief on the basis of
this expansion.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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