People v. Sands CA1/5

CourtListener 9567223Calctapp14 giu 2024

Testo completo

Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Sands CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169369
v.
PHILIP LEO SANDS, (San Francisco City & County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. Nos. SCN195209,
CT2131939)

Philip Leo Sands appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing (Pen. Code, § 1172.6).1 His appointed
counsel on appeal filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our
independent review of the record, pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 230, 232. After reviewing
Sands’s supplemental brief, we affirm. Sands is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.

BACKGROUND

A.

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437), effective January 1, 2019, changed the law relating to
accomplice liability for murder to better align punishment with
individual culpability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b), (f).) To that

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.
1
end, Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as to murder and narrowed the felony-
murder exception to the malice requirement. (People v. Mancilla
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 862.)

Specifically, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder, to limit murder liability based on
felony murder or a natural and probable consequences theory to a
person who: (1) was an actual killer; (2) aided and abetted the
killer with the intent to kill; or (3) was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as those terms are used in the statute defining felony-murder
special circumstances. (§ 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3;
accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong).)
The definition of malice in section 188 was also amended to
provide that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3);
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)

As a result of these amendments and later Senate Bill No.
775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. January
1, 2022), a person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter before Senate Bill 1437 may seek retroactive relief
by filing a petition in the trial court alleging that (1) the
information or indictment allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which
malice is imputed based solely on the defendant’s participation in
a crime; and (2) the petitioner could not be convicted of murder or
attempted murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a),
renumbered from § 1170.95 by Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022; People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960 (Lewis).)

If the petition includes a declaration of eligibility, the trial
court must appoint counsel (if requested), receive briefing from

2
the parties, and then determine whether the petitioner has made
a “prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c); Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 960, 966.) If so, then the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing—
where the burden is on the prosecution to prove (beyond a
reasonable doubt) that the petitioner is ineligible for relief
because they are guilty of murder under the law as amended by
Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c)-(d); Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 709; Lewis, at p. 960.) On the other hand, if the
petition and record of conviction establish conclusively that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, at pp. 970-972.)

B.

In 2001, Sands stabbed Robin Clarke, inflicting life-
threatening injuries. Robert Ramirez witnessed the stabbing.
When Sands was charged, Ramirez was ordered to return to court
to testify. In 2003, after Sands posted bail, he killed Ramirez by
firing a machine gun at him at least 30 times while Ramirez sat
in a parked car.

In 2005, a jury convicted Sands of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) of Ramirez, assault with a machine gun (§ 245,
subd. (a)(3)) against another victim who was asleep in the same
parked car, shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246), unlawful
possession and transportation of a machine gun (former § 12220),
and other charges involving Clarke that are not relevant here.
The jury also found true a special circumstance allegation that
Sands intentionally killed a witness to prevent them from
testifying (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)) and an enhancement allegation
that Sands personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
which caused Ramirez’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

The trial court sentenced Sands to a prison term of life
without the possibility of parole, plus an additional
indeterminate term of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, this
3
Division affirmed the judgment. (People v. Sands (Oct. 31, 2008,
A112684) [nonpub. opn.].)

C.

In 2022, Sands petitioned for resentencing in the superior
court. He requested the appointment of counsel and included a
declaration stating that an information had been filed against
him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under felony murder
or natural and probable consequences theories, and he could not
now be convicted of murder because of the 2019 amendments to
sections 188 and 189.

After appointing counsel and reviewing the record of
conviction, the superior court denied Sands’s petition, concluding
that he is ineligible for resentencing because the jury was not
instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which malice
could be imputed to Sands based solely on his participation in a
crime and because the personal and intentional discharge finding
made clear he was convicted as Ramirez’s actual killer.

DISCUSSION

After Sands’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief
raising no issues, Sands submitted a letter in which he argued
that the superior court improperly relied on the jury’s firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) finding; that the absence of
instructions on felony murder or natural and probable
consequences murder does not preclude resentencing relief; and
that the People did not meet their burden to show he is guilty of
murder under current law. He is wrong.

Here, the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
under which malice could be imputed to Sands based solely on his
participation in a crime. There is no evidence Sands was one of
multiple perpetrators. Accordingly, the record of conviction—
4
including the jury’s firearm enhancement finding that Sands
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
Ramirez’s death and the jury’s special circumstance finding that
Ramirez was intentionally killed to prevent him from testifying—
establishes that Sands was convicted based on his own express
malice (not imputed malice).

In other words, Sands was the actual killer, the killing was
intentional, and resentencing under section 1172.6 is therefore
unavailable. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710; People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1258-1259 [special
circumstance finding on allegation that required intent to kill
made defendant ineligible for resentencing]; People v. Romero
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145, 152 [“a petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing if he or she was the actual killer, acted with the
intent to kill or malice aforethought, or was a major participant
. . . who acted with reckless indifference to human life”].)

Sands is correct that an enhancement under section
12022.53, subdivision (d), “on its own” is not determinative of a
resentencing petition because it does not show the defendant
acted with malice aforethought. (People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 597-598 (Offley).) But Offley is plainly
distinguishable in that it involved a shooting by multiple gang
members and the jury had been instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at pp. 592-593.) The court
explained that, in other cases, “additional information from the
record will establish that a defendant’s conviction was not based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that the
jury must have convicted the defendant on the basis of his own
malice aforethought.” (Id. at p. 599.)

This is such a case. Here, the jury’s implicit findings that
Sands personally discharged a firearm and intended to kill
Ramirez distinguish this case from both Offley, supra, 48

5
Cal.App.5th at pages 597-598 and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1257, 1262 & fn. 3.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.

P. v. Sands (A169369)

6

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.