People v. Lewis CA2/5

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Filed 6/13/24 P. v. Lewis CA2/5
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B335016

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA030632)
v.

TEDDY LEWIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________
Defendant Teddy Lewis appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1
1172.6 (former section 1170.95). Defendant’s appointed counsel
found no arguable issues and filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and defendant filed
a supplemental brief. Finding no merit to defendant’s argument,
we affirm.
In 1997, defendant was convicted of one count of attempted
murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) following a no contest plea. He
was sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional three
2
years for a firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.5.)
Twenty-five years later, defendant filed his petition for
resentencing in pro. per. The trial court appointed counsel. The
prosecution conceded defendant had established a prima facie
case for resentencing under section 1172.6, and the matter
proceeded to an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, the prosecution relied on the transcript
from defendant’s 2003 initial parole hearing. Over defendant’s
objection, the trial court found the transcript admissible, under
People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575. At the parole
hearing, defendant was sworn. The Presiding Commissioner set
forth the facts of the crime, and asked defendant if he had
committed the crime; defendant agreed. The facts were as
follows: Defendant and a co-defendant robbed a business at

1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
Our record of the proceedings in 1997 is minimal. It
appears, however, that the life term was imposed because
defendant’s victim was a law enforcement officer. (§ 664, subd.
(e).)

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gunpoint. They fled from the scene in a Chevy van; defendant
was driving. A CHP officer gave chase, with the lights and siren
on his motorcycle activated. Eventually, defendant stopped the
van. His co-defendant exited the van and ran away. Defendant
put the van in reverse and backed up, at a high rate of speed, into
the officer’s motorcycle, while the officer was still on it, pushing
the motorcycle backward. The officer drew his gun and fired
several times at defendant, striking him. Defendant exited the
vehicle and ran; the officer followed on foot. Defendant raised his
arm and fired four rounds at the officer, but did not hit him.
Defendant tried to hide, but eventually surrendered.
At his parole hearing, defendant was further questioned as
to the facts of his offense. When asked if there was a reason he
had tried to run the officer down, he responded, “Well, I don’t
really make excuses. There’s no excuse. I was in a desperate
situation and I just had a desperate action that followed.” The
Presiding Commissioner responded, “You ran away and shot at
him.” Defendant said, “Just trying to get away.” He added, “I
wasn’t really comprehending what was going on.”
Defendant chose to testify at the section 1172.6
resentencing hearing. He testified that the officer had shot him,
and continued to shoot at him while he was running. When
specifically asked if he shot back, he said, “Yes.” Defendant
denied having any intent to kill the officer; he was simply scared,
trying to get away, and shot “impulsive[ly].” In cross-
examination, defendant began to minimize his culpability,
denying facts he had admitted in his parole hearing. He denied
knowing the officer was behind the van when he backed it up; he
claimed he had driven into a dead end and had thought he lost
the officer. He only realized the motorcycle was still behind him

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when he felt the impact. In redirect, defendant confirmed that,
while he denied any intent to kill, he was not denying that he
fired at the officer. Moments later, in recross, defendant modified
his testimony further; he had not, in fact, tried to shoot at the
officer. Instead, he shot, over his shoulder “in the direction of the
officer.” He knew the officer was behind a building, and did not
look or aim when he shot. He was simply shooting to scare the
officer.
The court concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant was guilty of attempted murder. He was the actual
shooter and acted with intent to kill, which the court inferred
from the shooting itself, as well as the earlier attempt to run over
the officer. The court expressly found that defendant’s testimony
lacked credibility.
Given this conclusion, the resentencing petition was
denied. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232, raising no issues,
but suggesting we consider independently reviewing the record.
3
Defendant filed a supplemental brief.

3
Defendant’s supplemental brief took the form of a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged both the denial of
resentencing and defendant’s initial 1997 conviction. By order of
May 13, 2024, defendant’s writ petition was considered a
supplemental brief in the current case, and the writ matter was
deemed non-operative. We address defendant’s argument
directed toward the denial of his resentencing petition below. As
to his arguments directed toward his initial conviction, he is
procedurally defaulted from raising these issues, due to his
inadequately explained delay in seeking relief. (In re Clark
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 783.)

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We decline to conduct an independent review of the record
as counsel requested, and limit ourselves to consideration of the
issue defendant raises in his supplemental brief. Defendant
argues there was insufficient evidence he possessed the intent to
kill.
At the outset, defendant’s admission that he was the
shooter (and the driver) is sufficient to establish that he is not
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, and his conviction
is valid under current law. (See People v. Fisher (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 [defendant’s admission at the plea
colloquy that he was the actual shooter justifies denying the
1172.6 motion at the prima facie stage].)
Nonetheless, we address defendant’s argument that there
was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill. While the trial
court must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, our
standard of review is sufficiency of the evidence. (People v.
Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.) We view the facts in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in favor
of the judgment the existence of every fact that can reasonably be
deduced from the evidence. (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of
intent to kill. Defendant, having been chased and ultimately
cornered by the CHP officer, first tried to run him over with the
van. Thereafter, while trying to flee, he shot at the officer
repeatedly. Defendant’s actions demonstrate his intent to kill the
officer. The court’s rejection of defendant’s testimony to the
contrary is well-supported, especially since defendant
contradicted his prior admissions at his parole hearing and at the

5
resentencing hearing itself. The resentencing petition was
properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.

LEE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J. MOOR, J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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