CourtListener 9546239•In re A.G. CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 2/20/24 In re A.G. CA2/5
Review denied 6/12/24; reposted with Supreme Court order and statement
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re A.G., a Person Coming B321717
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MJ25062)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mario Barrera, Judge. Affirmed.
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
1
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M.
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
A.G., a minor, pleaded no contest to second degree robbery.
(Pen. Code, § 211.) He appeals from the juvenile court’s order
declaring him a ward of the court and placing him home on
probation, contending his plea resulted from coercion. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
On June 8, 2022, S.C. walked down Avenue J. A.G. and
two or three companions approached S.C. and asked, “‘Do you
bang?’” and stated, “‘We don’t like white boys.’” S.C. said he did
not belong to a gang and continued walking.
About 30 seconds later, S.C. heard footsteps approach him
from behind. He felt two hands shove him and he fell to the
ground. A.G. and his companions began punching and kicking
S.C. S.C. assumed a fetal position and attempted to cover as
much of his body as he could. S.C. was punched and kicked at
least 30 times.
S.C. felt someone reach into his pants pocket. A.G. and his
companions stopped assaulting S.C. and walked away. S.C.
1
Because defendant pleaded no contest, we base our
statement of facts on the Probation Officer’s Report.
2
wanted to call 911, but noticed his cell phone had been taken
from his back pants pocket.
A.G. and his companions returned to S.C. and demanded
his passcode. S.C. gave them the wrong passcode. A.G. and his
companions threatened to assault S.C. again if he did not give
them the correct passcode. S.C. complied and A.G. and his
companions left. S.C. lost three days of work and $408 in wages
due to his injuries.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2022, the District Attorney of Los Angeles
County filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition
charging A.G. with second degree robbery. The probation
department’s detention report recommended that A.G. remain
detained, stating, “Release is not recommended. The minor is
accused of committing a violent [Welfare and Institutions Code
section] 707[, subdivision ](b) offense that involved force and fear.
Elements related to the offense suggest the minor is a danger to
the victim in that he along with other companions assaulted the
victim, forcefully took the victim[’]s cell phone from his pocket
and fled the location. This level of delinquency requires
immediate intervention and restriction[.]” At A.G.’s
June 13, 2022, arraignment and detention hearing, the juvenile
court denied defense counsel’s request that A.G. be released from
detention.
At a pretrial conference hearing on June 30, 2022, defense
counsel again requested that A.G. be released from detention.
Defense counsel stated she had two letters stating A.G. was of
good character. Other evidence showed that S.C. was responsible
3
for the incident and threw the first punch, and A.G.’s role in the
alleged robbery was minimal.
Defense counsel added there was a safety concern with A.G.
remaining at juvenile hall. A.G. had been told that if he did not
fight, “then basically he was going to get beat up . . . [he] was
going to get picked on and possibly assaulted by the other kids
. . . .” Defense counsel argued that “the probation officers allow
the kids to fight,” and “if we’re removing [A.G.] from the
community for his own safety, obviously we’re putting him in a
situation where his safety is at risk.” Defense counsel explained
that other clients had previously advised her that fighting took
place in juvenile hall.
The juvenile court stated that defense counsel’s
characterization of A.G.’s role in the alleged robbery was based
on disputed facts that were properly resolved in a trial.
Moreover, it had considered many of the factors defense counsel
raised when it earlier made its detention decision.
As for any threat A.G. faced at juvenile hall, the juvenile
court suggested that A.G. and defense counsel “make probation
aware of that.” If A.G. was injured after making probation aware
of the threats, he could file a civil action.
Defense counsel argued that she was not raising disputed
facts, but facts in the police report and an 11-second video of a
portion of the incident that showed A.G.’s role was minimal and
that “it almost appears in the video like he’s kind of trying to
separate people or move them.” Moreover, she had new
evidence—the two letters, a pre-plea report, and a witness who
reported that S.C. threw the first punch. The juvenile court
stated that it could not consider the two letters and the witness
4
as new evidence. Defense counsel disagreed. The court offered to
set the matter for a hearing on the next court date—July 7, 2022.
Defense counsel stated that setting a hearing would defeat
the purpose of obtaining A.G.’s immediate release. She argued
that “in terms of his safety in juvenile court, I believe the court
can absolutely consider that. This court places minors under the
care and custody of probation under the assumption that
probation has to provide a safe environment. If the court is
receiving information that probation is failing to do that . . . .”
The court responded that it had not received such information.
Defense counsel responded that A.G.’s parents could address the
court on the issue.
The juvenile court stated, “[I]f we’re going to have a
hearing, we need to set it for a hearing. If you want to set it for a
hearing, let me know and we will set it for a hearing.” Defense
counsel responded, “That’s fine, Your Honor, we can set it for a
hearing on the 7th.”
After a brief recess, the juvenile court stated that defense
counsel requested it recall the matter for a potential disposition.
Defense counsel stated appellant was “willing to accept the
court’s indicated, which is upon admission he would be released
and his case transferred to Kern County.”
The juvenile court replied:
“Well, I don’t think that that’s correct, [defense counsel]. I
have to clarify the record.
“The agreement is between the parties, which is the
prosecution and defense, which is to allow [A.G.] to plead to one
count, which is the only count, which is a 211.
5
“By law, since he lives in Kern County, this court indicated
that it would transfer the matter to Kern County pursuant to—
since he lives there—pursuant to the law.
“The court is not deeming or saying that it’s going to
release [A.G.] as a result of a plea or an admission, which is the
way—it sort of sounded the way you were stating it, and that is
incorrect.
“What I’m doing is I’m transferring the matter pursuant to
the Welfare and Institutions Code. If he—and the People are
actually arguing against the release of [A.G.] pending the
transference to Kern County.
“This court has indicated that it is willing, based upon what
it received as further information from the probation department,
that if [A.G.] had been a resident of L.A. County, that they would
have made a recommendation of home on probation. And so that
tells me that their recommendation would be for him to be
released after the plea.
“But this court, I want to be clear, is not stating that I want
or desire or need him to plead and/or to admit in order for him to
gain the release, which I think is inappropriate; that would be
essentially coercing [A.G.] to enter the plea for the release.
“I’m indicating that I’m willing, potentially, because I have
yet to still go along—well, actually it’s not a disposition other
than just the plea.
“So what I’m indicating is based upon the agreement of the
parties which is an admission to the 211, I’m willing to allow that
admission to go forth. And then based upon the request which is
to send the matter to Kern County, I’m willing to do that since he
lives in Kern County.
6
“If the defense then is asking for me to release him pending
this transference, I’m willing to hear from both sides. But I’ve
also given my tentative, which was to release him during the
pendency of the case being transferred to Kern County.”
Defense counsel then engaged the juvenile court in a
discussion about the basis for its initial detention decision and
the court’s prior ruling that it was necessary to set a hearing to
consider evidence about A.G.’s release from detention. After the
court reviewed the pre-plea report with defense counsel’s
permission, the court continued the hearing to the following day.
At the start of the resumed hearing, A.G., represented by
new counsel, requested that he be “released pending his case
without entering an admission . . . so that he can fight his case
while being at home.” The juvenile court responded by reviewing
the basis for its initial detention decision and the previous day’s
hearing. It then asked defense counsel whether he had any new
information bearing on A.G.’s release.
Defense counsel again raised a concern about A.G.’s safety
while at juvenile hall. He stated that after A.G.’s mother had
successfully arranged to have A.G. moved within juvenile hall,
A.G. had been threatened and “some comments potentially on
social media” had labeled A.G. a “snitch[ ].” A.G. and his parents
were concerned his life would be at risk if he remained in
custody.
The juvenile court stated A.G.’s safety was of its “utmost
concern.” To address any safety issues, the court could “direct
probation to keep [A.G.] housed separately for a period of time.”
It also could order probation to house A.G. at the Hope Center. It
did not find, however, that the probation department was unable
7
to protect A.G. Accordingly, the new information presented did
not warrant A.G.’s release.
Defense counsel stated that A.G. was “prepared to admit
the petition.” The juvenile court confirmed with defense counsel
that A.G. had not, through defense counsel, been promised any
conditions or release.
The juvenile court then took A.G.’s no contest plea to the
charge of second degree robbery. While taking the plea, A.G.
stated that no one had made any promises to him to get him to
admit to the petition, no one had made any threats to him or
anyone close to him or his family in order to get him to admit to
the petition, and he was admitting to the petition freely and
voluntarily because he believed it was in his best interest. The
court found that A.G. “knowingly and intelligently waived his
constitutional rights; that he understands the nature of the
conduct and the possible consequences of the admission. [¶] The
admission was freely and voluntarily made. There’s a factual
basis for the no contest plea and the allegation in the petition, the
court finds to be true.”[2]
2
The dissent describes A.G. as “a boy who denied robbing
anyone”, who only entered a plea of no contest because he “had
been regularly threatened” while in custody, and the court offered
A.G. a way out of custody, that is, “if [A.G.] admitted the
allegation, the court would free him.”
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s characterization
of the record. As to A.G.’s denial of his participation in the
robbery, A.G. admitted to the police to having been involved in a
physical altercation with the victim and, following his arrest, he
and one of the adults were recorded in the back of the patrol
trying to “get their story straight.”
8
The juvenile court next decided whether to transfer A.G.’s
case to Kern County or keep it in Los Angeles County. The court
found it was in A.G.’s best interest to keep the case in Los
Angeles County.
The juvenile court then turned to disposition. Because the
prosecution had not complied with Marsy’s Law,3 the court set
the disposition hearing for July 12, 2022. The court released
A.G., over the prosecution’s objection, having received A.G.’s
promise to return. The court explained that it was releasing A.G.
Moreover, as to the alleged “repeated threats” to A.G.,
during the June 30, 2022, hearing, A.G.’s counsel expressed
concern over the general safety of minors in juvenile hall. Then,
on July 1, 2022, new counsel explained his understanding that
“implicit and direct threats have been made upon [A.G.],” but
aside from a reference to a social media comment labeling A.G. a
“snitch,” which followed his transfer (at A.G.’s mother’s request)
to a different area in juvenile hall, counsel did not describe the
nature of any such threats. More importantly, as explained
above, the juvenile court expressed concern over counsel’s
reference to threats and offered to house A.G. separately or at a
different facility.
Finally, the juvenile court, at the hearing on June 30, 2022,
corrected A.G.’s counsel’s description of the “potential disposition”
as including a release upon his admission to the petition. And,
during the continued hearing on July 1, 2022, when the court
asked A.G.’s counsel, “And in regards to the admission of the
petition, [A.G.] has not, through you, been promised any
conditions or release at this time; is that correct?,” counsel
responded, “That is correct.”
3
The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008. (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 28.)
9
“because the recommendation is for me to place him home on
probation.” Further, the court did not want to “overly detain”
A.G. because the prosecution potentially wanted to have S.C.
speak at the disposition hearing pursuant to Marsy’s Law.
At the July 12, 2022, disposition hearing, the juvenile court
declared A.G. a ward of the court and placed him home on
probation under various terms and conditions.
IV. DISCUSSION
A.G. contends “[t]he totality of the circumstances
surrounding his no contest plea to robbery demonstrate [his] plea
was made under considerable pressure to escape threats of
violence in juvenile hall, rather than having anything whatsoever
to do with the merits of his underlying case.” Thus, his plea was
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We disagree.
“Under both the state and federal Constitutions, a valid
plea of guilty must be preceded by a knowing and voluntary
waiver of [a] defendant’s rights. ‘[T]he record must contain on its
face direct evidence that the accused was aware, or made aware,
of his right to confrontation, to a jury trial, and against self-
incrimination, as well as the nature of the charge and the
consequences of his plea.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wrest (1992) 3
Cal.4th 1088, 1102–1103; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S.
238, 242–243 (Boykin); In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132
(Tahl).)4 “The record must affirmatively demonstrate that the
4
Minors have all the Boykin–Tahl rights except the right to
a jury trial. (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 321.)
10
plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the
circumstances. [Citations.]” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th
1132, 1178, fn. omitted.)
A defendant’s waiver of his rights is knowing and
intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness both of the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297,
305, internal quotation marks omitted.) It is voluntary if “it was
the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.” (Ibid., internal quotation
marks omitted.) We review de novo the voluntariness of a
waiver. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.)
The record, on its face, shows that A.G.’s no contest plea
was knowing and intelligent. In taking A.G.’s plea, the juvenile
court advised A.G. of his constitutional rights and the
consequences of his plea. A.G. stated he understood his rights
and the consequences of his plea.
The record also shows A.G.’s plea was voluntary. The
juvenile court confirmed with defense counsel that A.G. had not
been promised release. It asked A.G. if anyone had made any
promises to him in order to get him to admit to the petition or if
anyone had made any threats to him or anyone close to him or
his family in order to get him to admit to the petition. A.G.
answered, “No, Your Honor” to each question. The court asked
A.G. if he was admitting to the petition freely and voluntarily
because he believed it was in his best interest. A.G. answered,
“Yes, Your Honor.” The court asked A.G. whether, after being
advised of the consequences of his plea, he still wanted to enter a
no contest plea. A.G. responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
11
As for A.G.’s contention that his concern about his safety
while housed at juvenile hall coerced his no contest plea, the
juvenile court stated it was very concerned about A.G.’s safety
and could “direct probation to keep [A.G.] housed separately for a
period of time” or order probation to house A.G. at the Hope
Center. A.G. did not request either solution, and instead pressed
for his immediate release. After A.G. pleaded no contest and was
released from detention and thus no longer subject to threats at
juvenile hall, he did not file a motion to withdraw his plea as
having been coerced by the alleged threats.
A.T. v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 314, which
A.G. cites in support of his appeal, is procedurally inapposite. In
that case, the juvenile challenged the juvenile court’s denial of
her request to be released pending the disposition of criminal
charges. (Id. at p. 317.) Although the juvenile had later pleaded
guilty to the criminal charges, the court exercised its discretion to
consider the merits of the petition because, among other things,
the juvenile had filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (Id.
at p. 318.) Here, by contrast, A.G. neither filed a petition
challenging the juvenile court’s denial of his request for release
nor made a motion to withdraw his plea. Instead, A.G. contends
that contrary to his unequivocal statements during the change of
plea hearing, his plea was coerced. We disagree.
12
V. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM, J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
13
People v. A.G. — B321717
RUBIN, P. J. — DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
The short version of the relevant facts is as follows: The
juvenile court refused to release Albert G. upon his initial
detention relying, at least in part, on a probation report that
recommended against release, a report that included errors and
inconsistencies. As various pretrial hearings were scheduled, and
held or continued, Albert remained in custody for several weeks
and was repeatedly threatened in juvenile hall. He consistently
asked the juvenile court to release him pending resolution of the
case. The Probation Department eventually agreed and
recommended release. The juvenile court was not convinced, and
just before Albert changed his plea, the court denied release once
again. Moments later, Albert capitulated and pled no contest.
Immediately thereafter, the court released Albert to his parents
and ordered him to return for the final disposition hearing.
This summarized chronology of the key events is enough for
me to conclude Albert’s plea was coerced. But to present a fuller
picture and fill in what I believe to be gaps in the majority
opinion, I recite the facts in more detail throughout this dissent.
1. Legal Principles
I start with the statutory purpose of juvenile delinquency
law. In Division 2 (“Children”), Part 1 (“Delinquents and Wards
of the Juvenile Court”), Chapter 2 (“Juvenile Court Law”),
Section 202, the Legislature has enacted: “The purpose of this
chapter is to provide for the protection and safety of the public
and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to
1
preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever
possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her
parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the
safety and protection of the public. If removal of a minor is
determined by the juvenile court to be necessary, reunification of
the minor with his or her family shall be a primary objective.
This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these
purposes.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a); see, e.g., In re
Jose S. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1118, review denied [“Unlike
the adult criminal justice system, which has a primary punitive
purpose, reunification of a minor with his or her family and
rehabilitation are the primary objectives of the juvenile
system.”].)1
At an initial detention hearing, the juvenile court
determines whether to order the minor to remain in custody
pending his jurisdictional hearing. (§ 632, subd. (a).)
“To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a
detention hearing, ‘the court shall make its order releasing the
minor from custody,’ ‘unless it appears . . . that it is a matter of
immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or
reasonably necessary for the protection of the person or property
of another that he or she be detained or that the minor is likely to
flee to avoid the jurisdiction of the court.’ (§ 635, italics added.)
‘By requiring that the minor be released unless the case [falls]
within one of the specified categories, the Legislature [has]
indicated its intention that detention be the exception, not the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare &
Institutions Code.
2
rule.’ ” (A.T. v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 314, 322
(A.T.).) The Legislature has thus spoken: Unless specific facts
are found, “the court shall” make its order releasing the minor
from custody. (§ 635; see In re Bianca S. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
1272, 1275 [under Juvenile Court Law, the intendments are all
against detention, and it may not be ordered unless there is clear
proof of urgent necessity].)
When making this determination, the court must treat
every minor individually, “on a case-by-case basis.” (§ 636,
subd. (d); A.T., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 322.) Thus, although
the court may consider the “circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offense,” it may only do so “in conjunction with other
factors.” (§ 635; In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 30
(William M.) [“The nature of the charged offense cannot in itself
constitute the basis for detention.”].) If the court finds this test is
satisfied, it may order the minor detained “for a period not to
exceed 15 judicial days.” (§ 636, subd. (a).)
At the detention hearing or any subsequent hearing, a
minor facing a section 602 petition may admit the allegations
against him and waive his jurisdictional hearing. (§ 657,
subd. (b); In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1519.)
Alternatively, he may enter a plea of no contest to the
allegations. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778(e); In re Alonzo J.
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 924, 937.) As with defendants in criminal
cases, however, minors in delinquency matters are guaranteed
the fundamental constitutional rights that accompany such an
admission or plea—namely, that the waiver of those rights must
be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (People v. Collins (2001)
26 Cal.4th 297, 308 (Collins); Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005)
545 U.S. 175, 183.)
3
A waiver is intelligent if it is “ ‘ “ ‘made with a full
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Collins,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305.) It is voluntary if it is “ ‘ “ ‘the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Coercion, either in the form
of penalizing a defendant for exercising a constitutional right or
promising leniency to a defendant for refraining from exercising a
right, renders a waiver involuntary.” (People v. Dixon (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 985, 990.) We may not presume that a guilty
plea is intelligent and voluntary; the record must affirmatively
demonstrate that the defendant had the necessary knowledge
and understanding. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238,
242.)
The voluntariness of a guilty or no contest plea is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo. (People v. Panizzon
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.)2
2 To the extent the majority concludes Albert has forfeited
the issue because he did not move to withdraw his plea, I
disagree. He was not required to do so under the facts of this
case. “As a general matter, when a minor enters an admission as
part of a negotiated plea agreement and does not later seek to
withdraw that plea, the minor has forfeited the right to attack
the terms of the bargain on appeal . . . . [Citations.] Application
of this forfeiture rule, however, is not absolute. An appeal is
permitted, for instance, on the issue of whether the waiver of
rights made upon entering a plea was knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently made.” (In re M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1519.)
4
2. Proceedings Below
With these principles in mind, I turn to Albert’s detention
history from the time of his arrest until the entry of his no
contest plea.
2.1. Detention Report of June 10, 2022 and Hearing
of June 13, 2022
Albert was arrested and detained on June 8, 2022. A
detention report was filed two days later, on June 10, 2022. The
Los Angeles County Probation Department (Department) was
unable to interview Albert because he was in quarantine for
Covid-19, but based upon the seriousness of the charge, the
Department recommended against his release.
At the detention hearing on June 13, 2022, defense counsel
requested Albert’s release pending adjudication.
The juvenile court expressed concern that despite the
court’s request, no one from the Department was available to
explain various discrepancies in the detention report. In
particular, the court wanted more information about why the
Department had listed gang membership as a risk factor despite
concluding Albert was not a gang member. The court also
questioned the conclusion that Albert’s parents lacked parental
control despite the mother’s statements that he was well-behaved
at home and attending high school. The court explained, “I have
to assume it cannot be just on the basis of this charge, otherwise
that would always be checked, and that’s not the case.” The court
also expressed concern about why the Department did not list
lack of substance abuse as one of Albert’s strengths, when the
only information in the report was that Albert did not drink or
use drugs.
Nevertheless, after asking for and receiving additional
5
information about the nature of the offense, the court ordered
Albert detained. The juvenile court emphasized that it was
“appreciative of the fact that this is a [section] 707(b) offense” and
concluded that despite the inconsistencies in the detention report,
based on the facts of the offense, “the court is going to go along
with the recommendation of probation and detain the minor.” 3
The court held the facts of the offense constituted prima facie
evidence that Albert was a person described by section 602 and
“the minor is to remain detained again, based upon the fact that
it is of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the
minor and for the protection and property of others.” The court
stated its understanding that because Albert’s family lived
outside Los Angeles County, it could not order Community
Detention.
Before the hearing ended, Albert interjected that he was
“not involved” in the incident. The court acknowledged Albert’s
disappointment at being detained and replied: “I can tell you
that we are going to get a report on the next court date . . . .[4]
Just because you are being detained today does not mean that you
3 Albert was charged with second degree robbery, which is
listed in section 707, subdivision (b). Although juvenile
adjudications are usually not treated as criminal convictions,
adjudications for crimes listed in section 707, subdivision (b), are
different: If the minor goes on to commit a felony as an adult, the
adjudication for an enumerated “707(b)” offense can be treated as
a prior strike under the Three Strikes Law. (Pen. Code, § 667,
subd. (d)(3)(D); People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 6, 8.)
4 The juvenile court appears to be referring to the pre-plea
report that was in fact filed with the court on June 22, 2022.
6
are going to continue to be detained on the next court date. I don’t
know what’s going to happen. I am going to wait for that report.”
(Italics added.)
2.2. Pre-Plea Report—June 22, 2022
The pre-plea report was filed on June 22, 2022. In that
report, the Department reversed its view on detention: It now
advised the court not to remove Albert from his home pending
adjudication of the petition. Specifically, on page 20, under the
heading “Detention/Removal Findings,” the report stated, “It is
not deemed necessary to REMOVE the minor from the home at
this time. Services reducing or eliminating the need for removal
will be delivered. Case factors, including deterioration of
behavior or the failure of intervention services to accomplish
results may require removal from the home in the future.” (All
capital letters in original.)5
In addition to the facts stated in the earlier report, the pre-
plea report included information from interviews with Albert and
his parents. Albert had “no prior or subsequent record” of
juvenile delinquency. And Albert and his parents all denied that
he had any gang associations. Albert’s parents reported having
“a positive extended family.” They explained that Albert had
been depressed and anxious since the death of his great-
grandmother the year before, and he was worried about his great-
grandfather’s currently poor health. But Albert typically
5 By contrast, the original detention report, filed with the
court on June 10, 2022, had checked “NO,” after “A. RELEASE —
IT IS RECOMMENTED THE MINOR BE RELEASED BASED
ON THE FACTORS BELOW.” (All capital letters in original.)
Albert was not released at that hearing.
7
followed the rules at home, and thus, his behavior there was
“pretty good.” Albert’s parents did not impose a curfew because
he did not go out at night, although he did socialize with friends.
To be sure, Albert’s school attendance was poor, as were his
grades. But he had strong interests in breeding and training
dogs, as well as in mixed martial arts. He also worked for his
uncle 35 hours per week.
2.3. The Court Again Denies Release—June 30, 2022
When the matter was called for pretrial conference on
June 28, 2022, the court explained that the parties had discussed
the case off the record. Because defense counsel wanted to speak
with the deputy district attorney in charge “about a potential or
possible reduction and/or resolution to the case,” the matter was
trailed for two days.
On June 30, 2022, the prosecutor represented that she had
spoken to her head deputy, who rejected the defense “request to
make it a non-strike offer” given the information available.
Defense counsel indicated she wanted to speak with the head
deputy herself, so the court continued the matter to July 7, 2022.
By this point, however, Albert had been in custody for more
than three weeks. (See § 636, subd. (a) [court may detain minor
before adjudication “for a period not to exceed 15 judicial days”].)6
Thus, before the June 30th hearing concluded, defense counsel
asked to be heard on release. Counsel presented two letters
stating that Albert was a person of good character and was not a
danger to the community. She also pointed to information in the
6 At the initial detention hearing, Albert had waived
statutory time to June 27, 2022, as day 0 of 15.
8
pre-plea report that had been filed the previous week: “We do
have a pre-plea report as well. Both parents indicate he has good
behavior. I think the court is aware of that.” (Italics added.)7
Albert had no behavioral problems in juvenile hall and had no
prior offenses.
Counsel then turned to the facts of the case and the
discovery of additional evidence that cast doubt on the severity of
the offense as depicted at the previous hearing, particularly as to
Albert’s involvement. And, she stressed, Albert should be
released for another fundamental reason—he had been
threatened at juvenile hall. Other kids warned they would beat
up Albert if he refused to fight them. Emphasizing that Albert
had been detained for three weeks without behavioral issues,
counsel argued “if we’re removing Albert from the community for
his own safety, obviously we’re putting him in a situation where
his safety is at risk.” To allay any concerns the court might have
about Albert’s residence in Kern County, defense counsel also
explained that Albert’s father had arranged to stay with him in
Burbank at Albert’s grandfather’s house. Thus, Albert would
remain within Los Angeles County.
The juvenile court complimented Albert on his good
behavior but declined to consider the “disputed facts” raised by
defense counsel. As to the other new factors counsel had cited,
the court explained: “The court, when it makes a decision to
detain a person, which is what this court did back on the date of
7 Counsel’s argument assumed the court had read the pre-
plea report. It would later emerge that the court had not yet read
the pre-plea report that recommended release.
9
June the 13th, 2022, it took into consideration most of the factors
that you had already mentioned.”
Defense counsel argued based on the facts in the pre-plea
report—which was filed after the detention hearing—that Albert
did not present a danger to the community, but the court
responded, “this has already been dealt with.” Counsel insisted
she was presenting new information to support release: the
letters of recommendation, the pre-plea report, and the new
witness. But the court explained: “I can’t consider if you have a
letter from a victim or a witness as new information. I cannot
consider that.” Again, the court did not mention the pre-plea
report.
Ultimately, Albert withdrew his waiver of statutory time,
and a hearing was set for July 7, 2022.
2.4. The Case is Recalled—June 30, 2022
Later that same day, before Albert was physically returned
to juvenile hall, the defense asked the court to recall the case so
Albert could admit the allegation in the petition. She said Albert
was “willing to accept the court’s indicated, which is upon
admission, he would be released and his case transferred to Kern
County.”
As the majority notes, the court disputed that
characterization but stated “that it is willing, based upon what it
received as further information from the probation department,
that if the minor had been a resident of L.A. County, that they
would have made a recommendation of home on probation. And
so that tells me that their recommendation would be for him to be
released after the plea.” (Italics added.) The majority opinion
does refer to the June 22, 2022 pre-plea report, but the opinion
does not expressly state either (1) that in the pre-plea report, the
10
Department changed its earlier recommendation and now
recommended Albert’s release, or (2) that the juvenile court
acknowledged during the hearing that it had not yet read that
report.
In any event, the defense stated for the record that it was
unnecessary for the juvenile court to set a subsequent hearing for
the defense to argue for Albert’s release. Rather, the defense
posited the court could have, and should have, considered release
at every hearing, “depending on the new information that comes
to the court’s attention.” Counsel explained that her
understanding of the prior proceedings was that, based on the
seriousness of the offense, the juvenile court would not release
Albert prior to an admission or plea. The court replied, “That’s
incorrect. That’s not true.”
The court explained it had detained Albert based on the
warrant detention report and the information contained
therein—information beyond the charged offense itself. The
court asked why any clarification was necessary given that
defense counsel had been present at the June 13, 2022 hearing,
and repeatedly asked whether counsel was asking the court to
reiterate its remarks from that hearing.
Counsel tried to explain that the detention hearing had
occurred before the Department changed its recommendation
from detention to home release, and stressed that the pre-plea
report had addressed and resolved issues about which the court
had seemed concerned at the initial hearing. The court could
reconsider release from detention based on new information—the
new information being the information the Department had
gathered in the pre-plea report and its revised recommendation
that Albert be released. Based on the Department’s own
11
findings, counsel argued, there was no longer an “immediate and
urgent necessity” for Albert’s removal from home; the seriousness
of the charge was the only remaining justification. (See § 635,
subd. (a).) The court responded: “That’s incorrect.”
The discussion continued this way for some time, but
eventually, the crux of the problem emerged: Defense counsel
mistakenly assumed the court had read the pre-plea report. But
the court said it had not read that report because defense counsel
had not given the court permission to do so. With the confusion
resolved, the parties took a break for the court to read the report,
which it did.
By the time proceedings resumed, however, court hours
had concluded for the day, and the matter had to be trailed to the
following day. Albert wanted to admit the allegation that
afternoon to secure his immediate release, but there was no time.
The court assured those assembled that they would get to the
bottom of things the next day.
2.5. The Court Denies Release for the Third Time
and Albert Pleads No Contest—July 1, 2022
The next morning, a new alternate public defender
appeared to represent Albert. He renewed Albert’s request for
release without entering an admission “so that he can fight this
case while being at home.” The court made a record of what had
occurred on and off the record at the previous two hearings and
denied the request. Again, the court did not acknowledge the
pre-plea report or the Department’s change in recommendation.
The court concluded: “What’s been asked of the court today
is whether or not the court is willing to allow the minor to be
released, prior—as in before a plea is entered.” When counsel
confirmed that was Albert’s request, the court asked: “Do you
12
have any new information that the court has—did not have
before it yesterday with [prior defense counsel] reciting
information? Do you have any new information that the court
could take into consideration after having previously yesterday
denied this request from [defense counsel]?”
The new attorney again raised the fears Albert and his
parents had for his physical safety at juvenile hall in light of
“implicit and direct threats” of violence against him. But the
court again denied Albert’s request for release, finding this
information did not “merit[ ]” release on Community Detention
pending the outcome of the case. As an alternative, the court
offered to “direct probation to keep the minor housed separately
for a period of time” or order Albert placed in the Hope Center.
The court was unwilling to say it had “no faith in probation” to
protect Albert.
At that point, defense counsel informed the court that
Albert was “prepared to admit the petition.” During this hearing,
no mention was made of either the pre-plea report or the
Department’s changed view on detention.
After the juvenile court elicited defense counsel’s assurance
that Albert had not been promised release, the court accepted
Albert’s no contest plea to the section 602 petition alleging
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), a strike offense. During the plea
colloquy, Albert agreed that he had not been promised anything
in exchange for his plea and that neither he nor his family had
been threatened to induce him to accept it. The court found
Albert “knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional
rights” and his “admission was freely and voluntarily made.”
After Albert’s plea, the parties argued about whether the
case should be transferred to Kern County for disposition. The
13
defense wanted the case to remain in Los Angeles; the
prosecution argued for transfer. The court held it was in Albert’s
best interest for his case to remain in Los Angeles. The court
started to turn immediately to disposition, but because the
prosecution had not yet complied with the victim notification and
statement procedures required by Marsy’s Law, the disposition
hearing was continued for 12 days to July 12, 2022.
After receiving Albert’s personal assurance that he would
appear at that hearing, the court ordered his release pending
disposition: “The reason that I’m releasing him, just so the
record is clear, is because the [Department’s] recommendation is
for me to place him home on probation.” The court did not want
to “overly detain” Albert simply because the prosecution wanted
the complaining witness to speak at the disposition hearing in
accordance with Marsy’s Law.
The prosecutor objected to Albert’s pre-disposition release:
“The People do not believe there were any change of
circumstances. If anything, he just admitted to the crime and the
facts. And the court found them to be true based on the same set
of facts that the court assumed to be true when the court
determined the minor should have been detained. So there have
been no changed circumstances. So the minor should not be
released currently.”
The court asked the prosecutor whether he was “suggesting
that probation, when they made the recommendation of home on
probation, is in error?” The prosecutor replied that he hadn’t had
a chance to question the probation officer about whether her
recommendation was based on all the evidence, including an
interview with the victim, but did not believe it was.
In response, the court expressed its confidence in the
14
Department’s analysis: “I have no reason to doubt [the probation
officer’s] reputation. I know her very well since I’ve been in
juvenile court. She appears to be, in my opinion, always
intimately knowledgeable about the cases. [¶] I see no reason
why she would not have taken all of that into consideration.”
Indeed, the court explained that the previous prosecutor had
asked the probation officer whether the home on probation
recommendation was “a result of some internal policy that would
prevent her from seeking a more restrictive environment. And
[the probation officer] said ‘no’ to that question. She said she was
doing this based upon all of the information that she had. [¶]
And this court has no reason to believe that she is not doing her
job, as she normally does, nor that she is missing out on any
information.”
Albert was then released from custody pending disposition.
As he had promised the court at the July 1, 2022 hearing, Albert
appeared out of custody at the July 12, 2022 disposition hearing.
Consistent with the Department’s recommendation, the court
declared Albert a ward of the court and placed him on home
probation with terms and conditions.
3. Albert’s Plea Was Involuntary
Albert contends entering a no-contest plea was the only
way to secure his release from juvenile hall, where, at the time of
the plea, he had been confined for 24 days and had been regularly
threatened; absent such a plea, the juvenile court was unwilling
to consider new information that he did not present a danger to
the community, including information presented by the
Department in the pre-plea report. The People argue, and the
majority agrees, that the plea colloquy demonstrates that Albert’s
plea was not coerced. Yet the People, the court below, and the
15
majority all fail to address the pre-plea report and its change in
recommendation.
To emphasize, the juvenile court may only detain a minor if
it finds “immediate and urgent necessity.” (§ 635, subd. (a).) The
probation department has the burden of making that showing.
(William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 28.) The court in this case
expressed concern about the Department’s detention report,
which was internally inconsistent,8 and seems to have ignored
the pre-plea report recommending release, although the court
had read it. Despite its reservations about the first report, the
court decided, based on the facts of the offense, to “go along with
the recommendation of probation and detain the minor.” (See
A.T., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 324, citing William M., at p. 30
[nature of the charged offense cannot, on its own, constitute the
basis for detention].) In doing so, however, the court stressed to
Albert that its ultimate detention decision would be based not on
the detention report but on the pre-plea report, which would be
filed before the next court date. That later report contained more
information from a larger variety of sources and recommended
release. Albert, the Department concluded, was not a danger to
the community; he should be sent home to his parents. In light of
the court’s previous assurances, Albert undoubtedly expected the
court to follow that advice. Yet the court continued to deny
release, insisting repeatedly that nothing had changed. Under
the circumstances, the court abused its discretion in not releasing
8 The detention report was prepared the day after Albert’s
arrest and based solely on a police arrest report and a
conversation with Albert’s mother.
16
Albert before the entry of a plea.9 That abuse of discretion had
the effect of coercing Albert’s plea, thus rendering the plea
unconstitutional.
Albert’s responses during the plea colloquy were not magic
words that negated this reality. After more than three weeks in
custody, Albert, a boy who denied robbing anyone, who had never
been in trouble with the law, and had never been removed from
his parents, was denied release for a third time despite the
9 I have found no reported case on the standard of review of
an order denying (or granting) release before a jurisdictional
hearing in a delinquency case. The issue would most likely arise
in the context of a petition for extraordinary writ from the order
itself, a different procedural posture from the present appeal.
Because determining OR release for adult criminals is somewhat
analogous, I consider the standard of review in that setting.
Although the bail statutes have undergone significant changes
over the years, historically, the abuse of discretion standard was
applied to the review of a trial court decision whether to release
on his or her own recognizance a person charged with a serious
felony. (In re Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1101–1102; see
also In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288 [in
reviewing a delinquency commitment placement, the court
stated, “ ‘We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for
abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support
its decision.’ [Citation.] “ ‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the
court exceeds the bounds of all reason, all of the circumstances
being considered.’ ” [Citation.] We will not disturb the juvenile
court’s findings when there is substantial evidence to support
them”].)
Although not fully developed into an argument, the
Attorney General in Respondent’s Brief states, “The court, in its
proper discretion, found appellant was not eligible for release.”
17
Department’s recommendation that the court let him return
home. Although the court had assured Albert it would revisit its
decision when it received the pre-plea report, it ultimately did not
do so. The court instead offered Albert a (tentative) way out:
Despite the prosecution’s vigorous opposition, if Albert admitted
the allegation, the court would free him. In response, Albert
agreed to admit a strike offense—receiving no concessions from
the prosecution to induce him to do so. Moments later, after
Albert entered the plea, the court in fact released him—based on
its great confidence in the probation officer whose detention
advice in the pre-plea report the court had ignored.
But as even the prosecutor noted, nothing had changed
after the plea. The probation officer recommended release from
detention both before and after Albert entered his plea. The
court rejected that course of action before the plea; it changed
course to accept the Department’s recommendation only after
Albert admitted a strike offense. The record does not reveal any
basis for the court’s choice. Under these circumstances, I cannot
conclude that Albert’s plea was “the product of a free and
deliberate choice” such that he voluntarily relinquished his
constitutional rights. (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305.)
As the plea was constitutionally defective, I would reverse
the judgment of the juvenile court and permit Albert to withdraw
his plea.
RUBIN, P. J.
18
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five - No. B321717
S284330
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
________________________________________________________________________
In re A.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.G., Defendant and Appellant.
________________________________________________________________________
The petition for review is denied.
Liu, Groban and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted.
(See Dissenting Statement by Liu, J.)
___________/s/___________________
Chief Justice
In re A.G.
S284330
Dissenting Statement by Justice Liu
For the reasons ably explained in Presiding Justice
Rubin’s dissent, the circumstances surrounding A.G.’s plea
raise serious questions as to whether his plea was voluntary. I
would grant review.
The Legislature has made clear that the primary
objectives of the juvenile justice system are rehabilitation and
family reunification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.) Detaining a
minor in juvenile hall can compromise these objectives. Thus,
a juvenile court “shall” order the release of a minor from
custody unless the court finds specific facts warranting
detention. (Id., § 635, subd. (a).) A juvenile court may not
ignore this clear directive and withhold releasing a minor from
detention until the minor enters a guilty or no contest plea.
When the juvenile court abuses its authority in such a manner,
the voluntariness of the minor’s plea is dubious.
When the juvenile court initially ordered A.G.’s
detention, it relied on a deficient detention report from the
probation department. The court assured A.G. that it would
base its ultimate detention decision on the upcoming pre-plea
report. In that pre-plea report, the department changed its
position and recommended A.G.’s release. Contrary to its
previous assurances, and despite the department’s revised
recommendation, the juvenile court refused to reconsider its
detention order on two more occasions, including immediately
1
In re A.G.
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review
before A.G. entered his plea. At that point, A.G. had been
confined for over three weeks.
At the hearings on June 30, 2022, and July 1, 2022,
A.G.’s counsel stated their understanding that the court would
release A.G. once he entered the plea. The court responded by
disabusing counsel of the notion that the court was promising
A.G.’s release upon entry of the no contest plea, and the court
confirmed that counsel had not promised A.G. that he would be
released upon entering a plea. When the pre-plea report was
again brought to the court’s attention on June 30, the court
took a break to read the report. But when the hearing
resumed on July 1, the court again denied release. At that
point, A.G. entered his plea, and the court immediately ordered
his release based on the pre-plea report. As the prosecutor
observed, nothing had changed in the circumstances bearing
on whether A.G. should be released; the court had become
aware of the probation department’s release recommendation
before A.G. entered his plea. The only change was that A.G.
had gone ahead and entered his plea; only at that point did the
court grant his release.
Additional circumstances suggest that A.G.’s plea was
not voluntary and was instead made to obtain release. A.G.
received no benefit from the prosecutor for admitting the
allegation of second degree robbery, a strike offense. The lack
of a benefit to A.G. is particularly significant as the record
indicates A.G. potentially had a strong defense, including facts
in the police report and video evidence that his involvement
was minimal. In addition, A.G. entered into the plea
agreement after he had advised the court that he feared for his
safety. Direct or indirect fear or threats are relevant
considerations when assessing whether an individual’s plea
2
In re A.G.
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review
was coerced. A.G. and his counsel repeatedly raised those
fears with the court. During an earlier hearing, A.G.’s counsel
stated probation officers allowed children to fight at juvenile
hall, and there were indications A.G. was being pressured to do
so. The juvenile court’s offer to move A.G. to another facility or
house him separately is beside the point. Indeed, A.G.’s
mother had arranged for A.G. to be moved within juvenile hall,
but A.G. continued to experience threats of violence.
(I note that A.G. was detained at Barry J. Nidorf
Juvenile Hall, one of two Los Angeles juvenile hall facilities
that has been found unsuitable for detaining minors. (Ellis,
L.A. County Has 2 Months to Fix Problems in Juvenile Hall —
or Get Everyone Out. Again, L.A. Times (Feb. 15, 2024).)
Numerous Los Angeles probation officers were recently placed
on leave based on allegations of doing exactly what A.G.’s
counsel reported — allowing or encouraging detained children
to assault one another — and a video of such an incident has
been released. (Queally & Ellis, Video Shows Staff Allowing
Assault by Youths at Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall, L.A. Times
(Apr. 12, 2024); Queally, Juvenile Hall Fight Videos Raise
Question: Can L.A. County Probation Reports be Trusted? L.A.
Times (May 30, 2024); see also County of Los Angeles
Probation, LA County Probation Puts Four More Officers on
Leave at Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall after Finding Additional
Incidents of Youth-on-Youth Violence (Apr. 26, 2024)
<https://probation.lacounty.gov/lacountyprobationputsfourmor
eofficersonleaveatlospadrinos/> [as of June 12, 2024].))
Further, A.G. was 17 years old, was in ninth grade, and
had no prior contact with the juvenile justice system.
According to the probation department’s reports, his mother
said he was well-behaved at home, he had no gang
3
In re A.G.
Liu, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review
associations, he had “a positive extended family,” and his
father had arranged for him to stay at his grandfather’s house
in Burbank upon release. It is a fair inference that A.G.,
realizing that the court was unwilling to release him despite
these circumstances and the pre-plea report’s recommendation,
felt he had no option but to enter a no contest plea to obtain
release.
The sequence of events in this case supports A.G.’s claim
that after being detained for 24 days despite a pre-plea report
recommending his release, he did not enter his plea
voluntarily. Even after reading the report recommending
A.G.’s release, the court inexplicably denied release until after
A.G. entered his plea, even though nothing had changed. The
upshot is that A.G. now has a strike offense, despite some
evidence of his minimal involvement in the crime and no prior
delinquency history. Because the trial court’s refusal to
release A.G. until he entered his plea raises serious questions
as to whether the plea was voluntary, I would grant review.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
◦
4
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