M.M. v. C.S. CA4/1

CourtListener 9530813Calctapp11 giu 2024

Testo completo

Filed 6/11/24 M.M. v. C.S. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

M.M., D081628

Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 22FDV04321C)

v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING REHEARING
C.S.,
NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
Respondent.

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed May 21, 2024, is modified as follows:
In the opinion filed May 21, 2024, footnote 6 on page 9 reads:
C.S. also asks us to take judicial notice of the Montana court’s
May 18, 2023 order issued while this appeal was pending in which that
court ruled it had jurisdiction under both the UCCJEA and Montana
law. He points out the San Diego court took judicial notice of the order
in postjudgment proceedings. C.S. maintains the order is properly
subject to judicial notice as a record of another court (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (d)(2)), this court may judicially notice any matter noticed by the
trial court (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a)(1)), and the order is relevant to
whether M.M.’s appeal has been rendered moot by the Montana court’s
decision to exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction. We may take judicial notice
of the records of “any court of this state.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd.
(d)(1).) However, the Montana court’s order is irrelevant to this appeal
as it is outside the record on which the California court’s judgment is
based (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 530; accord,
Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, 958),
notwithstanding the fact the San Diego court later judicially noticed
the document.

Footnote 6 on page 9 is replaced with the following footnote, so
that the footnote now reads:
C.S. also asks us to make findings, accept additional evidence on
appeal and take judicial notice of two items issued or filed while this
appeal was pending: (1) the Montana court’s May 18, 2023 order in
which that court ruled it had jurisdiction under both the UCCJEA and
Montana law; and (2) M.M.’s December 2023 verified motion to amend
the Montana court’s parenting plan, in which M.M. asserted the
Montana court had “exclusive and continuing jurisdiction” under
Montana’s version of the UCCJEA. He points out the San Diego court
took judicial notice of the May 2023 order in postjudgment proceedings,
but not M.M.’s December 2023 motion. C.S. maintains the order and
motion are properly subject to judicial notice as records of another court
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(2)), as to the May 2023 order this court
may judicially notice any matter noticed by the trial court (Evid. Code,
§ 459, subd. (a)(1)), and the order and motion are relevant to whether
M.M.’s appeal has been rendered moot by the Montana court’s decision
to exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction as well as M.M.’s concession. We may
take judicial notice of records of “any state of the United States.” (Evid.
Code, § 452, subd. (d)(2).) The Montana court’s order is irrelevant to
this appeal as it is outside the record on which the California court’s
judgment is based (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523,
530; accord, Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932,
958), notwithstanding the fact the San Diego court later judicially
noticed the document. As for M.M.’s December 2023 motion in the
Montana court, C.S. asks us to take the motion as evidence and find
Montana has exclusive continuing UCCJEA jurisdiction “as it pertains
to [his] motion to dismiss.” Because we decline to dismiss the appeal as
moot and remand the matter for further proceedings in the San Diego
court, C.S. may ask that court in those proceedings to consider whether
M.M.’s motion in the Montana court establishes M.M. has conceded the
Montana court’s exclusive UCCJEA jurisdiction.

2
The petition for rehearing is denied.
There is no change in judgment.

McCONNELL, P. J.

Copies to: All parties

3
Filed 5/21/24 M.M. v. C.S. CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

M.M., D081628

Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22FDV04321C)

C.S.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Olga
Alvarez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. Mazur for Appellant.
Cage & Miles and John T. Sylvester for Respondent.
Appellant M.M. appeals from an order quashing service of a domestic
violence restraining order (restraining order) petition that she brought
against respondent C.S. M.M. and C.S. have a minor child together and for a
time lived together in the state of Montana. After M.M. took the child to
California and petitioned for the restraining order, C.S. moved to quash
service, alleging the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; Fam.
Code,1 § 3400 et seq.). Following a conference with participation of both
parties and the Montana judge, the San Diego court granted the motion and
quashed service of the restraining order petition for lack of California
UCCJEA jurisdiction. Finding the child had not resided in California since
March of 2020, the court ruled Montana was the “most appropriate state to
exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction.”
On appeal, M.M. contends the court erred by its determination, as the
evidence established as a matter of law Montana is not the child’s home state
within the meaning of the UCCJEA, the court failed to assess certain factors
in section 3421, subdivision (a)(2) as well as statutory factors of section 3427,
and it deprived her of due process by denying her requests for an evidentiary
hearing relating to UCCJEA jurisdiction and custody. As we will explain, the
court’s ruling—which does not mention UCCJEA home state jurisdiction—
indicates it determined California was an inconvenient forum and Montana
was the “more appropriate forum” (§ 3427), without engaging in
consideration of factors required by section 3427 of the UCCJEA. Because we
cannot imply findings to uphold the court’s ruling, we reverse and remand
with directions set forth below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The pertinent facts were contested below, so we state them in the light
most favorable to C.S., who prevailed on his motion to quash. (In re A.C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 669-670; see also Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1285, 1287.) M.M. and C.S., who had a dating
relationship, have a minor child together. The child was born in February
2018 in San Diego. In April 2020, the parties moved to Montana to be near

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
2
C.S.’s family and bought a house there. M.M. and C.S. registered their cars,
filed taxes and maintained their primary residence in Montana.
On September 7, 2022, M.M. sought and obtained in the San Diego
Superior Court a temporary domestic violence restraining order against C.S.
as well as an order awarding her legal and physical custody of their child,
and denying C.S. visitation. M.M. asserted that she had been staying with
C.S. and his parents in Montana when she and C.S. got into an altercation
over how to divide the proceeds of their recently-sold home, which she
characterized as a joint investment. According to M.M., C.S. became
aggressive and violent—shouting obscenities in her face and swinging his fist
hard at her, grazing her head and hitting their car—causing her to return to
San Diego on September 4, 2022, assertedly in fear for her and their child’s
safety. The San Diego court set the matter for an October 2022 hearing.
In late September 2022, C.S. specially appeared in the San Diego court
and moved for an order quashing service of M.M.’s restraining order request
on grounds the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him or subject matter

jurisdiction over child custody and visitation.2 In an accompanying
declaration, C.S. denied becoming violent or assaulting M.M., and stated that
Montana had been the parties’ and their child’s resident state for the past 17
months, with extended trips with one or both parents to Brazil from
September 8, 2020, to February 21, 2021, and again from November 14, 2021,

2 M.M. does not challenge the San Diego court’s ruling concerning
personal jurisdiction over C.S.
3
to April 23, 2022.3 He explained that once he learned M.M. had left Montana
with their child, he filed a petition in the Montana court on September 8,
2022, resulting in an ex parte order adopting an interim parenting plan and
requiring M.M. to return their child to Montana within 14 days. C.S. asked
that if the San Diego court were inclined to exert emergency jurisdiction, to
contact the Montana judge for a UCCJEA conference given Montana was the
UCCJEA home state and there was a pending action there relating to the
child.
In response, M.M. contended California had UCCJEA jurisdiction to
make an initial child custody determination because no other state had home
state jurisdiction. She argued the court was required to decide whether
California had jurisdiction under section 3421 as “a more appropriate forum”
than Montana under factors identified in section 3427. M.M. also argued
California remained the home state because the child was conceived and born
in California, lived in California until April 2020, and spent temporary
absences in both Montana and Brazil, the country where M.M.’s family is
from. M.M. submitted a declaration in which she stated that she and C.S.
only lived in Montana temporarily and had always planned to return to

3 C.S. denied their stays in Brazil were relocations, stating: “When we
visited Brazil we continued to work our jobs in the U.S. remotely. We
continued to maintain our residence in Montana including continuing to pay
our utilities and property taxes. Our vehicles, furniture and furnishings, and
personal assets all remained in Montana. We continued to file our taxes in
Montana. [¶] In addition, while in Brazil, we never rented or owned
property, we always stayed with [M.M.’s] family. We never worked in Brazil,
we never rented or owned a car, we never paid taxes, we never opened bank
accounts, or had local credit cards. Every time we left to Brazil we had a
mutual understanding that it was a temporary trip not a permanent
relocation and we always intended to return to our residence in Montana and
always did so after each trip. We were never in Brazil for six months or
more.”
4
California. She also stated she and their child did not live in Montana for the
last six months before she fled to California. According to M.M., she and the
child spent significant time in Brazil; M.M. and C.S. hired a nanny there and
the child attended a local school there. M.M. stated she and the child only
lived in Montana from April 24, 2022, until the time she left for California on
September 4, 2022. M.M. asked the court to continue the hearing to permit
her to conduct discovery, and to set an evidentiary hearing to resolve the
factual disputes related to UCCJEA jurisdiction, including whether the
parties’ time in Montana and Brazil were temporary absences from San
Diego. She submitted a list of the names of ten witnesses who would testify
regarding C.S.’s “intent [or plans] to return to San Diego.”
In October 2022, the San Diego court conducted a conference call with
the Montana court, the parties and their counsel in attendance. The San
Diego court first recounted its understanding of where the parties and child
lived, stating “[t]hey lived in Montana between April of 2022 to September of
2022. Then they lived in Brazil between November 2021 to April of 2022.
Then again in Montana between February 2021 and November of 2021. And
then in September of 2020 to February of 2021 in Brazil. Then in April of
2020 to August of 2020 in Montana. And then in San Diego from February
2018 to November of 2020 [sic].” The Montana court recounted what C.S. had
set forth in his September 8, 2022 petition: “[C.S., M.M.], and the child lived
in Helena, Montana from . . . September 2020 to August 2022; Brazil, . . .
December 2021 to April of 2022; and there is an indication that says ‘[C.S.
and M.M.] spent five months in Brazil visiting [M.M.’s] family,’ . . . . ‘They
did not establish residency in Brazil[.]’ And then from April 2020 to
September 2020, they lived in Jefferson County, Montana; and then February
2018 to April 2020, they lived in San Diego, California.” The Montana court

5
confirmed that on September 8, 2022, it had issued an order for an interim
parenting plan and had set a hearing for October 2022.
The San Diego court then allowed the parties’ counsel to speak,
observing that the child had not lived in San Diego since March of 2020.
After both courts reviewed California and Montana law, the Montana court
based on C.S.’s Montana petition stated that “until August of 2022, [C.S.,
M.M.] and the child lived in Montana” and offered its view that Montana was

the child’s home state.4 The Montana court stated, “[T]he question becomes
whether the home state[ ] gives way,” and asked counsel to address that
point.
C.S.’s counsel confirmed that C.S. still resided in Montana. She
explained why the evidence showed the parties’ trips to Brazil were
temporary absences, which did not take away from Montana’s ability to
exercise home state jurisdiction. In response, M.M.’s counsel asserted that
there had been a “material misrepresentation in the Montana pleading,”
namely that the child had lived in Montana from December 2020 to August of
2022. He explained that because the time in Brazil was not a temporary
absence, there was no home state under the UCCJEA, and thus the court had

4 During this exchange, the San Diego court recognized M.M. and the
child had been in San Diego since September 2022, but the last time they
were in San Diego before that was March 2020. The court stated: “Then the
second part of the statute is significant—there is a significant connection and
substantial evidence. Can [the California court] exercise custody or
jurisdiction? [¶] It says, ‘No other state has home state jurisdiction or a
court of the home state has declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground
that California is the more appropriate forum.’ [¶] So, I think, Judge
[referring to the Montana court], that’s where the Court is at this time with
respect to its connection to Montana and significant connections.” After that
remark, the Montana court offered its position that Montana was the home
state, and asked counsel to address whether it as the home state should give
way.
6
to resolve the factual question of whether the child had significant
connections to San Diego County. M.M.’s counsel pointed to M.M.’s
declaration in which she set forth facts pertaining to the inquiry. He
asserted the San Diego court had available to it substantial evidence of the
child’s care, protection, and personal relationships in San Diego. M.M.’s
counsel asked the court in view of the factual dispute to grant M.M. an
evidentiary hearing, and asked the court to accept his remarks as an offer of
proof pending the hearing.
After considering further argument, the San Diego court ruled
Montana was the “most appropriate state to exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction,”
finding “the child has not resided in California since March of 2020.” It
removed the child from the temporary protective order, and vacated the
orders regarding visitation and custody.
The following day, the San Diego court convened the parties to clarify
the stay it had granted pertaining to the restraining order. During that
hearing, the court and parties again discussed M.M.’s request for an
evidentiary hearing, and the court asked counsel for an “offer of proof as to
why an evidentiary hearing should occur.” Counsel responded: “There is
substantial overlap in the facts regarding the motion to quash and the
UCCJEA motion. I think under the UCCJEA motion, since it is a motion
filed under [section] 3400, we’re entitled under [section] 217, to that
evidentiary hearing, absent some very specific findings by the court. And of
those, the most important is there are disputed facts. As you look in the
declarations, there’s a lot of disputed facts regarding the UCCJEA issue. And
again, we believe that the court should have given us the evidentiary
hearing, you know, based on [section] 217.”

7
In its later findings and order after hearing, the San Diego court found
that section 217 “permits an evidentiary hearing when there is an order to
show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to the Family Code”; that
the UCCJEA communication in October 2022 was not a hearing, but a
“communication under . . . [section] 3410 in which the court allowed the
parties to participate . . . .” (Bold omitted.) The court found good cause to
deny the request for an evidentiary hearing relating to UCCJEA subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling “there are no material facts in controversy . . . that
the last time the child spent time in San Diego was in March of 2020” and the
child “spent the rest of the time between then and now, as agreed upon by the
parties, in Montana and Brazil with a nine month stay in Montana in 2021.”
(Bold omitted.) The court ruled there was no controverted issue, and thus no
need to take live testimony to assess the parties’ or witness credibility. It
found M.M.’s offer of proof and submission of a witness list irrelevant.

M.M. appeals from the court’s findings and order after hearing.5
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss
C.S. moves to dismiss this appeal, arguing the matter is moot because
the Montana court during the pendency of this appeal asserted UCCJEA
jurisdiction and made custody determinations with respect to the child. He
maintains Montana’s assertion of jurisdiction bars California from asserting
its jurisdiction, as “[t]he UCCJEA requires that only one state has jurisdiction
to make child custody determinations at any one point in time.” C.S. cites
the proposition that “[w]here such a statutory scheme renders a court unable

5 M.M. filed two notices of appeal, one from the court’s October 2022
minute order, and a second from its December 2022 findings and order after
hearing. This court assigned the same case number to the appeals.
8
to act in the manner requested by appellant, the appeal must be dismissed as

moot.”6
Faced with a similar argument in Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 692, this court declined to dismiss an appeal on mootness
grounds. In Segal, a father appealed a California court’s order determining
that Virginia would retain UCCJEA jurisdiction, and ruling the California
court was without jurisdiction to modify or make custody orders. (Id. at p.
701.) In a motion to dismiss the appeal, the mother maintained that because
she and the child were living in Virginia and the Virginia court had issued
orders pending the appeal, this court could not grant any effectual relief and
was required to dismiss the father’s appeal as moot. (Id. at p. 702.) A panel
of this court declined to do so, instead stating: “[W]hether we can still grant
effectual relief to [the father] necessarily turns on whether the California
family court properly concluded that California does not have jurisdiction
over the custody dispute.” (Ibid.)

6 C.S. also asks us to take judicial notice of the Montana court’s May 18,
2023 order issued while this appeal was pending in which that court ruled it
had jurisdiction under both the UCCJEA and Montana law. He points out
the San Diego court took judicial notice of the order in postjudgment
proceedings. C.S. maintains the order is properly subject to judicial notice as
a record of another court (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(2)), this court may
judicially notice any matter noticed by the trial court (Evid. Code, § 459,
subd. (a)(1)), and the order is relevant to whether M.M.’s appeal has been
rendered moot by the Montana court’s decision to exercise UCCJEA
jurisdiction. We may take judicial notice of the records of “any court of this
state.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) However, the Montana court’s order
is irrelevant to this appeal as it is outside the record on which the California
court’s judgment is based (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523,
530; accord, Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, 958),
notwithstanding the fact the San Diego court later judicially noticed the
document.
9
So it is here. As in Segal, “[b]ecause [C.S.’s] motion to dismiss
necessarily implicates a review of the record and the merits of this appeal, we
deferred ruling on it and instead will consider it together with the merits.”
(Segal v. Fishbein, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 702.) Dismissal is not
appropriate since whether we can grant effective relief depends on the
propriety of the San Diego court’s ruling, which we address below.
II. Reconsideration of Order Denying Request to Augment the Record
At the time M.M. filed her opening appellate brief, she requested that
the record be augmented to include exhibits—including an October 27, 2022
Helena Montana Police Department report—pertaining to the domestic
violence incident involving C.S. M.M. had lodged some of those documents
with the lower court in January 2023 in connection with her application for a
stay of the court’s UCCJEA jurisdiction order. We denied M.M.’s
augmentation request on grounds the matters were lodged after issuance of
the appealed-from orders.
At this court’s invitation, M.M. seeks reconsideration of our order on
grounds it is appropriate to augment the record under the “unusual
circumstances presented here” in that the documents corroborate a
September 2023 domestic violence incident that was the basis for a criminal
charge against C.S. M.M. says the documents are “highly relevant to this
appeal because they help to establish some of the evidence which would have
been offered had the court not erroneously denied an evidentiary hearing”
(some bold and underline omitted) and thus to show prejudice. She claims
she would have been able to establish that “domestic violence has occurred
and is likely to continue in the future” which is relevant to the court’s
decision as to whether California or Montana could best protect the parties

10
and child, assertedly a mandatory factor for the court’s consideration under
section 3427.
Augmentation “does not function to supplement the record with
materials not before the trial court.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods,
Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3; see also FCM Investments, LLC v. Grove
Pham, LLC (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 545, 552; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1)(A).) “[N]ormally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of
the record at the time the judgment was entered.’ ” (Vons Companies, at p.
444, fn. 3.) Exceptional circumstances must exist to justify deviating from
this rule. (Ibid.) Merely seeking to rebut an opponent’s factual argument in
a reply brief does not constitute exceptional circumstances. (Ibid. [request for
a factual determination under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 to add
documents not before the trial court in order to rebut factual claims
concerning content of franchise agreements did not constitute exceptional
circumstances]; compare Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d
800, 813 [courts consider postjudgment events such as legislative changes,
events that render an issue moot, or undisputed facts that do not usurp the
fact-finding function of the trial court and avoid repetitive litigation of fully
briefed issues].)
Though she characterizes the circumstances as “unusual,” M.M. does
not cite authority expanding on what would constitute exceptional
circumstances compelling us to find such circumstances here, where the
proffered documents corroborate evidence (M.M.’s declaration) already in the
record. M.M.’s request in substance asks us to take additional evidence on
appeal and make independent factual findings. “Although appellate courts
are authorized to make findings of fact on appeal . . . the authority should be

11
exercised sparingly. [Citation.] Absent exceptional circumstances, no such
findings should be made.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405; see also
Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 912
[“ ‘Trial courts . . . are better situated to resolve questions of fact’ ”]; In re L.B.
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1423, fn. 1 [authority of appellate court to take
new evidence “ ‘is to be used sparingly and has been narrowly construed’ ”].)
We decline to augment the record with the postjudgment evidence.
III. UCCJEA Jurisdiction
A. Legal Principles
“It is well settled in California that the UCCJEA is ‘the exclusive
method of determining the proper forum in custody disputes involving other
jurisdictions.’ ” (Segal v. Fishbein, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 702; In re A.C.,
supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 668.) One primary purpose of the UCCJEA is
“ ‘to encourage states to respect and enforce the prior custody determinations
of other states, as well as to avoid competing jurisdiction and conflicting
decisions.’ [Citation.] To that end, ‘[t]he UCCJEA ensures that only one
state has jurisdiction to make “child custody determinations” ’ at any one
time.” (Segal v. Fishbein, at p. 702.) “[W]hen a California court is asked to
make either an initial or a modified custody determination, UCCJEA
jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied.” (Ibid.) In such child custody
proceedings, “subject matter jurisdiction . . . either exists or does not exist at
the time the petition is filed, and jurisdiction under the UCCJEA may not be
conferred by mere presence of the parties or by stipulation, consent, waiver,
or estoppel.” (In re A.C., at p. 668; see also A.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 343, 350; In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1040.) M.M. points out, and C.S. does not dispute,

12
that Montana has adopted the UCCJEA (West’s Mont. Code Ann. (2024) tit.
40, ch. 7, § 101 et seq.; In re B.P. (2008) 343 Mont. 345, 349).
California’s UCCJEA “takes a strict ‘ “first in time” ’ approach to
jurisdiction.” (Segal v. Fishbein, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 703; In re
Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040.)
“The general rule of the UCCJEA, subject to certain delineated exceptions, is
that once the court of an appropriate state—that is, one having jurisdiction
under its terms—has made an initial child custody determination, that court
obtains exclusive, continuing subject matter jurisdiction over the child.”

(A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 523.)7 “[A] court ‘has
jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination’ if it is the child’s
home state.” (Segal v. Fishbein, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 703, fn. 6,
quoting § 3421, subd. (a)(1).) As relevant here, the child’s home state is “the
state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at
least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
child custody proceeding . . . [and a] period of temporary absence of any of the
mentioned persons is part of the period.” (§ 3402, subd. (g); In re L.C. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 728, 740.)
A court can alternatively exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction under a
“significant connection” provision where (1) a court of another state does not
have home state jurisdiction “or a court of the home state of the child has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more

7 A “ ‘ “[c]hild custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation
with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial,
and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child
support or other monetary obligation of an individual.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Initial
determination” means the first child custody determination concerning a
particular child.’ ” (A.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 523.)
13
appropriate forum . . .” and (2) both of the following are true: “(A) The child
and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting
as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere
physical presence. [¶] (B) Substantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.”

(§ 3421, subd. (a)(2); see In re A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 668.)8
“When a California court asserting temporary emergency jurisdiction is
aware that a child custody determination has been made by another
jurisdiction, the California court ‘shall immediately communicate with the
other court.’ (§ 3424, subd. (d).) ‘To make an appropriate order under the
[UCCJEA], the California court needs to know whether the sister state court
wishes to continue its jurisdiction and how much time it requires to take
appropriate steps to consider further child custody orders.’ [Citations.] ‘The
court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the
parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given
the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on
jurisdiction is made.’ (§ 3410, subd. (b).)” (In re Cristian I. (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097-1098.)
Further, a California court with UCCJEA jurisdiction to make a child
custody determination may nevertheless decline to exercise it “if it
determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and

8 The two other alternative bases for a California court to make an initial
child custody determination are where: “All courts having jurisdiction under
paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child” and “[n]o court of any other state would have jurisdiction under
the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2) or (3).” (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3), (a)(4);
see In re A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 668-669.)

14
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” (§ 3427, subd. (a).)
Such an inconvenient forum argument may be raised on a party’s or any
court’s own motion. (Ibid.) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient
forum, the court must first consider whether it is appropriate for another
state to exercise jurisdiction. (Brewer v. Carter (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1312,
1319, citing § 3427, subd. (b).) In doing so, it “ ‘shall allow the parties to
submit information’ ” and “ ‘shall consider’ ” and weigh relevant factors,
including those enumerated in section 3427. (Brewer, at p. 1320, § 3427,

subd. (b).)9
“On appeal, ‘when the facts are contested, a trial court’s jurisdictional
finding under the UCCJEA is reviewed under the deferential substantial
evidence standard. [Citations.] When conducting a substantial evidence
review, we must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling or
judgment being reviewed, and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of
the family [or juvenile] court’s findings. [Citation.] The family . . . court’s
resolution of conflicts in the evidence and credibility assessments are binding
on this court. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In contrast, we review de novo, or

9 These factors include: “(1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and
is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the
parties and the child. [¶] (2) The length of time the child has resided outside
this state. [¶] (3) The distance between the court in this state and the court
in the state that would assume jurisdiction. [¶] (4) The degree of financial
hardship to the parties in litigating in one forum over the other. [¶] (5) Any
agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction. [¶] (6)
The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
litigation, including testimony of the child. [¶] (7) The ability of the court of
each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to
present the evidence. [¶] (8) The familiarity of the court of each state with
the facts and issues in the pending litigation.” (§ 3427, subd. (b); Brewer v.
Carter, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319.)
15
independently, a . . . court’s determination of jurisdictional facts based on
undisputed evidence and its interpretation of statutes.” (In re A.C., supra, 13
Cal.App.5th at pp. 669-670, fn. omitted; see also Schneer v. Llaurado, supra,
242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1285, 1287 [in reviewing a court’s determination of
UCCJEA jurisdiction, the appellate court does not “independently reweigh
jurisdictional facts,” rather it “generally must defer to the trial court’s

resolution of credibility and conflicts in the evidence”].)10
Finally, failure to “comply with the procedural requirements of the
UCCJEA is subject to harmless error analysis. [Citations.] Before any
judgment can be reversed for ordinary error, it must appear that the error
complained of ‘has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13.) Reversal is justified “ ‘only when the court, “after an examination of
the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (In re Cristian I.,
supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1098-1099.) The harmless error standard
requires the appellant to show “merely a reasonable chance” of a more
favorable outcome, which is “more than an abstract possibility.” (College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715, italics omitted.)
B. Contentions

10 The court in Schneer v. Llaurado, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 1276,
declined to follow In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez, supra, 191
Cal.App.4th 1015 and other authorities to the extent they stated that an
appellate court “may independently reweigh the jurisdictional facts.”
(Marriage of Fernandez-Abin, at p. 1042; Schneer, at pp. 1284, fn. 2, 1285-
1286.) A panel of this court in A.M. v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th
343 more recently adopted Schneer’s standard of review. (Id. at p. 351.) We
do as well.
16
Conceding that California was not the child’s home state under the
UCCJEA, M.M. contends the evidence was undisputed that Montana was
also not the child’s home state under the UCCJEA. Pointing to C.S.’s
agreement that the child lived in Brazil from November 2021 through April
2022, M.M. maintains the child did not live in Montana for six consecutive
months immediately before commencement of the action. According to M.M.,
because no home state existed, the California court was required to consider
the subjective “significant connection” factors under section 3421, as well as
factors to determine which state was the more appropriate forum under
section 3427, and the court erred by failing to do so.
C.S. responds that the San Diego court properly complied with the
UCCJEA, consulting with the Montana court and determining Montana was
the “appropriate state to exercise UCCJEA ‘home state’ jurisdiction.” He
points out the Montana court did not decline jurisdiction, and there was
evidence that the child’s stays in Brazil were intermittent and did not
constitute residency. C.S. maintains that the record contains factual
disputes on whether Montana was the child’s home state, as to which we
apply the substantial evidence standard of review. He argues section 3427’s
inconvenient forum analysis does not apply since the San Diego court, which
was not the child’s home state, did not have initial jurisdiction to conduct
such an analysis and the record contains no indication that inconvenient
forum was raised by either the San Diego or Montana courts, or the parties
by motion. He argues substantial evidence supports the court’s implied
finding that Montana was the more appropriate forum for UCCJEA
jurisdiction.

17
C. Analysis
We conclude remand is necessary given the basis for the San Diego
court’s ruling. The court did not expressly rule that Montana was the child’s
home state for purposes of UCCJEA jurisdiction, which requires the child live
with a parent at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding. The record contains
substantial evidence from C.S.’s declaration that the child’s times in Brazil
were temporary absences, from which the San Diego court could conclude
Montana was the child’s home state, as temporary absences are included in
the six-month period. (§ 3402, subd. (g).) But the San Diego court’s remarks
concerning the “significant connection” part of the UCCJEA suggest that it
did not consider either state to be the child’s home state. And its use of the
specific phrase “most appropriate state” tracks the UCCJEA inconvenient
forum provision, section 3427, indicating it considered California to be an
inconvenient forum “and that [the Montana court] is a more appropriate
forum . . . .” (§ 3427, subd. (a).)
C.S. says we must imply a finding that the court found Montana to be
the UCCJEA home state., but we cannot do so where the court’s analysis
shows it believed there was no home state and thus the “significant
connection” analysis applied (see footnote 4, ante), or that California was an
inconvenient forum. We cannot imply findings if the court’s reasoning
otherwise is clear from the record (Brewer v. Carter, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th
1320 [“Where the record reflects what the court actually did . . . these
presumptions [under the doctrine of implied findings] do not apply”]; United
Services Auto. Assn. v. Dalrymple (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 182, 186 [no findings
to be implied where order expressed the trial court’s legal conclusion]; see
Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538,

18
1550 [ “[W]e are not compelled to resort to a presumption if the record
adequately demonstrates the legal theory the court applied”].) Because the
record indicates the court’s ruling was based on no state being the child’s
home state and California being an inconvenient forum, we may not imply a
finding that Montana was the child’s home state.
C.S. also urges that the San Diego court could not have engaged in an
inconvenient forum analysis because to do so, it must have had home state
jurisdiction to release to the Montana court. In order to undertake an
inconvenient forum analysis, a court must first have “jurisdiction under this
part to make a child custody determination . . . .” (§ 3427, subd. (a).) The
statute—which we interpret as a matter of law (Schneer v. Llaurado, supra,
242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287)—does not specify home state jurisdiction as a
condition precedent. Here, the San Diego court had entered a temporary
restraining order at M.M.’s request before learning of the Montana
proceedings. Upon learning of the Montana proceedings, it then contacted
the Montana court as it was required to do under section 3424, which
addresses temporary emergency jurisdiction to issue a child custody order.
(§ 3424.) Temporary emergency jurisdiction is “jurisdiction under this part
[the UCCJEA].” (§ 3427, subd. (a).) This was sufficient.
While the San Diego court was empowered to consider the inconvenient
forum issue on its own motion (§ 3427, subd. (a)), it could only do so if it
considered the required factors and allowed the parties “to submit
information” (§ 3427, subd. (b)) on them. Subdivision (b) of section 3427 uses
the word “shall,” making the procedure mandatory. “The court has broad
discretion with respect to weighing the applicable [inconvenient forum]
factors and determining the appropriate weight to accord to each. However,
the court cannot ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in section

19
3427, subdivision (b); rather, the trial judge must recognize and apply each
applicable statutory factor.” (Brewer v. Carter, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p.
1320.) In Brewer, the trial court “raised the inconvenient forum issue on its
own motion” without providing the parties “an opportunity to submit
evidence relevant to the court’s determination of whether California was a
convenient forum or Illinois was an appropriate forum.” (Id. at p. 1319.) The
appellate court agreed that “in the absence of evidence, the [trial] court could
not consider and apply the statutory factors set forth in section 3427” (ibid.),
and thus the court had erred by staying the California proceedings. (Ibid.)
“Without the parties having had an opportunity to submit evidence on the
inconvenient forum issue and lacking any evidence in the record that
California is an inconvenient forum or Illinois is a more convenient forum to
resolve the parties’ custody issues, we decline to presume the trial court made
the factual findings necessary under section 3427.” (Id. at p. 1320.) The
Brewer court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
(Ibid.)
Here, the San Diego court had before it some evidence of one of the
factors (as to domestic violence), but it did not say it was analyzing all of the
listed factors nor did it appear to undertake a review of those factors, at least
expressly. Another one of the factors—the distance between the courts of
each state—could have been the subject of judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (h) [permitting judicial notice of facts that are not reasonably subject to
dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to
sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy]), but the court did not rule or
suggest it was taking judicial notice of that matter. Even if on this silent
record we were to imply findings on these issues, not all of them are
supported by substantial evidence. (See Brewer v. Carter, supra, 218

20
Cal.App.4th at p. 1320 [each implied finding on the section 3427 inconvenient
forum factors must be supported by substantial evidence].)
As we have stated, where a court does not comply with procedural
requirements of the UCCJEA, that error is subject to harmless error
analysis. (In re Cristian I., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1098-1099.) In
response to the court’s request for an offer of proof as to what an evidentiary
hearing as to subject matter jurisdiction would show, M.M.’s counsel did not
set out any specific evidence; he just pointed to the declarations and said,
“there’s a lot of disputed facts regarding the UCCJEA issue.” Had this been
M.M.’s only showing, we would hold M.M. has not shown how the court’s
failure to take evidence or conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
inconvenient forum issue resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13; accord, Segal v. Fishbein, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp.
708-709 [party “failed to explain with specificity, either in the trial court
below or in his briefing on appeal, how cross-examining Segal about her
declaration would have related to the issues underlying the California court’s
jurisdictional ruling”].)

21
But M.M. has proffered additional evidence in her appellate brief.11
Under the circumstances and recognizing the importance of the issues
presented in child custody matters, we reverse the order and remand for
further proceedings. On remand, the court may clarify that it was deciding
the question of home state jurisdiction. If the San Diego court intended to
rule that Montana was the child’s home state under the UCCJEA, then (as
we explain below) M.M. may renew her request that the court grant her an
evidentiary hearing with an offer of proof on that issue, or she may submit
the proffered evidence to support her argument that California is the child’s
home state.
If the court intended to address whether California is an inconvenient
forum and Montana is the more appropriate forum, it must consider and

11 On appeal, M.M. states that “[h]ad an evidentiary hearing been held,
[she] would have presented, among other evidence, that prior to the [domestic
violence] incident on September 3, 2022, [C.S.] had already purchased one
way airline tickets for herself, [C.S. and their child], to fly to San Diego just
after the close of escrow on their Montana property, thereby establishing
their intent to return as well as refuting [C.S.’s] claim made to the Montana
court that she ‘abducted’ [their child] . . . by returning to San Diego a very
short time after they were scheduled to go there.” (Bold and underline
omitted.) She states she would have cross-examined C.S. “regarding the
parties’ intentions when they first went to Montana and their intentions after
they sold their property in Montana,” which is “highly relevant” to the
question of whether their move to Montana was a temporary absence under
section 3402. In In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, the court stated a
ruling on temporary absence under the UCCJEA entails an evaluation of the
parents’ intentions, “as well as other factors relating to the circumstances of
the child’s or family’s departure . . . .” (Id. at p. 518.) The court may consider
the parties’ reasons for leaving California and their plans once they arrived
in Montana, including whether they discussed moving back to California and
other circumstances of the parties’ ties to both states. (Accord, id. at p. 521.)
Given our decision to remand the matter, M.M. may present such evidence or
make a more specific offer of proof to the court below.
22
permit the parties to present evidence on all of the factors under section
3427, subdivision (b). (Brewer v. Carter, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320-
1321.)
IV. Entitlement to Evidentiary Hearing
Because we remand for further proceedings as stated above, we address
M.M.’s claim that she is entitled under section 217 and California Rules of
Court, rule 5.113 to an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts relating to
custody and UCCJEA jurisdiction. According to M.M., under these
provisions, the court in a jurisdictional UCCJEA proceeding “ ‘shall receive
any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the
hearing’ unless the court makes ‘a finding of good cause to refuse to receive
live testimony’ and states its reasons for the finding on the record or in
writing.”
Section 217, subdivision (a) provides: “At a hearing on any order to
show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to [the Family Code], absent
a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision
(b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and
within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the
parties.” Subdivision (b) of the statute provides: “In appropriate cases, a
court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony
and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing.” Here,
the San Diego court found the communication with the Montana court was
not a hearing within the meaning of section 217, and also that there was “no
need for [it] to take live testimony to assess the credibility of the parties or
other witnesses when there is no controverted issue.”
We conclude the court’s discussion with the Montana court was

23
a “hearing on any . . . notice of motion brought pursuant to [the Family Code]
. . . .” (§ 217, subd. (a).) The San Diego court conducted the UCCJEA-
required call in connection with C.S.’s noticed motion to quash for lack of
UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, on remand, M.M. may renew her
request for an evidentiary hearing under section 217. The court may revisit
its good cause determination under the statute. We observe M.M. had
presented a witness list of persons who would testify as to C.S.’s intent or
plans to return to San Diego, as well as a declaration describing connections
between the child and California, which M.M. sought to introduce on what
she asserts are subjective factors relevant to “significant connection” home
state jurisdiction. As noted, M.M. has also made an offer of proof on appeal
relevant to the issue of the parties’ temporary absences. (Compare Segal v.
Fishbein, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 708 [party “failed to explain with
specificity, either in the trial court below or in his briefing on appeal, how
cross-examining [the other party] would have related to the issues underlying
the California court’s jurisdictional ruling” (italics added)].) C.S. argues that
if section 217 applies, the court properly exercised its discretion to deny
M.M.’s request for an evidentiary hearing because the material facts as to the
child’s time in San Diego, Montana and Brazil were uncontroverted, as was
the evidence showing California was not the child’s home state. But there is
controverted evidence on the parties’ intent relevant to whether the stays in
Montana and Brazil were temporary absences. Though C.S. points out M.M.
did not elaborate below on what factual disputes were present or give an offer
of proof as to the substance, purpose and relevance of C.S.’s cross-
examination on her UCCJEA arguments, M.M. has now done so on appeal.

24
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

25

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.