CourtListener 9530812•People v. Ashley CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 6/11/24 P. v. Ashley CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B328929
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA159597)
v.
JAMES LELAND ASHLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Maria A. Davalos, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
James Leland Ashley appeals from the judgment entered
after he pleaded no contest to recklessly causing a fire to an
inhabited structure (Pen. Code,1 § 452, subd. (b)). He argues the
trial court erred in denying his application for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36 because the evidence failed to
support its finding that Ashley did not currently suffer from a
mental disorder. The People concede that the trial court did not
apply the proper legal standard under the recent amendments to
section 1001.36, and that the matter should be remanded for the
court to apply the amended statute. We agree and, therefore,
conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Underlying charges
Ashley was charged with one count of arson of a structure
(§ 451, subd. (c)), and one count of recklessly causing a fire to an
inhabited structure (§ 452, subd. (b)). According to the
preliminary hearing testimony, on November 17, 2022, the police
responded to a fire at a residence occupied by Ashley. When the
officers arrived, the house was on fire, and Ashley was in the
backyard. He was pointing a knife at his neck and attempting to
cut himself. After the police tased Ashley multiple times, he
released the knife and was taken into custody. Ashley told the
officers that he started the fire because he was trying to kill
himself.
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
2
II. Denial of mental health diversion
On February 16, 2023, Ashley filed an application for
mental health diversion under section 1001.36. He supported his
application with a psychological assessment report from Haig
Kojian, Ph.D. According to the report, Ashley began using
methamphetamine and fentanyl after he became involved in a
relationship with an older man. After losing his job and his car
due to his drug use, Ashley became severely depressed and
suicidal.
In the report, Dr. Kojian stated that Ashley “did qualify for
the following DSM-5 diagnoses at the time of the alleged matter”:
Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder, Stimulant Use Disorder—
Amphetamine Type, and Unspecified Depressive Disorder. He
further stated that Ashley’s methamphetamine use resulted in a
psychotic episode that substantially contributed to his behavior
in the matter. Dr. Kojian found that Ashley could benefit from
mental health treatment and recommended that he be placed in
an inpatient dual-diagnosis treatment program. Dr. Kojian also
found that Ashley would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
if he actively participated in the inpatient program, had a well-
established after-care program, and addressed his future plans in
individual therapy. Based on these findings, Dr. Kojian opined
that Ashley qualified for mental health diversion under section
1001.36.
On February 22, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on
Ashley’s application. The court noted that, in the psychological
assessment report, Dr. Kojian wrote that Ashley “ ‘did qualify for
the following DSM[-]5 diagnos[e]s at the time of the alleged
offense.’ ” However, the court explained that it construed
section 1001.36 as requiring that the defendant currently suffer
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from a mental disorder. The court stated: “The impression that
I’m getting from this report is that this doctor believes that at the
time of the incident on that day he suffered—he did suffer from
these disorders.” The court added that, if Dr. Kojian believed
Ashley continued to suffer from a mental disorder, he “should say
‘he suffers.’ He shouldn’t say ‘he did suffer.’ ”
Defense counsel argued that the totality of the report,
including Dr. Kojian’s recommendation for a specific treatment
plan, showed that he believed Ashley’s mental disorder was an
“ongoing issue” rather than an isolated incident. The court
responded: “I understand what you’re saying, but the code is
very clear that the court, in order to grant diversion, has to have
a report that says the defendant suffers from a mental disorder
that’s in the DSM[-]5. I don’t have that. I have a report that
says he did. In other words that he doesn’t any longer. That’s
the way I’m reading it.” The court stated that it was denying
Ashley’s application on that basis alone because “he has not made
a prime facie case . . . that he currently suffers from a mental
disorder.” The court also noted that it “didn’t even get to the
issue of whether [Ashley] poses a risk because his report is
lacking for this court.”
III. Plea and sentence
Following the denial of his application, Ashley agreed to
plead no contest to one count of recklessly causing a fire to an
inhabited structure. The trial court accepted the plea, and placed
Ashley on formal probation on the condition that he complete a
mental health treatment program at the Tarzana Treatment
Center.
On February 22, 2023, Ashley filed a timely appeal. The
trial court granted Ashley’s request for a certificate of probable
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cause to appeal the denial of his application for mental health
diversion.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ashley argues the trial court erred in denying
his application for mental health diversion because there was no
substantial evidence to support its finding that Ashley did not
currently suffer from a mental disorder. The People assert that
we need not reach the sufficiency of the evidence issue. Instead,
the People concede the court erred because the amended version
of section 1001.36, which was in effect at the time of Ashley’s
application, removed the requirement that a defendant currently
suffer from a mental disorder. We agree with the People that the
trial court misapplied section 1001.36 in denying mental health
diversion, and that the proper remedy is to remand for the court
to reconsider the application under the amended statute.
I. Governing law
In 2018, the Legislature enacted section 1001.36 to create a
pretrial diversion program for criminal defendants with certain
diagnosed mental health disorders. (People v. Frahs (2020)
9 Cal.5th 618, 624; § 1001.36, subds. (a), (b)(1).) Pretrial
diversion “allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and
potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of
mental health treatment.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890.) In enacting the statute, “[t]he
Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to
apply as broadly as possible.” (People v. Whitmill (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149.)
As originally enacted, section 1001.36 authorized a trial
court to grant pretrial diversion if the defendant met the
following six criteria: “(1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying
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mental disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the
commission of the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms
will respond to mental health treatment; (4) the defendant
consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right;
(5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if treated in the community.” (People v. Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 626–627, citing former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)–
(6).)
However, “ ‘[i]n successive versions of section 1001.36, the
Legislature has provided increasingly detailed guidance for
deciding whether a defendant qualifies for diversion.’ ” (People v.
Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 120.) Effective January 1,
2023, Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) further
amended section 1001.36 to redefine the first two criteria as
eligibility requirements and the remaining four criteria as
suitability factors. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a)–(c); Stats. 2022, ch. 735,
§ 1.) “ ‘The criteria for each are specified in the statute.’ ” (People
v. Brown, at p. 120.)
As amended, section 1001.36 now states the defendant is
eligible for pretrial diversion if (1) “[t]he defendant has been
diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders,” and (2) “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)–(2).) As to the first requirement, “[e]vidence of the
defendant’s mental disorder shall be provided by the defense and
shall include a diagnosis or treatment for a diagnosed mental
disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health
expert.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) As to the second requirement, the
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amended statute creates a presumption that the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense, “unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing
factor.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
If the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements, “the
court must consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial
diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) The amended statute provides
the defendant is suitable for diversion if: “(1) In the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder . . . would respond to mental health treatment.
[¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant
agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . .
[¶] (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
Even where the defendant meets all of the eligibility and
suitability criteria, the court retains the discretion to deny
mental health diversion, but “ ‘this “residual” discretion must be
exercised “ ‘consistent with the principles and purpose of the
governing law.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 121.) We review the trial court’s denial of a request for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Doron (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1, 9; People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067,
1080.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary
or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(People v. Gerson, at p. 1080.)
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II. Remand is required for the trial court to correctly
apply the law under amended section 1001.36
In this case, the 2023 amendments to section 1001.36 were
in effect when the trial court heard Ashley’s application for
mental health diversion. While the prior version of the statute
required that the court be “satisfied that the defendant suffers
from a mental disorder” (former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)), the
2023 amendments changed that eligibility criteria. The amended
statute instead requires that the defendant “has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder . . . within the last five years by a
qualified mental health expert.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)
Thus, as the People concede, the trial court applied the
incorrect legal standard when it denied mental health diversion
based solely on its finding that Ashley did not currently suffer
from a mental disorder. In deciding whether Ashley was eligible
for diversion, the court instead should have considered whether
Ashley received “a diagnosis or treatment for a diagnosed mental
disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health
expert.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) We also agree with the People
that the proper remedy is to remand the matter with directions
that the trial court reconsider Ashley’s application under the
correct legal standard in amended section 1001.36. (See People v.
Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 128; People v. Doron, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 9.) We express no view regarding whether
Ashley is eligible or suitable for mental health diversion, or how
the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider Ashley’s
application for mental health diversion under amended section
1001.36. If the trial court determines that Ashley qualifies for
diversion, then it may grant the application. If the trial court
determines that Ashley does not qualify for diversion, then it
shall reinstate the judgment of conviction.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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