People v. Perine CA1/4

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Filed 6/10/24 P. v. Perine CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166548
v.
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS PERINE, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 21-SF-003391-A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Christopher Thomas Perine appeals a judgment convicting him of
penetration by a foreign object and infliction of a corporal injury on a dating
partner and sentencing him to a total of six years in prison. He contends the
trial court erred (1) by excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual activity with
another person, which he asserts would have provided an alternate
explanation for the injury the victim claimed Perine inflicted during the
penetration; (2) by not instructing the jury on any lesser included offenses to
the corporal injury charge; (3) by admitting evidence of his 2014 conviction of
misdemeanor domestic violence; and (4) by failing to stay the concurrent
prison term imposed on his corporal injury conviction in violation of Penal
Code section 654.1 We agree that the concurrent term imposed on Perine’s
corporal injury conviction should be stayed but find no other prejudicial error.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Accordingly, we stay the sentence imposed on count 2 and affirm the
judgment in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
Perine was charged by information with one felony count each of
penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); corporal injury on a
dating partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)); and stalking with two prior convictions
(§ 646.9 subds. (a), (c)).2
At trial, evidence was presented that Perine met and started dating the
victim in October 2015. The victim testified that the relationship ended in
April 2020 after a verbal disagreement, although she did acknowledge having
sexual intercourse with him one time after the breakup. She claimed that,
despite returning his key and letting him know that she was blocking him
from contacting her phone, he continued to leave voice and text messages and
drive by her home. In February and March 2021, Perine sent the victim
several unwanted, sexually explicit texts, which were read to the jury. He
also left several unwanted, sexually explicit voicemails on her phone that
were played for the jury. Some of the messages referenced Perine wanting to
engage in sexual activity in the alleyway behind the victim’s house, but the
victim testified that it was not something that had happened previously
between them.
On March 17, 2021, the victim heard Perine’s truck, which she
described as black with a large yellow panel on the side, idling in the
alleyway next to her house. She went out and asked him to leave. Perine left
but returned on March 20 sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. She

2 The stalking charge was based on conduct occurring after the sexual

assault. Because the jury acquitted Perine on that count, we omit from our
recitation of the facts testimony relevant to only that count.
2
heard his truck in the alleyway again and thought, “Oh no, not again.” When
she went outside to ask him to leave, he grabbed her left arm, pinned her
against the garage, and put his finger in her vagina. She felt him scratch her
vagina when he penetrated her. She said “stop,” got out of his grasp, and ran
into her house.
Her family came home approximately 15 minutes after the assault.
When she told them what happened, they encouraged her to file a police
report, which she did that evening. An officer arrived at her home and
advised her to go to the hospital for a forensic examination. The forensic
nurse who examined her approximately six hours after the assault testified
that there was a “very superficial, shallow abrasion” on her vagina. Although
it was a minor abrasion, it was visible to the naked eye, and there was a
definite border between the abraded area and normal tissue. She did not see
bruising on the victim at the time of the exam, but because bruising could
develop later, she instructed her to report any bruising for documentation.
The doctor who reviewed the photographs from the exam confirmed that the
photographs depict a “small, difficult-to-see” injury.
The next day, when the victim noticed that a large, finger-shaped
bruise had formed on the underside of her left arm, she called the police as
instructed. A photograph of the bruise taken by a police officer two days after
the assault was introduced as an exhibit at trial.
Also on March 21, the victim received a voicemail message from Perine
at 10:17 p.m. in which he said, “I don’t understand uh, this uh, avoidance
accomplishes nothing just more built-up lust and desire, so. Then I pull up in
your alley and make a scene and you get wet and you still won’t suck my
cock.”

3
The victim’s neighbor testified that on March 20, at around 6:00 p.m. or
7:00 p.m., he saw a black truck with a yellow stripe idling in the alleyway
behind his home.
Perine denied sexually assaulting the victim. He testified that he last
engaged in sexual activity with her in February 2021, and at that time, he
believed they were still in a relationship. He admitted, however, that he left
several graphic voicemails on the victim’s phone in February and March and
texted her repeatedly, and that she had not returned any of his calls or texts.
He also admitted that when he went to her house on March 17, she asked
him to leave. He explained, however, that she told him she was expecting
company but that she would call him later. Although she did not call him by
the weekend, he did not understand that, by not responding to him, the
victim was indicating that she did not want to see him.
With regard the March 20 assault, Perine testified that he did not see
the victim at all that day. He, his six-year-old son, and a friend went to a
local restaurant and stayed for about an hour. After leaving the restaurant,
he went directly home and watched a movie with his son. Video surveillance
showed the group leaving at 5:35 p.m., which Perine believed was actually
one hour later due to daylight savings time. He claimed to have been driving
a white truck at the time because his black-and-yellow truck was in the shop.
On cross-examination, Perine acknowledged leaving the victim the
phone message the day after the assault in which he referenced pulling up in
the alley but claimed that it was not an admission of guilt. Rather, it was a
reference to the fact that they previously had sex in the alley.
Perine’s friend, who was with him at the restaurant and who owned an
auto repair shop, testified that Perine left the restaurant driving a white

4
truck and that Perine’s black-and-yellow truck had been in his shop since
February.
The jury found Perine guilty of penetration by a foreign object and
inflicting corporal injury on a dating partner, but was unable to reach a
verdict on the stalking charge.
The court sentenced Perine to concurrent middle terms on each count
for a total of six years in prison.
DISCUSSION
I. Exclusion of the Victim’s Sexual History

Perine argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the
victim’s sexual activity with another person in February 2021, which he
asserts would have provided an alternate explanation for the injury the
victim claimed he inflicted during the digital penetration. He contends that
this evidence was relevant to the victim’s credibility and admissible under
Evidence Code sections 1103 and 783, and that precluding that cross-
examination deprived him of his right to present a defense under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and due process.

A. Legal Background

A criminal defendant has a “fundamental constitutional right to a fair
opportunity to present a defense.” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683,
687.) “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the
Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Id. at
p. 690.) “ ‘ “[T]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for
the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” ’ ” (Delaware v. Van
Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 (Van Arsdall).) Trial courts, however,

5
“retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on[] cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive
or only marginally relevant.” (Id. at p. 679.)
“Evidence of the sexual conduct of a complaining witness is admissible
in a prosecution for a sex-related offense only under very strict conditions.”
(People v. Fontana (2010) 49 Cal.4th 351, 362; Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (c).)
Evidence of the complaining witness’s prior sexual conduct may be admissible
when offered to explain injuries the prosecution alleges were the result of the
defendant’s conduct where the evidence “is relevant under [Evidence Code]
section 780 and is not barred by [Evidence Code] section 352.” (Fontana, at
p. 363.) “In such circumstances, ‘it is not the fact of prior sexual activity as
such that is important, but something about the special circumstances under
which that prior sexual activity took place that renders it important.’
[Citation.] Where the prosecution has attempted to link the defendant to
physical evidence of sexual activity on the complainant’s part, ‘the defendant
should unquestionably have the opportunity to offer alternative explanations
for that evidence, even though it necessarily depends on evidence of other
sexual conduct.’ ” (Ibid.)
Evidence Code section 780 generally identifies factors a jury may
consider in determining the credibility of a witness that have a “tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness” of that witness’s testimony,
including statements made by the witness that are inconsistent with any part
of the witness’s testimony and the existence or nonexistence of any fact
testified to by the witness. Under Evidence Code section 352, the court has
discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue

6
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
Evidence Code section 782, subdivision (a) sets forth the procedure for
determining the admissibility of such evidence: It requires (1) that the
defendant submit a written motion “stating that the defense has an offer of
proof of the relevance of evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining
witness that is proposed to be presented and of its relevance in attacking the
credibility of the complaining witness,” (2) that the motion “be accompanied
by an affidavit in which the offer of proof shall be stated,” (3) that the court
shall determine if the “offer of proof is sufficient,” and if so, “order a hearing”
to “allow the questioning of the complaining witness regarding the offer of
proof made by the defendant.” If the court determines, following the hearing,
that the evidence is relevant under Evidence Code section 780 and not
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352, then the court may make an
order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and the
nature of the questions allowed. (Evid. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(4); People v.
Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 362.)

B. Factual Background

Prior to trial, Perine moved to admit evidence that the victim suffered a
vaginal injury during sexual activity with a different person three weeks
prior to the offense. His motion argued that if the victim denies the injurious
sexual contact with another person at trial, he intends to testify that she
alluded to another sexual relationship and showed him the injury in
February 2021. The prosecution opposed the motion.
At an evidentiary hearing, Perine testified that on February 26, 2021,
the victim told him that she had been “touched inappropriately.” She was
“too embarrassed” to tell him who had touched her but “smirked” when he

7
asked if it was her friend who had recently visited. She later removed her
clothing and asked him to look at a “small tear” on her labia.
The victim denied having a sexual relationship with her friend and
testified that that the interaction described by Perine never happened.
The nurse who had examined the victim after the assault testified that
the abrasion she observed in the victim’s vaginal area was consistent with
having been inflicted six hours prior but that it was “highly unlikely” that the
injury was inflicted three weeks ago. To still be visible at the time of the
exam, the prior injury “would have had to have been very, very deep and
have a lot of bleeding and probably would have needed sutures.” She
explained that genital mucosal tissue heals quickly and a shallow abraded
area such as the abrasion she observed on the victim could heal in a couple of
days. She did not believe the injury resembled an older, faint scar.
Following the hearing, the court denied Perine’s motion. The court
found that the evidence was not relevant based on the nurse’s testimony that
even a significant injury would have healed in the three weeks between the
alleged prior incident and the sexual assault. The court found further that
the evidence was subject to exclusion under section 352 because Perine’s
“testimony has such limited probative value, if any, and would create a
danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.”

C. Analysis

Perine contends the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence
was not relevant. He argues that the court improperly “relied on its
evaluation of the credibility of the evidence each side presented and found
Perine’s proposed testimony was not relevant because [the nurse’s] testimony
was more persuasive.”

8
Perine is correct that the trial court improperly evaluated the
credibility of Perine’s testimony regarding the incident in February when the
victim allegedly showed him the scratch. (See People v. Chandler (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 703, 711 [“The rape shield statutes do not permit the trial
judge to make a credibility determination at the in camera hearing”].) That
error, however, is of no consequence insofar as the trial court expressly stated
that, even if it found Perine’s testimony to be credible, it would deny the
motion based on the nurse’s undisputed testimony. Perine did not, nor could
he, offer testimony as to whether the scratch he saw in February would have
healed within three weeks. The nurse’s testimony that the injury she saw
was fresh and not made three weeks earlier was undisputed and necessarily
established that the victim’s prior sexual activity was not a possible alternate
cause of the victim’s injury. Perine’s proffered testimony was therefore not
relevant under Evidence Code section 780 because it would not contradict the
victim’s testimony that Perine caused her injury. For the same reason, the
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence under Evidence
Code section 352.3
Perine’s argument that the exclusion of this evidence violated his
federal constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination fares no
better. As this court recently observed, “[p]roper application of Van Arsdall
requires threshold consideration of whether the trial court exercised sound
discretion under state law evidentiary standards in limiting the scope of
cross-examination. The high court’s acknowledgment that trial courts ‘retain
wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination’

3 In light of this conclusion, we need not reach Perine’s remaining

arguments that the court erred in excluding his testimony as hearsay and by
failing to analyze the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony.
9
[citation] leaves room for an evaluation of admissibility under the Evidence
Code, tested under the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review
governing such discretionary questions [citation]. If the trial court excluded
‘evidence of marginal impeachment value’ [citation] or otherwise merely
carried out the routine evidentiary function of controlling the scope of
permissible cross-examination, the answer to this initial evidence question
will generally be yes—the trial court was within its discretion—and the
inquiry comes to an end. There was no error, under either state law or under
the Sixth Amendment.” (People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
1260, 1282, fn. omitted.) Because the proffered testimony had no probative
value, its exclusion did not impinge upon Perine’s constitutional rights.
II. Lesser Included Offenses on Count 2

Perine contends the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing
the jury sua sponte on spousal battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), simple battery
(§ 242) and simple assault (§ 240), which are lesser included offenses of
corporal injury on a dating partner (§ 273.5).
“[A] trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a
lesser included offense [that] find substantial support in the evidence. On the
other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no
[substantial] evidentiary support.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
142, 162, overruled on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th
237.) When a defendant denies the charged offense in its entirety, the
“substantial evidence” required to trigger this duty is defined as “ ‘ “evidence
from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude []” ’
that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” (People v. Cruz
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50

10
[instructions required only where substantial evidence defendant committed
lesser, but not greater, offense].)
Prejudice stemming from the failure to instruct on a lesser included
offense in noncapital cases is state law error analyzed under the harmless
error test in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Gonzalez
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195–196, 201.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must
show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been
obtained absent the error.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955.)
“[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury
could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the
error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may
consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing
judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different
outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the
error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (Id. at p. 956.)
As relevant here, the charged offense requires that the defendant inflict
a traumatic injury, defined as a “wound, or external or internal injury . . .
whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical force.” (§ 273.5,
subd. (d).) None of the lesser offenses require infliction of an injury. (People
v. Gutierrez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 952 [“It is injury resulting in a
traumatic condition that differentiates [a section 273.5 offense] from lesser
offenses”].)
In closing, the prosecutor argued that the bruise inflicted when Perine
grabbed the victim and pinned her to the garage was a “minor injury”
sufficient to satisfy the traumatic condition requirement. He described the
bruise for the jury as “visible two days later. . . . It wasn’t a light, small, faint
bruise. It’s a sizable bruise.”

11
On appeal, Perine does not dispute the existence of the bruise or that
the bruise qualifies as a traumatic injury. He argues, as he did in the trial
court, that the evidence tying the bruise to the assault was not credible. He
notes that the victim did not report having been grabbed on her arm or
having any pain in her arm at the time of the exam and only reported the
bruise the following day. He contends that instructions on the lesser
included offenses were required because the evidence “presented the issue of
causation.”
We think it is doubtful that a reasonable jury could have concluded on
the evidence before it that Perine grabbed the victim and pinned her to the
wall without causing an injury so that it could have found Perine guilty of
one of the lesser offenses and not the charged offense. Assuming, however,
the jury could have reached that conclusion, it is not reasonably likely that
the jury would have done so had it been instructed on the lesser included
offenses. (See People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 53 [the question “is
not what a jury could have done, but what a jury would likely have done if
properly instructed”].)
The evidence that Perine’s actions caused the bruise was
overwhelming. The victim testified that Perine grabbed her left arm with his
hand and his forearm was outstretched parallel to the ground and across her
chest pinning her to the garage. The next day she noticed a large, finger-
shaped bruise on the underside of her left arm. The location of the bruise is
consistent with her description of how Perine grabbed her. She testified that
the bruise was on a part of her arm she would not have bumped into
something like a door or a counter, and she noticed it the morning after the
assault. Her delayed discovery is also consistent with the nurse’s testimony

12
that bruises do not appear immediately and that she would not have expected
it to be noticeable at the time of the exam.
Contrary to Perine’s suggestion, the jury’s question regarding count 2
does not support the conclusion that the failure to instruct on the lesser
offenses was prejudicial. The jury asked for clarification on whether
“willfully inflicted a physical injury” as used in the instructions meant
“intended to cause harm” or “intended to act but harm was incidental.” The
court responded, “Defendant ‘willfully inflicts’ injury when a direct
application of force by defendant upon victim causes injury.” Perine argues
that “[t]his focus on the traumatic condition shows the ‘deliberations were
close,’ something that in turn shows the prejudice from the court’s failure to
give the jury an alternative to the all-or-nothing choice posed by its failure to
instruct on lesser included offenses.” On the contrary, the jury’s question is
premised on a finding that Perine’s act caused the physical harm and merely
sought clarification as to whether he had to have intended to cause the harm
to be found guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the failure to instruct on any lesser
offenses, if error, was harmless.
III. Admission of Perine’s Prior Domestic Violence Conviction

Evidence Code Section 1109 provides an exception to the general rule
codified in Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) that prior acts may
not be used to prove a defendant’s conduct on a specified occasion. Under
section 1109, prior acts of domestic violence are admissible when the
defendant is charged with a criminal offense “involving domestic violence . . .
if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] section 352.”
(Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).) If evidence is admitted under Evidence
Code section 1109, a jury may infer from the evidence that the defendant had

13
a disposition or propensity to commit other offenses involving domestic
violence and may infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the
current domestic violence offense. (People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
1138, 1143; People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 528.)
We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court’s admission of
prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code section 1109 and its
refusal to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. (People v.
Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 539; People v. Poplar (1999)
70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1138.)
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to admit a certified copy of
Perine’s 2014 conviction of misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)).4 Perine opposed the motion, arguing that his prior conviction was
“wholly irrelevant” and should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
The court granted the motion, admitting “evidence of the actual conviction
without testimony.” At trial, Perine admitted that he was convicted of
misdemeanor domestic violence in 2014 and the prosecutor introduced, as
exhibit 42, certified copies of the charging document, Perine’s signed plea
form, and the docket from the prior case.
On appeal, Perine contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the evidence of his 2014 conviction. He argues that the probative
value of the conviction was weak because the jury, without any details of the
underlying offense, could not determine whether there was any similarity
between the prior offense and the charged offenses, and because the prior
conviction was based on conduct that occurred approximately six years before

4 The prosecution also sought to admit testimony by the victim of the

2014 crime to testify as to the underlying facts of the crime. The trial court
deferred ruling on the admissibility of her testimony, and ultimately the
victim was not called as a witness at trial.
14
the current offenses. We disagree that the probative value of this evidence
was weak. The admission of the fact of Perine’s prior conviction was relevant
to show a pattern of domestic violence and a propensity to commit domestic
violence. As the prosecutor argued in closing, Perine’s 2014 conviction can be
used to show he had the intent to commit the charged crimes and the
knowledge that his actions in this case were wrong. Admission of the fact of
the conviction by the certified record of conviction was not unduly prejudicial
and posed little danger of confusing the issues before the jury. Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the fact of Perine’s
prior conviction.
To the extent Perine’s challenge is directed to the additional
information contained in the documents that were admitted to prove the
prior conviction, we question whether Perine properly preserved his
argument. Perine notes that the docket and plea form revealed that he had
pled guilty in exchange for the dismissal of two felony charges, false
imprisonment and assault with force likely to create great bodily injury, and
that other entries on the docket showed that a protective order was issued
and he was ordered to complete 104 hours of domestic violence counseling
and to serve one day in jail. The plea form and docket, however, were not
before the court when it ruled that the “certified prior” would be admissible
at trial. When exhibit 42 was introduced and admitted into evidence at trial,
defense counsel did not object on the ground that the documents contained
prejudicial information or request that the extraneous information be
redacted. The trial court’s prior ruling that the fact of the conviction was
admissible did not excuse counsel’s obligation to object to the admission of the
documents used to prove that fact if he believed they contained additional
information that was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. (People

15
v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612, disapproved on other grounds by
People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459 [“appellate court’s review of the
trial court’s admission of evidence is [] limited to the stated ground for the
objection”].)
The Attorney General, however, does not argue that Perine forfeited
this argument on appeal. Instead, the Attorney General focuses on the
admissibility of the fact of the prior conviction and asserts rather summarily
that the “details of appellant’s prior conviction, including that he pled no
contest, that two charges were dropped, and that [the victim] obtained a
protective order, were not unduly prejudicial.”
The additional information contained in the documents to which Perine
now objects has limited, if any, probative value and thus, in our view, should
have been redacted. The potential error, however, was harmless. (People v.
Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195 [improper admission of evidence of other
crimes reviewed for error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818];
People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 21 [erroneous admission of irrelevant
evidence reviewed for error under Watson standard].) “Under the Watson
standard, the erroneous admission of [evidence] warrants reversal of a
conviction only if the appellate court concludes that it is reasonably probable
the jury would have reached a different result had the [evidence] been
excluded.” (People v. Scheid, supra, at p. 21.)
The extraneous information contained in exhibit 42 was not
particularly prejudicial. The details of the dismissed charges were not
included in the documents, and the charges themselves—false imprisonment
and assault with force likely to create great bodily injury—are no more
egregious than the sexual assault charged in the present case. The fact that
Perine was subjected to a restraining order in 2014 is also not particularly

16
prejudicial given the unchallenged testimony that in 1998 Perine was
arrested for violating a restraining order obtained by his ex-wife after he was
convicted of criminal stalking. Although it is possible that the jury resented
the lack of punishment on the dropped charges or the arguably lenient
punishment for the charge to which he pled guilty, we do not find it
reasonably likely that the jury convicted him of the charged offenses for these
reasons. The prosecutor’s closing argument did not reference the allegedly
extraneous information contained in the relevant exhibit and the jury was
properly instructed regarding the People’s burden to prove the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and the limited purpose for which it could
consider evidence of another incident of domestic violence not charged in this
case. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30 [courts presume jury followed
instructions on use of other crimes evidence].) Accordingly, we see no
reasonable probability that Perine would not have been found guilty had the
additional information been redacted from exhibit 42.
IV. Section 654

Perine was sentenced to the middle term of six years for his conviction
for digital penetration and to a concurrent three-year middle term on his
conviction for domestic violence. He contends that the trial court erred by
failing to stay the sentence imposed on his domestic violence conviction
pursuant to section 654. We agree.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.” Section 654
“ ‘applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also
where there was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute

17
but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. . . . If all the offenses
were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of
such offenses but not for more than one.’ [Citation.] Whether offenses are
‘indivisible’ for these purposes is determined by the ‘defendant's intent and
objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses.’ [Citation.] ‘If [a]
defendant harbored “multiple criminal objectives,” which were independent of
and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each
statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, “even though the
violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible
course of conduct.” ’ [Citation.] The application of section 654, thus, ‘turns on
the defendant’s objective in violating’ multiple statutory provisions.
[Citation.] Where the commission of one offense is merely ‘ “a means toward
the objective of the commission of the other,” ’ section 654 prohibits separate
punishments for the two offenses.” (People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
1210, 1214–1215.)
Perine contends that his sentence on the domestic violence conviction
must be stayed because the offense was part of a continuous course of conduct
undertaken with a single intent—it was the means of committing the sexual
penetration. It is undisputed that Perine’s acts of grabbing the victim’s arm,
pinning her to the wall, and digitally penetrating her constituted a
continuous course of conduct. The Attorney General argues, however, that
section 654 is inapplicable because Perine’s intent and objective differed for
each act: Perine grabbed the victim, pushed her against the wall, and
bruised her arm “to dominate her and inflict pain” and he digitally
penetrated her for sexual gratification.
Although Perine did not raise a section 654 objection during the
sentencing hearing, “ ‘[e]rrors in the applicability of section 654 are corrected

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on appeal regardless of whether the point was raised by objection in the trial
court or assigned as error on appeal.’ ” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th
290, 295.) If the trial court does not stay a sentence pursuant to section 654,
and offers no factual basis for its decision, we presume the court made the
necessary findings to impose separate sentences without violating the
statutory proscription against multiple punishment. (People v. Mejia (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1045.) A trial court’s imposition of multiple sentences
must be sustained on appeal so long as its factual findings, express or
implied, of multiple acts are supported by substantial evidence. (People v.
Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 715, 737.)
Here, the record does not support an implied finding that Perine
harbored separate intents with regard to the two offenses. Nothing in the
record suggests that Perine intended to inflict the injury at issue in this case.
The bruise was incidental to the force used by Perine to pin the victim
against the wall in order to digitally penetrate her. At sentencing, the trial
court described the crimes as follows: “The jury found that the defendant
used force against the victim causing injury and, while doing so, committed
sexual assault, pinning her up against a wall with force, rendering her
helpless, and digitally penetrating her.” Accordingly, section 654 requires
that the sentence imposed on one of the counts be stayed. (See People v.
Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1216–1217 [Section 654 prohibits punishment
for kidnapping and rape where “the evidence does not suggest any intent or
objective behind the kidnapping other than to facilitate the rapes”].)
Although a trial court has discretion under section 654 to select which
term to stay, Perine does not suggest that remand is necessary in this case.
Given the court’s comments at sentencing, there is no likelihood that the
court would have stayed the sentence imposed on the penetration count

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rather than the corporal injury count. (See People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [remand for resentencing is appropriate “unless the
record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion’ ”].)
Accordingly, we modify the judgment to stay the sentence imposed on
count 2.5
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the sentence imposed on count 2 and
affirmed in all other respects.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

5 We note that the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects imposition

of six-year terms on both counts. This error can be corrected when the court
prepares the amended abstract indicating that the sentence imposed on
count 2 has been stayed pursuant to section 654.
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