CourtListener 9522087•People v. Graham
Testo completo
Filed 6/10/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C097971
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 16FE017331)
v.
CRYSTAL GRAHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Raoul M.
Thorbourne, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Caely E. Fallini, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of defendant Crystal Graham’s
postconviction request for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section
1001.36. 1 Defendant first contends that, in ruling on her request, the trial court was
limited to viewing the matter as it stood before trial, and hence the trial court
prejudicially erred in considering the transcripts of her trial and resulting convictions
when assessing her eligibility and suitability for diversion. Defendant also argues that,
even if the trial court did not err by taking the trial evidence and her convictions into
account, it still erred by finding her both ineligible and unsuitable for diversion. We will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 22, 2018, a jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping to commit
robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), kidnapping during the commission of carjacking (§ 209.5,
subd. (a)), second degree robbery (§ 211), and simple kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)). In a
prior opinion, we summarized defendant’s underlying crimes as follows:
On August 28, 2016, “[d]efendant [ ] brought the victim, E.C., to a motel room
where he was attacked by her codefendant Joe Navarro, who held a box cutter to the
victim’s neck and relieved him of his wallet and keys. Defendant took the victim’s bank
card, went to an ATM, called Navarro who forced the victim to disclose his personal
identification number (PIN), and withdrew $400. Defendant and Navarro left the motel
in two vehicles, a Toyota 4Runner, in which they had arrived, and the victim’s Prius, with
the victim first in the backseat of the 4Runner and then transferred to the Prius driven by
defendant. The victim escaped by untying the tape binding his hands, jumping out of the
Prius when it slowed down on the freeway, and waving to passersby. Defendant exited
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
the freeway, abandoned the Prius, and fled in the 4Runner with Navarro.” (People v.
Graham (July 9, 2021, C087027) [nonpub. opn.] (Graham I).) 2
The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life in prison with
the possibility of parole (for kidnapping to commit a robbery and kidnapping during the
commission of carjacking) and stayed the sentences for the remaining two counts per
section 654.
In our opinion on defendant’s prior appeal from the judgment, we reversed
defendant’s conviction for simple kidnapping. (Graham I, supra, C087027.)
Additionally, we acknowledged that the amendments to section 1001.36, which became
effective while defendant’s prior appeal was pending, applied retroactively to her case.
(Graham I, supra, C087027.) As a result, we conditionally reversed the remainder of the
judgment and remanded the case for a mental health diversion eligibility hearing pursuant
to section 1001.36. (Graham I, supra, C087027.)
On remand, defendant’s mental health diversion application included a report from
clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Bruce W. Ebert, a mental health diversion court
referral form, and additional mental health documentation. It also included several letters
in support from defendant’s daughter and defendant’s correctional counselor, certificates
and awards defendant received while in prison, and a letter of acceptance from a
transitional housing facility. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to “exclude all
trial transcripts from consideration.”
At defendant’s section 1001.36 mental health diversion hearing, defendant’s
counsel made an offer of proof as to treatment and housing that defendant would receive
2 The People’s motion to incorporate by reference the record from Graham I, is
granted in part. We grant the motion as to our previous opinion in Graham I, as well as
the trial transcript and preliminary hearing transcript. We deny the motion as to the
remainder of the record on relevance grounds.
3
if diverted. Counsel further stated that, if called to testify, defendant would acknowledge
that she understands her rights and agrees to comply with the program.
The trial court remarked that the portion of Dr. Ebert’s report regarding a causal
connection between defendant’s mental illness and criminal behavior consisted of “rather
short and rather cryptic” comments. Accordingly, it permitted Dr. Ebert to testify as to
the contents of his report. At the hearing, Dr. Ebert opined there was “no question in [his]
mind” that there was a causal connection between defendant’s mental diagnoses and
criminal behavior. He testified that defendant’s mental disorders and history of substance
abuse led to defects in her brain that impaired her ability to fully understand the
consequences of her actions. He further opined that defendant had been “led by
Navarro,” had been “under duress” by him at the time of the underlying offense s, and
may have been afraid Navarro would harm her children if she did not comply,
particularly because she had been abused by men previously. In sum, he found that
defendant’s mental health disorder and the effects of methamphetamine on her brain
rendered her unable to make good choices, which was the “nexus” between the diagnoses
and crimes. Dr. Ebert said that, when preparing his report, he reviewed various
behavioral health and prison records relating to defendant, as well as this court’s opinion
in Graham I, and would have liked to review the transcripts of defendant’s trial, but could
not obtain copies and therefore did not read the transcripts, including those reflecting
defendant’s extensive trial testimony.
The prosecutor cross-examined Dr. Ebert and later argued that Dr. Ebert never
opined as to how defendant’s diagnosed disorder was connected to the crime, and that his
report was internally inconsistent. She went on to recount the details of the crimes based
on evidence presented at trial and urged the trial court to focus on defendant’s conduct
before and during the crime, which indicated that she willingly worked in tandem with
Navarro to rob and kidnap the victim. The prosecutor noted that the jury’s findings
4
reflect that the jurors disregarded defendant’s claim of duress and did not find defendant
credible.
The prosecutor further argued that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety because she had been convicted of two super strikes under the Penal
Code in this case, and she had a history of prior noncompliance with court-ordered
treatment, including mental health treatment. She also argued that defendant was seeing
a mental health provider and getting drug treatment and services at the time she
committed the underlying offenses. The prosecutor noted that the proposed treatment site
for defendant was not a locked facility, so it could not ensure that defendant would stay
drug-free or sober.
In closing, defense counsel read defendant’s statement saying that she takes full
responsibility for her involvement in the crimes against the victim and today has new
values and beliefs.
The trial court first found that defendant was ineligible for mental health
diversion. It viewed Dr. Ebert’s description of the nexus between the diagnosis and
criminal behavior as “rather scant” and “not detailed.” The court observed, “I have no
evidence that I found from any other source, at the time, that the Defendant’s admittedly
diagnosed [disorder] played any role in her commission of these crimes.” Further, she
was not under the influence of drugs or suffering from delusions or hallucinations at the
time of the underlying crimes. The court found there was no evidence that physiological
brain changes from drug abuse influenced her behavior. The court also found relevant
that defendant was “the principal actor” in crimes that “took a certain amount of
sophistication, elaboration, and planning,” and that defendant “helped to formulate the
plan” and carry it out, which took place over an extended period of time. Accordingly,
the court found clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption there was a
connection between defendant’s diagnosis and criminal behavior “given the facts as laid
out by [the prosecutor] and as laid out, . . . in the trial transcript . . .detailing, step by step,
5
her participation in this case.” It concluded there was “no nexus” between her mental
health diagnosis and criminal behavior.
The trial court next found, with regard to suitability, that defendant posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. It reasoned that, while typically mental
health diversion applications are considered pretrial such that the court has to assess
ahead of time whether someone might commit a super strike if released into the
community, here, defendant’s convictions make it knowable that she did, in fact, commit
two super strikes. Taking the interests of the community into account, the court found
that defendant’s participation in the crimes, along with her convictions and life sentences,
disqualified defendant from diversion.
The trial court vacated defendant’s conviction for simple kidnapping per Graham I
and affirmed the rest of the judgment, reinstating defendant’s sentence on the remaining
offenses.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that she was entitled to the full retroactive benefit of a pretrial
diversion hearing, such that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting her trial
transcripts and considering her convictions when assessing her eligibility and suitability
at a hearing intended by the Legislature to occur before trial. In the alternative, defendant
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that she was neither eligible
nor suitable for diversion.
I
Section 1001.36
In June 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36, which
authorized pretrial diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health
disorders. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626 (Frahs).) The purpose of the
statute is: (1) to increase “diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the
individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public
6
safety”; (2) to allow local discretion and flexibility for counties to develop and implement
diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings; and
(3) to provide “diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs
of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)-(c).)
While defendant’s appeal was pending, Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.), effective January 1, 2023, amended section 1001.36 to give courts discretion to
grant pretrial diversion “if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial
diversion set forth in subdivision (b)” and the court finds “that the defendant is suitable
for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a), as
amended by Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1.) Senate Bill No. 1223’s amendments
to section 1001.36 applied retroactively to defendant’s case on remand. (Graham I,
supra, C087027, citing Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
As presently enacted, section 1001.36, subdivision (b) provides that a defendant is
eligible for pretrial diversion if two criteria are met. First, the defendant has been
diagnosed with a mental disorder, such as the one with which defendant was diagnosed,
within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)
Second, the “defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of
the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) “If the defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Ibid.)
If a defendant meets these eligibility requirements, the court also must find that the
defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria:
“(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would
respond to mental health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and
7
waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to
comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . . [¶] [and] (4) The defendant will
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147; People v.
Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449; see Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 626.) “A
court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying
the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence [citation].” (Moine, supra, at
p. 449.)
II
Trial Transcripts and Defendant’s Convictions
We first consider defendant’s argument that the trial court prejudicially erred by
considering her trial transcripts as evidence when denying her request for mental health
diversion. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling.
Before the diversion hearing, defendant moved “to exclude all trial transcripts
from consideration.” Defendant argued that the trial court may not consider the trial
transcripts because it must revert the case to its pretrial posture to properly assess her for
pretrial diversion under section 1001.36. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning
that it was entitled to consider the evidence adduced in the transcripts, which was crucial
to assessing defendant’s dangerousness. It further noted that it was familiar with
defendant’s history, having presided over her trial.
As amended, section 1001.36 permits the trial court to consider any and all
relevant evidence. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2) [“A court may consider any relevant and
credible evidence”].) It does not carve out an exception for evidence presented at trial,
which makes sense given that the statute typically applies before a trial. Because of the
8
posture of this case, however, the trial court had access to extensive trial transcripts and
reasonably found the trial evidence relevant to its assessment of defendant’s
dangerousness. 3 Notably, section 1001.36 expressly permits the trial court to consider
preliminary hearing transcripts and witness statements. Thus, even in a pretrial context,
there is nothing preventing the court from hearing evidence of what the People anticipate
presenting at trial. Hence, consistent with the plain language of the statute, we conclude
that section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2) authorizes the trial court to consider any relevant
and credible evidence regardless of the format or timing of its presentation. (See People
v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 591 [admissibility of evidence at § 1001.36 hearing
turns on the relevance of the proffered evidence].)
Despite the broad discretion granted by the text of the statute, defendant contends
that Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 618 and People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879
(Qualkinbush) suggest that a court may not consider a defendant’s trial transcripts on
remand for a “pretrial” hearing. We find these cases distinguishable, as neither addresses
the evidentiary question before us. In Frahs, our Supreme Court held that section
1001.36 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. (Frahs, supra, at p. 640.) It then
opined that the proper remedy for retroactive application of the statute is a conditional,
limited remand to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing. (Ibid.) In
reaching this conclusion, it stated the broad proposition that, on remand for retroactive
application of section 1001.36, a case is restored to its “procedural posture before the jury
verdict for purposes of evaluating defendant’s eligibility for pretrial mental health
diversion.” (Frahs, at p. 639.) Thus, Frahs addresses only a defendant’s entitlement to a
retroactive diversion hearing, and the general, conditional posture of such cases on
remand. The Supreme Court did not consider the admissibility of evidence on remand.
3 Defendant does not challenge the relevance or credibility of the trial transcripts,
objecting solely based on the pretrial posture of the case on remand.
9
Qualkinbush is similarly inapplicable. In Qualkinbush, the court recognized that
applying the goals of sentencing to a mental health diversion application is improper and
remanded the matter to the trial court to reconsider diversion. (Qualkinbush, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 891-892.) In a footnote, it commented that “[f]or purposes of
evaluating the defendant’s eligibility and/or suitability for pretrial mental health
diversion, the court must treat the matter as if the charges against the defendant have not
yet been adjudicated . . . ” (Id. at p. 892, fn. 11.) Again, this is a statement about the
conditional posture of the case on remand; neither the Frahs nor Qualkinbush court
suggested that a trial court must ignore relevant evidence simply because it was
introduced at trial. 4
In addressing defendant’s arguments regarding the admissibility of the trial
transcripts, we are compelled to note the paradox inherent in her position. While arguing
that this case must be returned to its pretrial status, effectively erasing any evidence of
what occurred or was presented thereafter, defendant simultaneously urges us to consider
evidence of her progress and behavior while in prison (which defendant introduced and
urged the trial court to consider at her diversion hearing). However, if we were to
conclude that the case must be returned to its pretrial posture, and that any trial and
posttrial evidence must be excluded from the diversion analysis, it stands to reason that
evidence of defendant’s post-conviction actions or behavior also would be subject to
exclusion. But, like trial evidence, evidence relating to a defendant’s behavior in prison
may be relevant and useful to a court’s diversion assessment, and excluding such
evidence could unduly limit the court’s analysis. Thus, the rule that defendant proposes
4 We also note that, although defendant here does not necessarily benefit from the
introduction and consideration of trial evidence at her mental health diversion hearing,
the conclusion we reach may benefit defendants in other cases, given that favorable
evidence also could be introduced and considered.
10
brings into focus the difficulty inherent in drawing lines of admissibility if we prohibit
relevant evidence simply because of the posture of the case on remand.
Based on the foregoing, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
consideration of facts from the trial transcripts. 5
We further find that defendant forfeited her argument that the trial court could not
consider her convictions in its analysis. 6 “It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in
the trial court are forfeited on appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v.
Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038.) Here, defendant’s attorney did not
expressly object to the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s convictions at the
hearing. Rather, he made a motion “to exclude all trial transcripts from consideration by
the Court” because the case “should have been, under the law, looked at prior to her
conviction.” The court denied the motion and specifically found the transcripts
admissible, making no mention of defendant’s convictions. Later, the court and
prosecutor discussed defendant’s convictions at length, with regard to the suitability
analysis, and defendant’s attorney did not object. Later still, defendant’s attorney
said: “She is not in any way asserting that she is not guilty of those crimes. She
absolutely takes responsibility for those terrible crimes that she did in 2016. She’s not
5 Although the trial court said it would consider the trial transcripts for purposes of
deciding whether defendant posed a danger to public safety, it also relied on the
transcripts, and the prosecutor’s reassertion of the facts presented at trial, to determine
that there was no nexus between defendant’s mental disorder and the offenses.
6 The parties did not address forfeiture in connection with the propriety of
considering defendant’s convictions at the diversion hearing. However, the parties had
the opportunity to brief forfeiture, a rule always implicated when an argument is raised
for the first time on appeal. (See People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 679 [“The parties
need only have been given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court, and the
fact that a party does not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is raised or
fairly included within the issues raised does not implicate the protections of [Government
Code] section 68081” (italics added)].)
11
denying that.” Defense counsel also contested the meaning of the jury’s finding on the
duress instruction with regard to defendant’s convictions, tacitly conceding their
admissibility. Finally, Dr. Ebert—defendant’s mental health expert—referenced the
crimes for which defendant “was convicted” in his testimony, and again, defense counsel
did not object.
Based on this record, we conclude that defendant forfeited her argument that the
trial court was barred from considering her convictions on appeal.
III
Suitability
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by finding her unsuitable for
diversion. We again disagree, as substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if granted diversion and
treated in the community.
Whether a defendant would pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”
is analyzed employing the definition of that term found in section 1170.18. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) Under section 1170.18, an “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ ” is “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent [super
strike].” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) Thus, a defendant is not suitable for diversion if the
defendant is “too dangerous to be treated in the community because he [or she] would
commit a new violent super strike.” (People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1150.) When determining whether the defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the
defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment
plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any
other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Here, when assessing defendant’s suitability for diversion, the trial court observed
that diversion applications are typically brought pretrial, such that the court and all
12
“interested professionals” are “trying to predict ahead of time whether or not somebody
poses a risk that they will commit a [super strike].” However, because defendant had
already been convicted of two super strikes, the court stated that nobody “[had] to
speculate,” as “there is no doubt” she committed two such crimes. Thus, when
considering defendant’s dangerousness and the interests of the community, the trial court
found that defendant’s “participation in this case,” “what the two crimes were,” and the
fact that she “has been convicted of two crimes that carry . . . life in prison sentences,
. . . [¶] disqualify her” and “the dangerousness standard is met.”
It therefore appears that the trial court based its determination on the serious and
violent nature of defendant’s charged crimes and defendant’s actions during the
commission of those crimes. Section 1001.36 grants broad discretion to the court to
consider any factors it deems appropriate when assessing dangerousness, and it expressly
includes “the defendant’s violence and criminal history” and “the current charged
offense” among the permissible factors. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) “[T]here is nothing in
section 1001.36, with respect to. . . suitability, that precludes a trial court from relying
primarily, or even entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in
denying a motion for diversion.” (People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862.)
Thus, the court acted within its discretion in determining that the nature and manner of
defendant’s charged crimes—and particularly, the two super strikes—rendered her likely
to commit another super strike.
Specifically, the evidence presented at trial revealed the following: On August 27,
2016, the day before the charged offenses, defendant and Navarro rented a motel room.
Video surveillance from the motel showed them laughing and smiling while talking to the
motel clerk upon entry. The following day, defendant walked in front of the victim’s car
while he was parked at a gas station. Defendant smiled at him, opened the passenger car
door, and got into the car. He told defendant to get out, but she put her hand on his crotch
and his hand on her breast and said she needed a ride back to the motel. He decided to
13
drive her to the motel so she would leave his car. At the motel, she pressed him to come
into her room for a drink after he hesitated. When he acquiesced and entered the room,
Navarro, wearing a Halloween mask, grabbed him and pushed him face down on the bed
while holding a box cutter with an exposed blade. Someone took the victim’s wallet and
keys from his pants, and defendant and Navarro asked for his PIN. Defendant left while
Navarro pressed the box cutter to the victim’s neck, demanding his PIN. Navarro
repeated the PIN over the phone and $400 was withdrawn from the victim’s bank
account. Defendant returned to the motel room and hit the victim with her hat.
Defendant acted angry and the victim was afraid of her.
Navarro taped the victim’s wrists together and put him in Navarro’s Toyota
4Runner. At that time, the victim heard defendant say they would take him “ ‘to the
woods.’ ” Defendant got into the victim’s Prius and drove away. Both defendant and
Navarro drove on the freeway and exited at a vacant lot. Navarro shoved the victim into
the Prius and drove to a gas station in the 4Runner. Defendant drove the Prius, with the
victim inside, in circles around the gas station parking lot. Then both defendant and
Navarro got back on the freeway, with defendant driving in front of Navarro.
The victim started biting the tape off his hands and thought defendant saw him in
the rearview mirror. Defendant pulled over and stopped, as did Navarro. Defendant told
Navarro the victim was trying to take off the tape, but Navarro said it was fine. They
both drove back onto the freeway. The victim continued unraveling his tape, and
defendant pulled over again. While the car was still moving, the victim jumped out of the
vehicle and was rescued by a couple driving by. Defendant left the Prius and got into the
4Runner with Navarro, who drove them away.
This evidence reveals that defendant took numerous intentional and calculated
steps over a substantial period of time to kidnap and rob the victim with Navarro. She
rented a motel room with Navarro, initiated contact with and lured the victim to the motel
room, stood by while Navarro violently attacked the victim, helped Navarro steal the
14
victim’s money, independently returned to the motel room, suggested taking the victim to
the woods, drove away in the victim’s car, transferred the victim to the Prius, drove off in
tandem with Navarro, and stopped twice to ensure the victim remained bound. This
evidence also reveals that defendant had numerous opportunities to abandon Navarro and
their scheme but did not do so. Specifically, she initiated the encounter by entering the
victim’s car at the gas station and luring him into the motel room, and she left while
Navarro held the victim to the bed with a box cutter but returned to the motel room
shortly thereafter. She also initially drove off in the victim’s car by herself, and later,
with the victim, yet continued to drive in tandem with Navarro and execute their crimes.
It was reasonable for the trial court to infer from these facts that, because defendant was
recently capable of engaging in such violent, calculated criminal behavior, she posed a
risk of doing so again.
Additional evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination that
defendant was likely to commit a super strike if treated in the community. Indeed,
defendant’s history reflects a lack of compliance with court-ordered treatment, which
culminated in her super strike charges. The charged crimes in this case occurred on
August 28, 2016. (Graham I, supra, C087027.) Several months prior, on March 30,
2016, defendant received three years of probation and a one-year jail term for unlawfully
taking another’s vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) According to defendant’s
probation officer, her most recent report to probation was that she was homeless and
participating in a drug treatment program. However, she last attended the treatment
program on August 10, 2016, and failed to complete it. She also failed to report to
probation on August 31, 2016, and September 9, 2016, as directed, and last contacted her
probation officer by phone in late September 2016. She was informed at that time that a
violation of probation petition had been filed and a hearing set, but she failed to appear in
court for the hearing, resulting in a warrant for her arrest.
15
Further, shortly before the charged crimes, defendant was asked to leave a shelter
for battered women after she twice failed to obey its curfew. She also previously failed to
comply with court-ordered treatment by refusing to participate in drug testing,
counseling, appointments, and meetings, and failed to benefit from or complete prior
court-ordered mental health treatment. These facts indicate that, when offered treatment
in the community, defendant was noncompliant and, in fact, engaged in behavior
resulting in two super strikes. Additionally, if released into the community, defendant
again would have access to illicit substances and alcohol, which would increase her
likelihood of committing a violent felony. Relatedly, the treatment program that
defendant sought to use if diverted would be unsecured and create the risk and
opportunity for relapse. Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that defendant was not suitable for diversion.
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that one could read the trial court’s
dangerousness analysis to indicate it found defendant’s super strike convictions
themselves dispositive as a matter of law, categorically barring her from being found
suitable. However, we do not read the analysis so narrowly. Rather, we interpret the trial
court’s inquiry to acknowledge that this case presented a unique posture, as the jury had
already reached a verdict before the diversion hearing. And viewing the comments as a
whole, they suggest that the evidence at trial of defendant’s charged crimes, and not
simply the fact that she was convicted, guided the court’s finding of dangerousness.
Before rendering its decision, the court questioned the attorneys extensively regarding
defendant’s behavior in prison and other factors, clearly considering them and finding
them to be relevant. It also asked the prosecutor whether she viewed defendant’s
convictions as sufficient to meet the dangerousness requirement alone, to which the
prosecutor responded, “I don’t think that by itself. That’s why I’ve mentioned all the
other things that I’ve mentioned.” When making its findings, the court remarked that
defendant’s “participation in this case” and “what the two crimes were” were relevant to
16
its analysis, and not simply the fact she was convicted. In any event, as discussed ante,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that she posed an unreasonable risk
of committing a new violent super strike.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
defendant was not suitable for diversion, we affirm its denial on this ground alone, and
we need not address defendant’s alternative contention that she was eligible for diversion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\ ,
Krause, Acting P. J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.
\s\ ,
Ashworth, J. *
* Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17
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