In re A.F.

CourtListener 9514098Calctapp7 giu 2024

Testo completo

Filed 6/7/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re A.F. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168850
v.
(San Francisco City & County
M.S.,
Super. Ct. Nos. JD23-3211,
Defendant and Appellant. JD23-3211A, JD23-3211B)

In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) filed
a petition alleging three children came within Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300. (Undesignated statutory references are to this code.) The
juvenile court exercised jurisdiction, sustained the allegations in part,
released the children to M.S. (mother), and ordered the family to participate
in therapy. Mother appeals. We affirm. Among other things, we hold an
alleged father constitutes a “parent” within the meaning of section 300,
subdivision (b)(1).
BACKGROUND
The Agency’s petition concerned M.S.’s sons — ages 13 and 10 — and
daughter — 16 months old. (All ages at the time of the petition.) The Agency
alleged the toddler had suffered, or there was a substantial risk she would

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suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by P.F., her alleged
father. It also alleged the children were at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical or emotional harm due to P.F.’s domestic violence towards
mother, and that P.F. had substance abuse issues impeding his ability to
appropriately care for the children.
The Agency alleged mother admitted to letting P.F. stay in her home
beginning July 2, 2023, despite a three-year criminal restraining order —
listing her and the boys as protected parties — issued after he hit and choked
her on May 18, 2021. (Unless otherwise specified, all events occurred in
2023.) On July 4, the police responded to a report of P.F. “violating
the . . . order.” P.F. was intoxicated and holding the toddler. The eldest son
asked P.F. to give her to him, but P.F. refused. The son began punching him,
and P.F. used the girl to deflect the blows. P.F. admitted he’d inhaled an
unspecified white powder before coming home that day. Mother reported P.F.
appeared fine until he became intoxicated; the eldest son reported P.F. was a
“ ‘tweaker’ ” who got “ ‘scared and paranoid’ ” when not sober.
In its detention report, the Agency recommended the juvenile court
remove the children from P.F.’s custody and temporarily place them with
mother. It noted P.F. referred to the children as his own, and they recognized
him as their father. It also stated mother identified P.F. as the children’s
biological father and that, on July 2, P.F. was released from jail. That day,
mother let him into the home. One of the boys reported P.F. had been in the
home since July 2, and the family went to Chuck E. Cheese and the beach
together. Mother and the boys’ version of the July 4 incident tracked the
Agency’s description in the petition. P.F. did not appear at the detention
hearing, but the court appointed counsel for him. The court issued a
temporary restraining order protecting mother and the children.

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Before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Agency submitted a
dispositional report recommending the juvenile court sustain the petition and
provide family maintenance services to mother. It contained more
information from social workers. Mother stated she allowed P.F. into the
home because the children missed him and blamed her for keeping him away.
Despite his violence against her, mother stated she and P.F. remained best
friends, and he should remain in the children’s lives. She reported P.F. was
loving when sober, but violent when drunk. Social workers concluded her
desire for the children to have a relationship with P.F. put them at risk.
Despite the Agency’s recommendations, mother did not want to participate in
domestic violence services. The Agency concluded she needed support to set
boundaries with P.F., and the children would benefit from therapeutic
support.
The report also detailed the family’s history with domestic violence and
the Agency, and it described P.F.’s criminal history. A substantiated referral
showed he choked and hit mother in June 2021 while the children were
present. Another referral stated he abused one of the boys in November
2022. In February 2023, the Agency received two more referrals — one
expressing concern about one of the boy’s suddenly changing behaviors and
mother appearing overwhelmed, and another stating P.F. left the home and
family without financial resources or a car. He had four DUI convictions —
one in 2003 and 2006, and two in 2011 — and a 2004 conviction for
possessing controlled substances.
In September 2023, the juvenile court held the contested jurisdiction
and disposition hearing. P.F. did not appear. (The Agency was unable to
locate him despite its diligent efforts.) The parties agreed to admit the
detention and dispositional reports, and the Agency amended the petition to

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strike the allegation that P.F. nonaccidentally inflicted harm to the girl. It
also amended the remaining allegations to state mother failed to protect the
children by allowing P.F. in the home despite the criminal protective order
protecting her and the boys.
Mother testified P.F. was the children’s father. She was aware of his
release from jail but did not see him until he “appeared” near her home the
next day. She ignored him, but he returned the following day — July 4. Her
younger son let P.F. in when she wasn’t home; when she arrived, P.F. didn’t
look sober. Mother saw P.F. grab “the baby” and heard their eldest son tell
P.F. to give him the toddler — mother went to the bathroom, and she heard
“chaos” when she returned. She denied P.F. had been in the home since July
2 and that he went to the beach or Chuck E. Cheese with the family.
Ultimately, the juvenile court struck allegations pertaining to mother
but found true the allegations against P.F. Specifically, it found the children
were at “substantial risk of suffering serious physical and/or emotional harm
due to the domestic violence perpetrated by the alleged father towards the
mother.” It also found police responded to mother’s home on July 4 because
P.F. violated the criminal restraining order, held the toddler while
intoxicated, refused to put her down after his son asked him to, and used her
as a shield when his son hit him. It also found P.F. was previously arrested
for choking and hitting mother, and domestic violence had been increasing in
the home — “red flags of potential lethality.” Lastly, it found P.F. had
substance abuse issues which impeded his ability to care for the children, he
admitted sniffing a white substance on July 4, and his family reported he had
substance abuse issues.
After making its findings, the juvenile court denied mother’s request to
dismiss the case, declared the children dependents of the court, kept the

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children in mother’s home, and ordered mother and the children to
participate in family therapy. In issuing its order, the court expressed
concern with P.F.’s escalating pattern of domestic violence. It also sought to
help the children understand the seriousness of domestic violence and to
address their tendency to blame mother. The court set a review hearing in
six months.
DISCUSSION
Mother first contends the juvenile court erred by sustaining the
petition and exercising jurisdiction. Specifically, she argues an alleged father
is not a parent or guardian within the meaning of section 300, subdivision
(b)(1); since the founded allegations concerned P.F. — an alleged father — the
court had no jurisdiction. For its part, the Agency contends that nothing in
section 300 provides an alleged father is not a parent. The Agency has the
better argument. 1
The purpose of dependency is “ ‘to provide maximum safety and
protection for children who are currently being . . . abused, being neglected,
or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and
emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’ ” (In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 552.) Section 300, subdivision (b), in relevant part,
provides a child comes within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction when they have
suffered, or there is a substantial risk they will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness as a result of the failure or inability of a parent or legal guardian to

1 At the Agency’s request, we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s

minute order, dated January 8, 2024, in which P.F. was elevated from alleged
to presumed father status. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subds. (a),
(b); Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881–882.) Thus, even if mother prevailed on this
argument, at most the parties would presumably return to square one with
an amended petition like the one sustained here.
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supervise or protect them, or the inability of the parent to provide regular
care for them due to the parent’s substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
Mother contends an alleged father is not a “parent” within the meaning
of section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and P.F.’s abuse of his children cannot
confer jurisdiction. We are unpersuaded. The California Supreme Court has
repeatedly declined to read implicit limitations into the exercise of
dependency jurisdiction (e.g., In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 552–553; In
re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 640), and mother does not persuade us to
follow a different course here. Instead, she relies on cases addressing the
rights of alleged fathers during dependency proceedings. (E.g., In re Emily R.
(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354–1355 [alleged father had no right to
reunification services]; In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715
[alleged father who was not party of record had no right to appeal
termination of parental rights].) Those cases are inapposite. They did not
purport to hold or otherwise suggest an alleged father’s abuse against his
children cannot confer jurisdiction under section 300, or that an alleged
father is not a “parent” within the meaning of that statute. (See Emily R., at
pp. 1354–1355; Joseph G., at p. 715.) And it makes “little sense” to make that
logical leap. (In re H.R. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1286.) When
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction under section 300, we see no
basis to distinguish between alleged, presumed, or biological parents. (H.R.,
at p. 1286 [“alleged father, by definition, means the possibility exists that the
man is the biological father of the child”.) Moreover, given the evidence that
everyone considered P.F. to be the children’s father — including the children,
mother, and P.F. himself — we cannot conclude he is not a parent for
purposes of section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

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Mother next argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile
court’s declaration of dependency. 2 We disagree. We review challenges to a
juvenile court’s dispositional findings for substantial evidence. (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) We “ ‘ “draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court.” ’ ” (In
re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘ “We review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 773) “ ‘ “We do not
reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial
court.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the children
fell within section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother testified P.F. was the
children’s father. (In re H.R., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1284–1285
[mother’s credible testimony that man is father of her child is substantial
evidence of paternity].) Moreover, P.F. referred to the children as his own,
and the children recognized him as such. He stated he came home
intoxicated after sniffing a white powder, and his family members stated he
used his baby as a shield to deflect blows from his eldest son. The family had
a history of domestic violence, and P.F. had a history of substance abuse —

2 Mother also argues a disposition hearing should not have occurred

but merely repeats the same jurisdictional arguments we already rejected.
She also contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
dispositional orders, but she does not challenge any of its factual findings
other than its declaration of dependency. For that reason, we review the
declaration of dependency for substantial evidence and subsequently
address the dispositional orders for abuse of discretion. (In re K.T. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25 [reviewing findings on which dispositional orders are
based for substantial evidence, and dispositional orders for abuse of
discretion].)
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including criminal convictions. The court could rely on these facts when
finding the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering physical harm
from P.F. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193–194 [evidence of
continuing violence between parents, where at least one incident occurred in
presence of minors, sufficient for jurisdictional finding]; In re Daisy H. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 [physical violence can support jurisdictional finding
where violence is ongoing or likely to continue and places child at risk of
physical harm].)
Lastly, mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not
granting her request to dismiss the case at disposition and instead ordering
family therapy. She argues the orders did not protect the children, resolve
the problems that led to the petition, and only pertained to her and her
children when she was the “ ‘nonoffending’ ” parent. No abuse of discretion
appears.
Juvenile courts have “wide latitude” in formulating reasonable
dispositional orders for the care, custody, support, and well-being of
dependents subject to their jurisdiction. (In re Jasmin C. (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 177, 180.) The court is authorized to “require a nonoffending
parent to comply with orders pertaining to a child once the court has accepted
jurisdiction.” (In re K.T., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.) The problem the
court is addressing need not be described in the petition. (In re S.F. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 696, 725.) There need only be a nexus between the services
ordered and the conditions that gave rise to the finding that the children
come within section 300. (S.F., at pp. 725–726; see, e.g., In re Christopher H.
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [juvenile court did not abuse discretion in
ordering parent to participate in alcohol testing even though alcohol problems
did not cause dependency jurisdiction].) Nevertheless, the court’s orders

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must be “ ‘designed to eliminate [the] conditions that led to the
court’s . . . finding’ ” that the child is a person described by section 300.
(In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639.) We review dispositional orders
and orders denying a request for dismissal for abuse of discretion. (In re K.S.
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 327, 340; In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)
A court abuses its discretion “if its determination is arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd.” (L.W., at p. 851.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. It found the children at
risk of harm due to P.F.’s domestic violence, thereby warranting retention of
the case and the therapy orders. (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134
[exposing children to domestic violence creates substantial risk of harm].)
The court found P.F. previously strangled mother, and domestic violence had
been increasing in the home. Ample evidence also supports an implied
finding that mother did not understand the harm P.F.’s actions inflicted upon
the children. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [denial a factor in
determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior without
court supervision].) Despite P.F.’s history of violence, mother stated the two
remained best friends, it was important he remain in the children’s lives, and
she did not want domestic violence services. Social workers concluded her
desire for the children to have a relationship with P.F. put them at risk. On
this record, we conclude the court reasonably concluded it should retain the
case and order therapy to reduce the risk of domestic violence within the
family. (T.V., at p. 134.) Contrary to mother’s arguments, her culpability is
irrelevant to this conclusion. (In re K.T., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 25; In re
S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 725 [“ ‘there need not be a jurisdictional
finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a
dispositional order’ ”].)

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.

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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A168850

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Trial Court: San Francisco City and County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Susan M. Breall

Counsel:

Mara L. Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.

David Chiu, City Attorney, Kimiko Burton and Elizabeth McDonald Muniz,
Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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