People v. Richards CA2/8

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Filed 6/7/24 P. v. Richards CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B324291

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA154855-01)
v.

TRAVEON DESHAWN
RICHARDS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Susan S. Kim, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Armed with a semi-automatic weapon, appellant Traveon
Deshawn Richards (defendant) followed Jairo Sanchez and his
girlfriend, Teresa Marin, into a liquor store located in territory
claimed by defendant’s gang. Outside the store, an exchange took
place in which Sanchez may have told Richards he belonged to a
rival gang. Richards followed Sanchez and Marin on foot as they
walked away. Marin noticed Richards following them and urged
Sanchez to hurry to which he responded, “stop telling me what to
do nigga.” After Richards questioned what was said, Marin told
him Sanchez had not been talking to him. At that point Richards
fired 13 rounds, killing Sanchez.
A jury convicted defendant of one count of first-degree
murder and one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm; it
found true two firearm enhancements. The trial court found true
allegations that appellant had a prior conviction for robbery that
qualified as both a serious felony and a serious and/or violent
felony “strike.”
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in:
(1) denying his request to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder based on
sudden quarrel or heat of passion; (2) imposing an upper term
sentence as to the firearm enhancement for the murder count,
without complying with the amended statutory mandates of
Penal Code1 sections 1170 and 1170.1; and (3) doubling his
sentence as to the two firearm enhancements.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
We reject appellant’s first contention, finding there was no
reasonable basis for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. We
find the trial court failed to comply with the mandates of section
1170.1 in imposing the upper term sentence as to the firearm
enhancement for the murder count and we cannot conclude the
trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly
exercised its discretion. As for appellant’s third contention, the
Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that the court erred by
doubling appellant’s sentence on the firearm enhancements. We
remand the matter for resentencing and to correct the abstract of
judgment as to the two firearm enhancements. In all other
respects, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2021, appellant was charged by
information with murder (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)) and assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (count 2; § 245, subd. (b)). As to
both counts, the information alleged that appellant personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), had suffered a prior serious
felony conviction for robbery (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and had a prior
serious and/or violent felony (strike) conviction (§§ 667, subds.
(b)–(j), 1170.12). Appellant pleaded not guilty to both counts and
denied the special allegations.
A jury convicted appellant of first degree murder and
assault with a semiautomatic firearm and found true the firearm
allegations. Appellant waived his right to jury trial on the prior
conviction allegations. The trial court found appellant had
suffered a prior serious felony conviction.
Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 70 years to life,
as follows: on the murder, 25 years to life, doubled to 50 years to
life due to the prior strike, plus a consecutive high term of

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10 years for the firearm enhancement, doubled to 20 years. On
the count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, the sentence
was three years, doubled to six years, plus three years, doubled to
six years, for the firearm enhancement, to run concurrently to the
sentence for murder. This appeal followed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The Prosecution’s Case
a. Events Leading to the Shooting
On the evening of June 27, 2021, Marin and Sanchez,
whom Marin had been dating a few months, walked to the N’Joy
Liquor Store, near the intersection of Wilmington and 109th
Streets in Los Angeles, to buy snacks and a drink. Neither
person carried a weapon.
Marin grew up nearby, was a frequent customer of the
store, and knew the area, claimed by the Ten Line gang, was
unsafe. Marin and Sanchez were members of the Watts Varrio
Grape gang, a rival of the Ten Line gang to which defendant
belonged.
Santiago Ramirez worked as a security guard at the liquor
store. He recognized Marin and Sanchez but did not know their
names. Ramirez also recognized an African American man he
knew as “Cyco,” a frequent customer at the store. The man wore
a white T-shirt and had a gun in his front right pocket when he
entered the store. Ramirez, who was “scared” to testify at trial,
said defendant was not the person he knew as Cyco. Shown a
photograph of several individuals (Peo. Exh. No. 7), Ramirez
testified he was familiar with Cyco’s friends, cousins, and a
wheelchair-using uncle, many of whom frequented the liquor
store.

4
Marin did not notice anything unusual while she and
Sanchez were inside the liquor store. Sanchez bought a beer and
left while Marin waited to pay for her items. When she left the
store Marin saw Sanchez standing within “arm distance” of
another man. Marin heard the man whisper “something” to
Sanchez and say “stuff.” As she approached, Marin heard
Sanchez respond to the man saying, “Watts Varrio Grape Street.”
Sanchez said nothing else to the man and did not look at him.
The man warned Sanchez not to “come around here no more.”
Marin told Sanchez to ignore the man, and the couple began to
slowly walk away. The man followed them.
As they walked away, Marin looked back, saw the man
following them and noticed a gun in the pocket of his shorts. She
told Sanchez to “hurry up” because the man “ha[d] a gun.”
Sanchez replied, “stop telling me what to do, nigga.”2 At that
point, the man said, “what’d you say,” and Marin responded that
Sanchez “wasn’t talking to him.” Sanchez said nothing. After
she and Sanchez had taken a few steps Marin heard the man
“rack” the gun. She looked back, saw the man holding out the
gun with both hands and told Sanchez to run. He did not. Marin
moved to the side.
The man ignored Marin and began shooting at Sanchez
who fell to the ground. After the shooting stopped, Marin yelled
at the man who was running back toward the store holding his
waistband. She then went to help Sanchez, as did a bystander
who began performing CPR. Ramirez had also heard gunshots,

2 Marin testified that the “N-word” was a “term of
endearment” between herself and Sanchez.

5
followed by the sight of the man in the white T-shirt running
away.
Marin repeatedly answered “no” when asked whether the
man who shot Sanchez was in the courtroom. She still lived in
the area and admitted she was “scared to testify in court” for fear
of something happening to others. Marin identified Sanchez in a
photo.
Marin was shown photographs from inside the store of a
man wearing a white T-shirt and shorts, but said she did not
remember seeing him in the store. She also testified that the
man who had spoken to Sanchez outside the store was not
depicted in the photographs. From still shots taken from video
footage, Marin identified the body on the ground as Sanchez. She
also identified herself, Sanchez and the shooter wearing a white
T-shirt from video footage taken inside the store.
b. Crime Scene Evidence and Video Footage
At the time of the shooting, Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) Officers Issac Guevara and Brenda Cortez heard
gunshots as they patrolled nearby. When they arrived at the
intersection of 109th and Wilmington at about 7:17 p.m., they
saw spent casings and a shooting victim lying on the ground. A
citizen was performing chest compressions on Sanchez who had
blood all over his shirt, and whose eye was dislodged. The
officers took over and performed chest compressions on Sanchez.
No weapons from Sanchez or Marin were recovered from the
crime scene.
LAPD Detective John Jamison arrived at the crime scene
by 11:00 p.m. the day of the shooting. He recovered 13 spent
cartridge casings from the sidewalk area on Wilmington near

6
109th Place. A spent casing is typically expended from a
semiautomatic firearm.
The jury was shown surveillance video from inside the
liquor store, and exterior footage from nearby residences which
captured the shooting itself. The investigating officer, LAPD
Detective Irma Castillo, reviewed the video surveillance and
camera footage of the incident for the jury. Based on his tattoos,
facial hair, clothing, hat and shoes, Detective Castillo believed
appellant was both the man who had been inside the store
wearing a white T-shirt and who confronted Sanchez and Marin
outside. Detective Castillo searched social media accounts
associated with the Ten Line Crips to try to link the person in the
surveillance video to defendant. On Instagram Detective Castillo
found an account with the user name “headnigga_rgcyco3.”
Another Instagram account with the vanity name “Mr. 10Line,”
contained a photo of a person identified as “Deshawn Da Fliikiid
Richards,” whom Detective Castillo believed to be defendant, as
well as videos taken in the area surrounding the N’Joy liquor
store. A photograph of defendant taken in a holding cell depicts a
tattoo reading, “Cyco.”
From video footage taken inside the store, Detective
Castillo described for the jury individuals in the liquor store,
including Ramirez, Marin (who was in line for the cash register),
Sanchez (who was smiling and “minding his own business”), and
defendant (who had tattoos, was wearing a white T-shirt and had
a hand leaning against his right pocket). The footage showed
defendant (with the butt of a handgun visibly protruding from his
right pocket) looking toward Sanchez, and later exiting the store
with his hand on his right pocket.

7
From portions of video and still photos taken from the
camera of a residence facing the liquor store, Detective Castillo
described Sanchez and Marin walking together on the sidewalk,
followed by defendant. Marin kept turning around, then she and
Sanchez sped up. The video showed defendant pull a handgun
from the pocket of his shorts, extend his arm and fire at the
couple. Marin ducked and Sanchez fell to the ground. Defendant
continued to advance and fire at Sanchez as he lay on the ground.
An autopsy performed on Sanchez revealed he suffered
11 gunshot wounds. Four shots–one each to his head, neck, chest
and left thigh–were independently fatal. The cause of death was
deemed a homicide.
c. Gang Evidence
LAPD Officer Carlos Gonzalez, an expert on criminal street
gangs, testified about several gangs including the Watts Varrio
Grape, Grape Street Crips and Ten Line Crips. The Watts Varrio
Grape gang (which is affiliated with the Mexican Mafia) is
predominantly Hispanic, and the Grape Street Crips gang is
predominantly African American. The N’Joy liquor store is
located in territory claimed by the Ten Line Crips gang. Two
primary rivals of the Ten Line Crips gang are the Grape Street
Crips and Watts Varrio Grapes.
Officer Gonzalez testified about violence among and
between street gangs. If a gang member challenges a member of
a rival gang to a fight, the person challenged is expected to
engage and identify his gang. If he fails to do so, he may be
disciplined by his own gang. It is viewed as disrespectful for a
gang member to enter a rival gang’s territory, and the intruder
may be attacked, beaten, shot or killed. Typically, a gang
member who enters rival gang territory is armed. If not, he

8
probably does not plan to threaten a rival gang member. When
someone within his own gang territory “calls out another,” it
usually results in violence. Witnesses to gang violence who live
or work in the area generally refuse to cooperate with police,
fearing retaliation.
2. Defense Evidence
Appellant did not testify.
Detective Castillo testified about her interview of Marin on
the day of the shooting. Marin told Detective Castillo she had
been a member of the Watts Varrio Grape gang for several years.
Detective Castillo reviewed the contents of Marin’s cell
phone, including text messages. A text sent by Marin at
7:42 p.m. the night of the shooting read: “Hey 911,” “They shot
Klepto,” (Sanchez’s moniker), and “110” (referring to the Ten Line
Crips). The recipient responded: “What u mean He got shot,” to
which Marin had texted in response: “110 did it blk fool and I
think he’s dead the ambulance took him.” Marin sent additional
texts that read: “Tell [M]anos I don’t know what to do,” “Im not
going [to] remember what he look like cuz I got scared,” and “the
blk fools were mad digging [sic] [looking angrily at] me.” Marin
received a text telling her, “don’t say nothing,” “Be careful wen
they let u go,” and “come to my trailer.”
Detective Castillo arrested defendant and searched his
residence. She did not find a gun on defendant’s person or in his
residence. Defendant was not wearing a T-shirt or sneakers like
those worn by the individual depicted in surveillance footage
from the liquor Store. Detective Castillo identified defendant as
the man wearing the white T-shirt on the surveillance video.

9
DISCUSSION
1. The Evidence Did Not Warrant an Instruction on
Voluntary Manslaughter Based on Heat of Passion.
Defendant maintains that his murder conviction must be
reversed because the record comprises substantial evidence from
which a reasonable juror could conclude he shot Sanchez out of
heat of passion. He insists the trial court erred in refusing his
request to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense
of voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of
passion. He is mistaken.
a. Procedural Background
During a conference on instructions, defense counsel asked
the court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter “under
the heat of passion lesser included” (CALCRIM No. 570).
Counsel argued that Sanchez’s use of the “N-word,” coupled with
his possible affiliation with a rival gang, was sufficient to justify
a juror’s conclusion that appellant reasonably shot Sanchez out of
heat of passion.3

3 CALCRIM No. 570 states: “A killing that would otherwise
be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant
killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion. [¶] The defendant killed someone because of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion if: [¶] 1. The defendant was
provoked; [¶] 2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant
acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that
obscured (his/her) reasoning or judgment; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to
act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion
rather than from judgment. [¶] Heat of passion does not require
anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or

10
The People argued it would be more appropriate for the
court to give CALCRIM No. 522, regarding provocation to reduce
murder from first to second degree. Notwithstanding the “racial
epithet that may have been uttered,” the People argued the
evidence indicated premeditation and deliberation by appellant
who entered the store with a gun in his pocket, then followed the
victims after they left before firing at them multiple times. The
People argued it would be “misplaced to try to suggest uttering
the N-word would suggest a response of emptying a magazine of
ten rounds at people on the street, if we’re going to suggest that

intense emotion that causes a person to act without due
deliberation and reflection. [¶] In order for heat of passion to
reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must
have acted under the direct and immediate influence of
provocation as I have defined it. While no specific type of
provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not
sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long
period of time. [¶] It is not enough that the defendant simply was
provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up (his/her) own
standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant
was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In
deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider
whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation
and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion
rather than from judgment. [¶] [If enough time passed between
the provocation and the killing for a person of average disposition
to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment,
then the killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this
basis. [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not kill as the result of a
sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
murder.”

11
this isn’t a gang-related heat of passion but rather a racial
epithet, neither apply.”
The trial court acknowledged that, based on the order in
which the victims’ statements were made, the shooter could have
believed the racial slur was directed at him. Nevertheless, the
court declined to instruct the jury on manslaughter based on heat
of passion, explaining:
“[I]n order to give instructions on it, the court has to
find substantial evidence. And in this case with regards to
heat of passion, we look at . . . three things, the testimony
. . . , and then I look at the description of what heat of
passion is. [¶] And if you see the video, I recall the video
being that the two individuals, victim 1 and victim 2 go
right along the sidewalk, the so-called encounter is finished
with. They pass in the direction that they go to, and only
after that is when the shooter follows. The shooter follows,
and then suddenly, just opens fire at them. There’s no heat
of passion. [¶] Now the prov[o]cative conduct by the victim
may be . . . verbal. But the conduct must be sufficiently
prov[o]cative that it would cause an—and this the key
word—ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly
or without due deliberation or reflection. And that’s under
People [v.] Lee [(1999)] 20 Cal.4th 47. [¶] And this is far
from it. This is not an ordinary person of average
disposition that’s acted rashly. So the court is not going to
instruct on the heat of passion. [¶] However, the court
agrees that the provocation, as [defense counsel] put it, and
as I think the People concede . . . the provocation effect on
the degree of murder is something that [the jury] should
consider. So the court will give [CALCRIM No.] 522. It
says, provocation may reduce murder from first degree to
second degree . . . .”

12
The court’s instructions to the jury included CALCRIM
No. 522.4
b. Controlling Law and the Standard of Review
A trial court must instruct the jury on general principles of
law relevant to issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 586.) This duty includes the duty to
instruct on “ ‘lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a
question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense
were present.’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154
(Breverman), disapproved on another ground by People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260 (Schuller).) If substantial
evidence exists that would support a conclusion that the lesser
and not the charged offense was committed, the court has a duty
to instruct even if the instruction was not requested. (People v.
Kruse (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1045–1046.) If a reasonable
juror could find that the lesser included offense, but not the
greater, was committed, the court must instruct on the lesser
offense. (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664.)
We review the issue de novo and independently determine
whether a lesser included offense instruction should have been
given. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705.) We resolve
all doubts as to the sufficiency of evidence to warrant such an
instruction in favor of the defendant, and do not weigh witness

4 CALCRIM No. 522 states: “Provocation may reduce a
murder from first degree to second degree. The weight and
significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide. [¶] If
you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was
provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime
was first or second degree murder.”

13
credibility. (See also id. at p. 712.; People v. Manriquez (2005)
37 Cal.4th 547, 584 (Manriquez) [appellate court determines
independently whether an instruction on lesser included offense
of voluntary manslaughter should have been given].)
“California law separates criminal homicide into two
classes: the greater offense of murder and the lesser offense of
manslaughter. [Citation.] Murder is defined as ‘the unlawful
killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought’ (§ 187,
subd. (a)), while manslaughter is defined as ‘the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice’ (§192). Thus the
‘distinguishing feature [between the two offenses] is that murder
includes, but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.’
[Citation.] Malice exists when ‘an unlawful homicide was
committed with the “intention unlawfully to take away the life of
a fellow creature” (§188), or with awareness of the danger and a
conscious disregard for life.’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 252.)
“ ‘Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes
malice.’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 252.) As relevant
here, “California law recognizes [a] circumstance[] where ‘a
finding of malice may be precluded, and the offense limited to
manslaughter, even when an unlawful homicide was committed
with intent to kill,’ ” specifically “when a person kills ‘ “ ‘in a
“sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Such
“ ‘mitigating circumstances reduce an intentional, unlawful
killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter “by negating the
element of malice that otherwise inheres in such a homicide.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)

14
“A killing committed in a heat of passion on sufficient
provocation is voluntary manslaughter.” (People v. Rountree
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 855.) “ ‘Heat of passion is a mental state
that precludes the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful
killing from murder to manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Vargas (2020)
9 Cal.5th 793, 827 (Vargas).) “Heat of passion killing is distinct
from malice murder because thought in some form is necessary
‘to form either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for
human life.’ ” (Id. at pp. 827–828.) “A heat of passion killing . . .
is one caused by an unconsidered reaction to provocation rather
than the result of rational thought,” and “[i]f reason ‘ “ ‘was
obscured or disturbed by passion’ ” ’ to so great a degree that an
ordinary person ‘ “ ‘would act rashly and without deliberation and
reflection,” it has been concluded that such a “killing arose from
passion rather than from judgment.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 828; see People
v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942 (Beltran).)
“A heat of passion theory of manslaughter has both an
objective and a subjective component.” (People v. Moye (2009)
47 Cal.4th 537, 549.) The subjective component looks to the
defendant’s state of mind to see whether, in fact, he acted in the
heat of passion. (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252
(Steele).) The provocation must be initiated by the victim.
(People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306.) No specific type
of provocation is required, and “the passion aroused need not be
anger or rage but can be any ‘ “ ‘[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought
or enthusiastic emotion.’ ” ’ ” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 163.) The objective component requires the victim’s behavior
to have been provocative enough to cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly or without deliberating or
reflecting. (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759 (Enraca);

15
see Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 949 [The question is not
whether a reasonable ordinary person of average disposition
would be moved to kill, but whether a reasonable ordinary person
of average disposition would react].)
“ ‘To be adequate, the provocation must be one that would
cause an emotion so intense that an ordinary person would
simply react without reflection,’ ” and the “ ‘anger or other
passion must be so strong that the defendant’s reaction bypassed
his thought process to such an extent that judgment could not
and did not intervene.’ ” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019)
8 Cal.5th 548, 650, italics omitted (Beck and Cruz; Beltan, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 949.) A defendant may not “set up his own
standard of conduct.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1215–1216.) “No instruction on lesser included offenses is
required if there is no evidence that there was any offense less
than that charged.” (Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 827.)
“Instructing the jury on a lesser included offense is not
required when the evidence supporting such an instruction is
weak, but ‘ “ ‘whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only
of the lesser offense is “substantial enough to merit
consideration” by the jury,’ ” ’ such an instruction is required.”
(Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 827.) “Whether the evidence is
substantial is tested by considering whether a jury would
conclude the lesser but not the greater offense was committed.”
(Ibid.) “Manslaughter instructions are warranted when
substantial evidence exists to support a jury’s determination that
the killing was committed in the heat of passion and thus does
not constitute a first-degree murder.” (Ibid.)

16
“[W]hen provocation [is] at issue, the prosecution is
compelled to disprove those circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 254.) “California’s
standard jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter include
this requirement.” (Ibid.) An erroneous failure to instruct on
this theory when supported by substantial evidence is subject to
review under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (See
Schuller, at pp. 260–261.)
c. No Instructional Error Occurred Because the Record
Lacks Substantial Evidence of Sudden Quarrel/Heat
of Passion.
Considering the evidence here, as we must, in the light
most favorable to defendant, we conclude the record lacks
sufficient evidence that he was subjectively and objectively
provoked to kill Sanchez.
First, the trial court was required to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter (based on sudden quarrel/heat of passion) only if a
reasonable jury could have found that appellant was subjectively
provoked by Sanchez’s use of the word “nigga” to act rashly and
without due deliberation and reflection. (See Beck and Cruz,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 650.)
Defendant contends the record includes substantial
evidence to support a juror’s conclusion that he was subjectively
provoked into a state in which he experienced a violent, intense,
highly-wrought or enthusiastic emotion to Sanchez’s use of a
highly charged racial slur. Defendant concedes that he followed
Sanchez and Marin as they walked away from the liquor store.
But he maintains that the fact that the gun remained in his
pocket as he followed the couple, demonstrates he did not intend
to shoot Sanchez, but wanted only for him to leave Ten Crips

17
territory. Defendant’s state of mind changed markedly only after
he heard Sanchez utter the word “nigga.” Only at this point did
defendant pull the gun from his pocket and shoot Sanchez.
Defendant insists the fact that he shot Sanchez so many times,
even after the man fell to the ground is indicative of and
“consistent with the intensely emotional state of mind that he
was in.” In short, the fact that he fired many more shots than
would have been necessary to kill Sanchez demonstrates that he
was in a state of heat of passion that negated malice.
Even if we assume defendant satisfied the subjective
component of this test, he failed to satisfy the objective
component. Appellant acknowledges that numerous courts have
found that a victim’s verbal taunts, or offensive and insulting
words are insufficient to satisfy the “objectively reasonable”
component of provocation. For example, in People v. Najera
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 226, the victim taunted defendant by
calling him a “faggot.” The court found this was “insufficient to
cause an ordinary person to lose reason and judgment under an
objective standard.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in Manriquez, the victim
“called defendant a ‘mother fucker’ and . . . taunted defendant,
repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should
take it out and use it.” (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 586.)
The Supreme Court found such taunts “insufficient to cause an
average person to become so inflamed as to lose reason and
judgment.” (Ibid.; see also Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759
[rejecting argument “that insults or gang-related challenges
would induce sufficient provocation in an ordinary person to
merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter”].)
So, too, here. To warrant an instruction on heat of passion,
the defendant must actually have killed in the heat of passion,

18
and the circumstances that gave rise to the passion must be such
that they would arouse such passion in the mind of a reasonable
person. (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1252–1253.) Ample case
law and our independent review of the record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that Sanchez’s single use of a racial slur was
insufficiently objectively provocative to warrant a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th
789, 826–827 [insufficient provocation for voluntary
manslaughter existed when the defendant and the victim
engaged in a verbal argument shortly before the killing, during
which the defendant testified that he told the victim “ ‘[g]et off
me, you f . . . ing bitch’ ” and the victim “ ‘cuss[ed] back at’ ”
him].) The record lacks sufficient evidence that defendant acted
under an objectively reasonable and intense surge of passion
when he fired 13 shots at Sanchez who was both unarmed and
walking away. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct
the jury on voluntary manslaughter with CALCRIM No. 570.
2. The Trial Court’s Error in Imposing the Upper Term
Sentence on the Firearm Enhancement as to Count 1
Based on Aggravating Factors Not Found True
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Requires Remand for
Resentencing.
Defendant argues that remand for resentencing is required
because the trial court erred in imposing the upper term sentence
on the firearm enhancement attached to the murder conviction
based on seven aggravating factors to which he did not stipulate,
and which a jury or court did not find true beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The Attorney General maintains defendant forfeited his
claim of sentencing error as to the court’s imposition of the upper
term for the firearm enhancement for count 1 by failing to raise

19
the issue at the time of sentencing. Alternatively, the Attorney
General argues resentencing as to firearm enhancement is not
necessary because at least one of seven aggravating factors on
which the trial court relied to impose the upper term was found
true beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the Attorney General
asserts if there was trial court error, it was harmless.
a. Controlling Law
As explained in People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911,
review granted September 13, 2023, S281242 (Falcon), Senate
Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 567), which
became effective in January 2022, “materially revised the
determinate sentencing scheme under section 1170[, former
subdivision] (b)” (Falcon, at p. 924) “and the amended law now
limits a trial court’s discretion to impose an upper term.” (Id. at
p. 918, citing § 1170, subd. (b)(1)). “Presumptively, the middle
term is the maximum term that may be imposed, and it may be
exceeded ‘only when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term . . . .’ [Citation.] In addition, the facts
underlying those circumstances must be proven, stipulated to by
the defendant or evidenced in a specific manner not required
under the former law.” (Id. at p. 918.)
“The plain language of this new configuration creates a
presumption that the middle term is the default maximum
sentence, and this new presumption bears weight on how the
trial court may exercise its discretion to depart from the
presumptive rule. [Citation.] Unlike its predecessor, the statute
does not allow a court to select an upper term simply because it
appears warranted and supported by aggravating circumstances.
Instead, in distinct contrast with the former sentencing scheme,

20
the court’s decision to impose an upper term is now expressly
framed around whether properly proven or established
aggravating circumstances justify invoking the exception to the
rule that the middle term is the default maximum sentence.”
(Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 925, review granted.)
Under section 1170 as amended, “the court may consider
the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based
on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) Otherwise, “ ‘[t]he
court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the
middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial. . . .’ ” (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 925, review
granted; § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
Similar principles apply to section 1170.1 which governs
sentencing for enhancements:
“(1) When the court imposes a sentence for a felony
pursuant to Section 1170 or subdivision (b) of Section 1168, the
court shall also impose, in addition and consecutive to the offense
of which the person has been convicted, the additional terms
provided for any applicable enhancements. If an enhancement is
punishable by one of three terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle
term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).
“(2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term only when there are circumstances in aggravation that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the

21
middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170.1, subd. (d), italics added.)
b. No Forfeiture
As a threshold matter, relying on People v. Flowers (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 680, review granted October 12, 2022, S276237
(Flowers), the Attorney General argues appellant forfeited his
claim of error by failing to raise any Senate Bill No. 567 issues at
the time of his sentencing hearing. (See Flowers, at pp. 683–684
[defendant forfeited his claim that trial court erred in imposing
upper term punishment pursuant to former section 1170].) As
noted above, the applicable versions of sections 1170 and 1170.1
became effective in January 2022. Defendant was sentenced on
October 24, 2022.
Defendant insists his claim remains cognizable on appeal
notwithstanding his counsel’s failure to object because, in
imposing the upper term sentence as to the enhancement, the
trial court failed to comply with explicit sentencing mandates of
the current version of section 1170.1, subdivision (b)(2), and thus,
the sentence is unauthorized. (See People v. Panozo (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 825, 839 [rejecting forfeiture argument despite
absence of objection because the claim related to trial court’s
misapprehension of statutory sentencing obligations]; People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 (Scott).)
The Attorney General’s reliance on Flowers is misplaced.
Flowers involved a challenge to an upper term sentence under the
former version of section 1170, which gave the trial court
discretion to impose any of three prescribed terms. Since the
court’s decision to impose an upper term sentence was purely

22
within its discretion, the defendant’s failure to object at the time
of sentencing forfeited the issue on appeal. (Flowers, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 683–684, review granted.)
This matter involves application of amended section 1170.1,
which expressly limits the trial court’s discretion to impose an
upper term sentence as to enhancements. The question is close.
We acknowledge defendant was sentenced several months after
the new rule became effective. It is also true that the trial court
may lawfully have imposed the upper term had it complied with
the statutory requirements in effect at the time of sentencing.
Neither party addressed the new requirements in their
sentencing memoranda, nor were the requirements discussed in
the probation report the court reviewed. The court did not
discuss any facts underlying the aggravating factors on which it
relied for sentencing as to the enhancement on count 1.
We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that
ameliorative changes to criminal sentencing law are applied
broadly. (Cf., People v. Superiour Court (Lara), (2018) 4 Cal.5th
299, 308 [absent indications to the contrary, the Legislature
ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to
extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary
between sentences that are final and sentences that are not].)
For reasons explained below, we cannot conclusively determine
there is no reasonable probability the trial court would have
adopted amended section 1170.1’s presumption in favor of using
the middle term, and that its failure to adhere to statutory
mandates may have resulted in an unauthorized sentence.
Accordingly, we find no forfeiture.

23
c. Relevant Factual Background
The trial court cited seven aggravating factors in choosing
to impose the high term sentence for the firearm enhancement
attached to the murder conviction: (1) Appellant’s crimes involved
great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness or
callousness within the meaning of California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1);5 (2) Appellant was armed with or used a weapon
at the time of the commission of the crime within the meaning of
rule 4.421(a)(2); (3) The victim was particularly vulnerable
within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(3); (4) The manner in which
the crime was carried out indicated planning, sophistication, or
professionalism within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(8);
(5) Appellant was engaged in violent conduct that indicated a
serious danger to society within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(1);
(6) Appellant’s prior convictions were numerous and increasing in
seriousness within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(2); and
(7) Appellant served a prior prison term under rule 4.421(b)(3).
The court found no mitigating circumstances.
The trial court did not discuss the facts underlying its
findings as to any aggravating circumstance. Nor, as in People v.
Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098 (Zabelle), did the court
indicate that it afforded any “particular weight to any of its listed
aggravating circumstances[, or] whether its decision to impose
the upper term was (or was not) a close call.” (Id. at p. 1115; see
People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 468 (Lopez) [“trial
court offered no indication that it would have selected an upper

5 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

24
term sentence even if only a single aggravating factor or some
subset of permissible factors were present”]; cf. People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 (Gutierrez) [remand for
resentencing proper if record does not clearly indicate the court
would have imposed the same sentence under different
sentencing presumption].)
Defendant argues his upper term sentence as to the
enhancement is unauthorized because he never stipulated to the
underlying circumstances, nor did the jury or trial court find any
aggravating factor true “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The Attorney General maintains that resentencing is not
required because one aggravating factor–that appellant served a
prior prison term–may be deemed to have been found true beyond
a reasonable doubt by virtue of the court’s reliance on a certified
record of that factor. Accordingly, because this aggravating
circumstance upon which the court relied in sentencing appellant
presumably was found true beyond a reasonable doubt, there was
no violation of appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury, nor
any violation of section 1170.1, subdivision (d).
The Attorney General is mistaken. Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3) provides for an exception to the proof
requirements for aggravating factors based on a prior conviction:
“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider
the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based
on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” However, this paragraph “does not apply to
enhancements imposed on prior convictions.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(3), italics added.) Section 1170.1, subdivision (d)(1), (2)
contain no “prior conviction exception” to the imposition of the
upper term for enhancements with triads. Rule 4.420(c) also

25
expressly provides that, “the court may consider the fact of the
defendant’s prior convictions based on a certified record of
conviction without it having been stipulated to by the defendant
or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the
judge in a court trial. This exception does not apply to the use of
the record of a prior conviction in selecting the upper term of an
enhancement.” The plain language of these provisions requires
that either defendant stipulate to the fact or a trier of fact find
the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
d. The Standard of Review
The parties dispute the standard of review when a
sentencing court imposes an upper term sentence in partial
reliance on an aggravating circumstance not found true by the
jury. (E.g., compare Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 465–466,
[error is harmless only if appellate court concludes a jury would
have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which
the court relied], and People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394,
review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn), with People v.
Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500–501 [harmless error so
long as appellate court finds the jury would have found at least a
single aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable
doubt].)
More recent authorities have suggested a hybrid standard
of review which we find applicable.6 Under this standard, there
are two inquiries. First, to satisfy federal constitutional
requirements, we must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

6 The Supreme Court is set to resolve this split. (See People
v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
August 10, 2022, S274942.)

26
a jury–also applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard–
would have found true at least a single aggravating
circumstance. (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112; see also
Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 401, review granted; see People
v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839 (Sandoval).) Second, the
appellate court must determine, under the California Watson
standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson)),
whether the trial court would have imposed the upper term
regardless of the error. This examination involves two steps. “In
particular, we must consider whether it is reasonably probable
that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence in the
absence of the error. [Citation.] Resolving this issue entails two
layers of review. We must first, for each aggravating fact,
consider whether it is reasonably probable that the jury would
have found the fact not true. We must then, with the
aggravating facts that survive this review, consider whether it is
reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a
lesser sentence had it considered only those aggravating facts.”
(Zabelle, at p. 1112.)
Applying this analytical framework, it may be said that, by
virtue of its verdicts, the jury necessarily and implicitly found the
first two aggravating circumstances cited by the court established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, the crime of murder involves
great bodily injury. (Rule 4.421(a)(1).) Similarly, the second
factor—that appellant was armed with a weapon—is inherent in
the firearm enhancement itself. (Rule 4.421(a)(2).) Reliance on
these factors to impose the upper term as to the firearm
enhancement may constitute an impermissible dual or
overlapping use of facts. (People v. Moberly (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 350

27
[Generally a court “may [not] use a fact constituting an element
of the offense either to aggravate or to enhance a sentence.”];
People v. Barker (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 921, 941 [Where there is
an improper dual or overlapping use of facts, remand is required
if it is reasonably probable the defendant would obtain a more
favorable result].)
Defendant did not object to the court’s use of overlapping
aggravating factors at the time of sentencing. Nothing in Senate
Bill No. 567 relieved him of the obligation to object to the court’s
dual use of facts to preserve that claim on appeal. Accordingly,
he forfeited any appellate challenge to an improper dual use of
facts. (See People v. de Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [failure to
specifically object to the court’s dual use of facts in sentencing
forfeited the issue on appeal]; People v. Gonzalez (2003)
31 Cal.4th 745, 755 [same].)
The Attorney General contends that the seventh
aggravating factor on which the court relied—appellant served a
prior prison term—was properly relied upon as proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, because it was established by certified records.
Not so. As discussed above, section 1170.1 does not include a
“prior conviction exception” to the imposition of the upper term
for firearm enhancements with triads. (§ 1170.1, subd. (d)(1), (2);
rule 4.420(c).)
Because the jury may have found at least one aggravating
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no Sixth
Amendment violation. A sentencing court may impose a sentence
higher than the statutory maximum based on one aggravating
circumstance found true by the jury. (See Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 409, review granted [“A fact that is necessary
to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum must be

28
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]hen multiple
aggravating circumstances not proved to the jury are relied upon
by a trial court in imposing the upper term, the reviewing court
must only conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that one of those
circumstances would have been found true by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt to avoid offending the Sixth Amendment”].)
Thus, we turn to state law and apply the harmless error
standard set forth in Watson: “[T]he question posed is whether, in
the absence of the improperly considered sentencing factor(s),
there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for
the appealing party—i.e., the imposition of a lesser sentence.”
(Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 941, review granted; see
People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233 (Avalos); People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 (Price).) Although a single
aggravating factor might be sufficient to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111–1112),
the same cannot be said under Senate Bill No. 567. (Zabelle, at
p. 1115.) In Zabelle, as here, the court alluded to multiple
aggravating factors but did not state which factor, or combination
of factors, compelled it to select the upper term. (Ibid.)
Setting aside the dual use of the first two aggravating
factors, the trial court improperly cited five remaining
aggravating circumstances. The sentencing court did not suggest
that it had considered any aggravating circumstance more
heavily than any other. However, it appears reasonably likely
that the aggravating circumstance that defendant served a prior
prison term influenced the court to impose the upper term on the
enhancement. If so, such reliance was inappropriate. Section
1170, subdivision (b)(3)’s exception for reliance on a certified
record of conviction without submission to a jury does not apply

29
to enhancements imposed on prior convictions. (See §§ 1170,
subd, (b)(3), 1170.1, subd. (d)(1), (2); rule 4.420(c).)
Turning to the remaining aggravating factors, the
sentencing court found that Sanchez was “particularly
vulnerable.” That conclusion is debatable. Courts have found
that “ ‘a “particularly vulnerable” victim is one who is vulnerable
“in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other
cases.” ’ ” (People v. Esquibel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 539, 558.)
“ ‘Particularly . . . means in a special or unusual degree, to an
extent greater than in other cases. Vulnerability means
defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one
who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.’ ” (People v.
Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, 1007; People v. DeHoyos
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 154.)
For two reasons, we conclude it is reasonably probable that
a jury would not have found this circumstance true beyond a
reasonable doubt. First, as explained by the prosecution’s gang
expert, Sanchez, an adult member of the Watts Varrio Grape
gang, voluntarily chose to assume the well-known risk of violence
associated with entry into rival gang territory. Second, whether
Sanchez may be said to have been particularly vulnerable is a
comparative standard; it requires speculation as to whether a
jury would have concluded the circumstances surrounding these
crimes rendered him more vulnerable than other victims. (See
People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962, 983, review
granted Sept. 28. 2022, S275942, review dism. Aug. 30, 2023
[finding harmless error in the court’s reliance on particular
vulnerability would require some degree of speculation, given the
quantitative standard].)

30
Although Sanchez was vulnerable in the sense that he was
unarmed and walking away from the store, the evidence suggests
he was not “particularly vulnerable.” Sanchez was outside, in an
open public space, not cornered or in a confined space. He was in
territory claimed by a rival gang. Sanchez was vulnerable to the
extent anyone being followed by an armed man is vulnerable, but
that alone did not render him “particularly” vulnerable. From
this evidence, a reasonable jury could conceivably conclude that
Sanchez was not unusually defenseless. Thus, it is reasonably
probable that a jury might not have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Sanchez was a particularly vulnerable victim. (See
Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 841 [remanding in part because
the record did not “reflect such a clear-cut instance of victim
vulnerability that we confidently can conclude the jury would
have made the same findings”].)
Similarly questionable is the court’s finding that the
shooting was carried out in a manner indicating planning,
sophistication, or professionalism. Defendant was armed when
he entered the liquor store after Sanchez and Marin but did not
shoot until after the couple left the store, after Sanchez identified
his gang membership and after defendant heard Sanchez utter
the word “nigga.” The fact that defendant was armed from the
outset and followed the couple as they walked away lends itself to
a conclusion that the shooting was planned. However, a
reasonable jury could conceivably conclude that firing 13 shots
(four of which were fatal) in a surveilled public area and even
after Sanchez fell to the ground, was neither sophisticated nor
professional. The murder was committed by brute force and
violence, not by a particularly sophisticated method. Sadly, this
case involves the relatively routine act of severe violence by a

31
gang member against a suspected rival. A jury could rationally
find that defendant’s conduct did not exhibit criminal
sophistication or professionalism.
Although less ambiguous, it is nevertheless questionable
whether the jury would have concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant’s prior convictions were “numerous and
increasing in seriousness’ ” as the trial court found. According to
te probation report, defendant had four juvenile adjudications
between 2005 and 2007,7 and a single prior conviction for armed
robbery (when he was age 16 but treated as an adult) in 2009.
That conviction occurred 12 years before the crimes at issue, and
appellant remained in prison until 14 months before Sanchez was
murdered. There is no question defendant has a criminal record,
which has (mostly) increased in severity. It is less clear,
however, that a jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that his aged convictions were “numerous.” Determining
numerosity or the increasing seriousness of prior crimes involves
subjective factfinding and may be subject to reasonable dispute in
a given case.
The final aggravating factor cited by the court was that
defendant was engaged in violent conduct that indicated a
serious danger to society. A reasonable jury likely would find
that factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, no such
finding was made here by the jury or by the trial court, and we
cannot make that finding definitively on this record.

7 According to his probation report, defendant’s first juvenile
adjudication in 2005 (at age 12) was for robbery. He had two
adjudications 2006 for burglary and grand theft, and one in 2007
for possession of marijuana.

32
The trial court relied on seven aggravating circumstances
to conclude the high term was appropriate for the enhancement.
Under current law, the court’s reliance on at least five of those
factors was improper.8 Under these circumstances, we conclude
it is reasonably probable the court may have imposed a lesser
sentence but for its failure to adhere to the explicit mandates of
newly amended section 1170.1.
e. The Sentencing Error Was Not Harmless
The parties discuss a variety of harmless error approaches
taken by appellate courts in recent cases when trial courts
impose upper term sentences based on aggravating
circumstances not properly determined under amended sections
1170 and 1170.1, an issue currently pending before the California
Supreme Court in People v. Lynch. We need not weigh in on the
split of authority, because, unlike this case, those cases involved
the retroactive application of the new law. (See Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 465; Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1109; Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403; Falcon, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 921, 950–951, review granted.) The
amendments to section 1170.1 were in effect for many months at
the time of sentencing, and we must presume the trial court was
aware of the change in the law. Because the trial court is
presumed to have known about the limits imposed on its
sentencing discretion, application of the state law standard for
harmless error under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 is

8 Based on the prohibition against dual or overlapping use,
the court also improperly relied on the first two factors it cited.
However, as stated above, appellant forfeited this argument by
failing to raise it at sentencing.

33
straightforward. (See, e.g., Falcon, at p. 950 [noting Watson
harmless error test has been applied when a sentencing court
considered improper sentencing factors under statutory scheme
that had not changed in interim].)
“When a trial court has given both proper and improper
reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the
sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of
its reasons were improper.” (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 492.) A
reasonable probability of a more favorable result exists where the
improper factor or factors was or were determinative for the
sentencing court or where the reviewing court cannot make that
determination. (Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 233; see People v.
McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426 [“When a trial court
has abused its discretion in choosing among available sentencing
options, such as by relying on an improper sentencing factor, a
reviewing court must still affirm unless ‘the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] In these
situations, the trial court has revealed which sentencing choice it
prefers, and the reviewing court must decide whether there is a
reasonable probability that the trial court’s lawful exercise of
discretion on remand will lead it to make a different choice.”]; In
re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 715 [Watson standard has been
applied to sentencing error in adult criminal cases where trial
court is aware of its discretion at sentencing].)
Although the trial court cited the appropriate rules, its
sentencing determination does not reflect that it fully appreciated
the significance of the newly adopted presumptive middle term.
After finding, without any analysis of the underlying facts, that it
could rely on seven aggravating circumstances and then finding

34
no mitigating circumstances, the court imposed the upper
sentence as to the enhancement at issue. The court’s cursory
recitation of aggravating factors failed to acknowledge that the
discretionary limitation imposed by Senate Bill No. 567 “means
any weighing of aggravating circumstances must occur under the
weight of the new rule favoring the middle term as the maximum
sentence.” (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 948, review
granted.) As it appears the trial court was not fully cognizant of
(or failed to apply) limitations on its sentencing discretion,
resentencing is required. The record does not “clearly indicate[]
the trial court would have imposed the same sentence” if it had
known not only that most of the aggravating circumstances it
relied on were improper but also that “the middle term was the
presumptive maximum sentence.” (Id. at pp. 926, 938; People v.
Lewis (2022) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1137–1138, review granted
May 17, 2023, S279147; Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.)
The Attorney General’s analysis is too superficial. He
considers only the existence of aggravating circumstances
without evaluating their significance as justification for
departing from the presumption favoring a middle term. The
trial court expressed no opinion that appellant deserved the most
severe punishment. Nor does the record provide an adequate
basis for us to conclude the court would have concluded the
aggravating circumstances justified an upper term had it
included the weight of the presumptive middle term in its
analysis.
Because not all aggravating factors survive the first step of
the harmlessness analysis, the question is whether it is
reasonably probable that the trial court would impose a shorter
sentence had it relied only on permissibly proven factors. We can

35
only speculate as to how the court might have viewed the
aggravating circumstances it relied on if it considered whether
those circumstances justified imposition of the upper term
bearing the presumptive middle term in mind. Critically, in
addition to the impermissible factfinding, the record is devoid of
indication that appellant was afforded the benefit of the newer
middle-term presumption. As explained in Falcon, “[t]he
statute’s plain language creates an express presumption against
the imposition of an upper term sentence, even when properly
proven aggravating circumstances exist: a trial court must decide
whether the existence of properly proven aggravating
circumstances justify, not just the term selected, but upward
departure from the presumptive rule itself. The presumption
bears weight in this determination. As a result, the trial court no
longer has full discretion to impose an upper term sentence
without the weight of any presumption against it, as it did under
the former version of the [determinate sentencing law].” (Falcon,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 921, review granted.)
“[T]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at
issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective
standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude
with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury,
the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did
the trial court.” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840.) The
aggravating factors on which the court relied here are of this
nature, requiring “an imprecise quantitative or comparative
evaluation of the facts.” (Ibid.)
Some degree of speculation would necessarily be required
for us to conclude the jury would have agreed with the trial
court’s evaluation, or that the court would have exercised its

36
recently limited sentencing discretion in the same way had it
taken into account the statutory presumption in favor of the
middle term. On this record, we cannot conclude there is no
reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a
more lenient sentence had it been left with only the aggravating
circumstances that we assume a jury would have found true
beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant is entitled to a sentencing
decision reached through the exercise of the court’s informed
discretion. This requires a sentencing decision that affords
weight to the middle-term presumption, and any upward
departure must comport with the factfinding limitations
applicable to the firearm enhancement under section 1170.1.
(See Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 921, 925, review
granted.) On this record we conclude resentencing is in order.
3. The Trial Court Erred in Doubling the Firearm
Enhancements as to Counts 1 and 2.
As to count 1, the trial court imposed the upper term
sentence of 10 years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5),
doubled to 20 years (§ 1170.12). On the concurrent count 2, the
court imposed the low term of three years for the firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.5), doubled to six years (§ 1170.12). The
parties agree, as do we, that the trial court erred in doubling the
two firearm enhancements for counts 1 and 2.
Where, “as here, a defendant has one prior strike conviction
that has been pleaded and either proved or admitted, the
determinate term for the current felony offense is twice the term
otherwise provided as punishment. [Citations.] However,
enhancements are added after the determination of the base term
and are not doubled. [Citations.]” (People v. Sok (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 88, 93–94, fn. omitted; see also People v. Hardy

37
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433 [“In sentencing a defendant
who has one prior strike, the court may not double any
enhancements it imposes”].)
Because we are vacating appellant’s sentence as to the
firearm enhancement on count 1, and its mistaken doubling of
the firearm enhancements as to both counts, appellant is entitled
to a full resentencing. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1067, 1096.) “[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on
remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Valenzuela (2019)
7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425.)
DISPOSITION
Appellant’s sentences as to the enhancements attached to
counts one and two are vacated and this matter is remanded for
full resentencing in accordance with sections 1170 and 1170.1,
and subsequent correction of the abstract of judgment. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.

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