CourtListener 9513647•People v. Johnson CA2/5
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Filed 6/7/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B327269
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA148587)
v.
RALPH CORNELIUS JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
Loyola Law School Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing
Clinic, Christopher Hawthorne and Jakob Meuser, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Defendant Ralph Cornelius Johnson appeals from a
resentencing order in which the trial court struck three one-year
priors, but declined to strike Johnson’s third strike, which would
have led to his immediate release from prison. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 28, 1999, a jury found Johnson guilty of four
counts of possessing a check with intent to defraud (Pen. Code,
§ 475) and one count receiving stolen property (Pen. Code,
§ 496).1 The jury found Johnson had been convicted of two prior
serious felonies for purposes of the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12);
specifically, he had been convicted in 1982 of attempted murder
and attempted robbery. Because the check fraud was his third
strike, he received a sentence of 28 years to life, comprised of four
concurrent terms of 25 years to life plus three one-year prior
prison enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The
court stayed the sentence on the count for receiving stolen
property. Johnson’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
(People v. Johnson, B133580 (May 11, 2000) [nonpub opn.].)
On February 9, 2022, Johnson filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.75 (former section 1171.1)
requesting that the trial court strike his three one-year
enhancements for prior prison terms and conduct a full
resentencing. The trial court initially denied Johnson’s petition
without a hearing or appointing counsel based on its belief that
“there is no provision for a defendant to initiate the process” set
forth in section 1172.75, and that the process had to be initiated
by the department of corrections.
After Johnson obtained counsel and moved for
reconsideration, the trial court recalled his sentence and
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
scheduled the matter for a hearing. Johnson then filed a
supplemental brief, in which he requested the court “exercise its
discretion and resentence [Johnson] to a determinate sentence
that would result in his release from prison.” The People filed
their response to Johnson’s petition for resentencing, which
contained various exhibits, including a recent “Comprehensive
Risk Assessment” report written by forensic psychologist Wendy
Chan, Psy.D. for the parole board, and transcript of the parole
board hearing, including the testimony of Dr. Irvine.
In her report, Dr. Chan concluded that Johnson
represented a “[h]igh risk for violence,” and that he “would
benefit from showing continued compliance with his mental
health treatment [and] developing additional coping strategies
for managing criminality and negative emotions or increase in
his symptoms.” Dr. Irvine, who had been meeting with Johnson
at least once a month for about two years at that point, testified
to the following: “My concern is that . . . since 2008 [Johnson] has
been on [a mandatory medication] order and without that order
in place, though I believe that he is making progress and it
sounds like over the course of the last several years has made
some strides, that temptation to stop that medication or even the
lack of insight as a result of his illness would be too difficult for
him to overcome and that in all likelihood despite his voicing his
desire and willingness to take the medicine that he may stop it.
And then . . . the consequences would be very severe.” Dr. Irvine
further explained that “in the past, [Johnson] has decompensated
fairly significantly and severely off of medication, which has
resulted in his inability to care for himself to the point where he
has smeared feces on his cell believing that they would protect
him against assassins. My concern is that off of medication that
3
those types of behaviors would recur and that he may become
hostile or aggressive or even a danger to himself.”
Johnson filed a reply.
The resentencing hearing was held on November 7, 2022.
Johnson’s counsel argued that because his four counts of
possession of checks with intent to defraud cannot currently be
charged as strikes, the court “should resentence him to those
sentences without the strike, [which] would lead to a determinate
term that would allow for immediate release.” The court rejected
that argument. Counsel also argued that Johnson should be
resentenced under section 1385, subdivision (c), which the court
also rejected.
The court recognized that it had discretion to strike the
strike under Romero. Johnson’s counsel argued that one of
Johnson’s two strikes (attempted robbery and attempted murder)
should be stricken because they occurred on the same occasion.
The court disagreed, observing that the crimes were “distinct,”
requiring “a different intent and a different act.”
The trial court then considered various factors: Johnson
was convicted of “two violent strikes in 1982,” after which he was
“sent back to prison on five separate years”; he had “been in
prison almost his entire life”; Johnson was a “career criminal,”
who had been convicted in 1978 for a “hit and run” and “receiving
stolen goods,” in 1979 for “receiving stolen property,” in 1982 for
attempted murder and attempted robbery (the two strikes),
which both “involved use of a weapon”; and while out on parole,
he was charged with receiving stolen property, altering a driver’s
license, forgery, and other parole violations.
The trial court acknowledged some factors that were
favorable to Johnson, such as the lack of damage from and
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nonviolent nature of the most recent check fraud convictions,
noting however it was not favorable to Johnson that the crime
involved some level of sophistication. Johnson had also “failed to
successfully complete probation or parole, basically any time in
his life; this is a negative factor.” The court further noted that in
the state prison, Johnson is “in a special program, [enhanced
outpatient program],” and “not in [the] general population.”
Thus, the court reasoned, “[he] . . . has not shown, on some macro
level, that he can follow rules and be medicine compliant in a
normal, free-community setting.” He cited Dr. Chan’s report that
“there was a high risk of violence if [Johnson] was not medically
compliant.”
The trial court then turned to consideration of Johnson’s
“background, character[,] and prospects,” some of which “are
beneficial to [Johnson].” Citing People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328 (Strong), the court stated “middle age
considered alone does not remove a defendant from the spirit of
the Three Strikes law. Otherwise, those criminals with the
longest criminal records over the longest period of time would
have a built-in argument that the very factor that takes them
within the spirit of the Three Strikes law, a lengthy criminal
career, has the inevitable consequences of making them older . . .
that takes them outside the law’s spirit.” The court noted that
“older people do commit crimes; they commit murders, they
molest children. And, frankly, [Johnson], at 60, was still engaged
in some kind of violent activity by attacking another inmate.”
Aside from the latter incident, which was due to mental illness,
the fact that Johnson had largely been discipline-free in his
recent history at prison was “a factor in his favor.” However, the
court observed that Johnson’s overall “performance in state
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prison [has] been uneven and problematic”; for example, he had
possessed a cell phone in 2010 and battered an inmate with a
weapon in 2006.
The court then addressed Johnson’s “mental health
problems, involving his schizophrenia and his future
dangerousness if released,” which it noted “affects [its]
assessment of [Johnson’s] background, character[,] and
prospects.” Recognizing it was not “bound” by the parole board’s
determinations, the court explained that it was considering the
information and opinions underlying the parole board’s decision,
including Dr. Chan’s report and Dr. Irvine’s testimony, because
the people involved in the board’s decision were “in a much better
position to evaluate his mental health problems.” The court
concluded that Johnson’s “mental health condition weighs
against striking [his] strike,” echoing Dr. Irvine’s concern that
“there is a good chance that [Johnson] would stop taking his
medication in his present state, because he has not yet developed
the understanding of the need for the medication. The
consequences of [him] not taking his medication, not receiving
therapy, are very concerning to the court.” The trial court
acknowledged various letters of support from family members
and others, but observed “they are in many cases unrealistic and
do not offer a comprehensive support system needed to assist
[Johnson] with his ongoing problems. They are letters of love and
express a hope that [he] is a changed man. None of the letters
show any appreciation of [his] mental health problems.” After
expressing “concern[]” about Johnson’s “prospects for a stable
life,” the court stated that “there are no extraordinary
circumstances, or even reasons, that would motivate a reasonable
judge to grant his release. [Johnson] has a long and continuous
6
criminal record. Several of the charges against [him] are serious
and involve violence. While there are some mitigating factors
that have developed since [his] original sentence, and I have
considered them . . . they are mostly extrinsic to the three strikes
scheme.”
The court declined to strike Johnson’s strike under Romero.
After striking Johnson’s three one-year priors, the court imposed
a sentence of 25 years to life, the determinate portion of which
Johnson had already served.
DISCUSSION
Johnson argues the trial court (1) committed legal error in
refusing to consider dismissing his strike under section 1385,
subdivision (c), and (2) abused its discretion in refusing to strike
Johnson’s strike under Romero; Johnson also urges this court to
(3) declare his sentence unconstitutional under California’s
Constitution and (4) strike his 25-year-to-life sentence for his
third strike under the California Racial Justice Act (§ 745). We
address each argument in turn.2
I. Section 1385, Subdivision (C) Does Not Apply to Prior
Strike Convictions
We reject Johnson’s argument that the trial court
committed legal error in refusing to consider dismissing
Johnson’s strike under section 1385, subdivision (c), because that
provision does not apply to strikes. “Whether the amendments to
section 1385 apply to prior strike convictions is a question of
2 We grant Johnson’s request for judicial notice of the
memorandum redesignating his rule violation due to his mental
illness and the order setting an expiration on the requirement
that Johnson involuntarily submit to taking psychotropic
medication.
7
statutory interpretation which we review de novo.” (People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242 (Burke).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides:
“ ‘(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.’ ” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) The court in
Burke observed that “[i]t is . . . well established that the Three
Strikes law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing
scheme for the current offense.” (Ibid.) Because “[t]he plain
language of subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an
‘enhancement,’ and the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement,” subdivision (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes
Law. (Id. at pp. 243-244.)
Citing People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1094-
1095 (Ortiz), Johnson urges that this issue is “contested.” He is
mistaken. Ortiz did not address the issue, and every court that
has, has agreed with Burke. (People v. McDowell (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1147; People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399;
People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60; People v. Cota (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 318; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 771.)
We join that chorus. We therefore have no occasion to analyze
the factors a court should consider in exercising its discretion
under section 1385, subdivision (c).
II. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Refusing to Strike Johnson’s Strike Under Romero
Under section 1385, subdivision (a) the trial court may, “in
the furtherance of justice,” order an action to be dismissed. This
authority includes the power “to strike prior felony conviction
allegations in cases brought under the Three Strikes law.”
8
(People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-
530.) We review a trial court’s refusal to strike a prior conviction
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
376 (Carmony).) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion
unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
“[T]he Three Strikes initiative . . . was intended to restrict
courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders.” (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) “ ‘To achieve this end, “the Three
Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do
other sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing requirement
to be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one
qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court “conclud[es] that an
exception to the scheme should be made because, for articulable
reasons which can withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant
should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three
Strikes scheme.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Factors for the court to consider in determining whether
“the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit” such
that he “should be treated as though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies” are “the
nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
his background, character, and prospects.” (People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
Johnson argues that “[t]here is no connection between
whether [he] should have received [25] years to life . . . and the
fact that he was recently denied parole,” and that the trial court
“improperly considered . . . parole denial as the main reason for
ruling against his Romero motion.” We disagree on both points.
9
The trial court did not consider the mere fact Johnson had been
denied parole. Rather, it considered the opinions of the
psychiatrists who evaluated Johnson, upon which the parole
board reasonably relied in making its decision. Dr. Chan
concluded that Johnson presented a “[h]igh risk for violence,”
based in part on his “mental health symptoms and . . . poor
response to treatment.” Similarly, Dr. Irvine expressed concern,
based on Johnson’s history and mental illness, that if left to his
own devices Johnson would stop taking his medication and “may
become hostile or aggressive or even a danger to himself.” The
trial court properly considered these reports in determining
whether Johnson fell within the “spirit” of the Three Strikes law,
one purpose of which is to “protect[] the public from criminals.”
(People v. Kilborn (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.)
We similarly reject Johnson’s argument that the court
“improperly used [Johnson’s] mental illness as an aggravating
[rather than mitigating] factor.” Johnson cites California Rules
of Court, rule 4.423 to support his argument. That rule lists as a
“[c]ircumstance[] in mitigation”: that “[t]he defendant was
suffering from a mental . . . condition that significantly reduced
culpability for the crime.” (Cal. Rules Court, rule 4.423(b)(2).)
The trial court did not consider defendant more culpable due to
his mental illness; to the contrary, it expressed that it was “very
sympathetic to [Johnson’s] position,” and acknowledged he had
“difficulty of all kinds.” The court considered Johnson’s mental
illness to be an aggravating factor only insofar as it caused him to
be “a danger to the community.” This was proper.
Relying on People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635 (Vargas),
Johnson urges that the trial court “failed to consider the fact that
[his] two strike priors arose out of the same occasion as a
10
mitigating factor.” We agree with the trial court that Vargas is
distinguishable because the defendant in that case committed
two crimes (robbery and carjacking) “that were based on . . . the
same act (forcibly taking the victim’s car)” (id., at p. 645),
whereas here, Johnson’s crimes of attempted murder and
attempted robbery were not based on identical acts, despite
having occurred on the same occasion. (See People v. Avila (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141, fn. 6 [drawing the same distinction].)
Although Johnson is correct that a trial court may consider the
fact that two crimes occurred on the same occasion, that fact does
not in itself compel a trial court to strike a prior. (See ibid.)
Nor are we convinced by Johnson’s arguments that the trial
court “failed to give proper weight to [Johnson’s] age as a
mitigating factor” or “to the nonviolent and victimless nature of
[his] third-strike offense.” The trial court did consider these
factors. Johnson’s belief that it should have given more weight to
them falls short of showing the court’s “decision [was] so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it,” as necessary to show an abuse of discretion. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 [“a ‘ “decision will not be reversed
merely because reasonable people might disagree” ’ ”].)
In denying Johnson’s Romero motion, the trial court
considered various relevant factors, including some that weighed
in Johnson’s favor. For example, it acknowledged Johnson’s
check fraud did not ultimately cause anyone harm, that Johnson
had loving and supportive family members who expressed their
willingness to help him, and that Johnson did not have
significant discipline issues in prison in the past 10 years. But
the court also considered that Johnson had spent most of his life
in prison, had committed numerous crimes over numerous years,
11
including violent crimes, had violated parole each time he was
released, had attacked another inmate at the age of 60 (due to his
mental illness), and there were recent and multiple reports from
experts opining that Johnson was dangerous. We are unable to
conclude on this record that the trial court abused its discretion.
III. Johnson’s Sentence Was Not Cruel or Unusual
Although Johnson has forfeited this constitutional claim by
failing to raise it below (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
880-881), we exercise our discretion to consider its merits (Avila,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145, fn. 12). “ ‘Whether a
punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the
appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v.
Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358 (Mantanez); accord
Avila, at pp. 1145-1146.)
“ ‘A punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of the
California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime
for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.” ’ ” (Avila, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145; accord In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th
959, 972 (Palmer).) “A claim of excessive punishment must
overcome ‘a considerable burden’ [citation], and courts should
give “ ‘the broadest possible discretion [citation] to the legislative
judgment respecting appropriate punishment.’ ” (Id., at p. 972.)
Courts reviewing excessiveness claims employ a three-
pronged analysis: (1) looking to the nature of the offense and the
offender, with particular attention to the degree of danger both
pose to society; (2) comparing the punishment with that which
California imposes for more serious offenses; and (3) comparing
the punishment with that prescribed in other jurisdictions for the
12
same offense. (Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 973.) Where, as
here, the defendant is a recidivist, it is generally not cruel or
unusual to enhance his sentence based on his recidivist status.
(Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146; see Mantanez, supra,
98 Cal.App.4th at p. 359 [appellate courts have consistently
found Three Strikes law not cruel or unusual].) We must
nonetheless consider whether “ ‘the ultimate punishment, all
facts considered,’ ” is “disproportionate to the crime.” (Avila, at
p. 1146.)
Citing Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at page 1146, Johnson
argues that “[p]ast offenses alone will not justify imposition of an
enhanced sentence,” such that our focus must be on the most
recent offense. That Johnson’s most recent strike was nonviolent
is a factor that weighs in his favor. However, we must consider
not only the “nature of the offense,” but also the “nature of the
offender.” (Ibid.) Our examination of the latter requires us to
“take into account [Johnson’s] recidivist behavior.” (People v.
Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 (Gray).) In addition to
having an extensive criminal history over the span of many
years, including violent crimes and repeated parole violations,
Johnson has a mental illness (schizophrenia) that predisposes
him to violent behavior. Johnson’s sentence is not
disproportionate in view of these factors. (Gray, at pp. 992-993
[defendant’s sentence of 25 years to life for attempted carjacking
was not cruel or unusual in view of “his lengthy criminal history,”
“his recidivist behavior,” untreated “drug problem,” and
“potential danger to the community”].)
We are not persuaded by Johnson’s reliance on Carmony,
supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, in which the defendant received a
third-strike sentence for failing to register as a sex offender
13
within five days of his birthday. The defendant had not moved,
so the authorities possessed his current address, and his failure
to register was “a harmless violation of a regulatory
requirement.” (Id. at pp. 1073, 1087.) Johnson’s third-strike
offense is not an innocuous regulatory violation. Although he
was caught before he caused any actual harm, his crime involved
a scheme to use stolen checks to defraud people.
Johnson provides no argument with respect to the second
and third factors (intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons),
and instead draws our attention to the Legislature’s continued
rollback of “aggressive enhancement regimes under the view that
such sentences are unjust.” Although accurate, this observation
is insufficient to meet Johnson’s “considerable burden” to show
his sentence is cruel or unusual under the California
Constitution.
IV. Racial Justice Act
The Racial Justice Act (§§ 745; 1473, subd. (f); 1473.6, subd.
(a)(3)) prohibits convictions and sentencing based on race,
ethnicity, or national origin (§ 745, subd. (a)). Pertinent here, “[a]
violation [of the Racial Justice Act] is established if the defendant
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . [that a] longer or
more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the
same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more
frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants
of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where
the sentence was imposed.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A).)
A defendant asserting a violation of the Racial Justice Act
“may file a motion pursuant to [section 745], or a petition for writ
14
of habeas corpus . . . in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging
a violation of subdivision (a). For claims based on the trial
record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of
subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.
The defendant may also move to stay the appeal and request
remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this
section.” (§ 745, subd. (b).) “If a motion is filed in the trial court
and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of
subdivision (a), the trial court should hold a hearing.” (Id.,
subd. (c).)
Johnson requests that we remand this action and instruct
the trial court to hold a hearing on his claim that “defendants of
his race are and were much more likely to receive third-strike
sentences,” and “to be charged with a felony when the underlying
crime is a ‘wobbler.’ ” We recognize that when the order Johnson
appeals from was issued, in November 2022, section 745 applied
only “prospectively in cases in which judgment ha[d] not been
entered prior to January 1, 2021.” (Former § 745, subd. (j), added
by Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5.) Not until January 1, 2023, did the
Racial Justice Act become applicable to “all cases in which
judgment is not final.” (§ 745, subd. (j)(1).) These facts have not
impacted Johnson’s ability to file a petition for habeas corpus
since January 1, 2023, when the law became applicable to him—
which he has not done. We decline to remand this matter for the
trial court to conduct a hearing on the claimed violation because
that is not consistent with the procedure prescribed by section
745.
15
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.
LEE, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KIM, J.
* Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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