In re Am. D.R. CA1/3

CourtListener 9510748Calctapp4 giu 2024

Testo completo

Filed 6/4/24 In re Am. D.R. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Am. D.R., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

A. D.R.,
Appellant,
v. A168489
Z. M.G.,
(Alameda County
Respondent. Super. Ct. No. HA21112775)

A. D.R., the stepmother of minor Am. D.R., appeals the denial of her
petition to terminate the parental rights of minor’s mother, Z. M.G., pursuant
to Family Code section 7822.1 On appeal, stepmother contends: (1) the trial
court applied the incorrect standard of proof; (2) the court failed to properly
apply a “burden shifting doctrine”; (3) the court’s decision is an abuse of
discretion and contrary to law; and (4) substantial evidence does not support
the court’s decision. We affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and father are the parents of minor, a boy born in late 2016.
By January 2019, mother and father appeared before the trial court seeking
custody orders. Mother wanted to relocate to New Jersey (where she is from)
with minor. Though noting there was an existing order that minor stay
within the county, the court indicated mother could file a Request for Order.
Father indicated mother had once already taken minor to New Jersey against
court orders.
In February 2019, father appeared in court without mother, stating
that he did not know where she was and that she said she was moving to
New Jersey. The court granted father’s request for sole physical and legal
custody with no visitation rights to mother. In March 2019, father appeared
in court and indicated he had retrieved minor from mother. Mother appeared
by phone, and the court informed her that she could file a Request for Order
or work out an agreement with father, but that minor would otherwise stay
in California.
In October 2021, stepmother filed a petition seeking to terminate
mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 7822.2 In support of the
petition, stepmother filed a declaration averring, among other things, that:
she and father have resided in their current residence since June 2019; she
and father are minor’s primary caretakers; they have provided minor a safe,

2 Around the same time, stepmother filed a request to adopt minor, and a
document entitled “Consent to Adoption by Parent Retaining Custody” in
which father declared his consent to terminating mother’s parental rights
and to stepmother’s request to adopt minor. The Alameda County Social
Services Agency wrote a report recommending the court grant stepmother’s
petition to adopt minor if the court found the allegations of stepmother’s
petition to adopt to be true, and “provided the parental rights of the mother
. . . are terminated.” (Boldface and italics omitted.)

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stable, and nurturing environment while mother has no stable residence;
mother abandoned minor; mother abducted minor, taking him to New Jersey
from April to August 2017, December 2018 to January 2019, and January to
March 2019 without father’s consent; mother previously violated court
orders; and mother falsely claimed that father had abused her. Various other
documents accompanied the petition and stepmother’s later filings, e.g., a
marriage certificate showing father and stepmother were married in May
2020, and transcripts from the aforementioned 2019 hearings.
Mother filed an opposition, denying any intent to abandon minor. She
contended that stepmother had no personal knowledge regarding various
facts stepmother alleged in her declaration, and that stepmother was
“ ‘throw[ing] mud’ ” with allegations having nothing to do with the issue of
terminating parental rights. Mother acknowledged she did not follow proper
legal procedures before, explaining she was fleeing domestic violence and did
not understand how to navigate the family court system. She indicated she
loves minor, raised him in the early years of his life, and wants visitation and
a relationship with minor. She further indicated stepmother and father
made efforts to cut her out of minor’s life, such as by not accepting or
facilitating calls. Mother claimed she paid child support through April 2020,
but became unemployed during the pandemic and resumed paying child
support after getting a new job. Though she had been saving money to hire
an attorney to file a request for visitation, stepmother filed her petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights before mother could do so. Accompanying
mother’s opposition and later filings were text messages from August 2021
between mother and father, and a printout showing mother’s child support
payments.

3
In August 2022, the trial court appointed separate counsel for minor.
At a bench trial on June 14, 2023, the parties stipulated to the admission of a
report summarizing child support payments. Four witnesses testified, as
follows.
Father testified the court had granted him sole legal and physical
custody of minor in February 2019, with no visitation to mother. Father
obtained physical custody of minor in March 2019, after mother had taken
minor to the East Coast in violation of the court’s orders. After returning to
California, mother initially called minor daily, but less frequently thereafter.
She stopped calling around July 2019, though she called once in November
2019. After November 2019, mother made no contact until August 2021.
Father arranged it so that mother would not call him; instead, she was
supposed to call his mother (the paternal grandmother) in order to talk to
minor. To father’s knowledge, his mother never stopped answering mother’s
phone calls. Father tried calling mother but did not have the right number.
Mother reached out in December 2021, after stepmother filed her petition,
and initially called or sent text messages every day. Subsequently, however,
she sent text messages only once or twice a month asking about minor.
Father did not have a problem with mother’s requests to speak with minor,
but he is concerned because minor does not know who mother is. Father
wants mother to take a “parenting class on the effect that a missing parent
has on a child and then get a psych eval, and that’s it.” Mother apparently
provided father a picture of a certificate showing she took a parenting class in
2022, but father indicated the certificate did not show the parenting class
was aimed at the effects of “being a missing parent.”
Father further testified that mother did not provide child support from
March 2019 to early November 2019, and during Covid from April 2020 to

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December 2021, but now she does provide support. Father indicated he and
his family have relocated to Texas. Minor knows stepmother as his mother,
but minor also knows and loves mother’s family, some of whom live in
California. Minor, who was still very young, had not yet asked who mother’s
family members are in relation to him, and father is not sure what he and
stepmother would say to minor, but they would eventually tell him
everything.
Mother testified on her own behalf as follows. Mother was minor’s
primary care giver from the time he was born in late 2016 until March 2019.
She and minor had a strong bond, and minor has a close relationship with
mother’s family and saw them regularly until he and father moved to Texas.
Starting in March 2019, mother had phone contact (voice and video
calls) with minor, facilitated by father’s mother. After mother moved to the
East Coast, she changed her number and did not give her number to father
because members of his family were harassing her. Instead, she contacted
father’s mother which she could do via “apps.”3 In September 2019, calls
were limited to between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. because minor was either sleeping
or “busy,” and by March 2020 father’s mother stopped allowing or facilitating
calls. Mother felt discouraged and stopped attempting regular contact. She
experienced a “huge depression” because of what she went through with
father. She did not file a Request for Order when contact stopped because
kidnapping charges were pending against her; following the advice of a court-
appointed attorney, she waited to request a contact order until after those
charges were cleared from her record in January or February 2021. The
attorney also informed her she had an active arrest warrant in California.

3 Mother testified she still has not given father her phone number out of
fear, but will do so if needed to co-parent.

5
Mother did not deal with the criminal charge sooner because she was
struggling financially and had no attorney though she needed one to help her
navigate the court system. Recently, mother has been trying to contact
father weekly to speak to minor. Father and stepmother have not allowed
her to speak to minor, as they want her to first get a psychological evaluation
or see a counselor.
Mother indicated her paycheck was garnished for child support, but
then she became unemployed and financially unstable starting in March
2020 due to the pandemic. She received unemployment benefits for a limited
time, but the benefits went toward her bills and rent; after her
unemployment benefits ran out, she applied for a “Covid relief bill” to cover
rent because she was in arrears. She got a new job in August 2021, and
initially did not realize her checks were not being garnished. She resumed
paying support in December 2021. Mother now works two jobs to pay more
support.
Mother testified that she deeply regrets her prior violation of the trial
court’s custody order and explained she had been afraid because father
threatened to take minor from her if she did not want to be with father. At
the time, mother was unfamiliar with the court system. She never intended
to abandon minor and wants her parental rights to remain in place. She
loves minor very much, wants to re-establish their relationship, and will soon
file a Request for Order to reconnect with minor.
Lorraine Gibbons, mother’s aunt, testified she has a close relationship
with minor and visited him numerous times over the years. She recalled
seeing minor at father’s home in 2019 and hearing minor say “ ‘Mom, mom,
mom’ ” when mother called during Gibbons’s visits.

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In rebuttal, stepmother testified she was present for every conversation
and never heard father telling mother “that she would pay.” Stepmother did
not personally observe father’s family harass mother on social media.
Stepmother testified mother’s calls with minor—who was very young—were
very short.
Ultimately, the trial court denied stepmother’s petition to terminate
mother’s parental rights. The court found that stepmother did not meet her
burden to show that mother intended to abandon minor, under either the
“clear and convincing evidence” standard or the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Based on the record, the court determined that mother’s
failures to pay support and to communicate with minor during certain
periods did not establish an intent to abandon. This appeal followed.4
DISCUSSION
Section 7822 provides a “mechanism for terminating parental rights
based on a parent’s voluntary abandonment of a child.” (In re Aubrey T.
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 316, 325 (Aubrey T.).) The statute provides a
proceeding to terminate parental rights may be brought if “[o]ne parent has
left the child in the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one
year without any provision for the child’s support, or without communication
from the parent, with the intent on the part of the parent to abandon the
child.” (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3).) A proceeding under section 7822 is appropriate
“ ‘where three main elements are met: (1) the child must have been left with
another; (2) without provision for support or without communication from the
parent for the statutory period; and (3) with the intent on the part of the

4 After she filed her notice of appeal, stepmother filed a petition for writ
of supersedeas and request for immediate stay of child custody and visitation
proceedings initiated by mother following the decision in this case. We
denied both the petition and the request.

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parent to abandon the child.’ [Citations.] A trial court’s finding of
abandonment must ‘be supported by clear and convincing evidence.’
(§ 7821.)” (Aubrey T., at p. 326.)
Section 7822, subdivision (b), provides that “[t]he failure . . . to provide
support, or failure to communicate is presumptive evidence of the intent to
abandon. If the parent or parents have made only token efforts to support or
communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by
the parent or parents.” Case law explains “ ‘[t]he effect of such a
presumption is that “when the party against whom such a presumption
operates produces some quantum of evidence casting doubt on the truth of
the presumed fact, the other party is no longer aided by the presumption.
The presumption disappears, leaving it to the party in whose favor it initially
worked to prove the fact in question.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly,
when a party challenging the existence of section 7822’s presumption of an
intent to abandon presents evidence of its nonexistence, the presumption
disappears and the court must find the requisite intent ‘without regard to the
presumption’ and ‘with no change in the allocation in the burden of proof.’ ”
(Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.)
“ ‘ “ ‘In order to constitute abandonment there must be an actual
desertion, accompanied with an intention to entirely sever, so far as it is
possible to do so, the parental relation and throw off all obligations growing
out of the same.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The parent need not intend to abandon the
child permanently; it is sufficient the parent had the intent to abandon the
child during the statutory period. [Citation.] ‘ “[The] question whether such
intent to abandon exists and whether it has existed for the statutory period is
a question of fact for the trial court, to be determined upon all the facts and

8
circumstances of the case.” ’ ” (In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 839
(E.M.), italics omitted.)
We begin by addressing stepmother’s argument under the following
heading in her opening brief: “Trial court erred in using the preponderance
of the evidence standard of proof.” (Capitalization omitted.) Under this
heading, stepmother asserts, in full: “Section 7821 states, a finding pursuant
to this chapter shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
However[,] trial court [sic] held stepmother did not meet her burden by ‘clear
and convincing evidence or even by preponderance of the evidence.’
[¶] Preponderance of the evidence is a higher, improper burden of proof.”
The contention is unclear. Stepmother does not appear to contest that
the clear and convincing evidence standard applied, but perhaps argues the
trial court should have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard
because, in her view, it is a more rigorous standard. We cannot agree. It is
well established that the clear and convincing standard is the more rigorous
of the two standards. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 997–998
(Conservatorship of O.B.).) In any event, the court determined that
stepmother failed to meet her burden under both standards.
Next, stepmother contends the trial court “failed to apply the burden-
shifting doctrine.” (Capitalization omitted.) On this score, stepmother
argues that she met her burden of proving mother intended to abandon
minor, and that mother provided no evidence to rebut that intent. This
appears to be, in essence, a claim that substantial evidence did not support
the court’s finding that mother did not intend to abandon minor. We are not
persuaded.
The substantial evidence standard is highly deferential. “ ‘ “When a
trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no

9
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 88.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence is evidence that is “of ponderable legal significance,”
“reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value,” and “ ‘substantial’ proof of
the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.” ’ [Citation.] The
testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence as long as
it is not physically impossible or inherently improbable. [Citations.] [¶] In
exercising substantial evidence review, an appellate court does not evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses but defers to the trier of fact. [Citations.]
Similarly, the court does not reweigh the evidence, but will uphold a
judgment that is supported by substantial evidence even if substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists.” (DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 371, 381–382.) “[W]hen presented with a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and
convincing evidence, the [reviewing] court must determine whether the
record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability
demanded by this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 1005.) “ ‘[A]ll evidence must be viewed most favorably to [the
prevailing party] and in support of the order.’ ” (E.M., supra, 228
Cal.App.4th at p. 839.) “It is the appellant’s burden on review to show that
the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s findings.” (Ibid.)
In this case, mother testified she loves minor very much and never
intended to abandon him. Though she testified she had not attempted to
contact minor from around March 2020 until around August 2021 when she

10
spoke to father, she explained that minor’s paternal grandmother—who
facilitated all calls between mother and minor—ceased allowing or
facilitating the calls by early 2020. Mother testified she felt discouraged and
stopped attempting contact regularly, and also that she went through “a huge
depression” because of what had occurred between her and father. Mother
did not file a Request for Order when contact stopped because kidnapping
charges and an active arrest warrant had been pending against her in
California, and a court-appointed attorney advised her she could not request
a contact order until those were cleared off her record, which occurred in
January or February 2021. She indicated she did not deal with the abduction
charge sooner because she was struggling financially, had no attorney, and
needed an attorney to help her navigate the court system. Mother even
started a “GoFundMe” to try to raise the funds. This testimony supports the
trial court’s determination that mother had no intent to abandon minor.
Likewise, the evidence and testimony from both father and mother
establish that mother has paid and does pay child support. Mother
acknowledged there was a period when she stopped paying child support.
She explained, however, that this was due to her losing her job and becoming
financially unstable during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that she has since
resumed paying support and is even working two jobs so that she can pay
more. Again, this supports the conclusion that mother had no intent to
abandon minor. There appears no reason why the trial court could not
properly take into account all these circumstances in determining that
mother’s failure to pay support for a period of time did not reflect an intent to
abandon. (In re H.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 42, 53 (H.D.) [“It is also
undisputed mother was unemployed during the months she failed to pay
child support and was therefore unable to comply with the support order. A

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parent’s failure to support a child when they do not have the ability to do so
does not, by itself, prove intent to abandon.”].)
We conclude that, viewed as a whole, the record contains substantial
evidence from which the trial court could have made a finding of high
probability that mother had no intent to abandon minor. (Conservatorship of
O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005.) Having so concluded, we need not and do
not address stepmother’s contention that there is substantial evidence
showing that mother “ ‘left’ ” minor with father. We take a moment, however,
to address some of stepmother’s other contentions.
Stepmother contends substantial evidence does not support the “trial
court’s ‘best interest’ decision.” (Underlining omitted.) In making her
argument, stepmother focuses on the evidence of her bond with minor and
the home she and father provide for him.
At the hearing, the parties presented no argument concerning minor’s
best interests and requested no explicit ruling on the issue. Assuming the
issue has been properly preserved, we reject it. “In ruling on a section 7822
petition, the court is required to act in the best interests of the child.
(§ 7890.)” (E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 847.) Here, the trial court’s
implicit finding that its decision was in minor’s best interests is supported by
the evidence that mother loves minor, that she was his primary caretaker for
years after he was born and had a strong bond with him, that she is desirous
of reestablishing their relationship, and also that she did not intend to
abandon him. We note, as well, the recognized bond between natural parents
and their children. (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 848, citing
Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 463 U.S. 248, 256; In re George G. (1977) 68
Cal.App.3d 146, 165.) Stepmother’s argument, which mainly focuses on the

12
evidence concerning her own bond with minor, amounts to a request that we
reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.
Stepmother also argues that a “parent’s failure to provide [support] or
communicate with children while they address personal issues is not a
rebuttal to presumptive intent.” But case law recognizes the propriety of
considering the circumstances surrounding a parent’s lack of communication
or financial support when determining whether a parent intended to abandon
a child. (E.g., H.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 45–47, 52–53 [reversing
termination of parental rights where the mother left her children in the
father’s custody and did not contact or financially support the children for
over a year so she could deal with her addiction issues].)
The cases that stepmother cites—Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
912 (A.B.), Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004 (Allison C.),
and Rowan v. Kirkpatrick (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 289 (Rowan)—do not
support the categorical conclusion that parents who fail to communicate or
provide support because they are dealing with personal issues cannot
overcome the presumption of intent to abandon. First of all, Rowan has
nothing to do with section 7822 and provides no support for stepmother’s
position.5 Second, though A.B. and Allison C. affirmed orders terminating
parental rights based on presumptive abandonment, they acknowledged the
governing principles that “ ‘ “questions of abandonment and of intent . . . are
questions of fact for the resolution of the trial court” ’ ” and that appellate
courts may not re-evaluate credibility or reweigh evidence. (A.B., at pp. 922–

5 Stepmother also cites to Rowan in arguing the trial court abused its
discretion “by finding COVID-19 rebuts presumptive intent.” This argument
is unclear and unsupported by record citations. The court does not appear to
have made a finding that the COVID-19 pandemic rebutted the presumption
of intent to abandon.

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923; Allison C., at pp. 1010–1011, 1016.) Finally, to the extent stepmother
attempts to analogize this case to the parental terminations found
appropriate in A.B. and Allison C., the facts in those cases are amply
distinguishable. (A.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 915–918, 923–924 [father
never made any serious efforts to visit with or even inquire about child until
she was five years old]; Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1012–1014
[though incarcerated on and off, father failed to seek custody or care for the
child once she was about seven months old, failed to communicate with the
child for over three years, and essentially failed to support child for over
three years].)
Stepmother further claims the trial court abused its discretion by
considering mother’s conduct or payments outside of the “statutory period”
(the one-year period set out in section 7822, subdivision (a)(3)) when deciding
whether mother acted with intent to abandon. Stepmother cites no authority
supporting this argument, and case law is to the contrary. (E.g., H.D., supra,
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 52 [indicating “weightiest evidence of intent . . . was
mother’s actions” “[a]fter becoming and remaining sober,” i.e., after the period
of her alleged abandonment], italics added.) There appears no reason why a
parent’s actions outside the statutory period cannot, in appropriate cases,
speak to their intent during it. The authorities that stepmother relies on—
A.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th 912, Allison C., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1004,
E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 828—do not suggest the existence of a
categorical prohibition on considering a parent’s actions outside of the
statutory period.
Stepmother also claims the trial court erroneously believed the intent
to abandon must be permanent. In support, stepmother points to the court
quoting E.M. for the proposition that “ ‘ “ ‘In order to constitute abandonment

14
there must be an actual desertion, accompanied with an intention to entirely
sever, so far as it is possible to do so, the parental relation and throw off all
obligations growing out of the same.’ ” ’ ” (E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at
p. 839 italics omitted.) This is meritless.
Setting aside the fact that stepmother made no objection on this ground
below, we note the same paragraph in E.M. clarified that the foregoing
passage was not requiring a showing of an intent to permanently abandon.
Indeed, the E.M. court continued: “The parent need not intend to abandon
the child permanently; it is sufficient the parent had the intent to abandon
the child during the statutory period.” (E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at
p. 839.) The record discloses no reason to believe the court below
misunderstood the import of this passage in E.M. or otherwise misapplied the
law. (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the
correct statutory and case law’ ”].) To the extent stepmother argues the court
abused its discretion by citing to E.M. because that case was factually
distinguishable, the record plainly shows the court cited E.M. for its
recitation of general legal principles and did not analogize the instant facts to
those in E.M.
In closing, we note we have reviewed stepmother’s remaining
contentions and conclude that none warrants a reversal.
DISPOSITION
The order denying stepmother’s petition to terminate mother’s parental
rights is affirmed.

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_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

A. D.R. v. Z. M.G. (A168489)

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