CourtListener 9509886•Mueller v. Mueller
Testo completo
Filed 6/3/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
LING MUELLER,
Petitioner and Appellant, A166577
v.
PAUL MUELLER, (Mendocino County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Respondent. SCUKCVFL202073826)
Ling Mueller asks us to enforce a confidentiality clause in
an agreement that explicitly states that the entire agreement is
legally unenforceable. We agree with the family court that the
confidentiality clause is unenforceable. The court therefore
properly admitted testimony about statements she made in a
collaborative law negotiation initiated by the agreement to
dissolve her marriage.
We publish this case to highlight the importance of
carefully drafting collaborative law agreements. Unlike
mediations, our Legislature has not created an evidentiary
privilege for collaborative law processes. (Compare Evid. Code,
§ 1119 with Fam. Code, § 2013.) If parties intend to keep the
process confidential, they are responsible for drafting an
enforceable contract that so provides.
BACKGROUND
A.
Collaborative law is a non-judicial alternative dispute
resolution process commonly used for marriage dissolutions. (See
1
Knight et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution
(The Rutter Group 2023), ¶¶ 1:72.20, 3:511.)
Family Code section 2013 is California’s collaborative law
statute. It provides only that “(a) If a written agreement is
entered into by the parties, the parties may utilize a collaborative
law process to resolve any matter governed by this code over
which the court is granted jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2000.
[¶] (b) ‘Collaborative law process’ means the process in which the
parties and any professionals engaged by the parties to assist
them agree in writing to use their best efforts and to make a good
faith attempt to resolve disputes related to the family law
matters as referenced in subdivision (a) on an agreed basis
without resorting to adversary judicial intervention.”
The statute includes no confidentiality protection. While
the Legislature has enacted an evidentiary privilege for
mediations (Evid. Code, § 1119, subd. (b)), Ling 1 concedes that
the collaborative law process typically does not qualify as a
mediation because, as was the case here, no neutral person
conducts the process. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1115, subd. (a), 1117,
subd. (a).) Confidentiality is left to the parties to negotiate.
B.
Ling and Paul Mueller married in 2009 and separated in
2017. During their marriage, they cultivated cannabis and
buried the proceeds on their property.
The couple initially attempted to use collaborative law to
wind down their marriage. At the first of two collaborative
sessions, their attorneys explained the process and its differences
from litigation, and they executed the agreement that is the focus
of this appeal.
1 We use the parties’ first names for clarity.
2
On its first page, the agreement states, in plain language,
that it creates no enforceable legal rights or contractual
obligations: “Each of us understands that this document does not
give either of us enforceable legal rights that we did not already
have. We both understand that these good faith undertakings set
out in this document are not legally enforceable contractual
obligations. We also understand that other documents will be
signed in the Collaborative Divorce process that are legally
enforceable contracts, including the Stipulation and Order re:
Collaborative Matter, and the retainer agreements we sign with
our lawyers and other nonparty participants, if any. We are not
relying on this Agreement to create legally enforceable rights.
However, we both commit to abide by the letter and spirit [of]
this Agreement and we each expect that the professionals
involved will do the same.”
The agreement proceeds to explain various aspects of the
collaborative process. One clause addresses the confidentiality of
the collaborative proceedings: “Communications related to
collaborative matters made during the collaborative process are
confidential and may not be disclosed to third parties. The
parties agree that in any court or other proceeding, they will not
request, subpoena or summons a collaborative lawyer, a
collaborative party, or a nonparty participant in the collaborative
process to make disclosure or testify as a witness regarding a
communication made during the collaborative process, unless
during the proceeding the agreement under this paragraph is
expressly waived by all parties in writing.” Confidentiality is
also subject to waiver if one of the parties “expresses an intention
to commit irreparable economic damage to joint property or
property of either party.”
The second collaborative session focused on the
community’s assets. However, Ling became angry and left the
meeting abruptly when she was asked about investments she had
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made using proceeds from the couple’s marijuana operation that
she had excavated. Two weeks later, she initiated divorce
proceedings in family court. Both parties retained new counsel.
At a subsequent hearing on support and other issues, Paul
subpoenaed both parties’ collaborative attorneys to testify about
statements Ling made at the second collaborative session. In
opposition, Ling argued the confidentiality clause shielded her
statements from disclosure. Paul contended the clause was
merely advisory and “in the spirit of collaboration,” conferring no
legal rights or obligations. Further, he maintained, even were it
enforceable, Ling had waived confidentiality by “taking,
concealing, spending, or hiding” cash she had purportedly dug up
on the couple’s property.
The court found the agreement, including the
confidentiality clause, was unenforceable. “It is not a contract. It
doesn’t give [the Muellers] any other duties other tha[n] what is
provided in law. [¶] I think they went in knowing that while
confidentiality is an important part in establishing trust and
participating in collaboration, they also knew it was not
enforceable that this confidentiality could be maintained.” The
court also found that, in any event, Ling had waived the
confidentiality provision. Accordingly, it allowed the parties’
collaborative attorneys to testify about the second collaborative
session.
Paul’s collaborative counsel testified Ling had “reluctantly”
admitted she dug up and took cash the couple had buried,
viewing it “as her savings from growing weed that she had
received and retained.” According to counsel, Ling said she had
excavated at least $400,000, sent $100,000 to China to invest in
real property, and invested another $200,000 in antiques. By her
account, she had less than $100,000 left.
When Paul’s collaborative counsel started to question Ling
about her investments during the session, he testified, she “just
4
blew up. [¶] To say she was emotional wouldn’t describe it. She
was very angry. She jumped up, and I think hollered something
like, ‘We’re going to court.’ ” It was clear to counsel that Ling
“considered this her money, and these were her assets, and . . .
she wasn’t interested in hearing that it had to be considered in a
division of the community property.” Her sudden departure from
the meeting ended the collaborative process.
Ling’s collaborative counsel recalled the session differently.
To his recollection, Ling insisted she had taken only $300,000
from the couple’s $600,000 in buried cash, leaving “very little”
after her $300,000 investment in antiques and Chinese real
estate.
Paul testified consistently with his former counsel. Ling
testified the couple had equally divided $400,000, not $600,000,
in cannabis proceeds when they separated; that she never
invested in property in China; and that she invested (and lost)
around $140,000 in fake antiques.
The court found both parties had “significant credibility
gaps” but that Paul’s “testimony and differences in credibility on
different days pales in connection to [Ling], whom I could not
believe most of what she said.”
At trial, Ling moved to exclude testimony about the
couple’s collaborative session, again asserting it was barred by
the agreement’s confidentiality clause. The court denied the
motion, allowed Paul to testify to Ling’s statements at the
session, and took judicial notice of the collaborative attorneys’
prior testimony. Finding Ling was not credible, it concluded she
took more than her share of the community funds and ordered
her to make a $161,077 equalizing payment.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal, the admissibility of testimony
about the second collaborative session, turns on whether the
5
confidentiality clause is enforceable despite the agreement’s
multiple statements that it creates no enforceable rights or
obligations. Ling contends the court erred in finding the
confidentiality clause has no legal force, maintaining its
interpretation was unreasonable and violated multiple canons of
contract interpretation. Alternatively, she contends principles of
estoppel preclude Paul from claiming the confidentiality
provision is unenforceable. Neither contention has merit.
Our review is de novo because interpretation of the
agreement does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.
(Saeta v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 261, 267.) In
conducting that review, we must first determine whether the
contract language is reasonably susceptible to Ling’s
interpretation. If it is not, there is nothing more for us to decide.
(Civ. Code, § 1638; People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 524 (R.J. Reynolds).)
It is not. At its outset, the agreement unequivocally states
the parties’ understanding that it does not “give either of us
enforceable legal rights that we did not already have;” that “these
good faith undertakings set out in this document are not legally
enforceable contractual obligations;” and that, while the parties
commit to “resolve their differences fairly and equitably” and
abide by the agreement’s “letter and spirit,” they “are not relying
on this Agreement to create legally enforceable rights.” There is
no ambiguity here. While the agreement sets ground rules for
how the parties intended to proceed, the parties agreed that the
agreement has no legal force. We must give effect to its explicit
language. (R.J. Reynolds, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 524.)
It is an unusual agreement, to be sure. But as Professor
Witkin explains, “[t]he word ‘contract’ is often used with different
meanings, e.g., as a synonym for ‘agreement’ or ‘bargain.’ It may
refer to legally ineffective agreements, or wholly executed
transactions; to acts of parties, to a document that evidences
6
them, or to resulting legal relations.” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
Law (11th ed., May 2023) Contracts, § 1, italics added.) Here, the
agreement sets out a mutual understanding of the collaborative
process that the parties agreed to follow. It is not a “contract” in
the traditional sense of an agreement that, once entered, gives
rise to a legally enforceable obligation. (See 1 Witkin, supra, § 1.)
By its terms, rather, it provided an aspirational and nonbinding
framework of a process for, ideally, achieving a mutually agreed-
upon marital dissolution without resorting to litigation.
Ling disagrees. She maintains the more (or only)
reasonable interpretation of the unenforceability language is that
“a party cannot be forced to continue with collaborative
dissolution.” Well, yes, it does do that. But Ling does not grapple
with the sweeping language that the parties used. If the
agreement creates no “legally enforceable rights,” but also creates
a legally enforceable right to confidentially, it would be a
contractual version of Schrödinger’s cat—simultaneously
enforceable and unenforceable. The agreement is not reasonably
susceptible to that interpretation. (See R.J. Reynolds, supra, 107
Cal.App.4th at p. 524.)
Citing the canon that contracts are interpreted to avoid
surplusage and give effect to every part where reasonably
practicable (see Civ. Code, § 1641; Lueras v. BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 71), Ling asserts the
confidentiality provision is enforceable because, in her view, it
would otherwise be a nullity. We are unpersuaded. Her
approach would leave the unenforceability language a nullity.
Ling does not acknowledge, much less resolve, this paradox, and
she cannot: if the confidentiality clause is interpreted as a
binding obligation, it is impossible to give legal effect to both
provisions. In contrast, the two are harmonized if, as the
agreement directs, the confidentiality clause is construed
consistently with the overarching provision that the parties
7
intend to abide by the agreement’s terms although they are not
legally binding. The family court properly took that view. 2
Ling’s remaining arguments are for the most part premised
on various other canons of contract interpretation. We agree
with Paul that they shed no light on the correct interpretation of
an agreement that, by its plain language, creates no legally
enforceable rights. In any event, assuming some ambiguity and
to the extent these points do not merely reiterate Ling’s
surplusage argument, they are meritless.
Ling maintains her interpretation conforms with local
custom and usage because the agreement is “ ‘the standard’ ”
form used in Mendocino County. (See Penn Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Rising (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 [general custom or usage
must be considered in determining the intent of the parties
unless the contract manifests a contrary intention].) But there is
no evidence the confidentiality clause has ever, let alone
customarily, been accorded legal force in the county, even
assuming common usage.
Ling also argues public policy compels her interpretation.
It may well be true that confidentiality would make most
collaborative law negotiations more effective. (Cf. Foxgate
Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th
1, 14 [“confidentiality is essential to effective mediation”]
2 To the extent Ling seems to argue extrinsic evidence
supported her position, she is mistaken. “Parol evidence is
admissible only to prove a meaning to which the contractual
language is ‘reasonably susceptible’; not to flatly contradict the
express terms of the agreement. [Citation.] Thus if the contract
calls for the plaintiff to deliver to defendant 100 pencils by July
21, 1992, parol evidence is not admissible to show that when the
parties said ‘pencils’ they really meant ‘car batteries’ or that
whey they said ‘July 21, 1992’ they really meant ‘May 13, 2001.’ ”
(Consolidated World Investments, Inc. v. Lido Preferred Ltd.
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 373, 379.)
8
(Foxgate).) But Ling cites no authority that permits us to invoke
public policy to make a contract term enforceable when the
parties expressly agreed that it is unenforceable. In any case, the
public policy considerations here are not one-sided. Ling is
essentially asking us to create an evidentiary privilege that
would bar the admission of highly relevant evidence. The
Legislature reserves to itself the power to balance the public
policies inherent in evidentiary privileges. (See Evid. Code,
§ 911; Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 17.) Courts may not create
new privileges unless required by constitutional law (Roberts v.
City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373) and must enforce
existing statutory privileges strictly, even when the results are
inequitable. (Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
137, 152-156, 162-164.) Ling’s policy argument should be
addressed to the Legislature.
Ling’s remaining contentions warrant only brief discussion.
She has forfeited her estoppel argument, which relies on factual
issues that the parties did not address in the family court
because Ling did not raise the issue. (See Doe v. Marten (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 [estoppel is generally a question of
fact unless reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion];
Colony Ins. Co. v. Crusader Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 743,
751 [estoppel claim not raised at trial forfeited for appeal].) She
contends that there was insufficient evidence for the court to find
the parties understood the agreement was unenforceable, but
that argument is legally irrelevant. (See Founding Members of
the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club,
Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956 [contract interpretation is
controlled by the objective intent evidenced by the contract
language, not the parties’ subjective intent].)
In sum, the family court correctly declined to enforce the
confidentiality provision. We therefore do not address Ling’s
additional argument that the exception to it for irreparable
9
economic harm was inapplicable. We also deny as unnecessary to
resolution of this appeal (see Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In
re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276) her request for
judicial notice of Family Code section 2013’s legislative history
and a judicial branch website concerning alternative dispute
resolution in family law matters.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Paul is entitled to costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (a)(2).)
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.
Mueller v. Mueller (A166577)
10
Mendocino County Superior Court, No. SCUKCVFL202073826,
Hon. Patrick Michael Pekin.
John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd for Petitioner and
Appellant.
Vannucci Momsen Morrow and Colin W. Morrow for Defendant
and Respondent.
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