CourtListener 9509594•People v. Alas CA2/8
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Filed 5/31/24 P. v. Alas CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B323781
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA146403–04)
v.
HENRY ALAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Defendant and Appellant Henry Alas appeals from a
judgment of conviction for first degree murder. Alas argues the
trial court erroneously admitted his coperpetrator’s recorded
hearsay statement made to an undercover informant under the
statement against penal interest exception. Alas asserts the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the entire 140-page
transcript without considering the context of each statement to
determine whether they fell into the exception.
Alas also argues his conviction must be reversed after the
passage of Penal Code1 section 1109, which requires the trial
court to bifurcate proceedings on gang enhancement allegations if
requested by the defense. Alas asks us to apply the statute
retroactively and to reverse his conviction, because he argues the
highly inflammatory gang evidence here allowed the jury to
convict him based on his gang history rather than evidence of the
underlying murder.
Last, Alas argues his sentence of 25 years to life is grossly
disproportionate to his role in the offense, his background, his
personal characteristics, and the more lenient sentences meted
out to his coperpetrators. Specifically, he asks us to exercise our
authority to modify his conviction to second degree murder or
manslaughter and resentence him accordingly.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
1 All further undesignated statutory citations are to the
Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The May 3 stabbing
Alas, Giovanni “Stoner” Ibanez, Pedro “Stretch” Guzman,
and Faustino “Cino” Bermudez are members of the “Down for
Whatever” (DFW) gang. DFW is a small, up and coming gang
that operates in Compton within the territory of the Compton
Varrio Setentas, a much larger and more established street gang
with ties to the Mexican Mafia. One of DFW’s rivals is the White
Street gang, whose territory is near DFW’s.
On May 3, 2017, Alas, Guzman, and Bermudez encountered
two men on the street, including Angel Zavala, a member of
White Street. The man who was with Zavala ran from the
attack, but Zavala stood his ground, and stabbed Alas, Guzman,
and Bermudez. Alas and Guzman suffered non-life threatening
stab wounds while Bermudez was seriously injured and required
hospitalization.
That evening, Daniel Moran, who was a member of the
Florencia 13 gang and a soldier for the Mexican Mafia, exchanged
messages on Facebook with a woman. Moran said Bermudez,
Guzman, and Alas had been stabbed, and that Bermudez almost
died and required hospitalization. Moran described how he
picked up Alas, Guzman, and Bermudez after the stabbing and
drove them to the hospital. Moran also indicated he had been
searching for members of White Street since the attack.
On May 4, 2017, Alas exchanged Facebook messages with
Stephanie H. In their exchange, Alas said that he and another
“homie” were stabbed, and that “ ‘my other homie in surgery.’ ”
He told her, “yea babe I gotta do my shyt tho babe they got my
nigga bad man im hot asf.” When Stephanie H. asked who
stabbed him, Alas replied, “ ‘an [enemy] that I was beating up he
3
pop a knife after he got me.’ ” Alas then said, “ ‘[b]ut going to get
it worse though straight leaving him dead.’ ” When she later
messaged Alas that “ ‘You’re not dying on me,’ ” Alas responded,
“ ‘No babe I’m not. The foo dat did this . . . is going to die serio.’ ”
That same day, Alas and Ibanez messaged each other on
Facebook. Ibanez said he heard Alas got stabbed. Alas explained
he and Guzman had been stabbed by a “wkierd ass foo” and
Bermudez “ ‘was doing bad’ ” in “ ‘surgery.’ ” Alas then wrote to
Ibanez, “Pull up I’m triena go to White or see [Bermudez].”
Ibanez responded, “We go wen I get out.”
II. The May 6 shooting
On May 6, 2017, at about 9:43 a.m., Alas sent a message to
Ibanez, asking him where he was located. Ibanez responded he
was on Pannes Street with Moran and Guzman. Alas said, “Dats
fishy” and “Ima pull u[p].” Ibanez responded, “Come out.”
Approximately 40 minutes later, a witness heard three to
four gunshots near the corner of White Avenue and Rose Street
and saw a silver Nissan Maxima speeding away.
At 10:45 a.m., deputies for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (LASD) responded to a report of shots fired on White
Avenue. The deputies found Zavala on the sidewalk, suffering
from three gunshot wounds, including a fatal gunshot wound to
his neck. They also found four .40 caliber shell casings
approximately 100 feet from Zavala’s body, a fired bullet, and
strike marks on a nearby fence.
Several days later, LASD detectives obtained surveillance
recordings from nearby businesses that showed a silver Nissan
Maxima leaving the scene of the shooting.
On the night of the shooting, Alas used a search engine on
his phone to search for “Compton shooting.”
4
On June 8, 2017, Alas, Moran, Guzman, Ibanez, and
Bermudez were arrested in connection with the shooting of
Zavala. At Ibanez’s home, investigators found a car matching the
description of the car seen driving away from the shooting.
Ibanez’s mother told investigators the car’s keys belonged to
Ibanez.
III. The Perkins2 operation
After the arrests, Ibanez and Moran were brought to an
LASD station in South Los Angeles. Investigators placed Ibanez
in a holding cell with a confidential informant. The conversation
was recorded.
The informant initiated a conversation with Ibanez,
identifying himself as a gang member and asking Ibanez about
the circumstances of Ibanez’s arrest. Ibanez explained he and
several other people had been arrested by different law
enforcement agencies. The informant asked him, “Did you guys
do something big, or what?” Ibanez responded, “Nah. Well, they
just—they were talking about a shooting . . . , but I mean, I don’t
[know] what the fuck is going on.” The informant asked, “Did
they tell you they arrested you for that or they arrested you for
something else?” Ibanez responded, “Well, that’s what they were
questioning us about, about the shooting.” Ibanez then explained
how he was arrested and that law enforcement had searched his
house.
Ibanez proceeded to explain how he was from a tagging
crew in Compton known as DFW. Ibanez and the informant
discussed the possibility of someone cooperating with law
enforcement since everyone was arrested at the same time.
2 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292.
5
Ibanez was worried his friends would suspect he was the
cooperator because he had been separated from the others and
taken to a different station. When the informant asked what
Ibanez was being charged with, Ibanez responded, “No, I don’t
even know who got murdered, who—what happened.”
At some point, investigators placed Moran in a cell near
Ibanez. Moran told Ibanez he was being charged with “gang
conspiracy.”
Investigators then took Ibanez out of his cell to question
him. They asked Ibanez about the murder and showed him
pictures of his car leaving the scene. When investigators placed
Ibanez back in the cell, the informant asked Ibanez what the
investigators told him. Ibanez said, “About some murder . . . ,
that happened. I don’t know why the fuck they tryina [sic]
involve me in that shit . . . . They showed me pictures of my car.”
Ibanez could see it was his car from the pictures. Ibanez also
said the investigators did not care about the shooter, they only
cared about him, and Ibanez would be charged with the murder
even if they never caught the actual shooter.
Ibanez told the informant he could explain his presence
around the area of the shooting by telling investigators he was
visiting a friend who lived in the area. The following exchange
then took place.
“[Informant]: See, . . . what you’re thinking is the way to
fucking think. I’mma tell you like this: if me and you go do a
[job] and we get a fucking way—and I get caught. Say, for
instance, like your situation, I’m the fucking driver, who are they
gonna go for?
“[Ibanez]: The driver, dog[.]
6
“[Informant]: The fucking driver. So, . . . the murder is
gonna be solid on who?
“[Ibanez]: On the driver.
“[Informant]: On the driver, the person who was driving.
If they got the shooter or not, or whoever was fucking involved,
they don’t give a fuck, because they know the driver’s the one
that drove them there. You get what I’m saying?”
The investigators then took the informant out of the cell.
When the informant returned, he asked Ibanez if he knew
somebody named “Stretch,” and suggested Stretch was
cooperating with law enforcement. Ibanez then admitted Moran
was the shooter and Stretch was in the car. When the informant
asked Ibanez whether it was just him, Moran, and Stretch in the
car Ibanez responded, “And another fool.”
Ibanez explained Moran got out of the car when he shot
Zavala. Ibanez said he cleaned the car after the shooting and
someone else cleaned the bullets in the gun before they were
fired. He also said that, after the shooting, they drove to
someone’s house where Moran showered and cleaned his hands.
When asked why Zavala was shot, Ibanez said Zavala was
an enemy from another crew. The informant explained to Ibanez
he was asking about the motive because Ibanez could be charged
with gang allegations.
Ibanez stated, “That fool, we got him ‘cause he’s the one
that stabbed the homies. [¶] . . . [¶] He stabbed three of the
homies.” The informant told Ibanez, “That’s good for you!”
because Ibanez could argue self-defense.
The informant asked what time the shooting occurred.
Ibanez said it happened around 10:00 a.m. The informant asked
7
Ibanez if they were searching for Zavala before the shooting.
The following exchange then took place.
“[Ibanez]: Fool, but check it out, fool. Look, fool, at that—
when we got him, we weren’t.
“[Informant]: Ah.
“[Ibanez]: You know what I mean? Well it’s ‘cause, this
fool—look, I’m gonna tell you how—the way it’s going down, you
know? ‘Cause—so can you know, you know? If I don’t tell you
certain parts you’re gonna be lost, you know? So—
“[Informant]: Yeah.
“[Ibanez]: So, this is basically what happened, fool: the
homies ran up on the niggers like on some normal shit like we
always run up on.
“[Informant]: Yeah.
“[Ibanez]: You know how we beef, you know?
“[Informant]: Yeah.
“[Ibanez]: But, I guess the homies ran up on the two fools,
but one fool runs and only one fool stays and homies jump him
and, it end up being the fool he jumped had a knife so—
“[Informant]: Oh shit.
“[Ibanez]: He stabbed three of the homies. But only one
got like stabbed, like the fool that I told you got hit in the lung
and I think he scratched his fucking rib. He was the one doing—
he was doing, you know, in the hospital, like fighting for his life.
Well, not really fighting ‘cause he had made it quick, but he was
the one like suffering type of shit. The other homies, they got like
sliced, like you know, little cuts.
“[Informant]: Yeah, like cuts.
“[Ibanez]: It was deep but you know, like—
“[Informant]: Yeah.
8
“[Ibanez]: Livable, you know? And we were mad ‘cause of
that shit and that’s why we were looking and you know, we’re
trying to retaliate and fucking—we were just on them fool like,
keep going and going and then this one, when that thing
happened we went to a gang of spots, fool. And we didn’t see
them, you know? And then we were like fuck it, we came back to
the homie’s pad and we were gonna go pick up the homie. The
homie lives on that block, on their block, on their main block, you
know? So we were gonna go pick up the homie and as we’re going
down a little street, like this, and this is the street where it
happened.
“[Informant]: Aha.
“[Ibanez]: And—
“[Informant]: What street was that?
“[Ibanez]: It’s called White.
“[Informant]: White?
“[Ibanez]: Yeah.
“[Informant]: White.
“[Ibanez]: That’s the name of the hood—White.
“[Informant]: Oh, okay.
“[Ibanez]: But, they—it was this street, and we’re coming
like this, so we made a right ‘cause the homie lives on the right
side.
“[Informant]: Aha.
“[Ibanez]: And then the [enemies] be on this side.
“[Informant]: Yeah.
“[Ibanez]: So as soon as I make the right, the homie—the
homies they’re looking at the other way you now, they’re like:
‘Just in case.’
“[Informant]: The motherfuckers are right there.
9
“[Ibanez]: Yeah. And the homie’s like: ‘Hey, I think that’s
one of them.’ It’s only one fool, but the homie said he didn’t know
who it was—it was just—it was just—he just seen a person, you
know? He just seen a body who looked—
“[Informant]: Aha.
“[Ibanez]: He like: ‘I think it’s one of them.’ And it ended
up being the same nigger that got the homies. And the homie got
off and pa, pa, pa!
“[Informant]: Damn! That’s right, fuck him.
“[Ibanez]: Yeah, but . . . .
“[Informant]: Did he . . . did that fool try to run?
“[Ibanez]: Nah, he tried to run but got got.
“[Informant]: . . . Go on. Payback’s a bitch, huh?
“[Ibanez]: We didn’t even know, we didn’t even know like
where we hit him or nothing, we thought like, the homies thought
that, it was like in his back and the leg—
“[Informant]: Yeah?
“[Ibanez]: But we ended up hitting the—he got shot in the
neck, and it came somewhere like through his face and that fool’s
on life support and doing bad.”
The informant then asked who had been arrested. Ibanez
said, “We all got busted. All the ones that were there got busted.
And an extra homie too that wasn’t there. [¶] . . . [¶] But he
wasn’t there when we did that shit. [¶] . . . He was in the
hospital.” The following exchange then took place.
“[Informant]: So, let me tell you. You were driving, then,
right?
“[Ibanez]: Yeah.
10
“[Informant]: And then, your homeboy from Florencia was
the driver—the passenger? You were in the back and the homie
that got stabbed was in the back?
“[Ibanez]: Yeah.
“[Informant]: So he watched that shit go down?
“[Ibanez]: Who?
“[Informant]: Uh, the homie that got stabbed?
“[Ibanez]: No, no, no. Well, yeah, two of the homies that
got stabbed, seen—took the payback, but the homie that was—
the one that was—the one that got stabbed more [seriously]—
“[Informant]: Right.
“[Ibanez]: He was still in the hospital.
“[Informant]: Oh, okay.
“[Ibanez]: So, he wasn’t—he wasn’t even around.
“[Informant]: Oh, I got it. So two—okay, the one that got
stabbed bad, he was still in the hospital, but the one that got
stabbed [not bad], he was with you . . . okay I got it. [And he’s]
Stretch?
“[Ibanez]: Yeah Stretch, and then the other homie, too.”
The informant and Ibanez then spoke about matters
unrelated to the shooting.
IV. Jury verdict and sentencing
An information charged Alas, Moran, Ibanez, and Guzman
with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). It was further
alleged the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and a principal personally used and
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)–(e)(1)).
11
After Alas’s trial was severed from his codefendants, a jury
convicted him of first degree murder and found true the firearm
and gang enhancement allegations. At sentencing, the trial court
dismissed the gang and firearm allegations, and sentenced Alas
to a term of 25 years to life.
Alas appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Ibanez’s statement to the Perkins agent
Alas argues the trial court erred by admitting Ibanez’s
entire statement to the Perkins agent without evaluating
whether all of the statements were against Ibanez’s penal
interest. Alas argues the trial court’s decision to admit the entire
transcript was an abuse of discretion because the trial court
stated it did not review every page of the transcript. He further
argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the
entire statement merely because a few of Ibanez’s statements
were against his penal interest.
A. Governing law and standard of review
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted and is generally inadmissible unless
an exception applies. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b).) One
exception to the hearsay rule is a declaration against the
declarant’s penal interests under Evidence Code section 1230.
(People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 42–43.) “[T]he rationale
underlying the exception is that ‘a person’s interest against being
criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the veracity
of his statement made against that interest,’ thereby mitigating
the dangers usually associated with the admission of out-of-court
12
statements.” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711
(Grimes).)
“To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is
admissible as a declaration against interest, ‘[t]he proponent of
such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that
the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when
made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to
warrant admission despite its hearsay character.’ [Citation.] ‘In
determining whether a statement is truly against interest within
the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into
account not just the words but the circumstances under which
they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and
the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.’ ” (Grimes, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 711.)
We review a trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code
section 1230 for abuse of discretion. (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
pp. 711–712.)
Our Supreme Court has interpreted the application of
Evidence Code section 1230 in determining whether a
coperpetrator’s extrajudicial confession implicating another
defendant in a crime was admissible as a statement against
penal interest. (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 428, 438
(Leach).) To the extent a confession contains collateral assertions
inculpating the defendant, rather than the confessor, the
statement is inadmissible. (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 713,
citing Leach, at pp. 441–442.) “[T]hose portions of a confession
inculpating others are not as inherently trustworthy as those
portions that are actually disserving to the declarant’s interests.”
(Grimes, at p. 713.)
13
Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has explained that lower
courts should “consider whether the portion of a confession that
tends to exculpate another, rather than to shift blame or curry
favor, should be admitted in view of surrounding circumstances,
even though the exculpatory portion of the statement is not
independently disserving of the declarant’s interests.” (Grimes,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 715.) “[T]he nature and purpose of the
against-interest exception does not require courts to sever and
excise any and all portions of an otherwise inculpatory statement
that do not ‘further incriminate’ the declarant. Ultimately,
courts must consider each statement in context in order to
answer the ultimate question under Evidence Code section 1230:
Whether the statement, even if not independently inculpatory of
the declarant, is nevertheless against the declarant’s interest,
such that ‘a reasonable man in [the declarant’s] position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ”
(Id. at p. 716.) “[S]uch a statement is more likely to satisfy the
against-interest exception when the declarant accepts
responsibility and denies or diminishes others’ responsibility, as
in the example ‘ “I robbed the store alone,” ’ as opposed to
attempting to assign greater blame to others, as in the example,
‘ “I did it, but X is guiltier than I am.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“Of course, not all such statements are admissible;
sometimes a declarant who makes an inculpatory statement may
have a substantial incentive to exculpate others. A member of a
criminal street gang, for example, may choose to take the fall for
fellow gang members by making a confession that exculpates
them. A trial court in that situation may reasonably conclude
that the declarant’s incentive to protect his friends renders the
exculpatory portions of the statement inadmissible. [Citation.]
14
But such a statement is not . . . automatically inadmissible
merely because it does not render the declarant more culpable
than the other portions of his confession—or because . . . the
statement does not ‘significantly enhance the personal detriment’
to a person who has already confessed responsibility for the
crime.” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 716–717.) In sum,
“context matters in determining whether a statement or portion
thereof is admissible under the against-interest exception.” (Id.
at p. 717.)
Evidence Code section 1230 therefore allows the admission
of “portions of a confession that, though not independently
disserving of the declarant’s penal interests, also are not merely
‘self-serving,’ but ‘inextricably tied to and part of a specific
statement against penal interest.’ ” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 715.) Ultimately, courts must consider each statement in
context to answer whether the statement, even if not
independently inculpatory of the declarant, is nevertheless
against the declarant’s interest such that a reasonable person in
the declarant’s position would not have said it unless true. (Id. at
p. 716.)
B. Analysis
Applying this contextual approach here, Ibanez’s two
statements identifying who was in the car during the shooting
and suggesting that Alas was one of those individuals were
against Ibanez’s penal interests. His statements identified two
other DFW members who were in the car, each of whom had been
stabbed by Zavala several days earlier. His statements therefore
placed him at the scene of the crime and provided a motive for
Ibanez and his fellow DFW members to participate in the
shooting. Further, Ibanez’s statements did not minimize his role
15
in the crime. When Ibanez spoke to the informant, he understood
that, as the driver, he would be just as guilty as the shooter and
knew law enforcement had already tied his car to the shooting.
We therefore disagree with Alas’s contention that Ibanez’s
statement identifying Moran as the shooter was an attempt to
minimize Ibanez’s role or to shift blame. (See, e.g., People v.
Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 120–121; People v. Cortez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 101, 128.) Rather, Ibanez’s statements incriminated
him, Moran, and the other individuals in the car at the time of
the murder. (See, e.g., People v. Greenberger (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335.)
Ibanez’s statements identifying the individuals in the car,
including Alas, were also inextricably tied to and part of a
statement against his penal interest because he was explaining
the circumstances of the shooting. For example, in his
statements, Ibanez admitted he was the driver, Moran was the
shooter, and that Guzman and another DFW member were also
in the car. He explained that the shooting was in retaliation for
Zavala stabbing three DFW members, including two who were
present during the shooting.
Alas’s reliance on People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
51 (Gallardo) does not convince us the trial court erred here.
In Gallardo, our colleagues in Division Seven found the
trial court erred and abused its discretion in admitting the entire
40-page transcript of a declarant’s conversation with undercover
informants under Evidence Code section 1230. (Gallardo, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 72.) The Gallardo court found the trial court
did not independently assess whether each statement implicating
the defendants was in fact against the declarant’s penal interest
at the time he made it. (Ibid.) Rather, the trial court admitted
16
the entire transcript because it found certain details the
declarant had provided to the informants regarding the crime
showed his entire statement was sufficiently trustworthy to
warrant its inclusion as a declaration against interest. (Ibid.)
“The [trial] court’s implied conclusion—in effect a decision that
every statement [the declarant] made implicating his
codefendants was sufficiently against his penal interest—cannot
withstand scrutiny even under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard.” (Ibid.)
The Gallardo court proceeded to identify several factors
that made the declarant’s statement unreliable. (Gallardo,
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 73.) It found unreliable those
statements that followed questions by the confidential informants
suggesting that something was a fact when that fact had not been
first introduced by the declarant. (Id. at p. 73.) For example, the
informants asked the declarant if one of the defendants was the
shooter, although the declarant had never stated that was the
case. (Ibid.) The problem was compounded when the informants
asked questions that led the declarant to contradict his earlier
statements. (Ibid.) The statements became even more
problematic when the confidential informants suggested the
declarant’s role was minimal, asked leading questions designed
to shift the blame to the defendants, and elicited a response
minimizing the declarant’s role and shifting the blame to others.
(Id. at p. 74.) The Gallardo court emphasized the declarant had
already implicated himself as a participant in the crime in an
unspecified capacity when he identified other individuals as
major participants, which “did little to increase [the declarant’s]
criminal culpability, and served primarily to ‘minimize [his] role
and place the blame . . . on [his] accomplice[s].’ ” (Ibid.)
17
Unlike Gallardo, the same indicia of unreliability are not
present here. While Ibanez initially denied knowing anything
about the shooting, after he was confronted with pictures of his
car leaving the scene, he consistently described himself to the
informant as the driver, Moran as the shooter, and the presence
of the other DFW members who were also in the car.3 These
details were not fed to Ibanez by the informant through leading
questions, rather, they were responses to the informant’s open-
ended questions about what had occurred. Nor was there any
indication that Ibanez was trying to minimize his role in the
shooting as he admittedly understood that the driver would be
just as culpable as the shooter.
We are also not persuaded that Gallardo requires a
reversal here based on the trial court’s statement that it did not
read the entire transcript. The Gallardo court’s finding that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the entire transcript
3 There was one instance during Ibanez’s conversation where
the informant asked Ibanez multiple questions before getting a
response. During the exchange, the informant asked, “So let me
tell you. You were the one driving, then, right?” Ibanez,
responded, “Yeah.” The informant then asked, “And then, your
homeboy from Florencia was the driver—the passenger? You
were in the back and the homie that got stabbed was in the
back?” Ibanez responded, “Yeah.” This muddled exchange
notwithstanding, Ibanez was consistent in his statements to the
informant that he was the driver, Moran was the shooter, and
two other DFW’s were also in the car. Indeed, the compound
nature of the question appears to be the informant correcting his
own question in real time based on what Ibanez had already told
him, which was then clarified by Ibanez shortly thereafter in a
manner consistent with Ibanez’s prior description of the shooting.
18
was merely support for its conclusion that the trial court failed to
consider the declarant’s statements in their full context, which
was required before admitting them. Indeed, the Gallardo court
focused its analysis on the declarant’s affirmative responses to
the informants’ questions regarding the identities of the shooter
and the driver. (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 72–73.)
Here, the trial court reviewed the statements at issue,
specifically, those statements identifying by inference Alas as one
of the other passengers in the car, in the context of which they
were made. In its motion to admit the statement and during the
hearing on the motion, the prosecutor described the
circumstances surrounding the statements at issue. The
prosecutor explained that Ibanez was speaking to a confidential
informant, Ibanez appeared to understand the driver would be as
guilty as the shooter, Ibanez identified Moran as the shooter, and
that Ibanez and the other persons in the vehicle had been
searching for Zavala and other rival gang members to retaliate
for the stabbing. Defense counsel did not challenge this
representation, conceding the prosecutor had presented a “correct
statement of the facts.” Further, the prosecution’s motion to
admit the statement, which the trial court did review with the
aid of the transcript, contained sufficient detail as to the context
of the specific statements at issue, quoting extensively from the
140-page transcript.
To the extent Alas argues the trial court should not have
admitted the entire 140-page transcript, that argument is
forfeited. During the hearing, when the trial court asked
whether the prosecutor intended to introduce the entire
transcript, the prosecutor stated his belief that the entire
transcript was admissible but was open to redacting large
19
portions that were unrelated to the incident. Nothing in the
record shows that defense counsel requested any redactions.
Therefore, we find any argument based on the admission of the
entire transcript was forfeited. (See, e.g., In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
II. Section 1109 does not require reversal
Next, Alas argues his conviction must be reversed because
section 1109, which became effective January 1, 2022, and
requires the trial court to hold a bifurcated trial on the gang
allegations if requested by the defendant, applies retroactively to
his case.
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) substantially changed the law governing gang-
related offenses. Assembly Bill No. 333 added section 1109,
which allows the defense to request a bifurcated trial on gang
enhancements. (§ 1109, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.)
Under the statute, the defendant’s guilt on the underlying offense
must first be determined, and a trial on the gang enhancements
is held only if the defendant is first found guilty of the underlying
offense. (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)
There is a split in authority on whether section 1109
applies retroactively. The Supreme Court has granted review to
resolve the issue. (People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550,
review granted July 13, 2022, S274743 [§ 1109 applies
retroactively]; People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, review
granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275090 [§ 1109 does not apply
retroactively]; People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, review
granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275341 [same]; People v. Boukes (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 937, review granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277103
[same]).)
20
Alas argues we should follow those line of cases that have
held section 1109 applies retroactively. We find that taking a
position on the issue is unnecessary here. This is because even if
the statute applied retroactively, reversal would not be required.
Our Supreme Court has held that any error in failing to
apply section 1109 is reviewed under the standard set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (People v. Tran
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1208–1209.)
Applying the Watson standard, we find any error in failing
to bifurcate the gang allegations was harmless. This is because
the most prejudicial gang evidence would have been admitted to
prove motive for the shooting and Alas’s participation. The gang
evidence included that Alas and his coperpetrators were
members of DFW, an up and coming gang trying to build its
reputation within a much larger gang’s territory. It also included
the fact that Zavala was a member of a rival gang and helped
explain the circumstances surrounding the stabbing that
ultimately led to the shooting. There was also evidence that
Moran was a member of Florencia 13 and a soldier for the
Mexican Mafia. The gang expert explained that a member of an
established gang like Florencia 13 could validate an up and
coming street gang like DFW that was seeking to gain
recognition and acceptance by the Mexican Mafia, which provided
an additional motive for the shooting.
Thus, had the trial been bifurcated under section 1109, the
only evidence that would have been properly excluded in proving
the underlying murder would have been the predicate offenses,
here, criminal threats and unlawful driving of a car, and DFW’s
primary activities, which were burglary, robbery, assault,
criminal threats, vandalism, and narcotics sales. When
21
compared with the gang evidence that was admitted to prove
motive and intent, the potentially inadmissible evidence to prove
the gang allegations was not so inflammatory as to sway the jury
to convict Alas regardless of his actual guilt of the underlying
crime. (See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051.)
Accordingly, we find any error in failing to bifurcate under
section 1109 was harmless. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th
622, 667.)
III. Alas’s sentence was not cruel and unusual under the
California Constitution
Alas argues we should exercise our authority to modify his
conviction to second degree murder or manslaughter, because his
sentence of 25 years to life is grossly disproportionate to his
personal culpability, thus making it a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the California Constitution.
A. Sentencing proceedings
Defense counsel submitted a statement in mitigation under
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). The
statement included a psychological and intellectual assessment,
which showed Alas had a low-average to borderline range of
intelligence, suggesting “he could, to a mild degree, struggle some
with keeping up with his peers intellectually, and utilizing
abstract problem solving techniques.” It also concluded that Alas
was “largely, raised in a stable home environment although there
were some times when [the family] [was] struggling financially
and utilities were off for a few days.” Although other family
members reported conflicts with his father, Alas stated he had a
good relationship with him, and that his father was not
aggressive, violent, abusive, or in trouble with the law.
22
The assessment also found Alas struggled “to do well in
school” and “had a tendency to associate with delinquent peers.”
It also noted that, while Alas “initially experienced few problems
in school,” he began demonstrating behavioral issues when he
“ ‘started hanging out with an older group of bad actors’ who he
saw as ‘older brothers.’ ” The assessment concluded, “although
[Alas] denied experiencing any significant problems in the home
it does appear there were conflicts and problems . . . especially
after the parents divorced and his mother left. In addition, [Alas]
has historically struggled to do well in school which testing
confirm[ed]. [Alas’s] home environment, and the learning
limitations and problems in his schooling negatively affected his
overall development.”
With respect to the incident, “Alas noted . . . he was at the
wrong place at the wrong time. He did admit he was associating
with the ‘wrong crowd.’ ” “In addition, the record shows he looked
up to older delinquent friends as brothers.” With respect to his
interpersonal functioning, the assessment noted that Alas saw
his friends as family and he did not care what was happening at
home. However, he reported having a good relationship with
everyone in his family and that he just “went down the wrong
path in life.”
The assessment concluded: “Given these findings it is
respectfully recommended Mr. [Alas’s] particular issues as well
as the general Franklin factors which can affect a youth’s
planning, judgment, decisionmaking, the evaluation of future
consequences, control of emotions, and the processing and
inhibition of impulses be taken into consideration at [Alas’s] next
hearing.”
23
After admitting the Franklin statement, the trial court
sentenced Alas to 25 years to life.
B. Governing law and standard of review
“A punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of the
California Constitution ‘if, although not cruel or unusual in its
method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity.’ [Citation.] Because it is the
Legislature’s function to define crimes and prescribe
punishments, the judiciary should not interfere ‘unless a statute
prescribes a penalty “out of all proportion to the offense.” ’ ”
(People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 723 (Baker).)
Our Supreme Court has explained that we should use
certain “ ‘techniques’ ” to aid in determining proportionality, i.e.,
whether a sentence is so disproportionate to the crime as to
constitute cruel or unusual punishment. (People v. Dillon (1983)
34 Cal.3d 441, 479 (Dillon).) These include the nature of the
offense and the offender, comparison of punishment for other
crimes in California, and comparison of punishment for
analogous crimes in other states. (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d
410, 425–427.) Here, Alas only argues his punishment is cruel
and unusual under the first factor, i.e., the nature of the offense
and the offender.
C. Forfeiture
As an initial matter, we find Alas has forfeited any
argument regarding whether his sentence was cruel and unusual
because he did not make that claim at sentencing. (See Baker,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 720 [cruel and unusual punishment
claim is fact specific and forfeited if not raised in the trial court];
People v. Johnson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 623, 636.)
24
Nevertheless, we will reach the merits of Alas’s argument to
avoid his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (People v. Em
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 (Em).)
D. Alas’s sentence was not cruel or unusual
considering the nature of the offense and the
offender or in comparison to the sentences of
his coperpetrators
1. The nature of the offense and the offender
“Factors to consider in evaluating the nature of the offense
include the seriousness of the offense and the presence of
violence, victims, or aggravating circumstances. [Citations.] We
consider not only the offense in the abstract but also the facts of
the crime in question—‘i.e., the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense in the case at bar,
including such factors as its motive, the way it was committed,
the extent of the defendant’s involvement, and the consequences
of his acts.’ [Citations.] We also evaluate whether the
punishment fits the criminal. [Citations.] We examine the
defendant ‘in the concrete rather than the abstract . . . focus[ing]
on the particular person before the court, [to ask] whether the
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s
individual culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior
criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind.’ ” (Baker,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.)
Alas was convicted of first degree murder, and the jury
found true the gang allegations, as well as that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury and death. Intentional murder is one of the worst
crimes under the Penal Code. (See People v. Edwards (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 183, 197; see also People v. Ngo (2023)
25
89 Cal.App.5th 116, 123.) It is undisputed that murder is a
serious crime and that the use of a gun by a gang member in the
commission of the crime presents a significant degree of danger
to society. (Em, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972–973.)
Alas argues his involvement in the murder was minimal as
he was merely present in the car, was unarmed, and did not
know Moran had a gun. This is not supported by the record as
there is additional evidence that Alas intended to kill Zavala in
retaliation for the stabbing, and was also motivated to kill a rival
gang member. These included Facebook messages, where Alas
admitted he intended to kill the White Street member who
stabbed him and was searching White Street’s territory for
Zavala. Further, life sentences for those convicted of aiding and
abetting a murder pass constitutional muster. (Em, supra,
171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972–973.)
Alas also argues his sentence was cruel and unusual given
his age and other individual factors, including his admiration of
his delinquent peers, the emotionally charged nature of the crime
given Zavala had stabbed Alas and seriously injured Alas’s
friend, Alas’s deficits in cognitive processing, his unstable home
environment, and his lack of a violent criminal record.
These additional factors do not persuade us that Alas’s
sentence was cruel and unusual. First, although Alas was
18 years old at the time of the shooting, he was legally an adult
and at the age where society draws the line for many purposes
between adulthood and childhood. (See People v. Argeta (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482, citing Roper v. Simmons (2005)
543 U.S. 551, 574.) Thus, his sentence of 25 years to life was not
cruel and unusual merely due to his age. (See, e.g., People v.
Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1218 [finding sentence of
26
life without the possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual
for an 18-year-old offender convicted of first degree murder].)
Nor are we convinced by Alas’s reliance on Dillon, supra,
34 Cal.3d 441, which found the defendant’s life sentence was
cruel and unusual considering the defendant’s emotional and
intellectual immaturity. In Dillon, the defendant was immature
in several ways: “intellectually, he showed poor judgment and
planning; socially, he functioned ‘like a much younger child’;
emotionally, he reacted ‘again, much like a younger child’ by
denying the reality of stressful events and living rather in a
world of make-believe.” (Id. at p. 483.) That is not the case here.
While Alas did demonstrate some intellectual and emotional
deficits, he also chose to associate with known gang members,
and to participate in the initial assault of Zavala, which set in
motion the need to violently retaliate. He also stated his intent
to kill Zavala because he was a rival gang member and an enemy,
and searched for anyone in the rival gang’s territory in order to
violently retaliate against them.
2. Comparison with Alas’s coperpetrators’
sentences
Last, Alas argues his sentence was unconstitutional given
the sentences of his coperpetrators.4
4 Alas requested judicial notice of various court documents
showing that: Moran was sentenced to 15 years after he pled no
contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the firearm
enhancement; Ibanez was sentenced to 15 years after a jury
convicted him of second degree murder; Guzman was placed on
formal probation after pleading no contest to being an accessory.
27
With respect to Alas’s coperpetrators, who admitted guilt
and pled no contest to lesser charges, their sentences are not
properly comparable to Alas’s sentence since they are the result
of plea negotiations. (See People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th
997, 1159; People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, 169–170.)
Further, while Ibanez received a lesser sentence, he was
convicted of second degree murder in contrast to Alas, who was
convicted of first degree murder. As discussed above, there was
evidence that Alas intended to kill Zavala and was searching for
him before the murder. Therefore, Ibanez’s sentence is not a
proper comparison given the jury found Alas acted with the
intent to kill.
Accordingly, we find Alas’s sentence was not cruel and
unusual under the California Constitution and decline to exercise
our authority to modify his conviction and sentence.
We deferred ruling on the request and now grant it. (See Evid.
Code, § 452; Duggal v. G.E. Capital Communications Services
Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 81, 86.)
28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
29
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