People v. Jones CA2/1

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Filed 5/31/24 P. v. Jones CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B328211

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA196110)
v.

JOMAINE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In 1999, when Jomaine Jones was 19 years old, he
participated in a home invasion robbery during which his
accomplice shot and killed one of the victims. The jury found
Jones guilty of one count of first degree murder, one count of
premeditated attempted murder, two counts of robbery, and five
counts of attempted robbery.1
Jones appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code former section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6)2 after an evidentiary hearing. He
contends the court erred in declining to appoint a mitigation
specialist and a psychologist to assist the defense in presenting
evidence that he suffered from an intellectual disability which
impaired his ability to assess risk. He maintains that without
such evidence, the court could not properly evaluate whether he
acted with reckless indifference to human life and committed
felony murder. As explained below, Jones has not demonstrated
error, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Jones’s Trial
A. Pertinent evidence presented at trial
Substantial evidence presented at trial showed the
following:

1 Jones was tried alone. Although originally charged
together, his accomplice’s case was resolved separately.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was

renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m., on November 13, 1999, 19-
year-old appellant Jones and a 23-year-old man called Earl
Young forced open the door of a house in Los Angeles where nine
members of the Amador extended family were present. Jones
and Young each held a handgun. Two members of the Amador
family, teenage brothers Jorge and Hector,3 had been asleep in
the living room. Jones approached Jorge,4 pointed a gun at him,
told him not to move, and pulled the trigger; the gun did not fire.
Jones removed the magazine from the gun and reinserted it.
Young then approached Jorge, pointed his own gun, and told
Jorge to get on the floor. Jones knocked Jorge down. As Jorge
went to the ground, he heard Young’s gun make a clicking sound.
Hector also got down on the ground. One of the intruders took a
gold chain from Jorge’s neck.
Jorge and Hector’s father Abraham exited a bedroom, and
Jones told him to come to the living room. Young and Jones went
into various bedrooms and brought Amador family members to
the living room, including Jorge and Hector’s brother Carlos,
their mother Maria, and Carlos’s wife Marcelina.5 Jones grabbed
Marcelina by her hair as he brought her to the living room.
These family members joined Jorge and Hector on the ground in
the living room. Jones took Carlos’s chain from his neck and
Jones or Young took Carlos’s wallet.

3 We refer to members of the Amador family by their first

names to distinguish them because they share the same
surname.
4 Jorge testified at Jones’s trial.

5 Marcelina also testified at Jones’s trial.

3
Young told the family that he and Jones were looking for
cocaine and money. According to Jorge and Marcelina, Young
appeared to be the man in charge. While Jones held the family at
gunpoint in the living room, Young searched and ransacked one
of the bedrooms. At some point, Jones moved the sofa in front of
the door, blocking the exit. When Young returned to the living
room, Jones searched and ransacked another bedroom. Young
moved the family to the dining room. Jones held them there
while Young searched the kitchen. Jones told them to remain
silent.
Young returned to the dining room, ordered Hector to stand
up, and escorted Hector into the kitchen. Jones held the other
family members at gunpoint in the dining room. Young asked
Hector where the drugs were located, and Hector denied there
were any drugs in the house. Young held Hector by the neck and
struck him in the stomach. Jorge attempted to stand up and go
to his brother’s aid. Young called Jones into the kitchen. Jones
pointed his gun at Hector while Young struck Jorge with a frying
pan. Then, Young retrieved a knife from the kitchen sink and
stabbed Jorge in the arm. Jones pointed his gun at Jorge and
brought him back to the dining room. Maria objected to the
treatment of her sons, and Jones struck her on the head with the
butt of his handgun.
Young kicked down the bathroom door and escorted
extended family members Justina and her two young children to
the dining room. Young and Jones moved all the family members
from the dining room to the living room. Young searched the
bedroom Justina shared with her children’s father. During the
search of the house, both Young and Jones repeatedly told the

4
family they would kill them all if the family did not give them
money.
While Young continued his search, Jones went to the dining
room and grabbed a bottle of orange juice from the table. As
Jones drank the juice, Jorge picked up a phone and tried to dial
911. Jorge put the phone down when Jones looked over at him.
Young returned from Justina’s bedroom and talked to Jones.
Then Jones flicked a light in the house on and off, and a car drove
by outside.
At some point, a police patrol car drove by the house.
Carlos told the intruders they should leave because the police
were there. Young and Jones told the family to keep quiet and
not move. While Young and Jones looked out the window, Carlos
moved toward the front door. Jones ordered him to stop. Carlos
climbed over the sofa. Young ran toward Carlos, grabbed Carlos
by the hair, and shot him in the head. Carlos died from a single
gunshot wound to the head.
Young and Jones fled. They were in the Amador family
home for about an hour.
On December 13, 1999, a month after the home invasion
robbery and murder, detectives from the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department interviewed Jones in Nevada, where he was
incarcerated after being arrested while staying at his mother’s
home. Jones denied involvement in the crimes, claiming he had
moved to Nevada in October 1999, the month before the crimes
occurred.
A few days later, on December 16, 1999, Jones asked to
speak with the same detectives again. This time, the interview
was recorded, and Jones confessed his involvement in the crimes.
An audio recording of the interview was played for the jury at

5
Jones’s trial and a transcript of the interview is included in the
record in Jones’s direct appeal. Jones told the detectives the
following.
A man called Kill-Kill told Young there were drugs and
money at the Amador family home, and the resident who was
involved with the drugs would be home at 2:00 a.m. Young
decided to conduct a home invasion robbery, and he brought
Jones in on the job. Young and Jones drove to the location with
three carloads of their associates.6 One of Kill-Kill’s associates
gave Jones a gun, and Young had his own gun.
Young busted through the door of the Amador family home,
and knocked a man to the ground. Jones followed Young inside
and closed the door. Young’s gun was cocked, and Jones knew “at
any moment it would go off.” Jones was shaken up. As Young
ransacked the house and waved his gun around, Jones told him
to calm down. Jones indicated he just wanted to get the drugs
and money and leave. Jones told Young, “[W]hatever you do[,]
don’t pull that pistol.” After Jones conducted his own search and
did not find anything, he told Young they should leave. He knew
the area was “hot” with police.
While Jones was in the living room watching the family, he
told them, “I ain’t no harmful person. If you do harm to me, I’m
gonna do harm to you.” He told them to “[j]ust lay down,” and he
would not hurt them. After Young brought three additional
family members to the living room, Jones reiterated that he was
done and wanted to leave.

6 A gang expert testified at trial that Young and Jones were

members of a criminal street gang. The jury found gang
enhancement allegations to be not true.

6
Jones described the shooting of Carlos as follows: “Fool
tried to run out the door, you know what I’m sayin[’]. And he got
‘em, you know what I’m sayin[’]. Put him to the ground. Put the
pistol to the face and like ba ha, you know what I’m sayin[’].
Popped him.” Jones was shaken up and could not believe Young
had just killed a man. Jones explained: “I didn’t think he was
gonna do it. But then again I know [Young], you know what I’m
sayin[’], so I know what he gonna do. No point . . . pissing him
off. He gonna do it anyway.” Jones fled with Young.
A detective asked Jones if he had seen Young hitting or
kicking members of the Amador family. Jones responded, “[H]ey
man, he was doing all that in the book.” Jones recalled that
Young “cut” a boy with something in the kitchen.
Jones admitted that he took jewelry (chains) from a drawer
in the home, and Young took a chain from a boy’s neck.
B. Verdicts and sentence
The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, on
theories of direct aiding and abetting, natural and probable
consequences, felony murder, and willful, deliberate and
premeditated attempted murder.
The jury found Jones guilty of the first degree murder of
Carlos, the premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted
murder of Jorge, two counts of first degree robbery (against
Carlos and Jorge), and five counts of attempted robbery (against
other members of the Amador family). As to the murder and
attempted murder, the jury found true the allegation that a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm.
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d).) As to all counts, the jury found true
the allegation that Jones personally used a firearm. (§§ 12022.5,

7
subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b).)7 The trial court sentenced
Jones to 102 years to life in state prison.
Jones appealed from the judgment of his convictions, and
this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Jones (Apr. 30, 2003,
B158567) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. The Petition for Resentencing
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f), p. 6674; §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) &
189, subd. (e).) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188
(defining malice) and 189 (felony murder) and added former
section 1170.95, now renumbered section 1172.6, which
established a procedure for vacating murder convictions and
resentencing defendants who could no longer be convicted of
murder in light of the amendments to sections 188 and 189 made
effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, pp. 6675–
6677.)
Section 189, subdivision (e), added by Senate Bill No. 1437,
states: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted

7 The jury also found true a robbery-murder special

circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The trial
court struck the finding because the verdict form erroneously
failed to reflect the requisite elements that the defendant was a
major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

8
perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [including
robbery and attempted robbery] in which a death occurs is liable
for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The
person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the
actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
A. The parties’ papers
On October 20, 2020, Jones, who was represented by
counsel, filed a petition for resentencing under former section
1170.95, now section 1172.6.8 He alleged, in pertinent part, that
he was entitled to relief and could not now be convicted of murder
due to changes to section 188 and/or section 189, made effective
January 1, 2019, because (1) he was not the actual killer; (2) he
did not know the shooting would occur; (3) he was not a direct
aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill; and (4) he was not
a major participant in the crimes who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.9

8 In or around August 2019, more than a year before Jones

filed the petition for resentencing, the trial court appointed
counsel to represent Jones in connection with such a petition.
Jones was represented by his appointed counsel throughout the
proceedings below.
9 The same day, October 20, 2020, Jones filed a

supplemental brief, arguing former section 1170.95 should apply
to attempted murder convictions, not only murder convictions.
This was before the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775,
which amended then-section 1170.95, effective January 1, 2022,

9
Seven months later, on May 21, 2021, the district attorney
filed a response to Jones’s petition for resentencing, urging the
trial court to “ultimately” deny the petition “on the ground that
[Jones] is still factually and legally responsible for the murder of
Carlos Amador.” After setting forth a summary of the
circumstances of the shooting, the district attorney argued: (1)
Jones was a major participant in the home invasion robbery who
acted with reckless indifference to human life, and (2) “there is
enough evidence to convict [Jones] as a direct aider and abettor”
of the murder. Notwithstanding these arguments, the district
attorney conceded that Jones made a prima facie showing for
relief in his petition.
On October 7, 2021, Jones filed a reply brief in support of
his petition for resentencing, arguing that he made a prima facie
showing for relief under former section 1170.95, as the district
attorney conceded. He further argued the trial court should
ultimately grant the petition after an evidentiary hearing
because the facts show he did not act with reckless indifference to
human life during the robbery.

to, among other things, authorize relief for persons convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2.) Neither party further briefed the applicability of
the statute to attempted murder convictions, and the trial court
did not address the issue. Thus, the issue of whether Jones is
entitled to resentencing relief on his attempted murder conviction
was not decided below, and this appeal only concerns Jones’s
murder conviction. Jones indicated in his briefing in this appeal
that he intends to file in the trial court a petition for resentencing
challenging the attempted murder conviction.

10
B. Jones’s ex parte motions for appointment of
experts
While his petition for resentencing was pending, Jones filed
multiple ex parte motions for appointment of experts to assist the
defense in connection with the petition.
On February 26, 2021, four months after Jones filed the
petition for resentencing, he filed an ex parte motion for
appointment of a mitigation specialist to assist the defense “in
investigating mitigating evidence regarding [his] youth, mental
disabilities, the facts and circumstances of this case, and to
interview witnesses and serve subpoenas to assist defense
counsel [to] prepare for presenting mitigating circumstances” in
connection with the petition. Jones further stated in the motion
that the investigation would “include obtaining [his] birth
records, school records, and records regarding any prior contacts
with law enforcement,” and also “locating and interviewing [his]
parents and family members, close friends, doctors or other
medical practitioners that were involved with [his] early life
development, and interviewing [him] as well as obtaining prison
records regarding [his] custody conduct.”
In an attached declaration, defense counsel stated: “At
[Jones]’s trial[,] his counsel told the jury in opening statement
that the jury would hear testimony of Dr. Adrian Davis that
[Jones] had a borderline verbal IQ of 75 and an overall IQ of 77,
and that his ‘ability to understand and function in a situation is
somewhat limited, and his overall cognitive ability is somewhat
limited’ [citation to trial record]. Ultimately, the court decided
not to allow expert testimony on this issue on the grounds of

11
Evidence Code [section] 352 [citation to trial record].”10 Defense
counsel represented in his declaration that the deputy district
attorney on Jones’s petition had no objection to the ex parte
motion. It is not clear from the appellate record before us
whether the trial court ruled on this ex parte motion.
Four months later, on June 30, 2021, Jones filed another ex
parte motion for appointment of a mitigation specialist. This ex
parte motion was materially similar to the earlier one referenced
above, except this second motion did not mention Jones’s IQ or
alleged “mental disabilities.”
On August 11, 2021, the trial court issued a minute order
denying Jones’s request for appointment of a mitigation expert.
The court concluded that defense “counsel’s stated purpose for
requesting a mitigation expert is irrelevant to the current status
of the case and the [section 1170.95] petition currently pending
before the court. New evidence of petitioner’s IQ and mitigating
sentencing factors are not relevant considerations for purposes of
[section] 1170.95[, subdivision] (a) and [Senate Bill No.] 1437.”
On October 7, 2021, Jones filed an ex parte request for
“rehearing” of the ex parte motion the trial court denied on
August 11, 2021. In this filing, Jones sought appointment of not
only a mitigation specialist, as he had requested in his two prior
ex parte motions, but also the appointment of a psychologist. He
argued that his youth and “issues of mental competency, low IQ,
learning disabilities and childhood abuse” are relevant factors on
the issue of whether he acted with reckless indifference to human

10 Jones submitted no other evidence regarding his IQ,

intellectual disability, or cognitive abilities in connection with his
various filings in support of his request for appointment of
experts (or in connection with his petition for resentencing).

12
life during the robbery, and specifically, his “subjective
awareness of the risks involved in the robbery and conscious
disregard for the risk of death his actions create[d].” (Emphasis
omitted.) In his reply brief in support of the petition for
resentencing, filed simultaneously with the ex parte request for
rehearing, Jones again urged the court to reconsider its denial of
his request for appointment of experts, arguing that his “youth,
intellectual and other disabilities should be explored on the issue
of reckless indifference.”
On December 13, 2021, the same day as the prima facie
hearing on the petition for resentencing, the trial court heard oral
argument from defense counsel on Jones’s request for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for appointment of
experts. Defense counsel stated it would “be difficult to address
[Jones’s] mental intent without” expert assistance, and it would
“be very tough for [the defense] to move forward without it.”
After setting forth on the record facts regarding the home
invasion robbery and Jones’s post-arrest statements to the
detectives, the court concluded the assistance of a mitigation
specialist and a psychologist was not warranted and denied the
request for reconsideration.
C. Prima facie hearing on petition for
resentencing
At the December 13, 2021 prima facie hearing on Jones’s
petition for resentencing, the deputy district attorney conceded
Jones made a prima facie showing for relief. The court issued an
order to show cause why relief should not be granted. (Former
§ 1170.95, subd. (c); § 1172.6, subd. (c).) Defense counsel
reiterated that in preparation for the evidentiary hearing, he
“would have liked to address with a mitigation expert . . . the

13
effect of low IQ on a 19-year-old.” He argued that without an
expert, the defense would “never get to” the question of “what
was [Jones]’s mental state of mind.”
D. Evidentiary hearing on the petition for
resentencing
On January 13, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on Jones’s petition for resentencing. This was more than
two years after Jones filed his petition (and more than three
years after defense counsel was appointed to represent Jones in
connection with the petition).
The trial court stated that it reviewed and considered, in
pertinent part, the reporter’s transcript of Jones’s trial and the
transcript of Jones’s post-arrest statement to the detectives. In
the present matter, we granted the Attorney General’s unopposed
request for judicial notice of the appellate record in Jones’s direct
appeal (case No. B158567), which includes the evidence the trial
court reviewed and considered. Neither party introduced any
“new or additional evidence,” as permitted under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3).11
Based on the evidence presented at Jones’s trial, the
parties argued their cases to the trial court. The prosecutor
argued Jones was not entitled to relief under section 1172.6
because he was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt
under current law. The prosecutor maintained the evidence is
sufficient to establish Jones was a direct aider and abettor of the

11 We note that minute orders in the record dated April 6,

June 10, and July 11, 2022, state that Jones was “waiting for
medical records,” and the trial court continued the matter on
each of those dates. Jones did not introduce any medical records
in connection with his petition for resentencing.

14
murder, but the prosecution was relying on the theory that Jones
was a major participant in the home invasion robbery who acted
with reckless indifference to human life under the factors set
forth in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.
Defense counsel argued Jones was entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 because the prosecution could not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he acted with reckless indifference to
human life, a requisite element of felony murder where the
defendant is not the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor.
(See § 189, subd. (e).) After discussing the facts and
circumstances of the shooting, and asserting they do not show
reckless indifference to human life, counsel argued that under
prevailing case law, “the adolescent brain is definitely a factor
that a court must weigh in determining whether or not a person
had the subjective indication of reckless indifference.” Counsel
added that the defense “would have liked to explore with expert
testimony” Jones’s subjective “capacity” to assess the risk of
death during the robbery. Counsel also stated, “There is evidence
at trial . . . [that Jones’s] IQ is in the neighborhood of 75. These
are real issues [Jones’s youth and IQ] that go into the formation
of judgment which I think should have been explored in the
determination of reckless indifference.”
The trial court stated on the record during the evidentiary
hearing that it found the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that Jones was a direct aider and abettor of the murder
who harbored express malice, and (2) that Jones was a major
participant in the home invasion robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court discussed the evidence
supporting the latter theory of murder, in light of the factors set

15
forth in Banks and Clark. Regarding Jones’s subjective
awareness of the risk of death, the court noted (1) that both Jones
and Young were armed with and used loaded firearms during the
robbery; (2) that Jones witnessed Young use “potential lethal
force” on two occasions during the robbery, prior to the shooting
of Carlos (hitting a victim over the head with a frying pan and
stabbing him with a knife), and Jones continued to participate in
the robbery thereafter; and (3) that Jones told the detectives that
Young had a temper and was likely to use force on someone. The
court denied the petition for resentencing. In doing so, the court
stated on the record that while it “recognize[d]” Jones’s youth and
IQ, it found the evidence established Jones acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
DISCUSSION
Jones contends the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to appoint a mitigation specialist and a psychologist to
assist the defense in presenting evidence of his alleged
intellectual disability at the evidentiary hearing. He argues that
without such evidence, the court could not “fairly evaluate”
whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life and
committed felony murder.
I. Section 1172.6 and Standards Applicable to the
Evidentiary Hearing
If a defendant files a facially sufficient petition for
resentencing and makes a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6, as in this case, the trial court must issue an order
to show cause and “hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder . . . conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts . . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, the burden of proof is “on

16
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as
amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The parties may rely
on “evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial
that is admissible under current law,” and they “may also offer
new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(Ibid.) “At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court acts as an
independent fact finder.” (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1015, 1022.) “We review the trial court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence.” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
112, 125.)
II. Standard of Review of Denial of Appointment of
Expert
Jones moved for appointment of experts under Evidence
Code section 730, which provides, in pertinent part: “When it
appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an
action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or
by any party to the action, the court on its own motion or on
motion of any party may appoint one or more experts to
investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court,
and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action relative to the
fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be
required. . . .” We review the denial of a request for appointment
of an expert under Evidence Code section 730 for abuse of
discretion. (See Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d
307, 321; People v. Stuckey (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 898, 904, 907-
908, 917.)
While Evidence Code section 730, by its terms, applies to
appointment of experts at trial, we agree with the parties that

17
the same standard of review applies here where the trial court
denied the appointment of experts in connection with an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6. We also agree with the
parties that any error is subject to harmless error review under
the test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
for state law error: whether it is reasonably probable that the
defendant would have achieved a more favorable result in the
absence of the error. (See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
706, 714 [evidentiary error at an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6 is reviewed under the Watson harmless error
analysis].)
Under sections 28 and 29, in the guilt phase of a criminal
action, an expert may testify about a defendant’s “ ‘mental
condition at the time of offense’ ” but may not testify about the
defendant’s “ ‘capacity to have, or actually having, the intent
required to commit the charged crime.’ ” (People v. Pearson
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 451; People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th
1008, 1052.)
III. Reckless Indifference to Human Life for Felony
Murder – General Legal Principles
“Reckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death.’ ” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676
(Scoggins).) It “has a subjective and an objective element.
[Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be
aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which
the particular offense is committed,’ and he or she must
consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her
actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘ “[t]he
risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that,

18
considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’ [Citation.]
‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent
in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless
indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk
of death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement. [Citation.]
Notably, ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery
could anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to
establish reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at pp. 677-
678.)
In Clark, the Supreme Court established a list of factors
useful to determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life while engaged in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony: (1) The defendant’s knowledge
of weapons, the number of weapons used, and the defendant’s
own use of weapons; (2) the defendant’s physical presence at the
crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the
victim; (3) the duration of the felony; (4) the defendant’s
knowledge that his cohort was likely to kill; and (5) whether the
defendant made efforts to minimize the risk of violence during
the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-622.) The
Supreme Court clarified that these considerations are not
exhaustive, sufficient, nor necessary to establishing whether the
defendant’s conduct meets the standard for reckless indifference
to human life. (Id. at p. 618.) Knowledge that a confederate has
a gun and that armed robberies carry a risk of death, without
more, is not sufficient to show reckless indifference to human life.
(Id. at pp. 617-618.) However, a “defendant’s willingness to

19
engage in an armed robbery with individuals known to him to use
lethal force may give rise to the inference that the defendant
disregarded a ‘grave risk of death.’ ” (Id. at p. 621.)
IV. Jones Has Not Established Error
In this appeal, Jones explains that he does not challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings that he was a major participant in the home invasion
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Thus, he concedes there is substantial evidence supporting both
the subjective and objective components of the reckless
indifference to human life element.
What Jones challenges here is a purported “unfairness” in
the way the trial court adjudicated the factual issue of reckless
indifference to human life. He asserts, “No trier of fact could
fairly evaluate reckless indifference without hearing the evidence
that the petition court excluded.” He describes the excluded
evidence as follows: “Intellectual disability is similar to youth in
that it manifests in an adult’s failure to function at the normal
age level and ‘meet age-related expectations,’ functioning like a
child despite chronological age. (DSM-5 [Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013)].) The
psychologist that counsel sought to have appointed in this case
could have testified to the conclusions in the DSM-5 as it relates
to the effect of intellectual disability on risk assessment in
younger defendants.”
Although Jones references the DSM-5 as the basis for the
proposed expert testimony, he does not set forth the DSM-5’s
criteria for intellectual disability. In the DSM-5, the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) replaced the diagnosis of “mental
retardation” with “intellectual disability.” Intellectual disability

20
is characterized by significant deficits (two standard deviations
below the mean) in cognitive/intellectual functioning (e.g.,
learning, problem solving, and judgment) and adaptive
functioning (e.g., communication skills and social participation)
that typically manifest before the age of 18. A diagnosis of
intellectual disability does not require a specific overall IQ score,
but IQ testing is used to diagnose the condition. An overall IQ of
70 or less has traditionally accompanied a diagnosis of
intellectual disability under the DSM; significant defects in
adaptive functioning also must be present. (APA, Intellectual
Disability
<https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practi
ce/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Intellectual-Disability.pdf> [as of May 31,
2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/5XK6-8SFA>; APA, What Is
Intellectual Disability <https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-
families/intellectual-disability/what-is-intellectual-disability> [as
of May 31, 2024, archived at <https://perma.cc/6TTR-NNJ3>].)
In the context of criminal competency proceedings, the
Penal Code defines intellectual disability as “the condition of
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with defects in adaptive behavior and manifested
before the end of the development period, as defined by clinical
standards.” (§ 1376, subd. (a)(1).) Our Supreme Court has
recognized that an overall “ ‘IQ between 70 and 75 or lower’ ” is
“ ‘typically considered the cutoff IQ’ ” for establishing the
intellectual functioning prong of an intellectual disability
diagnosis. (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40, 48, quoting
Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 309, fn. 5.) Neither our
legislature nor our Supreme Court, however, has adopted a “fixed
cutoff” IQ score as an “upper limit” for showing significantly

21
subaverage general intellectual functioning within the meaning
of section 1376. (Hawthorne, at p. 48; see also In re Lewis (2018)
4 Cal.5th 1185, 1191.)
On the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to appoint expert witnesses to
assist the defense. Jones failed to make a showing below that the
assistance of experts was required (or even warranted or
relevant) in this case.
Defense counsel’s offer of proof in support of his request for
expert assistance was as follows: “At [Jones]’s trial[,] his counsel
told the jury in opening statement that the jury would hear
testimony of Dr. Adrian Davis that [Jones] had a borderline
verbal IQ of 75 and an overall IQ of 77, and that his ‘ability to
understand and function in a situation is somewhat limited, and
his overall cognitive ability is somewhat limited’ [citation to trial
record].” (Italics added.) The offer of proof does not indicate
Jones has an “intellectual disability” within the meaning of the
DSM-5 (or California law). The alleged IQ scores do not
necessarily indicate a significant deficit in cognitive/intellectual
functioning, and there was no suggestion of a significant deficit in
adaptive functioning.
A 2002 pretrial probation report in the record before us
states that Jones completed the 11th grade and began taking
12th grade classes before dropping out of school. Statements
from Jones and his mother regarding Jones’s history were
incorporated into this probation report. Nothing in the
statements suggested Jones had an intellectual disability. The
probation report indicates Jones did not have any mental or
emotional problems.

22
Jones argues an abuse of discretion is shown here because
in ruling on the request for appointment of experts the trial court
(1) cited inapposite cases and (2) “prejudg[ed]” the merits of the
case by “essentially decid[ing] the reckless indifference issue as a
foundation for denying the prehearing motions for defense
assistance.” As to the first point, Jones acknowledges there are
no “California cases discussing intellectual disability relative to
the subjective awareness which is a component of reckless
indifference” to human life. The trial court cited cases regarding
consideration of a defendant’s youth, the other issue on which
Jones sought to present expert testimony, as stated in his ex
parte applications. Jones, himself, relies in his opening brief on
one of the two cases the trial court cited—In re Moore (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 434—in support of his argument that “a defendant’s
chronological age is pertinent to the issue of whether that
defendant was aware of the risk and danger involved.” (Id. at p.
439 [holding, “a defendant’s youth at the time of the offense
should be a factor in determining whether that defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2,
subdivision (d)” concerning special circumstance murder].)
As to Jones’s second point, we disagree with his position
that the trial court abused its discretion by considering the facts
of the case (i.e., evidence in the trial record of Jones’s conduct
during the home invasion robbery and his post-arrest statements
to the detectives) in deciding whether appointment of experts was
required here. Given the dearth of information in Jones’s offer of
proof regarding a potential intellectual disability, evidence of his
conduct and statements informed the issue of whether expert
testimony was necessary.

23
V. Jones Has Not Shown Prejudice
Even assuming Jones could show an abuse of discretion, we
would not reverse the order denying the petition for resentencing
because he has not demonstrated prejudice. It is not reasonably
probable he would have achieved a more favorable result if the
trial court had heard expert testimony regarding “the effect of
intellectual disability on risk assessment in younger defendants.”
Jones concedes his “defense that he did not anticipate
Young’s homicidal act could still be presented without expert
testimony concerning the effect of intellectual disability.” He also
acknowledges that lay witness testimony about a defendant’s
characteristics, such as “being ‘slow’ or an easily-led follower” is
admissible. Yet Jones presented no evidence at the evidentiary
hearing regarding any cognitive or adaptive functioning deficits.
Defense counsel never stated below that he could not access
Jones’s school records or obtain statements from family members
or friends without expert assistance. Moreover, despite the lack
of evidence at the hearing of an intellectual disability, the trial
court stated on the record that it considered Jones’s youth and IQ
in deciding if the evidence proved he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
The trial court concluded Jones’s conduct during the home
invasion robbery and his post-arrest statements to the detectives
about the robbery demonstrate he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Jones does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s findings.
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s
decision, as we must, there is strong evidence that Jones was
“ ‘aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which
the particular offense [was] committed,’ and he . . . consciously

24
disregard[ed] ‘the significant risk of death his . . . actions
create[d],’ ” such that any error here was harmless. (See
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
Substantial evidence presented at trial shows Jones
engaged in violent conduct during the hour-long home invasion
robbery. He pointed his gun at members of the Amador family
and held them against their will. He pulled Marcelina by her
hair as he led her from her bedroom to the living room. He
struck Maria with the butt of his gun when she protested Young’s
violent assaults on her sons. He told the family he and Young
would kill them if the family did not turn over drugs and money.
Substantial evidence also demonstrates that Jones
consciously disregarded the significant risk of death. His
statements to the detectives show he was concerned Young would
fire his gun as he watched Young wave the gun around. He
understood that if something went wrong, Young would act. And
yet he continued to participate in the robbery and the violence.
He attempted to block the victims’ exit by moving a couch in front
of the door. When Young struck Jorge with a frying pan and
stabbed him in the arm, Jones pointed a gun at Jorge and
brought him back to the dining room. As Jones indicated to the
officers, he knew Young, and he knew what Young would do if
someone made him angry by doing something foolish.
Any error in declining to appoint experts was harmless in
light of the overwhelming evidence supporting both the subjective
and objective elements of reckless indifference to human life.12

12 Because we have no cause to disturb the trial court’s

findings that Jones was a major participant in the home invasion
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life, we
need not review Jones’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

25
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition for resentencing
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

evidence supporting the trial court’s alternate ground for denying
the petition—that Jones was a direct aider and abettor of the
murder who harbored express malice.

26

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