CourtListener 9509118•People v. Jimenez CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Jimenez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B323995
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA481675)
v.
JAIR JIMENEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Terry A. Bork, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and William H.
Shin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Jair Jimenez guilty of attempted
murder (Pen. Code1, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 3) and assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 4). It also
found allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the
commission and attempted commission of the above offenses
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) to be true.
On appeal, defendant seeks to vacate his sentencing
enhancement for count 3 on the grounds that the second
amended information failed adequately to allege the personal use
of a firearm enhancement for that count.2 Defendant also
contends that the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect
that the trial court stayed imposition of the fines and fees.
Finally, defendant contends he should be awarded two additional
days of presentence custody credit. The Attorney General does
not dispute defendant’s latter two arguments.
We will order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect
the stay of fines and assessments and to add two days of
presentence custody credit. As so modified, we affirm.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defendant does not challenge his convictions for attempted
murder and assault with a firearm, or the true finding of the
personal use of a firearm enhancement for count 4.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Information
On December 28, 2020, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office (District Attorney) charged defendant by
information with four counts: discharge of a firearm with gross
negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 1); possession of a firearm by
a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2); attempted murder of John
Doe (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 3); and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm on Richard Cruz (§ 245, subd. (b); count
4). The information further alleged that “as to counts 1, 3, and 4
that in the commission and attempted commission of the above
offense [sic], the defendant . . . personally used a firearm . . .
within the meaning of . . . section 12022.5[, subdivision] (a) . . . .”
The first page of the information was comprised of a “summary,”
which reflected that the firearm enhancement was alleged for
counts 1, 3, and 4.
On March 14, 2022, the District Attorney filed an amended
information, which alleged the same four counts as set forth in
the initial information and included certain additional allegations
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1). The
amended information alleged, “as to counts 1 and 4 that in the
commission and attempted commission of the above offense[s]”
defendant personally used a firearm. The only attempt offense
charged in the information was count 3. The summary at the
first two pages of the information reflected that the firearm
enhancement was alleged for counts 1, 3, and 4.
On May 4, 2022, the District Attorney filed the operative
second amended information. That information omitted
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previously alleged count 1 but realleged counts 2, 3, and 4. The
second amended information again alleged, “as to counts 1 and 4
that in the commission and attempted commission of the above
offense[s]” defendant personally used a firearm. And, again, the
summary pages of the information reflected that the firearm
enhancement was alleged for counts 3 and 4.
B. Trial
Prior to the presentation of evidence at trial, defendant
entered a plea of no contest to count 2, which charged him with
being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The prosecution then presented evidence that on October 6,
2019, Richard Cruz was working as a security guard at the
Holiday Bar in Boyle Heights. That evening, defendant, who
carried an alcoholic beverage in his hand, approached the bar.
Cruz told defendant that he could not enter the bar with the
beverage. A gun then fell out of defendant’s pants and onto the
ground. Defendant picked up the gun and demanded to speak to
the owner.
As defendant waited for the owner, a male customer who
wore a jersey walked out of the bar. As that customer walked
down the street and away from defendant, defendant fired a shot
at him. Defendant then handed his beverage to Cruz, walked
toward the customer, and demanded that the customer take off
his jersey. The customer complied. As the customer walked
away, defendant shot at him a “couple more times.” None of the
shots struck the customer. Defendant told Cruz that he believed
the customer was “a possible other gang member.”
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Defendant continued to threaten other customers as he and
Cruz waited outside the bar for the bar’s owner. While Cruz was
on the phone with the bar owner, defendant fired another shot
that passed near Cruz’s face.
Defendant eventually went inside the bar and said that if
Cruz did not take the gun away from him, defendant would shoot
him. Cruz took the gun from defendant and threw it in a trash
can.
Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury that “[i]f you find the defendant guilty of the
crimes charged in counts 3 or 4 . . . you must then decide whether
for each crime the People have proved the additional allegation
that the defendant personally used a firearm during the
commission of the crime.” The court then instructed the jury on
the elements of the firearm enhancement.
During closing argument, the prosecution stated the
following regarding the firearm allegation: “So once you find the
defendant guilty of the attempt murder and the assault crime
then you’re going to move on to what we call an allegation.
Allegations attach to crimes . . . . [¶] In this particular case the
allegation is that he used a firearm. There’s no dispute in this
case that that was the case.”
During defendant’s closing argument, counsel did not
dispute that defendant used a gun, but argued that he did not act
with the required intent because “each time I think he used the
gun you can conclude that he’s playing mind games on the
security guard.” Counsel continued: “If he ever wanted to kill
him he would have killed him. If he ever wanted to kill him
when he’s talking to him and he’s got a loaded, operable semi-
automatic with five live rounds his opportunity to kill was there.
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And he did not do it. He didn’t shoot it. He didn’t do anything
with it. He didn’t hit him with it. He said, ‘Take off your shirt.’”
C. Conviction and Sentence
On May 6, 2022, the jury returned guilty verdicts on counts
3 and 4 for attempted murder and assault with a semiautomatic
firearm. It also found true the allegations that defendant
personally used a firearm in the commission of those offenses.
For count 3, the jury wrote “True” in the blank space on the
verdict form, which stated, “We further find the allegation, that
the defendant . . . personally used a firearm, a semi-automatic
handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.5(a) to
be: ____. ‘True’ or ‘Not True.’” The prosecution then dismissed
count 2 in the interest of justice.
On October 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant on
count 3 to eight years imprisonment, which was the low term for
the count plus three years for the firearm enhancement. For
count 4, the court sentenced defendant to three years and four
months, consisting of one-third the middle term, plus 16 months
for the firearm enhancement, to be served consecutively to the
sentence in count 3.
The trial court also imposed certain fines and assessments,
but, because defendant represented that he lacked the ability to
pay, the court “order[ed] the fines, fees, and assessments but
stay[ed] actual imposition of them until it is proved or shown that
[defendant] ha[d] the present ability to pay them.”
The trial court awarded defendant 1,095 days of actual
custody credit and 164 days of conduct credit.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Pleading of Sentencing Enhancement
Defendant contends that the second amended information
failed to comply with statutory pleading requirements and
violated his due process rights by not alleging the personal use of
firearm enhancement for the attempted murder count.
Alternatively, defendant contends his counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the imposition of the
enhancement on this ground.
“As a rule, all sentence enhancements ‘shall be alleged in
the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant in
open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 953 (Anderson).) The
bedrock of this rule is due process. “‘“No principle of procedural
due process is more clearly established than that notice of the
specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues
raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional
rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts,
state or federal.” [Citations.] “A criminal defendant must be
given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may
have a reasonable opportunity properly to prepare a defense and
avoid unfair surprise at trial.”’ [Citation.] This goes for sentence
enhancements as well as substantive offenses: A defendant has
the ‘right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement
allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for his
crimes.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Defendant’s statutory and
constitutional arguments are questions of law that we review de
novo. (People v. Scott (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1265, 1271.)
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“As a general rule, a criminal defendant who fails to object
at trial to a purportedly erroneous ruling forfeits the right to
challenge that ruling on appeal.” (Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 961.) This includes pleading defects. (Id. at p. 962.) Here,
defendant did not complain about the enhancements alleged in
the information in the trial court. He therefore has forfeited his
argument on appeal.
Even if, however, defendant had not forfeited his argument,
we would reject it on the merits. “‘An accusatory pleading[’s] . . .
purpose is to provide the accused with reasonable notice of the
charges.’ [Citation.] Defects in the form of an accusatory
pleading are not a ground to reverse a criminal judgment in the
absence of significant prejudice to a defendant. (§ 960 [‘No
accusatory pleading is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or
other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or
imperfection in matter of form which does not prejudice a
substantial right of the defendant upon the merits’].)” (People v.
Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 132.) Here, the
information provided defendant with reasonable notice that the
District Attorney charged him with a firearm enhancement on
count 3. The original information correctly and expressly alleged
that the firearm enhancement was alleged as to “counts 1, 3,
and 4.” In the subsequent first and second amended
informations, the summary of the charges reflected that the
firearm enhancement was alleged as to count 3, the attempted
murder count. Moreover, although the reference to count 3 was
not included in the allegation itself, it stated that the
enhancement was alleged as to the attempted offense, and the
only such offense charged in the information was count 3.
Finally, the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the delivery of
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jury instructions, the verdict form, and the closing arguments all
demonstrate that both parties understood the firearm
enhancement was alleged as to both counts 3 and 4. On this
record, we conclude that defendant was informed of the charges
he faced and therefore was not deprived of an opportunity to
defend against the enhancement.
We also reject defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. “To succeed, [defendant] must show that this omission ‘fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness’ [citations] in light
of ‘the professional norms prevailing when the representation
took place’ [citation]. [Defendant] must also show ‘a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [Citation.]
[Defendant] ‘need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more
likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’ [Citation.] It is
enough to show ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.’” (In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773.)
Because we have considered and rejected defendant’s claims on
the merits, defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by his counsel’s failure to raise the argument below.
B. Remaining Sentencing Issues
1. Stay of Fines and Assessments
Defendant also argues the abstract of judgment does not
properly reflect the trial court’s stay of fines and assessments.
The Attorney General concedes the error.
As noted, at sentencing, the trial court imposed fines and
assessments but stayed them. The abstract of judgment,
9
however, does not reflect the stay. “Courts may correct clerical
errors at any time, and appellate courts (including this one) that
have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered
correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect
the oral judgments of sentencing courts.” (People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 (Mitchell).) “An abstract of judgment
is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different
from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify
the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.” (Ibid.)
On remand, we will direct the trial court to correct the
abstract of judgment to include the stay of fines and assessments.
2. Presentence Custody Credit
Finally, defendant contends the trial court erroneously
calculated his presentence custody credit. The Attorney General
agrees.
Defendant was arrested on October 6, 2019, and sentenced
on October 6, 2022. Defendant therefore should be credited with
1,097 days, not 1,095, of actual custody presentence credit.
(§ 2900.5.) The conduct credits remain at 164 days. (See § 2933.1
[15 percent of actual custody credit if convicted of violent felony
such as attempted murder].) We will modify the judgment to
correct this error. (See Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect that defendant is
awarded 1,097 days of actual custody presentence credit. As so
modified, the judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial court is
directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the
judgment as modified, to correct the abstract of judgment to
reflect the stay of fines and assessments, and to forward the
amended and corrected abstract of judgment to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
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